When Lieutenant General Li Huohui (黎火辉)—then Director of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) Training and Management Department—took the floor on March 12, 2018, during the 13th National Congress delegation meeting, he was not delivering standard political rhetoric. He was issuing an operational mandate from the command node responsible for standardizing training across China’s entire armed forces.
Having previously commanded the 31st Group Army (a frontline force oriented directly toward Taiwan) and served as Chief of Staff of the 12th Group Army, Li brought operational experience to the administrative hub of the CMC. His parliamentary address laid out the structural, doctrinal, and technical roadmap for transforming military training into direct combat readiness.
1. Centralizing Guidance Under “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military”
“Ensure the guiding position of Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military in military training... firming up training as the strategic focus and central task to accelerate modernization.”
Li framed military training not as routine drillwork, but as the foundational engine driving overall modernization. Under the post-2015 CMC restructuring, the Training and Management Department was created specifically to tear down service-branch silos and standardize training requirements top-down. Li’s emphasis reinforced that operational training—rather than administrative maintenance—serves as the sole metric for evaluating military capability.
2. “War-Led Training” (以战领训): Reversing the Training Logic
“Persist in leading training with combat... using war to drive, force, reverse-engineer, and test training capabilities.”
Historically, military units designed training around available infrastructure and low-risk environments. Li demanded a total reversal of this logic through four operational imperatives:
Driven by War (用打仗牵引): Scenario planning built entirely around actual operational plans.
Forced by War (用打仗倒逼): Identifying gaps in current capabilities against peer adversaries and forcing rapid tactical correction.
Reverse-Engineered by War (用打仗反推): Designing training programs backward from mission objectives rather than forward from peacetime schedules.
Tested by War (用打仗检验): Evaluating training success solely based on performance in realistic operational environments.
Crucially, Li explicitly included “training for military capabilities to protect overseas interests” alongside regional contingency drills, signaling that realistic combat training must extend to expeditionary and sea-lane protection missions.
3. The New Military Training System: Logic Link to Capability
“Accelerate the construction of a new military training system—guided by theoretical innovation, based on studying adversary environments, equipment, and tactics, supported by military academies, grounded in unit training, and validated by warfare.”
Li outlined a systemic chain for capability generation. Rather than isolated exercises, the training pipeline requires continuous integration across five stages:
LOGICAL LINK FOR CAPABILITY GENERATION
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| Theoretical Innovation |
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| Adversary Analysis: Study Enemy Environments, Equipment & Tactics |
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| Academy Education Support <---> Active-Unit Field Training |
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| Validation Through Real-Combat Scenarios |
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A key takeaway is the explicit mandate to “study opponent environments, equipment, and tactical methods” (研透对手环境装备战法), directing units to optimize exercises against specific foreign tactics and technical capabilities.
4. Overcoming the “Five Can-Nots” (五个不会) and Peacetime Complacency
“Focus on training commanders to solve the ‘Five Can-Nots’ problem... use training inspection to rectify training styles and break peacetime disease.”
Addressing internal readiness deficits, Li targeted officer competence and exercise integrity:
Eliminating the “Five Can-Nots”: Targeting command weaknesses (inability to judge situations, understand higher intent, make operational decisions, deploy forces, and react to emergencies).
Eradicating “Peacetime Disease” (和平积弊): Eliminating scripted exercises, staged drills, and falsified readiness metrics through strict training inspections (训练监察).
Smart Training Infrastructure: Leveraging technology and AI to push training toward intelligentization (智能化).
Military-Civil Fusion (MCF): Utilizing civilian logistical, technical, and infrastructure resources to support complex training operations.
Strategic Summary
Lieutenant General Li Huohui’s 2018 speech outlined the administrative and doctrinal mechanics required to turn structural reform into actual combat power. By establishing strict training inspection, aligning exercises with adversary capabilities, and legally integrating overseas interest protection into training mandates, Li provided the blueprint for building a combat-ready force capable of joint operations.
In the official narrative of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the National People’s Congress (NPC) is a grand display of popular governance. For military intelligence analysts and national security scholars, however, the annual plenary meetings of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Armed Police delegation serve a vastly different function. They are an open-source window into the operational directives, structural reorganizations, and strategic ambitions of China’s highest military leadership.
