不仅是判例法：英格兰普通法体系的真相

在中国大陆，很多人误以为“英格兰普通法”只是“判例法”，即“由法官通过判例解释法律”，但这只是其中一个方面。

事实上，英格兰普通法体系是人类历史上最为成熟的“司法民主+制度进化”框架，它远远超越“法条”与“法典”，具有如下几个核心制度：

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一、普通法体系的三大核心

1. 判例演化体系（Case Law）

   • 法官并非只靠主观判断，而是严格遵循过去的有效判例（遵循先例，stare decisis）。

   • 如果出现“前所未有”的新情境，法官会创设新判例，被上诉法院检验，未来其他法院将以此为准。

2. 陪审团制度（Jury System）

   • 陪审团由普通公民组成，负责判断案件事实是否成立。

   • 陪审团是“司法民主”的基础，它让人民拥有最后的事实判断权，而非官僚。

   • 成员完全随机选出，极难被政府干预。

3. 独立审判机制

• 法官不能主动介入案件，必须基于程序启动。

• 每个法院公开审理，可被媒体、公众监督。

• 上级法院可纠正下级法院在法律适用或程序方面的错误，但通常不会推翻陪审团对事实的判断，除非存在严重程序瑕疵。

4. 普通法是一种体系化的法治哲学，其包括：

• 判例约束（precedent）：法官必须遵守上级法院的已判案件。

• 陪审团制度（jury trial）：公民决定事实，法官决定法律。

• 法官尊重习惯（custom）：在无明确判例时，可采纳地方民俗、国际法、公序良俗。

• 最高法院统一解释权：防止多法域彻底脱节。

5. 详见全文。

#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #联邦制 #独立自治

The CCP's Global Party Network: Insights from Central Organization Department Document No. 27 (2007)

In 2007, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Organization Department issued Document No. 27, officially titled “Opinions on Restoring Organizational Life for Returned Overseas Students and Scholars”. This directive outlines procedures for reinstating CCP members who studied abroad and have returned to China. While its primary focus is on the restoration of party activities for these individuals, the document provides insights into the CCP's strategies for maintaining organizational control and influence over its members, even beyond China's borders. Document No. 27 illustrates the CCP's long-term strategy for ensuring ideological conformity and organizational continuity among members, even outside China. Its provisions underscore the party's capacity to maintain overseas networks, influence foreign institutions, and guide returned members back into its organizational structure, providing insight into CCP operations beyond Chinese borders.

For detail, go to here.    #Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #联邦制 #独立自治

What does the Law Offices of Qiang Bjornbak(华强律师事务所) do

On April 1, 2025, Beijing Green Mountain Law Firm announced that its Chief Advisor, Luan Shaohu, had appointed Ms. Qiang Bjornbak, an experienced U.S. attorney, as Senior Advisor for the firm’s International Department in Los Angeles.  The announcement stated that the two sides recognized that, amid the complex state of China–U.S. relations, Chinese small and medium-sized private business owners already invested in the United States were facing uncertainty. They highlighted the perceived need for joint guidance on legal and policy compliance by Chinese and American lawyers.

1. Long-term professional relationship: It implies that Qiang Bjornbak, a U.S.-licensed attorney, has had sustained, direct contact with Luan Shaohu, a former national-level Chinese legal association leader and CCP-affiliated official. A decade of interaction suggests deep familiarity with each other’s work, clients, and networks.

2. Access to CCP-aligned networks: Luan Shaohu’s roles—including leadership in CCP-sanctioned legal associations and the SME Legal Affairs Branch—mean that a close relationship could provide Qiang Bjornbak access to CCP-controlled legal and business networks, including policy, compliance, and potentially sensitive information about Chinese enterprises or government-affiliated entities operating overseas.

3. Potential influence vector: Even if framed as “friendship” or professional collaboration, this long-standing connection could allow CCP-linked interests to be advanced indirectly via a U.S. attorney, especially in cross-border legal, corporate, or policy matters.

