When UNGA Resolution 2758 references the “People’s Republic of China”(PRC) and UN Charter Article 23 anchors the permanent seat of “the Republic of China”(ROC), the literal definitions of “People’s” (popular sovereignty and universal self-determination) and “Republic” (a public governance structure founded on civilian constitutionalism, constitutional supremacy, and the separation of powers) serve as essential legal benchmarks.
A rigorous textual examination of the Constitution of the PRC demonstrates that its structural articles and ideological preamble explicitly negate the literal legal definition of both “People’s” and “Republic.”
The term “People’s” in legal theory and international governance mandates that ultimate sovereign authority originates from the citizenry through genuine popular sovereignty, uncoerced political participation, and universal, equal suffrage without ideological qualification.
Literal Requirement of "People's" (Popular Sovereignty)
└── Universal suffrage & uncoerced political agency for ALL citizens
VS.
PRC Constitutional Text
├── Preamble & Art. 1: Subordinates state to "Leadership of the CCP"
├── Preamble & Art. 1: Mandates "Dictatorship" against ideologically defined "enemies"
└── Art. 51: Subordinates individual rights to "interests of the State"
The text of the PRC Constitution structurally denies popular sovereignty through four primary constitutional mechanics:
Constitutional Monopolization by a Single Vanguard Party (Preamble & Article 1):
Textual Provisions: The Preamble explicitly subordinates the national destiny to the directive that the populace shall “continue under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.” Article 1 further codifies that “The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
Literal Contradiction: In a true “People’s” sovereign state, the people retain the right to alter, choose, or dismiss their governing authorities. Codifying a single political party’s permanent monopoly as a foundational constitutional requirement strips the populace of political choice, reducing “the people” from sovereign masters to constitutional subjects under mandatory party guidance.
Institutionalization of “Dictatorship” Over Sovereignty (Preamble, Articles 1 & 28):
Textual Provisions: Article 1 defines the state as a “socialist state under the people’s democratic dictatorship,” explicitly equated in the Preamble with the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” The Preamble further asserts that “class struggle will continue to exist within a certain scope,” and Article 28 mandates that the state “suppresses treasonable and other criminal activities.”
Literal Contradiction: A dictatorship is legally antithetical to popular sovereignty. By embedding class struggle and “dictatorship” into the constitutional baseline, the state reserves the unilateral authority to strip citizenship rights from any individual or group designated as an “enemy” or “hostile force,” violating the prerequisite of universal, equal political belonging.
Subordination of Fundamental Rights to State and Collective Interests (Article 51):
Textual Provisions: Article 51 explicitly mandates: “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China, in exercising their freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society or of the collective.”
Literal Contradiction: In popular constitutional theory, rights belong inherently to the people to protect them against state overreach. Article 51 inverts this hierarchy: individual rights listed in Articles 35–37 (freedom of speech, assembly, press, person) are legal conditional privileges that vanish the moment their exercise conflicts with state or party interests.
Absence of Direct Universal Suffrage for Supreme State Organs (Articles 59 & 97):
Textual Provisions: Article 97 specifies that direct elections occur only at the lowest administrative levels (county and township), while provincial and national representatives are elected indirectly by lower-level congresses. Article 59 establishes that National People’s Congress (NPC) delegates are chosen through indirect multi-tiered processes managed by Standing Committee of the NPC.
Literal Contradiction: Genuine popular sovereignty requires direct accountability. The multi-tiered indirect election system filters popular will through party-controlled electoral committees, ensuring the citizenry exercises no direct legal mechanism to choose or recall national lawmakers or executive officers.
A “Republic” (res publica—a public affair) legally requires a government governed by public law rather than private or party decree, structured around civilian supremacy, an independent judiciary, constitutional checks and balances, and the complete institutional separation of state power from private or party control.
Literal Requirement of "Republic" (Res Publica & Rule of Law)
└── Civilian supremacy, independent judiciary, structural separation of powers
VS.
PRC Constitutional Text
├── Art. 3: Rejects separation of powers in favor of "Democratic Centralism"
├── Art. 93: Places armed forces under the Central Military Commission (CMC)
└── Arts. 133 & 138: Mandates courts and procuratorates are accountable to State Power Organs
The PRC Constitution explicitly dismantles the fundamental requisites of a republic through five key structural arrangements:
Explicit Rejection of Separation of Powers in Favor of Concentrated Power (Article 3):
Textual Provisions: Article 3 establishes that state organs operate under the principle of “democratic centralism” and that executive, supervisory, judicial, and procuratorial organs are all generated by, responsible to, and supervised by the People’s Congresses.
Literal Contradiction: A republic prevents tyranny by separating executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Under Article 3, all state power is unified under a single organ (”centralism”), eliminating horizontal checks and balances and concentrating total authority under whatever political body controls the legislative leadership.
Subordination of the Judiciary to Political Organs (Articles 133, 138):
Textual Provisions: While Articles 131 and 136 state that courts and procuratorates exercise their power “independently,” Articles 133 and 138 mandate that the SUPREME COURT (SPC) and SUPREME PROCURATORATE (SPP) are directly “responsible to the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee.”
Literal Contradiction: In a legal republic, the judiciary must possess final power to interpret the constitution and review the legality of legislative and executive acts. Under the PRC Constitution, the judiciary is structurally subordinated to the legislature, creating a self-referential system where the state organ that enacts laws is also the sole interpreter of their constitutionality (Article 67), leaving citizens with no independent judicial recourse against legislative or executive overreach.
Institutional Insertion of Military Command Over State Organs (Articles 59 & 93–94):
Textual Provisions: Article 93 specifies that the Central Military Commission (CMC) leads the armed forces under a system where the “Chairman of the Central Military Commission has overall responsibility” (Article 93). Article 59 explicitly establishes the military as an independent voting delegation within the NPC (“The National People’s Congress is composed of deputies elected from... and the armed forces”).
Literal Contradiction: A genuine republic demands absolute civilian supremacy over the armed forces and the complete exclusion of active-duty military units from national legislative governance. By granting the armed forces formal, direct block-representation within the national legislature, the PRC Constitution codifies a political-military hybrid structure, contradicting the civilian mandate of republican constitutionalism.
