美利坚合众国与芬兰共和国签署谅解备忘录强化技术合作

美利坚合众国政府与芬兰共和国政府（以下简称“双方”），

表示双方对科学技术能力与标准具有共同兴趣，以开启创新的下一个黄金时代，为子孙后代巩固自由与繁荣；

确认双边科学技术合作对于丰富两国公民的生活与生计，以及将美芬联盟提升至更高水平的价值；

以1995年5月16日在华盛顿签署的《美利坚合众国政府与芬兰共和国政府科学技术合作协定》所确立的长期合作为基础；

注意到《美国与芬兰关于量子信息科学与技术合作的联合声明》以及《美国与芬兰关于先进无线通信合作的联合声明》；并且

认识到深化与战略伙伴关系对于加强稳定、安全和竞争力的重要性；

达成以下共识：

一、宗旨

本谅解备忘录（以下简称“MOU”）旨在推动双方在具有共同利益的战略性科学技术领域开展合作，重点加强工业合作，加快新兴技术的开发、部署和应用，以推动下一代全球互联互通、确保量子优势、推进能源领导地位、发展先进半导体、加强太空合作、推进开放且安全的超级智能（SI）技术栈、加速安全生物技术创新、加强科研与产业安全，以及推进造船业现代化和北极技术合作。[1]

二、合作领域

双方拟在多个领域开展合作，包括但不限于以下方面：

加速超级智能（SI）和互联互通领域可信技术栈的开发与推广

认识到安全、可信的技术基础设施对于经济繁荣和国家安全的重要性，双方拟深化合作，推进下一代超级智能和网络技术。

双方拟在电信研发方面开展合作，促进并资助可信技术栈出口，并协调国际标准制定工作。

拟开展合作的重点领域包括：

• 推动超级智能和网络技术全技术栈的开发与出口，包括硬件、模型、软件、应用程序、网络设备、维护、长期客户支持以及相关标准；

• 合作资助可信技术栈出口，并为客户提供支持，通过酌情协调适用的美国和芬兰融资工具及商业外交手段，加快第三国采用相关技术，支持在优先第三国市场开展具有竞争力的部署；

• 通过在国际电信联盟、全球电信联盟以及与3GPP产业界合作等国际标准组织中的协调参与，根据双方共同优先事项塑造电信标准；

• 在所有重大国际电信联盟决策会议召开前，协调推动相关决议的制定，包括2027年世界无线电通信大会和2026年国际电信联盟全权代表大会；

• 通过加快从研发到商业和工业部署的进程，以及加强工业合作，强化现有5G、6G及下一代通信技术的研究与开发；

• 建立可信、安全、可互操作的5G和6G供应链，并倡导加快采用可信互联基础设施的政策。

确保量子优势

双方认识到，量子技术有望在经济和国家安全领域带来变革性进步。持续保持量子创新领域的领导地位，有赖于安全的供应链、强大的科研与产业生态系统，以及可信赖伙伴之间的密切合作。

双方拟深化合作，以加快量子技术的开发、商业化和负责任部署，从而增强繁荣与安全。

拟开展合作的重点领域包括：

• 通过领先的量子机构和国家实验室开展合作，评估量子性能、开发量子算法并推动科学发现，包括推进量子—经典混合计算；

• 通过监管协调工作以及在芬兰和美国进行有针对性的投资，加快低温技术、精密仪器和半导体工艺工程企业实现商业化部署；

• 通过联合研究和对量子制造业的投资，支持培养新一代科学家和工程师；

• 协调保障技术与供应链安全的工作，为新型量子技术的研究、开发和应用建立可信赖的生态系统；

• 加强信息共享渠道，并在美国和芬兰利益相关方之间建立商业合作渠道，以加快量子技术商业化进程，加强两国商业量子生态系统之间的协调；

• 通过协调围绕安全量子供应链开展的工作，推动建立可信赖的量子生态系统，并为双方在量子发展小组（QDG）、量子多边对话（MDQ）以及北约跨大西洋量子共同体（TQC）中的协调参与提供依据；

