Tencent's Strategic Cooperation with China Unicom Includes 5G Security Offense and Defense Research

Tencent frequently presents cybersecurity as a matter of protecting networks, preventing fraud, and safeguarding users. However, Tencent’s own publicly reported strategic cooperation with China Unicom reveals a broader scope of activity: 5G network security offense and defense research, security technology development, and joint laboratory construction.

A December 20, 2022, report published by Lei Feng Network (雷峰网), titled China Unicom and Tencent Upgrade Strategic Cooperation to Serve the Digital Transformation of the Real Economy (中国联通和腾讯战略合作升级 服务实体产业数字化转型), documented a new strategic cooperation agreement signed by the two companies at the 2022 China Unicom Partners Conference.

The report stated:

12月20日，中国联通和腾讯在“2022中国联通合作伙伴大会”上签署新一轮战略合作协议。

English translation:

On December 20, China Unicom and Tencent signed a new strategic cooperation agreement at the 2022 China Unicom Partners Conference.

This was not their first agreement. The report also noted:

早在2016年，腾讯就与中国联通达成战略合作伙伴关系。本次签署新一轮战略合作协议，标志着双方合作的进一步深化。

English translation:

As early as 2016, Tencent had already established a strategic partnership with China Unicom. The signing of this new strategic cooperation agreement marked a further deepening of their cooperation.

1. Cooperation Extends to Government and Enterprise Markets

The agreement covered multiple sectors, including government and enterprise customers:

根据协议，双方将在政企、个人、家庭客户市场以及数字化转型等方面开展深度合作，助力产业高质量发展和用户高品质生活。

English translation:

Under the agreement, the two parties would conduct in-depth cooperation in government and enterprise markets, personal and household customer markets, and digital transformation.

The report further specified that cooperation in government and enterprise markets would be a key strategic priority:

其中，面向政企市场，推动数实融合和产业互联网发展，是双方未来战略合作的重点方向。

English translation:

Among these areas, promoting the integration of the digital and physical economies and the development of the industrial internet for government and enterprise markets would be a key focus of the two parties’ future strategic cooperation.

The cooperation would involve cloud computing, big data, the Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence, with applications in industry, energy, and transportation, followed by nationwide replication and deployment of jointly developed solutions.

2. Tencent and China Unicom Explicitly Commit to 5G Security Offense and Defense Research

The most revealing part of the report concerns cybersecurity.

The original Chinese text states:

此外，双方还将在电信网络诈骗治理、5G网络安全攻防研究、安全前沿科技等方面开展合作。

English translation:

In addition, the two parties would cooperate in telecommunications fraud prevention and control, 5G network security offense and defense research, and cutting-edge security technologies.

The critical phrase is:

5G网络安全攻防研究 — 5G network security offense and defense research.

The Chinese expression 攻防 (offense and defense) explicitly encompasses both offensive and defensive aspects of security research.

This is not merely a commitment to protect networks against cyberattacks. The agreement expressly identifies offensive and defensive research as an area of cooperation.

The report goes further:

其中，面向安全前沿科技，双方将深入开展安全技术交流、安全攻防研究、联合实验室共建等合作，共同筑牢网络安全防线，为建设网络强国贡献力量。

English translation:

In the field of cutting-edge security technologies, the two parties would conduct in-depth cooperation in security technology exchanges, security offense and defense research, and joint laboratory development, working together to strengthen cybersecurity defenses and contribute to building a strong cyber power.

Three specific areas of cooperation are identified:

1. Security technology exchanges.

2. Security offense and defense research.

3. Joint laboratory development.

The stated national objective is to contribute to building a strong cyber power (网络强国).

3. The Distinction Between Cybersecurity Defense and Offense Matters

There is an important distinction between conventional cybersecurity protection and offensive security capabilities.

Defensive cybersecurity generally involves protecting networks, identifying vulnerabilities, preventing intrusions, detecting malicious activity, and responding to attacks.

Offensive security research, by contrast, can involve penetration testing, vulnerability exploitation, attack simulation, and the development and evaluation of offensive techniques.

The Chinese term 攻防研究 explicitly identifies both sides of this field.

Consequently, Tencent’s publicly reported cooperation with China Unicom cannot accurately be described as exclusively defensive cybersecurity work.

The company’s own reported strategic cooperation includes research into both offensive and defensive aspects of 5G network security.

The original report identifies the two signatories’ representatives as China Unicom Deputy General Manager Tang Yongbo (唐永博) and Tencent Vice President and President of Tencent’s Government and Enterprise Business Li Qiang (李强).