Party-State Fusion, Defense Law Statutory Enshrining, and the Non-Public Character of Power
Textual Provisions:
The Preamble and Article 1 of the PRC Constitution legalistically bind the entire state machinery—including administrative organs (Article 85), judicial bodies (Article 128), and military command (Article 93)—to the permanent leadership of a self-selected political party. This constitutional fusion is explicitly operationalized in statutory defense legislation. Specifically, Article 21 of the National Defense Law of the PRC mandates: ”The armed forces of the People’s Republic of China are subject to the leadership of the Communist Party of China. Organizations of the Communist Party of China in the armed forces shall carry out activities in accordance with the Constitution of the Communist Party of China.” Furthermore, this statutory subordination is enforced individually upon all military personnel under Article 59, which explicitly requires service members to be ”loyal to the Communist Party of China,” ensuring that the internal organizational hierarchy, command authority, and ideological allegiance of the armed forces prioritize party organs over civilian government oversight.
Literal Contradiction:
Res publica strictly requires that public state institutions, especially the national armed forces, exist independently of any private organization, political faction, or ideological party. By embedding party leadership directly into both constitutional law (Article 1) and statutory defense legislation (Article 21 and Article 59 of the National Defense Law)—and subjecting the national armed forces to internal party statutes (Constitution of the Communist Party of China)—the Beijing regime transforms national defense organs and public state authority into private instruments of party command. This statutory party-military fusion directly violates the core requirement of a genuine republic, wherein public military power must remain a neutral state institution accountable to all citizens equally rather than subordinate to a single political party.
Integration of PRC Constitutional Architecture and National Defense Law Statutory Mandates
Textual Provisions and Statutory Synergy:
The structural fusion of the party, state, and armed forces is codification-reinforced through the direct intersection of Article 59 of the PRC Constitution and key provisions of the **National Defense Law of the PRC:
Constitutional Enshrining of Military Legislative Power (Article 59):**
Article 59 of the PRC Constitution explicitly establishes the military as an independent voting delegation within the legislature, dictating that ”The National People’s Congress is composed of deputies elected from... and the armed forces.” Rather than subjecting military power to civilian legislative oversight, the constitutional architecture embeds the armed forces directly within the supreme organ of state power as a distinct political voting block.
Ideological and Statutory Subordination to Party Supremacy (National Defense Law Arts. 4, 21, and 22):This military legislative block does not represent a neutral public defense force, but rather an institution statutorily bound to party command under the PRC National Defense Law: Article 4 (Mandatory Ideological Alignment):Explicitly stipulates that all defense activities must be guided by ”Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and implement Xi Jinping’s thinking on strengthening the military.”
Article 21 (Statutory Monopoly of Party Leadership):Mandates that ”The armed forces of the People’s Republic of China are subject to the leadership of the Communist Party of China. Organizations of the Communist Party of China in the armed forces shall carry out activities in accordance with the Constitution of the Communist Party of China.”
Article 22 (Regime Security as the Primary Military Mission): Defines the core operational mission of the armed forces in the new era specifically as providing ”strategic support for consolidating the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system.”
Literal Contradiction:Res publica strictly requires that public state institutions, particularly the legislature and national defense forces, exist independently of any private organization, political faction, or ideological party. By embedding active-duty military units directly into the national legislature (Article 59 of the Constitution) while legally defining their primary mission as defending the ruling party’s political monopoly (Articles 4, 21, and 22 of the National Defense Law), the Beijing regime creates a self-referential loop of political control. Active-duty military NPC delegates do not serve as neutral representatives of public defense, but as a party-bound legislative cohort tasked with enforcing party supremacy, securing military immunity, and insulating party-state operations from genuine civilian legal accountability.
A Question Raised by China’s Own Constitution
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 is frequently invoked as if it simply established that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) represents China at the United Nations.
But that is not what the resolution says.
Resolution 2758, adopted on 25 October 1971, decided to restore the rights of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the United Nations and to recognize “the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations.”
That wording raises a question that deserves much more careful examination:
What does it mean to be the “Government of the People’s Republic of China” when the PRC’s own constitutional and national-defense laws place the state under the leadership of a political party, place the armed forces under that party’s leadership, and incorporate those armed forces as a distinct constituency of the national legislature?
This is not an argument that the PRC ceases to be a state.
It is a question about governmental identity and representation.
1. Resolution 2758 Recognized a Government — Not the CCP
The operative language of Resolution 2758 is important.
It refers to:
“the People’s Republic of China”
and then to:
“the representatives of its Government.”
The resolution therefore establishes a conceptual distinction:
People’s Republic of China → its Government → representatives of that Government → representation of China at the United Nations.
It does not say:
People’s Republic of China → Communist Party of China → representatives of the Communist Party.
Nor does it say:
China → whoever exercises effective political control → representatives at the United Nations.
The distinction matters because the question here is not whether the CCP exercises political power. The question is whether an institution operating under the superior political authority of the CCP can simply be equated with the Government of the People’s Republic of China for purposes of the representation described in Resolution 2758.
2. What Does “People’s Republic” Mean?
The PRC does not merely happen to have the word “People’s” in its name.
Its Constitution expressly defines the state.
Article 1 states:
“中华人民共和国是工人阶级领导的、以工农联盟为基础的人民民主专政的社会主义国家。”
The Constitution therefore describes the PRC as a socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship.
But the same Article immediately adds:
“中国共产党领导是中国特色社会主义最本质的特征。”
In English:
“The leadership of the Communist Party of China is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
This creates an important constitutional question.
If the state is called a People’s Republic, but its Constitution simultaneously makes CCP leadership an essential characteristic of its political system, how should the relationship between the people, the state and the ruling party be understood?
Is the CCP an organization operating within the government?
Or is the government itself constitutionally subordinate to a political organization standing above the state institutions?
The answer matters when the government's international representatives are described as representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
3. The PRC Does Not Use Separation of Powers
Article 3 of the Constitution provides:
“中华人民共和国的国家机构实行民主集中制的原则。”
The state organs of the PRC therefore operate according to the principle of democratic centralism.
The Constitution further provides that:
“全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会都由民主选举产生，对人民负责，受人民监督。”
The National People’s Assembly and local People's Assemblies are described as democratically elected, responsible to the people and subject to their supervision.
But the institutional structure that follows is fundamentally different from a conventional separation-of-powers model.
The Constitution provides that:
“国家行政机关、监察机关、审判机关、检察机关都由人民代表大会产生，对它负责，受它监督。”
Administrative, supervisory, adjudicatory and procuratorial organs are generated by the People's Assembly system and are responsible to it.
This is not a system of separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers.
It is a democratic-centralist state structure centered on the People's Assembly system.
That distinction becomes particularly important when asking whether “government of the people” should have substantive institutional meaning.
4. What About Judicial Independence?
The Constitution itself provides another piece of evidence.