Among the key architects of the PLA’s modern operational transformation is Lieutenant General Li Huohui (黎火辉). A former frontline combat commander of the Taiwan-oriented 31st Group Army, Li served as the Director of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Training and Management Department from 2017 through the critical threshold years of the COVID-19 pandemic. Concurrently, Li served as a Delegate to the 13th NPC and held the pivotal role of Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee for the 7th Military World Games (MWG) held in Wuhan in October 2019.
A comprehensive analysis of Li’s NPC parliamentary addresses from 2018, 2019, and 2020—cross-referenced with his leadership during the 2019 Wuhan Military World Games—exposes the PLA’s systematic doctrine: leveraging military-civil fusion (MCF), commandeering local infrastructure under the guise of non-war military operations (MOOTW), and converting public health crises into live-agent operational testbeds.
The 2018 NPC Mandate: “War-Led Training” and Requisitioning Civilian Infrastructure
On March 12, 2018, speaking at the 1st Session of the 13th NPC in front of Xi Jinping, Lt. Gen. Li Huohui set the administrative foundation for his tenure at the CMC Training and Management Department. His mandate focused on tearing down legacy peacetime practices and enforcing “War-Led Training” (以战领训).
Li established a four-part operational logic to drive all PLA exercises:
Driven by War (用打仗牵引): Aligning all training scenarios strictly with actual war plans.
Forced by War (用打仗倒逼): Identifying capabilities gaps against peer adversaries (specifically the U.S.) and forcing rapid tactical corrections.
Reverse-Engineered by War (用打仗反推): Designing training backward from battlefield objectives rather than forward from peacetime administrative schedules.
Tested by War (用打仗检验): Measuring readiness solely by realistic combat execution.
Crucially, Li’s 2018 address contained two directives that laid the groundwork for out-of-area operations and civil-military requisition:
Protecting Overseas Interests: He explicitly mandated “training for military capabilities to protect overseas interests” alongside regional contingency drills.
Leveraging MCF for Training Conditions: He called for “deeply integrating military-civil fusion (MCF) to improve training support conditions.”
This directive was not about building civilian roads; it was an administrative green light for the PLA to requisition civilian transportation, telecommunications, medical hubs, and public health networks for military logistics and joint exercises.
The 2019 NPC Directive: From “Passive Response” to “Proactively Designing War”
By March 12, 2019, at the 2nd Session of the 13th NPC, Li took his doctrine a step further. He declared that the PLA must transition from “passively responding to war” to “proactively designing war” (由被动应对战争向主动设计战争转变).
Li demanded:
Intensive Emergency Preparedness (应急应战训练): Rigorous drills built around sudden, non-standard, and high-intensity contingencies.
Targeting Adversaries: Deepening “research into opponents’ environments, equipment, and tactical methods” (研透对手环境装备战法).
Systemic Execution Control: Establishing rigid top-down inspection routines (训练监察) to eradicate “peacetime disease” (和平积弊)—such as scripted, low-risk exercises.
Seven months after making this speech, Li’s dual identity as CMC Training Director and Vice Chairman of the 2019 Wuhan Military World Games brought his “proactive war design” and “MCF training support” doctrines into the physical world.
The 2019 Wuhan Military World Games: The Intersection of MCF, Logistics, and Biodefense
In October 2019, Wuhan hosted thousands of foreign military personnel for the 7th Military World Games. On October 16, 2019, official state media photographed Lt. Gen. Li Huohui in his capacity as Vice Chairman of the Games’ Executive Committee, handing the ceremonial torch to Hubei Governor Wang Xiaodong.
Behind the sporting ceremonial facade, the 2019 Games functioned as a massive, real-world stress test for the PLA’s joint theater logistics and regional civil-military integration:
LI HUOHUI'S OPERATIONAL DUAL-USE PIPELINE (2018–2020)
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| Central Military Commission (CMC) |
| Director, Training & Management Department |
| Lt. Gen. Li Huohui (NPC Delegate & MWG Vice Chair) |
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| 1. Civil-Military Integration | | 2. "Proactive War Design" & MOOTW |
| - Requisitioning Wuhan municipal | | - Live-scenario joint exercises. |
| infrastructure & medical hubs. | | - Pre-Games port biosecurity drills|
| - Testing joint theater logistics | | (Sept 2019 airport emergency). |
| and border/entry control. | | - Seamless transition to crisis |
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| 3. 2020 COVID-Era Mandate: "Rapid Transition from Training to Combat" |
| - "Online/isolated training" to bypass epidemic restrictions. |
| - Harnessing PLA medical research for "hardcore" bio-warfare weapons/vaccines.|
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Requisition of Municipal Assets: Under Li’s MCF doctrine, the Games allowed the PLA to integrate Wuhan’s municipal transport, customs, state-key biological laboratories, and major regional hospitals (such as Jinyintan and Wuhan CDC) into the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force network.