4. Uncertain extent of activities: The phrase raises questions about what Qiang Bjornbak may have done in this capacity—ranging from ordinary legal collaboration to facilitating introductions, policy guidance, or intelligence-sharing aligned with CCP objectives. While there is no public evidence of wrongdoing, the structural alignment with a CCP-controlled legal apparatus makes the relationship strategically significant.

6. Direct exposure of U.S. officials to Chinese clients: U.S. government personnel would present at the seminar and meet Chinese lawyers along with their clients. This means U.S. officials could interact directly with representatives whose affiliations—private, state-owned, or party-aligned—may not be fully transparent.

7. Potentially sensitive Chinese clients: The “client representatives” could plausibly include entities or individuals linked to Chinese government or Party organs, such as the Ministry of Public Security, the People’s Liberation Army, Huawei, Hikvision, the Chinese Communist Party Central Propaganda Department, the United Front Work Department, or the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission.
8. Lawyers as intermediaries: The Chinese lawyers facilitating this interaction, particularly those approved by the Ministry of Justice and with historical ties to government or CCP structures, could act as channels for government-aligned actors to access U.S. officials under the guise of legal compliance training.
9. Potential intelligence or influence vector: By structuring the event this way, it creates the possibility for information gathering, influence operations, or indirect policy insights to flow from U.S. officials to Chinese entities, intentionally or incidentally.
10. Strategic timing: The event is scheduled when many Chinese SMEs invested in the U.S. are reportedly “uncertain” about policy compliance. This timing maximizes the ability of Chinese clients to access guidance from U.S. legal and government representatives while embedding their interests via trusted intermediaries. 

For detail, go to here.

#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #联邦制 #独立自治

Armed Parade in Philadelphia’s Chinatown: Chinese Gun Club Demonstrates Military Discipline

According to a report originally published in Chinese-language media, members of the Great Philadelphia Chinese Gun Club (GPCGC) staged what was described as an unprecedented public demonstration in October 2016. The group organized a parade through Philadelphia’s Chinatown and downtown areas in which participants openly carried firearms — including rifles, shotguns, AR-15s, AK-pattern weapons, M1 carbines, and handguns.

Such spectacles — complete with banners, chants, and police escorts — echo staged displays more typical of state-controlled demonstrations abroad rather than civic activism rooted in American traditions of individual liberty. Instead of reflecting grassroots pluralism, the march projected an image of an organized bloc, disciplined and controlled in ways that appear inconsistent with the decentralized spirit of American civil society.

In short, what appeared in local coverage as a “first-ever” Chinese American armed march was not simply a neighborhood protest against crime. It also served as a striking reminder of how diaspora associations, sometimes under the banner of cultural or civic groups, can stage spectacles in ways that blur the line between genuine local advocacy and performances that resonate with foreign authoritarian influence — at odds with U.S. values and national security interests.

For detail, go to here. #gunclub 

#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #联邦制 #独立自治

華人彩虹聯盟（CRN）：跨國社群的光鮮表象與潛在影響

在北美地區，華人彩虹聯盟（China Rainbow Network, CRN）自稱是全球最大的華人 LGBTQ+ 群體，會員分布遍及美國、加拿大，甚至東南亞與港澳台地區。CRN 的領導人邵帥（Shuai “Shawn” Shao）在 Airbnb 擔任資深數據分析師，負責高級分析與數據管理。CRN 的運作主要依賴微信群組、網上活動及年度獎學金計畫，每年提供 12 名獎學金受惠者，每人 $1000 美元。但其網絡架構、微信依賴、獎學金設計與中共海外留學生管理制度的交集，對海外華人、台灣社群與公共政策均可能構成潛在風險。

為何這樣說，情況有多嚴重呢，詳見全文揭露與分析。

#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #联邦制 #独立自治

CRN’s Rainbow Scholarship: A Trojan Horse for Data Collection and United Front Work of CCP?