Article 133 states:
“最高人民法院对全国人民代表大会和全国人民代表大会常务委员会负责。”
The Supreme People's Court is responsible to the National People's Assembly and its Standing Committee.
Article 138 similarly provides:
“最高人民检察院对全国人民代表大会和全国人民代表大会常务委员会负责。”
The Supreme People's Procuratorate is likewise responsible to the National People's Assembly and its Standing Committee.
The Constitution therefore does not establish an independent judiciary standing constitutionally outside the political state structure as a separate check on the other branches.
This raises a straightforward institutional question:
If a “People’s Republic” is supposed to mean a republic in which governmental power ultimately belongs to the people, what institutional mechanisms allow the people to exercise control over the government when judicial authority is itself institutionally accountable to the People's Assembly system rather than constitutionally independent from political power?
Again, this is not a question about whether the PRC exists as a state.
It is a question about the substantive meaning of its governmental designation.
5. The Most Striking Example: The Military
The constitutional structure becomes even more unusual when the military is examined.
Article 59 of the PRC Constitution provides:
“全国人民代表大会由省、自治区、直辖市、特别行政区和军队选出的代表组成。”
The National People’s Assembly is therefore composed of representatives elected by:
provinces;
autonomous regions;
municipalities;
special administrative regions; and
the armed forces.
The military is not merely represented because individual military personnel happen to win ordinary elections.
“军队” — the armed forces — is itself expressly identified as a source of national legislative representation.
The Constitution also states:
“全国人民代表大会代表的选举由全国人民代表大会常务委员会主持。”
Thus the armed forces occupy a constitutionally recognized position in the mechanism through which the national legislature is constituted.
This produces an unusual institutional relationship:
The armed forces are simultaneously:
an armed institution of the PRC;
a constitutionally recognized electoral constituency for the national legislature; and
an institution subject to CCP leadership.
The third point comes directly from the National Defense Law.
6. The National Defense Law Explicitly Places the Armed Forces Under CCP Leadership
Article 21 of the PRC National Defense Law provides:
“中华人民共和国的武装力量受中国共产党领导。”
The armed forces of the PRC are under the leadership of the Communist Party of China.
The same provision states:
“武装力量中的中国共产党组织依照中国共产党章程进行活动。”
CCP organizations within the armed forces operate according to the Constitution of the Communist Party of China.
Article 22 identifies the PRC's armed forces as including:
the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the Chinese People's Armed Police Force, and the militia.
The same article describes the PLA's mission in the current era as providing strategic support for, among other things:
“巩固中国共产党领导和社会主义制度”
—that is, consolidating CCP leadership and the socialist system.
Article 59 goes further:
“军人必须忠于祖国，忠于中国共产党。”
Military personnel must be loyal to the motherland and the Communist Party of China.
These are not merely political slogans appearing in a newspaper.
They are provisions of the PRC's own legal framework.
7. The Institutional Puzzle
Put the constitutional and national-defense provisions together.
The Constitution says:
The armed forces elect representatives to the National People’s Assembly.
The National People’s Assembly is the highest organ of state power.
The Constitution also establishes the National Central Military Commission and provides that its chairman is responsible to the National People’s Assembly and its Standing Committee.
But the National Defense Law simultaneously provides:
The PRC armed forces are under CCP leadership.
And CCP organizations inside the armed forces operate according to the CCP Constitution.
The military is therefore connected simultaneously to two institutional structures:
State structure
PRC → National People’s Assembly → state institutions → Central Military Commission → armed forces
Party structure
CCP → Party leadership → CCP organizations in the armed forces → armed forces
This creates a fundamental institutional question:
When an armed institution constitutionally represented in the national legislature is simultaneously placed under the leadership of a political party, whose political authority is ultimately being exercised through that representation?
The answer cannot simply be assumed from the word “People’s.”
8. The Question of Popular Government
The PRC Constitution describes the People's Assemblies as democratically elected and responsible to the people.
But that does not automatically answer the deeper question of who chooses the national government.
A political system can contain elections without allowing the population to choose among competing national political authorities.
It can contain representative institutions without allowing citizens to determine which political organization controls the state.
It can contain courts without establishing judicial independence.
And it can contain a legislature without establishing separation of powers.
The relevant question is therefore not:
“Does the PRC use the word democracy?”
The relevant question is:
“What constitutional power do the people actually possess to select, control and remove the political authority exercising national governmental power?”
That is the question that needs to be applied to the phrase “Government of the People’s Republic of China.”
9. This Is Not an Argument About PRC Statehood
There is an important distinction here.
This analysis does not claim:
“The PRC is not a state.”
Nor does it claim:
“The PRC automatically loses its UN membership.”
Nor does it claim:
“Resolution 2758 contains an explicit democratic checklist.”
Resolution 2758 does not contain such a checklist.
The narrower question is this:
If Resolution 2758 recognizes the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, can the substantive characteristics of that Government simply be ignored?
The PRC's own laws provide the evidence from which that question can be examined.
Its Constitution identifies CCP leadership as an essential characteristic of the political system.
Its Constitution establishes democratic centralism rather than a conventional separation of powers.
Its Constitution makes the judicial and procuratorial organs responsible to the People's Assembly system rather than establishing them as constitutionally independent powers.
Its Constitution gives the armed forces their own representation in the national legislature.
Its National Defense Law explicitly places those armed forces under CCP leadership.
And that law expressly states that the armed forces have a mission of consolidating CCP leadership and that military personnel must be loyal to the CCP.
10. The Question Resolution 2758 Leaves Open
Resolution 2758 did not recognize “representatives of the Communist Party of China.”
It recognized:
“the representatives of its Government.”
That wording should not simply disappear when Resolution 2758 is discussed.
It raises a basic institutional question:
Can an institution whose governmental authority is constitutionally subordinated to a political party, whose national political leadership is not selected through a nationwide popular election, whose judicial system lacks constitutional independence from the state political structure, whose governmental system rejects separation of powers in favor of democratic centralism, and whose armed forces are both a distinct legislative constituency and expressly subject to CCP leadership, nevertheless be substantively described as the “Government of the People’s Republic of China” for purposes of the representation recognized by Resolution 2758?
This question does not require denying that the PRC is a state.
It requires something more basic:
taking the words “Government,” “People’s,” and “Republic” seriously.
If those words have no substantive institutional meaning whatsoever, then the designation “People’s Republic” becomes merely a label.
If they do have substantive meaning, then the institutional structure of the PRC becomes relevant to determining what kind of government is actually being represented at the United Nations.