Pre-Games Biosecurity Drills: Exactly one month before the Games (September 18, 2019), Wuhan Tianhe Airport and local authorities held a joint emergency drill specifically simulating a customs response to an incoming passenger infected with a “novel coronavirus” or high-consequence pathogen.
For Li’s Training Management Department, the Military World Games served as a live-environment exercise in joint theater command, international entry-exit monitoring, and regional biodefense containment.
The 2020 NPC Mandate: Rapid Conversion “From Training to Combat” Under Epidemic Conditions
When the COVID-19 pandemic swept out of Wuhan in early 2020, the PLA did not retreat; it operationalized the crisis.
At the 3rd Session of the 13th NPC on May 26, 2020, Li Huohui delivered a speech outlining how the PLA converted the public health emergency into an operational testbed. Li issued four specific directives for military training under epidemic conditions:
“Rapid Transition from Training to Combat” (由训转战): Demanding that units use simulated emergency command chains (实案贯通推演) so that troops can transition instantly from peacetime training to active combat deployment (一声令下迅即转战、随时能战).
Novel Training Scenarios: Institutionalizing “基地封闭练兵” (base-isolated training), “网上练兵” (online cognitive/digital training), and small-group combat cell exercises to maintain full combat posture during quarantines.
Deterring Foreign Adversaries: Stating that real-combat readiness during a global pandemic is essential to “deter powerful rivals” (震慑强敌对手) and demonstrate national willpower.
During the same session, after listening to Li and biodefense researchers (such as Maj. Gen. Chen Wei’s peers), Xi Jinping responded by instructing the military to “harness the PLA’s medical research advantages, accelerate COVID-19 drug and vaccine R&D, and produce more ‘hardcore’ products (硬核产品).”
Strategic Takeaways: The Pattern of PLA Institutional Deception
Analyzing Lieutenant General Li Huohui’s parliamentary statements from 2018 to 2020 alongside his operational role during the 2019 Wuhan Games exposes three core truths about CCP military governance:
Dual-Use Exploitation: The CCP uses civil-military fusion (MCF) to blur the line between civilian public health, academic research, and military warfighting. Facilities, events, and research initially presented as peaceful or sporting (like the Military World Games) double as logistical trial runs for theater command operations.
Crisis as an Exercise: The PLA treats domestic and international crises—including viral outbreaks—not merely as emergencies to be managed, but as “大考” (great tests) and opportunities to refine combat readiness, practice civilian resource requisition, and execute rapid “training-to-combat” transitions.
Biological Science as Combat Power: By explicitly tying military medical R&D to “hardcore products” for combat capability, the highest levels of PLA command view biotechnology, pathogen research, and biodefense as core components of national defense and strategic deterrence.
Li Huohui’s parliamentary record proves that inside the CCP system, every civilian asset, public health protocol, and international event is engineered to serve the ultimate objective: building an army capable of “proactively designing war” and executing party directives on command.