Since 2016, the Chinese Rainbow Network (CRN) has promoted itself as North America’s largest Chinese LGBTQ support community. With its “Rainbow Scholarship,” CRN claims to empower young LGBTQ Chinese students in the U.S. and Canada. Yet beneath the surface of advocacy and inclusivity lies a pattern of control, surveillance, and potential United Front Work influence.

Risks for the U.S., Taiwan, and Beyond

• For the U.S. and Canada: LGBTQ Chinese students become part of datasets exploitable by Chinese state actors. Their vulnerabilities — personal identity, immigration status, financial need — may be used for leverage.

• For Taiwan: CRN frames all recipients as part of the “Chinese nation,” erasing Taiwan’s independent voice within LGBTQ advocacy networks. Some recipients already have ties to UNESCO and other UN bodies, showing potential for soft penetration.

• For the international stage: CRN’s scholarship allows Beijing to launder influence through what appears to be a grassroots LGBTQ cause, a textbook example of united front work disguised as progressive activism.

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👉 What looks like community support could in fact be a Trojan Horse of data collection, narrative control, and infiltration — targeting vulnerable students under the banner of inclusivity.

For detail, go to here.

#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #联邦制 #独立自治

Exposé: Attorney Qiang Bjornbak (Hua Qiang)

Attorney Qiang Bjornbak, also known by her Chinese name Hua Qiang, based in Los Angeles, presents herself publicly as a respected Chinese-American lawyer and community advocate. She is known for her leadership in the local Chinese community and her visible participation in American legal and civic affairs. However, a closer look at her activities reveals a dual-track role that connects her simultaneously to the U.S. government system and to Chinese Communist Party–linked networks.

1. Engagement with the U.S. Government

• In June 2020, Qiang Bjornbak was invited by the White House Initiative on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (WHIAAPI) to participate in a virtual meeting with senior U.S. officials. Here.

• During the meeting, she spoke directly to White House representatives, thanking President Trump and raising concerns on behalf of Chinese-American business owners about:

  • travel bans and trade war policies,

  • hate crimes targeting Asian-owned businesses,

  • and discrimination against Asian students in college admissions.

• Her participation positioned her as a federal-level interlocutor between the Chinese-American community and the U.S. government.

2. Connections to PRC-Linked Legal and Political Networks

• Qiang Bjornbak maintains long-term partnerships with PRC-based law firms, notably the powerful Duan & Duan Law Firm and Beijing Lvshan Law Firm(北京绿山律师事务所) aka Beijing Interlaw Consulting Co., Ltd. These firms have handled cases directly tied to Chinese state interests, including sanction evasion and defense of central SOEs.  Here.

• In 2025, Qiang Bjornbak was formally appointed as Senior International Legal Advisor to Beijing Lvshan Law Firm, whose chief consultant, Luan Shaohu, is a former police officer and influential figure in China’s legal-political system. Here.

• She has been celebrated by PRC-linked organizations such as the American Chinese United Association for her “contributions to the Chinese community,” aligning her reputation with Beijing’s broader United Front Work efforts.

3. The Dual Narrative

• In the U.S., Qiang Bjornbak appears as a law-abiding immigrant success story—an American lawyer, ABA award recipient, and advocate for Asian-American rights.

• In China’s orbit, she is presented as a trusted partner of CCP-aligned law firms and a valuable overseas Chinese leader, capable of extending influence into American political and legal circles.

4. Strategic Implications

Her position illustrates a classic case of dual influence operations:

• She gains legitimacy in the U.S. through White House–backed roles, thereby enhancing her authority in the Chinese-American community.

• Simultaneously, she serves as a bridge for PRC-linked organizations, bolstering their credibility abroad and potentially shaping narratives within the U.S. political system.

This dual track raises critical questions:

• Is her engagement with U.S. institutions fully transparent about her ties to PRC law firms and United Front organizations?

• Does her influence represent the interests of Chinese-American citizens, or the strategic objectives of Beijing?