And that is precisely why the PRC's own constitutional and national-defense laws deserve to be examined alongside Resolution 2758—not as an attempt to erase the PRC from the United Nations, but as evidence for a fundamental question about what, exactly, is being represented when the UN recognizes the representatives of the “Government of the People’s Republic of China.”
The provisions above describe the institutional structure in abstract terms. The composition of the National People’s Assembly allows that structure to be examined at the level of the individuals who actually exercise legislative representation.
Article 59 of the Constitution expressly provides that the National People’s Assembly includes representatives elected by the armed forces. This is therefore not a matter of individual military personnel entering the legislature through ordinary civilian constituencies. The armed forces themselves constitute a constitutionally recognized source of national legislative representation.
The 13th National People’s Assembly provides a particularly concrete case.
Its PLA and Armed Police delegation consisted of 269 representatives. Within that delegation were commanders, political commissars, senior officers, military academics, operational personnel, and Armed Police officers drawn from different parts of the military system.
The following 92 examples identify individual members of that delegation and their military positions. They are presented not as a claim that every one of these individuals exercised identical political functions, but to make the constitutional arrangement concrete: who were the people designated to represent the armed forces in the national legislature?
Their positions range from the Political Commissar of the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force and the Political Commissar of the PLA National Defence University, to theater-command commanders, provincial Armed Police commanders, military academy professors, operational officers, and personnel serving in highly specialized military units.
This matters because the question raised by Resolution 2758 is ultimately a question about representation.
Resolution 2758 refers to the representatives of the “Government of the People’s Republic of China.” The PRC Constitution, however, expressly incorporates the armed forces into the composition of the national legislature, while the National Defense Law expressly places those armed forces under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
The examples below therefore provide an empirical basis for examining the institutional relationship between the armed forces, the national legislature, the state government, and the CCP.
92 Examples from the 13th National People’s Assembly PLA and Armed Police Delegation
The following profiles document 92 representatives from the 269-member PLA and Armed Police delegation, beginning with Wang Wenquan, Political Commissar of the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force, and continuing through the delegation to Zhang Houshun, Deputy Commander of the PLA Western Theater Command and Commander of the PLA Western Theater Command Air Force.
Wang Wenquan, Political Commissar of the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force中国人民解放军联勤保障部队政委王文全
Zhang Xuefeng, Deputy Commander of the Eastern Theater Command Army, PLA中国人民解放军东部战区陆军副司令员张学锋
Zhang Xiongwei, Professor, Cyberspace Security Teaching and Research Office, College of Command and Control Engineering, PLA Army Engineering University中国人民解放军陆军工程大学指挥控制工程学院网络空间安全教研室教授张雄伟
Chen Liming, Professor, Operational Command Teaching and Research Office, Department of Operational Command, PLA Naval Command College中国人民解放军海军指挥学院作战指挥系作战指挥教研室教授陈黎明
Ling Xi, Political Commissar of the PLA Shanghai Garrison中国人民解放军上海警备区政委凌希
Wu Shaohua, PLA Army Service Academy中国人民解放军陆军勤务学院教授吴少华
Xiao Dongsong, Political Commissar of the PLA Army Command College中国人民解放军陆军指挥学院政治委员肖冬松
Yu Feng, Radar Platoon Commander, Unnamed South China Sea Island/Reef Garrison, PLA Navy中国人民解放军海军南中国海某岛礁雷达分队长于峰
Chen Xueli, Chief of Staff, Second Scrapped Weapons and Ammunition Disposal Depot, PLA Joint Logistics Support Force中国人民解放军联勤保障部队报废武器弹药销毁二队参谋长陈雪礼
Zhang Mingzhu, Carrier Aircraft Director, PLA Navy Aircraft Carrier Liaoning中国人民解放军海军辽宁舰舰载机引导员张明珠
Chen Yuan, Deputy Commander of Jiangsu Provincial Corps of Communist Armed Police 江苏省武警总队副司令员陈源
Zhang Jianchao, Deputy Commander of Zhejiang Provincial Corps of Communist Armed Police武警浙江省总队副司令员张建超
Huang Ming, Commander of PLA Unit 31675 中国人民解放军31675部队部队长黄铭
Song Shanyu, Deputy Director of the Political Department of PLA Unit 71620 中国人民解放军原71620部队政治处副主任宋善玉。
Yu Hailong, Political Instructor of the PLA Airborne Corps中国人民解放军空降兵政治教导员余海龙
Wu Jieming, Political Commissar of PLA National Defence University. 中国人民解放军国防大学政委吴杰明
Zhao He, Political Director of a Company, 1st Mobile Mobile Division of the Armed Police Force武警第一机动总队某中队指导员赵贺
Yin Dong, Operational Staff Officer of PLA Rocket Force Unit 96753 中国人民解放军火箭军96753部队作训参谋尹东
Yang Yang, Deputy Operations Officer of the PLA Amphibious Transport Dock Yimengshan中国人民解放军沂蒙山舰副作战长杨扬
Feng Wei, Deputy Regiment Commander of an Aviation Regiment of the Western Theater Command Air Force, PLA中国人民解放军西部战区空军航空兵某团副团长冯玮
Xiu Changzhi, Political Commissar of PLA Zhejiang Provincial District 中国人民解放军浙江省军区政治委员修长智
Wang Quanli, Engineering Maintenance Technician of a Regiment of the PLA Army Engineering Maintenance Corps中国人民解放军陆军工程维护总队某团工程维护技师王全理
Ma Hepali (a/k/a Maqpal, Makpal, the Political Commissar of the 2nd Tank Company of a Combined Arms Regiment in the Xinjiang Military District中国人民解放军新疆军区某合成团坦克二连政治指导员马和帕丽；