The central point is straightforward: Tencent’s own publicly reported strategic agreement with China Unicom explicitly includes 5G network security offense and defense research. Tencent’s cybersecurity activities, therefore, cannot simply be portrayed as defensive protection against cyberattacks. Original Chinese source:
https://tech.cnr.cn/techph/20221220/t20221220_526100313.shtml

U.S. government investigations and international media reports have documented several incidents involving China Unicom’s telecommunications networks and infrastructure in cyberattack and surveillance activities:

(1) In December 2020, The Guardian, citing mobile network security expert Gary Miller, reported that the vast majority of apparent surveillance attacks targeting U.S. mobile phone subscribers over 3G and 4G networks in 2018 were routed through China Unicom, a state-owned telecommunications operator, potentially indicating a state-sponsored espionage campaign. Source: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/dec/15/revealed-china-suspected-of-spying-on-americans-via-caribbean-phone-networks

(2) In March 2021, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in its official document FCC 21-37, cited an independent analysis finding that a component of China Unicom was identified as the most likely source of attacks targeting U.S. mobile users and devices through international SS7 signaling links between May 2018 and December 2019. The FCC also discussed the potential for China Unicom Americas to redirect U.S. communications traffic through BGP route attacks. Source: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-21-37A1_Rcd.pdf

(3) On September 18, 2024, the FBI, NSA and other U.S. agencies issued a joint cybersecurity advisory documenting that Integrity Technology Group, a Beijing-based company, used IP addresses belonging to China Unicom Beijing Province Network to control and manage a botnet of compromised devices; the same IP addresses were also used to access infrastructure involved in computer intrusion activities against U.S. victims. Source: https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/cyber-alerts/copy_of_peoples-republic-of-china-linked-actors-compromise-routers-and-iot-devices-for-botnet-operations.pdf

(4) On the same date, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that the FBI had disrupted a worldwide botnet controlled by Integrity Technology Group, which had been used by China-linked hackers to conduct malicious cyber activities, including attacks against U.S. and foreign organizations. Source: https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/court-authorized-operation-disrupts-worldwide-botnet-used-peoples-republic-china-state-sponsored-hackers

Cybersecurity threats involving Chinese telecommunications infrastructure are not confined to government agencies or military targets. Publicly documented investigations have also involved ordinary mobile phone subscribers, personal communications, and internet-connected devices. 

Oracle’s Founder, His Stealthy Partner, and the CCP’s Marriage Game

 When Beijing’s United Front work is discussed in Washington, it usually evokes images of community associations, lobbyists, or think tank partnerships. But one of the most discreet and potent instruments of influence is rarely examined: marriage itself.

This isn’t conspiracy-mongering. It’s about recognizing that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a long history of embedding influence through soft channels—cultural exchanges, sports diplomacy, overseas students—and that marriage can be a far more durable vector than a handshake or a check.

From Shenyang Cadre School to Silicon Valley

Larry Ellison, the billionaire founder of Oracle and the world’s fifth-richest man, married Jolin Zhu (朱乔琳, also known as Karen Zhu), a 34-year-old woman from Shenyang, Liaoning Province.

Zhu’s résumé seems innocuous:

• Born in 1991.

• Educated at Northeast Yucai School,whose founding commenced in 1948 under the direct patronage of senior CCP leaders. It began as a boarding school exclusively for the children of Party and military cadres, modeled on Soviet educational practices.The Red Pedigree of Northeast Yucai School：Northeast Yucai School, where Zhu reportedly studied, was not just any elite school. Its first principal, Li Liqun (李力群, 1920–2020), was a veteran Communist: trained at Yan’an, active in Party propaganda, and later a senior official in the Ministry of Education. From its inception, Yucai was a project of the Communist Party, designed to raise “red successors” under strict ideological supervision. If Zhu indeed attended Yucai, her formative years would have been steeped in a system directly shaped by the Yan’an tradition. This casts her later life in the United States in a different light: her background links her to one of the CCP’s oldest political education networks.

The first principal, Li Liqun, dedicated herself to student welfare, setting up strict regulations and even a milk farm to ensure proper nutrition. Notable students included the children of high-ranking leaders such as Mao Zedong, Bo Gu, and Lin Biao. In addition to standard academics, Northeast Yucai School provided specialized military-style training, serving as a reserve training base for Tsinghua University’s shooting team—a rare feature among Chinese primary and secondary schools.

• Later studied in the U.S. at Bard College at Simon’s Rock, then earned a B.A. in International Studies from the University of Michigan in 2012.

But Northeast Yucai is not just another “good school.” In its early years it was effectively a CCP cadre nursery, personally named by Zhang Wentian, staffed by teachers handpicked by Xu Teli, and repeatedly visited by PLA marshals. Its graduates still form an elite pipeline to top universities worldwide.

And PRC policy, spelled out as far back as the State Council’s 1986 “Provisional Regulations on Study Abroad,” explicitly directs both state-funded and self-funded students to:

• Report to Chinese embassies and consulates.

• Maintain contact with PRC officials.

• Receive “patriotic and socialist education” abroad.

So the idea of a “completely independent” Chinese overseas student is, at best, aspirational.