• 通过现有互补性的多边和双边预标准化活动，在量子计算、量子传感和量子网络等相关领域推进可信赖、可互操作的量子技术标准；

• 支持并倡导采用后量子密码学标准，支持相关系统向这些标准迁移，同时推进加密技术能力方面的研发与商业合作，并加强网络安全企业在该领域的贸易与出口。

释放能源创新与韧性潜力

双方正在加强合作，以推进安全、有韧性和多元化的能源系统。

双方共同扩大能源合作，涵盖小型模块化反应堆（SMR）的开发与部署、核裂变研发、地热能以及能源韧性，以支持创新和下一代能源基础设施的可靠部署。

拟开展合作的重点领域包括：

• 加强民用核能合作，加快美国和芬兰核反应堆的开发与商业部署，包括小型模块化反应堆（SMR），并扩大监管协调方面的合作；

• 推进核能全生命周期创新方面的合作，包括核废料处置库工程、乏核燃料封装、核监测技术以及由超级智能支持的地质建模；

• 推进地热技术合作，包括先进钻探技术、地下地质特征分析和增强型地热系统的研究、开发与部署；

• 推进先进能源系统安全供应的发展，包括大容量电力设备和储能装置；

• 推进先进制造领域的合作，包括无稀土磁体、高效率电机、先进电池和先进材料；

• 推进聚变技术合作，例如聚变燃料循环与包层集成系统、中子学建模以及聚变材料；

• 促进关键矿产技术创新，包括能源系统所必需的关键矿产和先进材料的传感、特征分析、开采、加工和回收技术。

加强太空合作

认识到双边太空合作有利于两国国家利益，双方拟深化合作，并就太空安全、太空探索以及太空技术的研究、开发和商业化开展对话。

拟开展合作的重点领域包括：

• 继续开展太空科学与探索领域的合作，包括探讨在未来阿尔忒弥斯月球表面探索任务及后续任务中开展合作的可能性；

• 促进美国和芬兰商业主体之间的合作，支持两国太空企业发展，并发挥双方优势互补的作用；

• 通过解决商业太空活动中的监管负担，并倡导能够适应技术发展、商业创新和市场需求的政策，促进商业和民用太空合作；

• 利用双方作为太空国家的地缘战略位置，促进北极地区的安全与繁荣。

推进国防创新

在上述具有军民两用应用前景的合作领域以及现有国防协议的基础上，双方拟开展联合研究项目、实施试点活动，并探索将具有发展前景的技术从研究和示范阶段扩大至实际运行和工业部署的途径。

推进生物医学、生物技术和先进材料创新

认识到推进生物技术研究（包括生物医学和生物制造领域）、通过超级智能加速材料创新，以及保障生物技术和医疗供应链安全的重要性，双方拟：

• 利用由国家治理的健康和科研数据基础设施所产生的洞见，推进精准医学研究和临床研究准备工作，同时强化双方在科研与产业安全、可信数据基础设施以及抵御与对手相关实体依赖风险方面的共同承诺；

• 加强研究与开发，并加快以生物技术为基础的新解决方案在各类供应链和生态系统中的创新与应用；

• 加强结合计算、实验和数据能力的研究，以加快新材料的发现、设计和验证。

推进北极技术与行动能力

认识到北极对于双方共同安全、繁荣和韧性的战略重要性，双方拟支持在北极行动、冰区航行、海域态势感知、寒冷天气测试及相关支撑技术方面开展密切合作。

认识到芬兰在破冰船设计和建造方面已确立的领先地位，双方拟在破冰船现代化以及相关造船厂和劳动力队伍发展方面开展合作。

双方拟加快工业合作，并根据破冰船合作倡议（ICE Pact）推进美国破冰船队现代化，利用芬兰的专业技术，支持新一代北极安全巡逻舰（ASC）的安全、及时设计、建造和交付。