Yang Zheng—Commander of the PLA Hainan Provincial Military Command 中国人民解放军海南省军区司令员杨征
Xin Yi, Deputy Director of the Science and Technology Commission of the Central Military Commission中共中央军委科学技术委员会副主任辛毅
Miao Runqi, Professor of Political Work Teaching and Research Section, Department of Political Work and Director of the Political Department at the PLA Air Force Command College中国人民解放军空军指挥学院政治系主任、政治工作教研室教授苗润奇苗润奇
Cheng Jian, Director of the Political Work Department of the PLA Rocket Force中国人民解放军火箭军政治工作部主任程坚
Zhao Yanquan, commander, formerly Captain of the Type 052D destroyer Hefei and later of Type 054A frigate Yueyang, in the PLA Navy South China Sea Fleet中国人民解放军海军合肥舰、岳阳舰舰长赵岩泉
Wu Zhongliang, former Political Commissar of the PLA 80th Group Army’s “Eagle” Special Operations Brigade and Deputy Director of the PLA 80th Group Army Political Work Department中国人民解放军陆军第八十集团军“雄鹰”特战旅政委武仲良
Wang Huiqing, Director of the Strategic Planning Office of the CCP Central Military Commission中共中央军委战略规划办公室主任王辉青
Zhang Yihu, Deputy Commander of PLA Central Threater Command中国人民解放军中部战区副司令员张义瑚
Dang Zenglong, Deputy Director of the PLA Army Political Work Department Department中国人民解放军陆军政治工作部副主任党增龙
Guo Puxiao, Deputy Political Commissar of PLA Central Theater Command and Political Commishsar of the PLA Central Theater Command Air Force中国人民解放军中部战区副政委兼中部战区空军政委郭普校
Li Wei, then Political Commissar of the PLA Xinjiang Military District新疆军区政委李伟
Miao Jing, Assistant, Barracks Bureau, General Administration of Offices, CCP Central Military Commission中共中央军委机关事务管理总局营房局副师职助理员缪静
He Lei, Distinguished Chief Expert and Former Vice President of the Academy of Military Sciences中国人民解放军军事科学院特聘首席专家、原副院长何雷
Liu Shilei, Deputy Director of the Military Chemistry Research Institute under at the Research Institute of Chemical Defense, PLA Academy of Military Science中国人民解放军军事科学院防化研究院军事化学研究所副所长刘石磊
Cheng Cheng, Captain of the PLA Honor Guard Women’s Battalion 中国人民解放军仪仗大队女兵中队中队长程诚
Jiang Yongxin, an Associate Professor at the PLA Naval Dalian Warship Academy and a member of its Optoelectronic Technology Research Institute 中国人民解放军海军大连舰艇学院基础部、大连舰艇学院光电技术研究所副教授蒋永馨
Zhang Hongying,Senior Engineer in the Command and Control Systems Office of the Communication Support Group at the Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Operational Command Center and Senior Engineer in the 2nd Department of PLA Unit 31006 中共中央军委联合作战指挥中心通信保障大队指控系统室正高级工程师、中国人民解放军31006部队2室高级工程师张洪英
Zhang Xiaoyan, Commander of Company 1, Battalion 3, Information and Communication Regiment, PLA Southern Theater Command中国人民解放军南部战区信息通信团三营一连连长张小燕
Wu Yingxia, Senior Engineer at PLA Hua Yin Ordnance Test Center Key Laboratory of Guided Weapons Test and Evaluation Simulation Technology中国人民解放军中国华阴兵器试验中心制导武器试验鉴定仿真技术重点实验室高级工程师吴颖霞
Yang Lixia, Director of Cardiology at the No. 920 Hospital of the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force中国人民解放军联勤保障部队第九二〇医院心内科主任杨丽霞
Liu Jingju, the Director of the Network Department at Electronic Countermeasures Institute of PLA National University of Defense Technology中国人民解放军国防科技大学电子对抗学院网络系主任刘京菊
Fu Ning, Senior Engineer of an institute of General Office of the CCP Central Military Commission 中共中央军委办公厅某研究所高级工程师付宁
Gu Qingyue, Lecturer at the Equipment System Engineering Teaching and Research Office, School of Equipment Management and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Engineering, PLA Air Force Engineering University 中国人民解放军空军工程大学装备管理与无人机工程学院装备系统工程教研室讲师古清月
Wang Jian, an attending physician in the Department of Military Sick and Wounded Management at PLA Joint Logistics Support Force No. 985 Hospital中国人民解放军联勤保障部队第985医院军队伤病员管理科主治医师王健
Wang Na, a major-rank staff officer and engineer at the Office of the PLA Army Military Transportation University 中国人民解放军陆军军事交通学院办公室参谋兼工程师王娜
Pan Jiaying, political instructor of the Communications Company of the Guard and Service Unit under the PLA Henan Provincial Military Command中国人民解放军河南省军区警卫勤务队通信中队政治指导员潘佳瑛
Cai Hongxia, head nurse of the Psychiatric Department at the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force 984th Hospital中国人民解放军郑州联勤保障中心984医院精神病科护士长蔡红霞
Cui Yuling, Chief Engineer of the Equipment Department of the PLA Nanjing Military Command中国人民解放军南京军区装备部总工程师崔玉玲
Yuan Yuan, Commander of the Women’s Howitzer Battery, Tibet Military District中国人民解放军西藏军区女子战炮班班长、中国人民解放军77611部队52分队班长袁远
Jiang Yong, Political Commissar of the PLA Beijing Garrison中国人民解放军北京卫戍区政委姜勇
Kang Xiaohui, Deputy Director of the Political Work Department of the PLA Northern Theater Command中国人民解放军北部战区政治工作部副主任康晓晖
Wang Xuanyu,Professor at PLA Army Chemical Defense College中国人民解放军陆军防化学院教授王玄玉
Zhang Mingzhu, Petty Officer First Class in the Aviation Department of the Liaoning Aircraft Carrier, the PLA Navy中国人民解放军海军辽宁舰士官长张明珠
Wu Changjie , soldier of an elite special operations brigade in the PLA 75th Group Army第75集团军某旅指挥通信连特战士兵吴昌洁
Mihelunsha Abudu,aka Major Mihri Gulsha Abdu or Mihrunnisa Abdu, a Uyghur officer,director of a communications station in the PLA Air Force 中国人民解放军空军93886部队通信站站长米合伦沙·阿不都
Yaping Wang, Special Class Astronaut, PLA Astronaut Brigade中国人民解放军航天员大队特级航天员王亚平
Wang Fang, Deputy Commander of a Support Force under the PLA Central Theater Command Joint Operations Command Center and Political Instructor for the 2nd Battalion of PLA Unit 66736.中国人民解放军66736部队二营政治教导员、中国人民解放军中部战区联合作战指挥中心某保障队副队长王方
Liu Xu, the head of the Discipline Inspection Group sent by the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) Discipline Inspection Commission to the General Office of the CMC中共中央军委纪委驻军委办公厅纪检组组长刘旭
Zhuang Bingkun, Director of the Financial Bureau of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Logistics Support Department中共中央军委后勤保障部财务局局长庄炳坤
