中共的“全球管控”野心与华人组织的角色

 中共的初心并不是局限在国内治理,而是要把整个地球纳入管辖。毛泽东提出所谓“第三世界”理论,把欧美划为第一世界,把苏联划为第二世界,而自己则要当“第三世界”的领袖。这种思路背后是一种霸权逻辑:不承认平等的国际秩序,而是要成为新的中心,新的帝国。

这种野心延续到今天,表现为所谓“百年初心”: 要把地球管起来。而实现这一目标,中共依靠三大核心力量:核武器、生物战和间谍战。同时,它还有“三个永远不变”:一带一路、超限生物战、以及总参二部三部主导的全球情报与影响力行动。


海外华人社团与枪友会的危险角色

在美国,一些表面上以爱好或文化交流为名的华人组织,实际上可能承担中共对外渗透和统战的任务。以 Chinese-American Network of Firearm Owners(大芝加哥华人枪友会)Great Philadelphia Chinese Gun Club(大费城华人枪友会) 为例,这些组织在美国社会环境中进行的公开活动看似合法,却往往带有与中共模式相似的特征。

他们组织游行、军事化队列、旗帜口号,甚至得到当地警方的护送(police escorts),看上去与美国宪法保障的第二修正案挂钩,但实际上更像是 列宁式组织的外在表演。他们还与中国背景的社团(同乡会、校友会)、以及敏感的科技人士网络(如科工专,Chinese Scientists and Engineers Association)保持密切联系。尤其值得警惕的是:2016年,该枪友会还曾接待过“中国访问团”射击体验活动。这说明,某些来自中国大陆、可能带有政府或军方背景的人士,已经通过这种渠道直接接触美国枪械环境。


中共的“域外管辖”与缺席审判机制

与此同时,中共在法律和司法解释层面,也在搭建一个对全球华人、甚至外国人进行长臂管辖的框架。

  1. 2024年5月26日发布的《关于依法惩治“台独”顽固分子分裂国家、煽动分裂国家犯罪的意见》 已明确:

    • 对认定为“分裂国家”的行为可判处无期、十年以上徒刑,甚至死刑。

    • 言论表达也可被定性为“分裂国家罪”,哪怕仅仅是媒体报道或历史表述。

    • 其他罪名可叠加,比如“资助危害国家安全犯罪活动罪”。

  2. 中华人民共和国刑法第八条 规定,外国人在境外实施的行为,如果“对中国或中国公民构成犯罪”,也可能被追诉。通过司法解释,中共进一步扩大了“犯罪地”的定义:只要数据流入中国、信息被中国网民看到,就可以认定“结果发生在中国”,从而声称有管辖权。

  3. 最高法、最高检、公安、国安等部门的联合规定,也为这种缺席审判提供了程序保障。即便一个人在美国从事合法活动,中共也能在国内法院启动“缺席审判”,宣布其有罪。


全球治理野心的结合点

把这些线索结合起来,可以看到一个清晰的脉络:

  • 海外组织:华人枪友会、同乡会、校友会、科工专等,既是社区网络,也是统战工具;

  • 军事化符号:在美国街头进行整齐划一的武装游行,更像是国家行为的投影,而不是公民自发的权利实践;

  • 法律武器化:中共通过刑法、司法解释和缺席审判,试图把自己的法律扩展到全球,把所有言行都纳入管辖范围。

这一切的背后是同一个逻辑: 中共要把地球管起来。它不仅要在海外塑造舆论阵地和力量网络,还要通过法律、科技和军事威慑,把任何人、任何地方的行为纳入“国家安全”的框架之中。

这不仅威胁到美国的国家安全和宪政价值,也冲击了全球秩序。如果任其发展,所谓的“第三世界领袖”幻想,实际上就是在重建一个带有极权色彩的全球帝国。

Chinese Gun Clubs in U.S. Raise Red Flags Over CCP Influence and Security Risks

 

In recent years, a number of Chinese gun associations have emerged in the United States, most notably the Great Philadelphia Chinese Gun Club (GPCGC) and the Chinese-American Network of Firearm Owners (CANFO) in Chicago. On the surface, these groups present themselves as advocates for lawful gun ownership and community self-defense under the Second Amendment. But their activities, structure, and social networks point to something far more troubling.