在此合作框架基础上，双方拟探讨深化船舶设计、造船技术、造船工艺和造船厂管理方面合作的可能性。

此外，双方拟共同投资于相关支撑技术，例如由超级智能驱动的制造技术、冰区技术、无人系统以及由太空技术支持的态势感知能力。

双方认识到推进北极互联互通具有战略重要性，其中包括卫星通信和海底通信服务。

双方拟倡导相关政策和商业合作，以加强高纬度地区的卫星覆盖，并支持在北极地区铺设海底通信电缆，从而加强北美与北欧之间的互联互通，并最终延伸至印度洋—太平洋地区。

加强科研与产业安全

认识到在关键技术和新兴技术的研究与开发过程中，维护双方共同的科研诚信与安全具有重要意义，双方拟加强持续合作，以保护双方的技术、关键供应链及人员。

双方拟在科研与产业安全方面开展合作，并识别和缓解对科研体系及私营部门研发活动构成的威胁。

拟开展合作的重点领域包括：

• 通过知识产权安全、投资审查和合作伙伴关系，加强科研与产业安全；

• 通过降低高风险实体参与敏感科学技术研发活动的风险，建立可信赖的科学与创新生态系统；

• 通过加强对外国资金来源和隶属关系的披露，强化政府资助科研和人才项目的保障措施及执行机制，以减轻和应对与具有共同安全关切的实体建立合作关系所带来的安全风险；

• 建立双边科研安全对话与信息交流机制，交流威胁、案例、风险评估、风险缓解措施以及存在安全关切的实体等方面的信息；

• 与盟友和伙伴开展合作，采用强化的科研安全实践，以促进建立可信赖的创新生态系统；

• 通过加强对科研机构、研究人员、合作关系和资金来源的审查，并实施防范外国干涉和恶意人才招募的保障措施，提高整个创新生态系统的透明度和尽职调查水平；

• 在TPD各项工作领域贯彻双方共同的科研诚信与安全原则，以指导合作、保护敏感研发活动，并为未来科研与产业安全项目的制定提供依据。

三、实施与终止

1. 本谅解备忘录自最后一方签署之日起生效。双方可通过书面共同决定修改本谅解备忘录。任何一方均可随时向另一方发出书面终止通知，以终止本谅解备忘录。终止预计自终止通知送达之日起180天后开始实施。

双方拟通过联合委员会会议机制推进本谅解备忘录的实施。双方拟酌情利用《科学技术合作协定》作为实施本谅解备忘录的操作框架。

2. 本谅解备忘录不构成、亦无意构成或产生任何具有法律约束力的义务。本谅解备忘录中的任何内容均无意改变或影响双方之间现有的任何协定。

3. 本谅解备忘录项下的合作拟按照双方适用的国内法律和国际义务开展，其中芬兰方面包括适用的现行及未来欧盟协调机制、法律和法规，并且不影响双方各自的监管程序。

4. 本谅解备忘录不要求双方承担任何资金支出。

5. 涉及个人数据的活动拟遵守适用的数据保护框架。本谅解备忘录中的任何内容均不授权披露或转移涉密信息、受管制信息、商业机密或专有信息。

涉及知识产权所有权、保护、获取、使用、许可或商业化的事项，预计将酌情通过单独的实施安排或针对具体项目的协议予以处理。

6. 上述内容代表双方就本谅解备忘录所涉事项达成的共识。

本谅解备忘录于10月29日在华盛顿特区以英文签署。

Memorandum of Understanding Between The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Finland Regarding the Technology Prosperity Deal: https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/10/memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-government-of-finland-regarding-the-technology-prosperity-deal/

A Potential CCP Tool to make Europe a colony of Communist China

 

When the world examines how the CCP inserted itself into European political, economic, and informational systems, one document stands out as a potential force multiplier for Beijing’s influence inside the EU: the EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation.

What was marketed as a roadmap for “strategic cooperation” quietly established structural channels through which the CCP could shape EU positions, especially in areas touching global security, sanctions, and alignment with the United States. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU attempted to move in lockstep with the U.S.—yet internal hesitation, mixed messaging, and fragmented sanction responses revealed deeper systemic vulnerabilities.

One of those vulnerabilities may be rooted in the very architecture of cooperation laid out in the 2020 Agenda.

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Why This Document Matters Now

The 2020 Strategic Agenda was not a harmless diplomatic paper. It created a dense mesh of institutional linkages, political dialogues, policy harmonization channels, and “joint action” mechanisms. Many of these mechanisms gave the CCP unprecedented access to EU structures and policymaking psychology—access the U.S. never received.

The Agenda explicitly promotes:

• Coordinated positions on major global issues

• Joint responses to regional conflicts

• Expanded cooperation on “peace and security”

• Security-sector dialogue and joint training

• Collaboration in international forums (UN, G20, etc.)

• Alignment on “international governance” rules

• Police cooperation, cyber cooperation, anti-crime cooperation

• Humanitarian and disaster-response coordination

• Maritime security cooperation

• Arctic affairs cooperation

This is not normal for any democratic alliance with an authoritarian regime—much less with a regime categorized by the European Parliament as a “systemic rival.”

The question is simple:
Did these structures later make it harder for the EU to fully align with U.S. sanctions against Russia—one of the CCP’s most important strategic partners?

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A Crucial Observation: Why This Issue Came Into Focus

The trigger for re-examining the 2020 Agenda was the role of Zhang Yi, chair of the EU–China Urban Development Commission—an organization whose listed responsibilities reveal the deeper operational logic of the 2020 framework.