Yu Zhijian, the head of the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center of PLA unit 63710. 中国人民解放军63710部队太原卫星发射中心主任于志坚
Zhu Fuhai, Deputy Director of the PLA Air Force Political Work Department 中国人民解放军空军政治工作部副主任朱富海
Gao Bo, Director of the PLA Ground Force Equipment Department中国人民解放军陆军装备部部长高波
Xu Xinglin, Director of the Political Work Bureau of the CCP Central Military Commission Logistics Support Department中共中央军委后勤保障部政治工作局主任徐兴林
Jiang Guoping, Assistant to the Chief of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department中共中央军委联合参谋部参谋长助理姜国平
Gu Xiangbing, Vice Commander of the PLA Eastern Theater Command中国人民解放军东部战区副司令员顾祥兵
Chen Daoxiang, Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA Southern Theater Command中国人民解放军南部战区副参谋长陈道祥
Xu Yunpeng, Director of the Propaganda Bureau, PLA Western Theater Command Political Work Department中国人民解放军西部战区政治工作部宣传局局长徐云鹏
Li Huohui, Director of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) Training and Management Department 中共中央军委训练管理部部长黎火辉
Song Dan, Secretary of the Politics and Law Commission of the CCP Central Military Commission中共中央军委政法委书记宋丹
Lang Youliang, PLA Lieutenant General, Former Deputy Political Commissar the PLA Academy of Military Science中国人民解放军中将、军事科学院前副政委郎友良
Yang Chengxi, full-time Deputy Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission of the Central Military Commission中共中央军委纪委专职副书记杨成熙
Wang Huishan, Deputy Commandant and Director of Cardiovascular Surgery at the General Hospital of the PLA Northern Theater Command中国人民解放军北部战区总医院副院长兼心血管外科主任王辉山
Guan Yanmi, Armed Police Equipment Department Director武警部队装备部部长管延密
Li Xiubao, President of the PLA Daily中国人民解放军《解放军报》社长李秀宝
Li Yong, Commander of the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force中国人民解放军联勤保障部队司令员李勇
Liu Guangbin, President of the PLA Rocket Force Engineering University,中国人民解放军火箭军工程大学校长刘光斌
Zhong Zhiming, a member of the Expert Advisory Group of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) Reform Leading Group 中共中央军委改革领导小组专家咨询组成员钟志明
Wang Hai, Commander of the PLA South Sea Fleet中国人民解放军南海舰队司令员王海
Jiang Jianxin,Director of the Combat Trauma Medicine Center at the PLA Army Medical Center 中国人民解放军陆军特色医学中心战创伤医学中心主任蒋建新
Han Xiaodong, Political Commissar of the PLA Hebei Provincial Military District中国人民解放军河北省军区政治委员韩晓东
Ling Huanxin, Political Commissioner of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences 中国人民解放军军事科学院政治委员凌焕新
Song Xue, Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA Navy中国人民解放军海军副参谋长宋学
Zhan Houshun, Deputy Commander of the PLA Western Theater Command and Commander of the PLA Western Theater Command Air Force.中国人民解放军西部战区副司令员兼西部战区空军司令员战厚顺
Regional/Provincial Delegations
Article 59 of the PRC Constitution provides:
“The National People’s Assembly is composed of representatives elected by the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government, special administrative regions, and the armed forces.”
The wording is significant because it identifies the armed forces as a separate electoral source of National People’s Assembly representatives, alongside the territorial constituencies.
But the military’s presence in the National People’s Assembly is not limited to this separate national military delegation.
The electoral records also show military personnel appearing among the representatives elected through provincial constituencies. For example, the official list of the Thirteenth National People’s Assembly Representatives from Hubei contains 118 representatives elected by the Hubei Provincial Assembly at its first session on 29th Jan 2018. Separately, beginning in 2018, the Thirteenth Hubei Provincial Assembly (HPA) consisted of 726 deputies, including 26 military personnel from troops stationed in Hubei as announced on 18th Jan 2018 by the Standing Committee of Hubei Provincial Assembly.
This therefore reveals two distinct channels through which military personnel can enter the national legislative structure:
First: the armed forces themselves constitute a constitutionally recognized source of National People’s Assembly representatives.
Second: military personnel stationed within a province can also participate in the provincial electoral structure and subsequently appear among that province’s representatives to the National People’s Assembly.
The distinction matters. The constitutional phrase “the armed forces” in Article 59 should not be read as exhausting the military presence in the Assembly. A PLA or Armed Police officer can be connected to the national legislature not only through the dedicated military delegation, but also through a territorial provincial delegation.
Hubei provides a concrete example of this overlapping structure: military personnel were present within the 726-member Hubei Provincial Assembly, while the province separately elected its 118 representatives to the National People’s Assembly.
Thus, when examining the military component of the PRC's national legislative representation, it is necessary to look beyond the separately constituted PLA and Armed Police delegation. Military representation can also be embedded within territorial delegations.
Examples of active-duty military personnel serving as deputies within the Thirteenth Hubei Provincial Assembly include:
Wan Huilan (female) Deputy Director of the Strategic Research Center at the PLA Rocket Force Command College, recipient of the PLA Science and Technology Progress Award, and awarded a Third-Class Merit Citation.By September 20, 2019, she had been promoted to Director of the Military Strategy Theory Teaching and Research Office at the PLA Rocket Force Command College.