A Marriage That Breaks the Pattern—On the Surface

What makes Jolin Zhu’s role striking is how carefully low-key her public profile remains despite marrying a man worth over $100 billion.

• She has avoided the flashy social circuits where Silicon Valley spouses often accumulate influence.

• She has stayed out of property disputes or public financial battles.

• She has reportedly set up trust funds and maintained a degree of professional independence, a move that looks more like risk management than gold-digging.

• She has been credited with playing an active role in Ellison’s sports investments, using her Michigan education and cross-cultural skills to deliver tangible results—rather than merely being ornamental.

  

In other words, she fits neither the stereotype of the social-climbing trophy wife nor that of the political fundraiser. She appears instead as a strategic partner, which, from a counterintelligence perspective, makes her less visible but potentially more effective.

Ellison himself has changed his own pattern: after five marriages, he not only married a much younger woman but also made a large donation to her alma mater and reportedly accompanies her back to China to visit family—a rare reversal for a man of his status.

The CCP’s Long Game: From Ping-Pong to Partners

The CCP has decades of experience using “soft” channels to achieve “hard” objectives. A November 2021 analysis by Chinese dissident media, for example, highlighted how Beijing used sports diplomacy to establish covert lines of communication with the United States in the 1970s.

• Table tennis player Zhuang Zedong famously paved the way for the secret Nixon–Kissinger diplomacy, while also carrying undisclosed tasks.

• Cultural troupes like the Oriental Song and Dance Ensemble were deployed abroad as de facto influence teams.

• Even in minor sports like Go and chess, retired athletes were used to establish contacts and collect information.

Beijing understands that sports and culture appear harmless, disarming Western counterintelligence. Marriage, of course, is even more off-limits to scrutiny.

Why This Matters

Larry Ellison is not merely a tech billionaire. He runs Oracle, a backbone provider of databases and software to governments and corporations worldwide. Any direct or indirect influence inside his inner circle matters—not just for U.S. national security but for the global digital infrastructure.

None of this proves that Jolin Zhu is an “agent.” But the pattern—elite cadre school background, study abroad under PRC guidelines, low-visibility yet high-influence role, and a spouse who controls critical technology infrastructure—should at least be recognized as a potential vector of influence.

If Washington is serious about understanding the CCP’s United Front work, it needs to move beyond watching the obvious community associations and start examining the quiet, intimate channels where influence can be seeded for decades—marriages, family ties, and cultural networks that are invisible to FARA filings and lobbying disclosures.

Frequent Trips “Home” Are Not Innocent

Another underexamined element is that Zhu has reportedly traveled with Ellison back to China to visit family frequently. On the surface, this sounds like ordinary family life. But in the context of Beijing’s tactics, it has darker implications.

Ellison’s trips to China appear perfectly ordinary—officially, he is visiting Oracle’s local operations. Yet these business trips provide a legitimate cover for accompanying his wife, whose frequent ties to China may represent potential leverage. What seems like a routine corporate visit could also be a strategic window for influence.

The CCP has repeatedly used exit bans, arbitrary detentions, and family leverage to coerce outcomes. The most well-known example is the case of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou: after her arrest in Canada, Beijing detained two Canadian citizens as hostages until Meng was released.

This pattern reveals a hard truth: anyone with family or frequent ties in China is vulnerable to Beijing’s pressure. Such ties create leverage points—whether through the threat of surveillance, coercion, or outright detention.

If Ellison’s wife maintains regular connections inside China, then her presence represents not only a personal relationship but also a potential channel of influence over Ellison himself. And because Ellison controls Oracle—a firm providing critical software to governments and corporations worldwide—the implications are global.

This does not prove intent or guilt on Zhu’s part. But it underscores how Beijing’s strategy works: normalize influence under the cover of family and culture, while retaining the ability to pull levers of control inside China.

The Name Game: A Subtle Erasure of Past Identity
Chinese reports indicate that Ellison’s wife was born Zhu Keran (朱可人), once using the Western name Karen Zhu. Later, however, she adopted the name Zhu Qiaolin (朱乔琳), and in English styled herself as Jolin Zhu. This was not a direct translation but a conscious reinvention, effectively detaching her new life from her earlier identity. When combined with her vanishing footprint in university records and social circles, the multiple names raise questions about deliberate obscurity.

If Jolin Zhu (朱乔琳, born Keran Zhu朱可人)is a member of Chinese Communist Party, kept or reactivated Party membership, a name change could fit the template: aligning with dual identities, easing cross-border movements, and avoiding scrutiny in both systems, according to Chinese Communist Party Organizational Department Notice No. 27 of 2007, i.e. CCP CODN 2007/27.

Rebuilding Party Loyalty Abroad: Implications of CCP CODN 2007/27 for National Security of Democracies and Freedom

CPA Jim

·

June 21, 2025

Introduction

Read full story