In Philadelphia, GPCGC has staged armed parades with participants marching in strict formation, carrying firearms under the escort of police vehicles. Organizers emphasized that every participant underwent multiple vetting and training steps to ensure “discipline and safety.” Such choreography resembles state-managed mobilization typical in authoritarian countries, rather than grassroots civic activism rooted in America’s tradition of individual liberty.

In Chicago, CANFO has gone even further. During the 2020 racial unrest, it organized armed patrols in Chinatown, presenting itself as a “self-defense force.” More concerning, however, is its web of connections:

  • Direct contact with Chinese delegations: In November 2016, CANFO arranged firearms activities for an official or semi-official “visiting delegation” from China — a shocking overlap between U.S.-based gun clubs and potential PRC government or military-linked visitors.

  • Ties to pro-PRC community networks: Its leadership has participated in Chinese hometown associations, which are closely linked to Beijing’s United Front system.

  • Links to Chinese Scientists and Engineers Association (CSEA): A group long viewed as part of China’s talent-recruitment and political influence operations. CANFO repeatedly appeared at CSEA events, including those attended by Chinese diplomats.

  • Outreach through alumni associations: Its instructors have been invited to speak at Chinese university alumni gatherings in Chicago, expanding recruitment channels within the Chinese diaspora.

Taken together, this is not simply a “gun hobbyist group.” It looks more like a Leninist-style social organization: highly disciplined, embedded in Chinese community networks, and potentially aligned with Beijing’s political agenda.

This concern becomes sharper when viewed alongside the CCP’s aggressive legal doctrine. In May 2024, China’s top judicial and security organs jointly issued rules enabling the prosecution of so-called “Taiwan separatists” with penalties up to death. The rules expand the notion of jurisdiction, allowing Chinese courts to claim authority if speech or online content abroad “produces harmful effects” inside China. In practice, this is a framework for long-arm jurisdiction over foreigners — including Chinese-Americans — whose speech is deemed hostile to Beijing.

When the existence of quasi-militarized gun groups in U.S. cities intersects with the CCP’s willingness to claim legal control over overseas Chinese, the risk is clear: Chinese nationals and immigrants in America could be pressured or mobilized as instruments of Beijing’s agenda, in ways fundamentally incompatible with U.S. security and values.

These developments deserve scrutiny not only from law enforcement but also from policymakers. What is being built is not a cultural association or a neighborhood watch. It is the scaffolding of an authoritarian influence operation, weaponized through community organizations, legal intimidation, and — most alarmingly — firearms.

【路德社】川普发文彻底打开对联合国展开全面系统调查通道,为什么说联合国总部的豁免权已经被川普这个post彻底剥夺了?中共在联合国渗透将会被一锅端...

Utah Valley University Students Attend Fuzhou ‘Gu Ling Yuan’ Choir Week: Xi Jinping’s Educational Legacy and CCP Propaganda Influence

Students from Utah Valley University (UVU), together with several other American youth choirs, participated in the “Gu Ling Yuan” U.S.-China Youth Choir Week, performing at Fujian Normal University, Minjiang University, and Fuzhou No. 16 High School. While framed as a musical and cultural exchange, the program operates under strict Chinese government oversight, highlighting the influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) United Front and Propaganda apparatus.Minjiang University, where UVU students performed, maintains a deeply institutionalized CCP presence. Its Party Committee and Propaganda Department orchestrate cultural events, guide students’ participation, and ensure alignment with CCP messaging. The university has historical ties to Xi Jinping, who oversaw its development in the 1990s and emphasized Party leadership, socialist education, and ideological guidance. Current departments—Propaganda, United Front, Student Affairs, and Organizational Departments—continue to enforce Party-directed educational and cultural policies. 

Observers suggest that such exchanges give the CCP a mechanism to influence foreign youth, exposing them to curated messaging while framing China positively and Western countries comparatively negatively. For Utah Valley University students, this represents both a cultural and educational experience—but one conducted within a politically controlled environment. Readers are left to consider the possible long-term implications of participating in CCP-supervised cultural diplomacy.
For detail, go to here.
#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #联邦制 #独立自治

【路德社】克格勃普京,为什么是Trump联俄灭共的关键?国会连推多份调查,深度清理PLA学术渗透 9/20/2025 【ludepress...