万惠兰（女）：中国人民解放军火箭指挥学院战略研究中心副主任，获得过军队科技进步奖，立过三等军功，2019年9月20日已经升为中国人民解放军火箭军指挥学院军事战略理论教研室主任。
2.Ma Tao (Manchu):Commander of the Hubei Provincial Military District, as a deputy to the Hubei Provincial Assembly. In comments made during the Hubei provincial legislative session, Ma publicly endorsed China’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy, describing Hubei’s military-civil fusion programs as a major driver of both economic development and national defense modernization.马 涛（满族）：中国人民解放军湖北省军区司令员，曾在湖北省两会上表示，“湖北军民融合充满生机活力，随着力度持续加大，必将对地方经济社会发展和国防建设带来巨大推动作用。”
3.Wang Jiaochen: On August 12, 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Yan Xiaolong, President of the Hongshan District Court in Wuhan and CCP Party Secretary, visited Wang Jiachen, a Hubei Provincial Assembly deputy from the PLA delegation, to discuss issues including military reform and COVID-19 prevention and control, and to solicit Wang Jiachen’s views and suggestions on the court’s work. According to the Supreme Court of the CCP regime, in its “Several Opinions on Comprehensively Strengthening Work on Accepting Supervision” (Fa Fa [2011] No. 14), courts across the PRC are required to actively carry out liaison work with assembly deputies and CPPCC members, diligently handle proposals submitted by assembly deputies, motions submitted by CPPCC members, and matters that concern them, with the aim of providing strong judicial guarantees for the overall work of the CCP and the CCP regime. The document also requires courts at all levels to strengthen their sense of the larger political and strategic picture, coordinate closely, and include the work of accepting supervision from assembly deputies and CPPCC members in performance evaluations, while providing the necessary funding and equipment to effectively mobilize initiative and enthusiasm. Any negligence in duty that causes adverse impact or other negative consequences must be subject to accountability. CPPCC members referred to in Supreme Court document Fa Fa [2011] No. 14 typically include figures such as PLA Major General Cao Xuetao, PLA Major General Chen Wei, Wang Huning, a Standing Committee member of the CCP Politburo and Chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC, Wang Yanyi, Director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Peng Liyuan, Xi Jinping’s wife, and Shu Hongbing, the husband of Wang Yanyi, Director of the Wuhan Institute of Virology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.王教琛:2020年8月12日，疫情期间，武汉洪山区法院院长、CCP党组书记闫小龙走访中国人民解放军代表团的湖北省人大代表王教琛，就部队改革、疫情防控工作等作交流，并征求王教琛代表对法院工作的意见和建议。根据中共国最高法院《关于全面加强接受监督工作的若干意见》（法发〔2011〕14号）要求中共国PRC的法院积极开展与人大代表、政协委员联络工作，认真办理人大代表建议、政协提案以及人大代表、政协委员关注事项，目的是为中国共产党和中共政权的工作大局提供有力司法保障，并要求各级法院强化大局意识，密切配合，要将接受人大代表、政协委员监督的工作纳入绩效考核，提供必要的经费和装备，切实调动工作主动性和积极性，对于因工作失职造成不良影响和其他不良后果的，要给予问责。中共国最高法院法发〔2011〕14号所述政协委员通常包括中国人民解放军少将曹雪涛、中国人民解放军少将陈薇、中共中央政治局常委、全国政协主席王沪宁、中科院武汉病毒研究所所长王延轶、习近平妻子彭丽媛、中科院武毒所所长王延轶的丈夫舒红兵这类政协委员。
4.Qi Yingchuan： born in 1965, male, is a professor and master’s supervisor at the Air Force Early Warning Academy of the PLA. His main research area is unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) control technology and applications. He has received two Second-Class and six Third-Class PLA Military Science and Technology Progress Awards. In 2023, he published a paper titled “Dynamic Offense and Defense of UAV Swarm Based on Situation Evolution Game.”亓迎川：1965年出生,男,在中国人民解放军空军预警学院担任教授、硕士研究生导师，主要研究方向为无人机控制技术及运用，获得过PLA军队科技进步二等奖2项、三等奖6项，2023年发表论文《基于态势演化博弈的无人机集群动态攻防》。
5.Shuai Changgen: Deputy Director of the Institute of Ship Equipment Vibration and Noise, Professor, and Doctoral Supervisor at the Naval University of Engineering of the PLA, a PLA expert in vibration and noise control for marine propulsion systems and naval engineering machinery, a “Top-Level Military Scientific and Technological Innovation Talent Training Candidate,” a “Navy Outstanding Young Talent,” and an “Advanced Individual in Learning and Professional Development Across the Armed Forces.” In 2024, he published a paper titled “Reconstruction of Physical Field Characteristics of Underwater Vehicle Wake Based on a Data-Driven Approach.”帅长庚：中国人民解放军海军工程大学舰船设备振动与噪声研究所副所长、教授、博士生导师，中国人民解放军的轮机工程舰船动力装置振动与噪声控制领域专家、“军队高层次科技创新学科拔尖人才培养对象”、海军“优秀青年”、“全军学习成才先进个人”，2024年发表了论文“Reconstruction of physical field characteristics of underwater vehicle wake based on data-driven approach”。
6.Wu Shourong：According to Announcement No. 243 issued by the Standing Committee of the Hubei Provincial Assembly in October 2018, prior to leaving office, another military representative in the Hubei Provincial Assembly delegation, Wu Shourong, served as Commander of the Suizhou Military Sub-District of the PLA.伍守荣：根据2018年10月发布的湖北省人大常委会公告（第二百四十三号），离任前，湖北省人大代表中的枪杆子代表伍守荣是中国人民解放军随州军分区司令员。
7.Liu Zhihai: According to the September 24, 2020 announcement issued by the Standing Committee of the Hubei Provincial Assembly, Liu Zhihai’s resignation from his post as a deputy to the Hubei Provincial Assembly was accepted by the Election Committee of the Hubei Provincial Military District of the PLA.刘志海：根据湖北省人大常委会2020年9月24日公告，刘志海辞去湖北省人大代表职务由中国人民解放军湖北省军区选举委员会决定接受。
8. Guan Su (Manchu)：According to Announcement No. 243 issued by the Standing Committee of the Hubei Provincial Assembly in October 2018, prior to leaving office, Guan Su, a military representative in the Hubei Provincial Assembly delegation, served as Director of the Office of the Hubei Provincial Military District of the PLA. He also concurrently served as a member of the Standing Committee of the Hubei Provincial Assembly and as Deputy Director of its Credentials Committee.
关 苏（满族）：根据2018年10月发布的湖北省人大常委会公告（第二百四十三号），离任前，湖北省人大代表中的枪杆子代表关苏是中国人民解放军湖北省军区办公室主任，兼湖北省人大常委会委员、代表资格审查委员会副主任。
9.Li Weiqiang: Deputy Political Commissar of the PLA Airborne Corps李伟强：中国人民解放军空降兵军副政治委员
10.Lai Chengtan: born in March 1967. He served as a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Xianning Municipal Committee and Commander of the Xianning Military Sub-District of the PLA. On August 31, 2017, he began serving as a PLA representative in the Xianning Municipal Assembly.
来承坦：1967年3月出生，是中共咸宁市委常委、PLA咸宁军分区司令员，2017年8月31日开始任代表PLA的咸宁市人大代表。
11.He Songli: Commander of the Wuhan Garrison of the PLA, and also a deputy to both the Hubei Provincial Assembly and the Wuhan Municipal Assembly, till 2021. also a member of of the Presidium of the Fifth Session of the 14th Wuhan Municipal Assembly.何松利: 中国人民解放军武汉警备区司令员，同时是湖北省人大代表和武汉市人大代表,2021年停止。也是武汉市第十四届人大第五次会议主席团成员。
12.Zhang Tianbao: Deputy Political Commissar of the PLA Air Force Wuhan Base, was announced by Hubei Provincial Assembly Standing Committee Announcement No. 266 in November 2020 as ceasing as a deputy to the Hubei Provincial Assembly, was promoted to the rank of Major General at the PLA National Defense University on December 16, 2020, and by November 2025 had become Deputy Political Commissar of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences.
