Constitutional governance rests on two basic structural principles: the separation of powers and judicial independence. Institutional checks and balances prevent the concentration of absolute power within a single authority.
Since the founding of the Communist China in 1949, the political and legal architecture of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime has explicitly rejected both principles. Under the doctrine of absolute Party leadership, the judiciary, administrative organs, and the legislature do not operate as independent branches. Instead, all judicial and procuratorial bodies operate as instruments of enforcement under Party control.
This monolithic hierarchy is demonstrated in official reporting from March 2018 and December 2018 involving Major General Kang Xiaohui, Deputy Director of the Political Work Department of the PLA Northern Theater Command, and military delegates to the National People’s Congress of Communist China.
Constitutional Revisions and Absolute Party Command
At the 13th National People’s Congress in March 2018, military delegates convened to approve constitutional revisions that removed presidential term limits and enshrined Xi Jinping Thought into the state constitution.
Major General Kang Xiaohui outlined the military’s relationship to constitutional law during the session:
“The military bears a special political responsibility in the implementation and enforcement of the Constitution... We must focus on the supreme status of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state, deeply comprehend the content of the constitutional amendments, and firmly establish Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military as the guiding position in defense and military building, while fully and thoroughly implementing the Central Military Commission Chairman Responsibility System.”
Within this framework, constitutional law does not limit state power or protect individual rights against government authority. Instead, it serves as a statutory tool to enforce political compliance across civilian and military structures. By subordinating constitutional execution to the Central Military Commission Chairman Responsibility System, legal authority is tied directly to supreme Party command.
Military Delegation Oversight of Civilian Procuratorates
The structural subordination of the judiciary was illustrated in December 2018, when the Supreme People’s Procuratorate organized an inspection tour for 17 military delegates to review the Hainan Provincial People’s Procuratorate.
The delegation was led by senior military political officers, including:
Lt. Gen. Zhao Ruibao: Deputy Political Commissar and Director of the Political Work Department, PLA Western Theater Command
Maj. Gen. Kang Xiaohui: Deputy Director of the Political Work Department, PLA Northern Theater Command
Lt. Gen. Wang Shu: Former Deputy Political Commissar, PLA National Defense University
Maj. Gen. Liu Xu: Former Discipline Inspection Group Leader, General Office of the CCP Central Military Commission
Civilian prosecutorial officials presented their operational surveillance technologies to the military officers, including big data platforms, facial recognition systems, remote interrogation networks, and drone surveillance units.
Core Structural Violations of Constitutional Governance
The documented activities of Kang Xiaohui and the PLA delegation demonstrate two direct operational violations of separation of powers and judicial independence:
Active Military Officers Serving as National Legislators: Active-duty PLA generals and political commissars directly hold seats in the National People’s Congress, voting on constitutional amendments, enacting statutory laws, and blurring any distinction between military force and legislative authority.
Direct Military Interference in Civilian Judicial Operations: Active-duty military commissars conduct formal “inspections” of civilian procuratorates, reviewing prosecutorial surveillance tools and issuing binding operational directives—such as commanding civilian procurators to alter drone surveillance protocols to comply with military airspace management.
From 1949 to the present, constitutional mechanisms and judicial organs in the PRC have functioned not to separate powers, but to enable military officers to act simultaneously as national lawmakers and supervisors of civilian judicial prosecution.