Xiaohui Yu & Associates and Its Connections to Chinese Military-Linked Biotech PLA



Law Offices of Yu & Associates, led by Xiaohui Yu, operates in Washington D.C. with a focus on international business, immigration, and cross-border legal services. While the firm’s public-facing work emphasizes corporate compliance and legal advisory for Chinese clients entering the U.S., the actual scope of Yu’s collaborations suggests a far more sensitive role with potential national security implications. 
Notably, the firm advises JOINN China (昭衍新药), a Chinese biotech firm whose leadership includes personnel with People’s Liberation Army (PLA) backgrounds.
Yu was officially appointed Senior International Advisor to Beijing Interlaw Consulting Co., Ltd. (北京绿山律师事务所) and its partner platform. Interlaw is a Beijing-based law firm with deep connections to Chinese state institutions, including the CCP’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission (政法委). Cooperation between a U.S.-based lawyer and a CCP-aligned Beijing law firm is unlikely to be limited to routine compliance.

The Political and Legal Affairs Commission is responsible for domestic surveillance, suppression of dissent, and enforcement of CCP priorities. Its operations have been shown to extend beyond China’s borders, targeting dissidents, journalists, and activists abroad through a combination of legal, financial, and social pressure. U.S. federal authorities have previously indicted or sanctioned operations linked to such cross-border suppression.
The combination of CCP-linked law firms and U.S.-licensed advisors raises multiple potential risks:

Assistance in avoiding U.S. sanctions for Chinese entities.

Legal and operational advice facilitating cross-border suppression or influence campaigns.

Leveraging Chinese diaspora networks for monitoring, reporting, or influencing individuals critical of the CCP.

Providing a legally shielded conduit for CCP priorities under the cover of commercial or educational programs.

This is not mere speculation: similar operations have been documented by U.S. law enforcement and open-source reporting, involving political pressure, surveillance, and threats against dissidents abroad.
For details, go to here.




#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #联邦制 #独立自治

Duan & Duan Law Firm: A “Red” Legal Powerhouse in China’s Cross-Border Legal Sphere

Duan & Duan Law Firm (段和段律师事务所), headquartered in Shanghai with offices across China, has established itself as one of the most politically and commercially integrated law firms in the country. While English-language materials about the firm often highlight its expertise in international arbitration, cross-border business law, and corporate services, a closer examination of its activities reveals a deeper alignment with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and national strategic priorities.

While the firm presents itself internationally as a provider of cross-border dispute resolution, international arbitration, investment law, and corporate services, its domestic activities suggest a dual role:

  1. Political Compliance and Loyalty – Party-building, national security initiatives, and engagement with strategic sectors signal a strong alignment with CCP priorities.

  2. Strategic Business Positioning – The firm’s party-led activities and academic collaborations position it as a key legal intermediary for enterprises operating in sensitive sectors like aerospace, defense, and technology, helping clients navigate international sanctions, export controls, and regulatory challenges.

  3. Branding and Professional Legitimacy – Publicized awards, nationwide conferences, and formal agreements with policy research institutions allow the firm to present itself as both professionally competent and politically credible.


Reported Representative Cases

  1. Sanctions and Compliance Work

    • Provided counter-sanctions legal advice and removal from the SND list for a company in Xinjiang.

    • Provided counter-sanctions legal advice and removal from the U.S. Entity List for a central state-owned enterprise.

    • Provided sanctions compliance legal advice to a foreign-invested company operating in China.

    • Assisted a well-known Chinese beverage company in filing a report with the Ministry of Commerce regarding a foreign company under the “Unreliable Entity List.”

    • Provided legal services to a Chinese overseas-listed company in response to U.S. sanctions.

    • Provided overseas compliance legal services for defense technology products for a central state-owned enterprise. here.

  2. Cross-Border Litigation and Arbitration

    • Represented a Chinese airline in an air accident compensation case in U.S. courts and Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court. The U.S. court recognized the Chinese company’s position and directed the plaintiff to file in China. The case was ultimately settled in Beijing.

    • Represented a Swedish door manufacturing group in a joint venture contract dispute with a Chinese company, litigated in Shanghai Second Intermediate People’s Court and Shanghai High Court, involving claims of approximately RMB 200 million.

    • Represented a Chinese listed company against a Swiss company seeking recognition and enforcement of a Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) award in Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court. The court dismissed the recognition and enforcement application. The dispute involved claims of approximately USD 34 million

Duan & Duan Law Firm illustrates how certain Chinese law firms fuse professional legal services with party loyalty and national strategic interests. For international audiences, understanding the firm requires recognizing not only its legal capabilities but also its embedded role in advancing state-aligned objectives
For more details about the firm, go to here.


#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #联邦制 #独立自治

Ad1