张天宝：中国人民解放军空军武汉基地副政治委员,被2020年11月湖北省人大常委会公告第266号公告其已离任,2020年12月16日在PLA国防大学升为少将，2025年11月已经是中国人民解放军军事科学院副政治委员。
13.Zhang Lin: Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA Joint Logistic Support Force, and by around 2019 he was already referred to as Chief of Staff in official military media coverage, a position he continued to hold into at least 2020 in public appearances and reports. He was later reassigned to Central Military Commission (CMC) organ affairs work around 2021 and subsequently took a leadership role in the CMC Logistic Support Department. By 2022, publicly available information indicates he held a senior position in the CMC Logistic Support Department, was promoted to lieutenant general, and became a member of the 20th CCP Central Committee. In 2025, an NPC Standing Committee announcement stated that his status as a deputy to the NPC was revoked on grounds of alleged serious disciplinary and legal violations.张 林:中国人民解放军联勤保障部队副参谋长，至2019年前后已出现在联勤保障部队参谋长岗位的报道中，并在2020年前后仍以该职务参与相关军队活动与会议。随后，他转入军委机关体系任职，并在2021年前后出任中央军委机关事务管理总局相关领导岗位，后进入中央军委后勤保障体系任职。2022年公开资料显示，其担任中央军委后勤保障部领导职务并晋升中将，并进入中共二十届中央委员会。2025年，全国人大常委会公告显示其全国人大代表资格被罢免，理由为“涉嫌严重违纪违法”。
14.Chen Changqing：Minister of the Armed Forces Department of Huarong District, Ezhou City under the PLA陈长青：中国人民解放军鄂州市华容区武装部部长。
15. Chen Hong (female):PLA Colonel and Political Commissar of the 2nd Cadet Brigade of the College of Electronic Engineering at the Naval University of Engineering.陈 红（女）：中国人民解放军上校、海军工程大学电子工程学院学员二大队政委
16.Fan Bingtao：Political Commissar of the PLA Hubei Army Reserve Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division and concurrently as Deputy Director of the Political Department of the Hubei Provincial Military District.范炳涛：中国人民解放军湖北陆军预备役高射炮兵师政治委员兼中国人民解放军湖北省军区政治部副主任。
17.Luo Cifeng: Political Commissar of the PLA Central Theater Command Army Pontoon Bridge Brigade罗词凤：中国人民解放军中部战区陆军舟桥旅政委
18.Zhou Xiaobo: a military representative in the Hubei Provincial Assembly delegation, submitted a request to resign from his position as a deputy to the Hubei Provincial Assembly. His resignation was accepted by the Election Committee of the Hubei Provincial Military District of the PLA.周小波：提出辞去湖北省人大代表职务的请求，由中国人民解放军湖北省军区选举委员会接受。
19.Zhao Yingjun: Director of the Political Work Department of a PLA Airborne Brigade赵英俊：中国人民解放军一个空降兵旅的政治工作部主任
20.Qian Dehai：Until his departure from office as announced by the Standing Committee of the Hubei Provincial Assembly on September 24, 2020, Qian Dehai served as Commander of the Xiangyang Military Sub-District of the PLA, a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Xiangyang Municipal Committee, and a deputy to the Hubei Provincial Assembly.钱德海：直到2020年9月24日湖北省人大常委会公告离任，中国人民解放军襄阳军分区司令员、中共襄阳市委常委、湖北省人大代表。
21.Gao Jindong: former Commander of the Jingzhou Military Sub-District of the PLA, Director of the Office of the PLA Hubei Provincial Military District as of December 18, 2018.高金栋:曾任中国人民解放军荆州军分区司令员，2018年12月18日已任中国人民解放军湖北省军区办公室主任。
22.Tang Zhixin: Political Commissar of the PLA Enshi Military Sub-District; according to Announcement No. 289 issued by the Standing Committee of the Hubei Provincial Assembly on January 23, 2021, he had left office by that date.
唐志信：PLA恩施军分区政治委员，2021年1月23日湖北省人大常委会公告第289号已经离任。
23. Huang Changqing (Tujia ethnicity):Commander of PLA Yichang Military Sub-District.
黄长清（土家族）:中国人民解放军宜昌军分区司令员
24. Jiang Zuquan:A senior colonel in the PLA, resigned from his position as a representative to the Hubei Provincial Assembly in November 2019, then as the deputy commander of the Wuhan Garrison of the PLA commended at the National Commendation Conference for Fighting the COVID-19 Epidemic in the PRC on September 8, 2020, in October 2020 became the commander of the Xiangyang Military Sub-district of the PLA, Starting in 2023, as a member of the Hubei Provincial Committee of the CPPCC as a “specially invited person”.
蒋祖权：中国人民解放军大校，2019年11月湖北省人大常委会公告蒋祖权辞去湖北省人大代表职务，作为PLA武汉警备区副司令员2020年9月8日在PRC全国抗击新冠肺炎疫情表彰大会现场接受表彰，聆听习近平讲话，2020年10月已经担任PLA襄阳军分区司令员，2023年开始作为“特别邀请人士”担任担任湖北省政协委员。
25.Zeng Yan：Until his departure from office as announced by the Standing Committee of the Hubei Provincial Assembly on September 24, 2020, Zeng Yan served as a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Shiyan Municipal Committee, Commander of the Shiyan Military Sub-District of the PLA, and a deputy to the Hubei Provincial Assembly.曾 彦：直到2020年9月24日湖北省人大常委会公告离任，曾彦是中共十堰市委常委、湖北省人大代表、中国人民解放军十堰军分区司令员。
26.Lei Jun:PLA Senior Colonel, Political Commissar of the Huanggang Military Sub-District, and a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Huanggang Municipal Committee; on June 13, 2018, he expressed appreciation to the CCP Committee of Huanggang Normal University for increasing policy and financial support for national defense and military development, commended the university for successfully completing its student military recruitment tasks, and expressed hope that it would successfully fulfill its 2018 recruitment objectives.
雷 军：中国人民解放军大校、黄冈军分区政治委员、中共黄冈市委常委，2018年6月13日感谢中共黄冈师范学院党委加大政策、资金投入支持国防与军队建设，肯定其圆满完成大学生征兵工作任务，希望黄冈师范学院完成好2018年征兵工作任务。
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