黎火辉，男，1963年10月生，江西丰城荷湖人。中共党员，中国人民解放军陆军中将军衔。曾任中国人民解放军南京军区军训和兵种部副部长，中国人民解放军福建省军区海防某师师长等职务； 2011年1月前，任中国人民解放军第12集团军参谋长。 2015年，任中国人民解放军第31集团军军长。2017年1月，已任中共中央军委训练管理部部长。中国共产党第十九届中央委员，第十三届全国人大代表。2018年3月12日在十三届全国人大一次会议解放军和武警部队代表团全体会议上发表的观点“习主席在今天的讲话中对加强实战化军事训练作了突出强调。我感到，正如习主席所说，我军讲新气象新作为，归根到底要看练兵备战这一条。要牢固确立习近平强军思想在军事训练领域的指导地位，坚定不移把军事训练摆在战略位置、作为中心工作抓住不放，抓出成效，带动我军现代化建设提挡加速；要坚持以战领训，深入研究现代战争制胜机理，突出抓好任务部队应急应战训练、使命任务训练和维护海外利益军事能力训练，始终用打仗牵引、用打仗倒逼、用打仗反推、用打仗检验训练；要加紧构建新型军事训练体系，以理论创新为先导、以研透对手环境装备战法为基础、以院校教学为支撑、以部队训练为关键、以战争检验为归宿，按照作战能力形成的逻辑链路，着力提高实战化训练水平；要抓住关键环节持续发力，突出按纲施训打牢部队战斗力基础，突出战区联合训练提升训练质量层次，突出练将强官解决“五个不会”问题，突出科技手段运用推动军事训练向智能化发展，突出军民深度融合改善训练保障条件，突出训练监察整治训练作风、破除和平积弊，打造与实现党在新时代的强军目标、全面建成世界一流军队相匹配的一流军事训练，全面提升部队能打仗、打胜仗能力。”在2019年3月12日举行的十三届全国人大二次会议解放军和武警部队代表团全体会议上，中共中央军委训练管理部部长黎火辉建议”推动军事训练由被动应对战争向主动设计战争转变“。
Beyond the Uniform: The Career of Major General Huang Xuhong and Allegations of Military Immunity in Beijing
On paper, Major General Huang Xuhong (黄绪鸿) represents the career progression of an officer within the former Beijing Military Region and the elite forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Originating from Meilin, Fengcheng, Jiangxi Province, Huang rose through political work units—serving as Political Department Director of an air defense brigade, Divisional Political Commissar in the former 38th Group Army, Political Department Director of the 26th Group Army, and later leading the Political Work Department of the 80th Group Army. In November 2015, he was officially honored as an “Outstanding Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces”.
However, public records and online citizen grievances present an acute contradiction between party-sanctioned military accolades and domestic institutional accountability.
The Anatomy of an Unresolved Petition
A series of public complaints uploaded online—most notably a public post dated June 2, 2021—accuses senior officers associated with the 82nd Group Army (formerly the 38th Group Army, including units 66336 and 66157) of operating as an unchecked authority. The filings explicitly name key military personnel:
Xia Minglong (夏明龙): Commander of Unit 66336.
Huang Xuhong (黄绪鸿): Former Political Commissar of Unit 66336.
Zhang Jilu (张纪录): Deputy Commander of Unit 66336.
Zhang Yuping (张玉平): Political Commissar of Unit 66157.
CIVILIAN GRIEVANCE VS. MILITARY IMMUNITY
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| Alleged Assault & Extortion Incident (Nov 26, 2015) |
| Location: R04 Lane, Baoding Toll Station, Beijing-Hong Kong-Macau Expy |
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| Citizen Evidence & Reporting | | Institutional Obstruction |
| - Over 20 armed personnel using | | - Beijing & Hebei Public Security |
| hammers, stun batons, handcuffs. | | refuse to open criminal case. |
| - Toll station video footage & | | - Over 5 years of unhandled |
| Dongjinzhuang Police reports. | | complaints (~1,000+ reports). |
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Key Accusations Detailed in Public Records
Armed Violence and Extortion: The complaint details a specific incident on November 26, 2015, at the Baoding Toll Station on the Beijing-Hong Kong-Macau Expressway. Over 20 individuals led by unit officers allegedly engaged in assault, property destruction, robbery, and unlawful detention using weapons such as hammers, electroshock weapons, and handcuffs.
Impersonation and Abuse of Power: Accusations state that officers impersonated National People’s Congress (NPC) delegates to perpetrate scams, conduct illegal searches of civilian women, and abuse administrative authority under the protection of military status.
Police Inaction and Protection Rackets: The petitioner alleges that despite filing hundreds of complaints over five years to the Ministry of Public Security, the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau, and local police stations (e.g., Dongjinzhuang Police Station), civilian law enforcement refused to register the criminal cases, effectively acting as a protective umbrella (保护伞) for military personnel.
Institutional Takeaways
This grievance highlights the systemic immunity enjoyed by high-ranking PLA political commissars and commanders. In China’s legal environment, civilian public security organs rarely possess jurisdiction over active-duty military personnel—especially those tied to elite units like the 82nd Group Army.
While officers like Huang Xuhong are praised by the Central Military Commission as model commanders, public records indicate how military power can be wielded against civilians with impunity, leaving victims without recourse despite repeated appeals to state legal mechanisms.
黄绪鸿，男，丰城梅林人。中国共产党党员，陆军少将军衔，长期在原北京军区服役，曾任原北京军区某防空旅政治部主任、原第38集团军某师政委，于2015年11月被中国人民解放军原四总部表彰为全军优秀指挥军官，于2016年升任原第26集团军政治部主任，后改任新组建的第80集团军政治工作部主任。