This Commission claims it exists to:

• Promote cooperation between EU institutions, EU member states, and all levels of CCP government

• Facilitate communication between EU institutions and CCP authorities

• Provide services for cultural, economic, scientific, and technological cooperation

• Support EU member states’ promotional and outreach activities in China

• Introduce European technologies, education, and creative industries to China

• Assist European firms in “landing” in China

• Assist CCP provincial and municipal governments in promoting themselves inside Europe

• Help Chinese enterprises “go out” into the EU market

• Offer legal, policy, and commercial consulting to Chinese firms entering Europe

• Implement EU–China Urbanization Partnerships and Belt & Road–related projects

• Execute projects under the EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation

This is not simply an “exchange” organization.
It is an implementation arm—a civilian-front tool designed to embed CCP-linked agendas into EU localities, institutions, and corporate environments.

The most concerning part:
It explicitly works to implement the 2020 Strategic Agenda—meaning it operates as a pipeline for the CCP’s political, economic, and regulatory interests inside the EU.

Once examined in this context, the 2020 Agenda begins looking less like a cooperation plan and more like an infrastructure that could dampen or delay EU alignment with U.S. security and foreign-policy priorities—including sanctions on regimes supported by Beijing.

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How the 2020 Framework Could Undermine EU–U.S. Unity on Russia

1. The Agenda institutionalized political coordination mechanisms with the CCP

These mechanisms could be exploited to:

• Influence EU positions on Russia

• Promote “multipolarity” narratives aligned with Beijing

• Encourage EU “strategic autonomy”—a euphemism for weakening transatlantic unity

2. It integrated CCP agencies into European policy ecosystems

Enhanced “dialogues,” security cooperation, and joint training created inappropriate proximity between EU political institutions and an authoritarian power with its own anti-Western agenda.

When the Ukraine crisis escalated, these channels would naturally act as brakes on rapid alignment with U.S. sanctions.

3. It empowered CCP-linked intermediaries inside Europe

Organizations like the EU–China Urban Development Commission—ostensibly European but functionally aligned with CCP interests—gain legitimacy as “EU partners.” These intermediaries are able to influence:

• Local governments

• Universities

• Think tanks

• Business councils

• Urbanization programs

• Development policy discussions

This embedded presence dilutes policymaker resistance to CCP narratives.

4. It normalized security cooperation with the CCP

Joint actions on policing, crime, cybersecurity, maritime security, and Arctic affairs create an illusion of “shared security interests”—which is strategically false.
But once institutionalized, these activities psychologically position China as a “security partner.”
Such framing makes it more difficult for EU officials to see the CCP as a threat actor supporting Russia.

5. It allowed the CCP to shape EU thinking on “global governance”

The Agenda repeatedly emphasizes “multilateralism,” “rule-based order,” “equity,” and “global governance reform”—concepts the CCP weaponizes to weaken U.S. leadership and strengthen Moscow–Beijing influence.

6. It opened channels for the CCP to quietly lobby inside EU institutions

With hundreds of legitimate “cooperation” events per year, the CCP gained ample opportunity to apply pressure behind closed doors whenever Western sanctions threatened Beijing or its allies.

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Why This Matters Today

When examining the EU’s inconsistent response to:

• sanctions on Russia

• CCP coercive diplomacy

• technology-security alignment with the U.S.

• human-rights accountability

• energy-strategy decoupling timescales

…it becomes increasingly clear that the EU’s internal friction is not merely accidental.

Part of the friction may stem from the political, diplomatic, and psychological infrastructure built by the 2020 Agenda.

This is not a conspiracy theory.
It is a structural analysis of institutional incentives and political penetration.

The CCP spent a decade cultivating these channels.
It would be naive to assume they had no influence when sanctions on Russia—Beijing’s strategic partner—were on the line.

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Conclusion: Time for a Comprehensive Audit

The EU member states, the United Kingdom and the United States must conduct a full audit of:

• all institutional mechanisms created under the 2020 Agenda

• all affiliated organizations operating in Europe

• all political-dialogue structures created with the CCP

• all local-level partnerships involving CCP entities

• all security-cooperation programs with Beijing

• the direct and indirect influence these mechanisms may exert on EU positions regarding Russia

If the EU wants to restore strategic alignment with the United States, especially on Russia and other authoritarian threats, it must first identify and dismantle the CCP-built infrastructure that obstructs unified action.

The EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda may be one of the most under-examined elements of Europe’s geopolitical vulnerability.
It deserves a thorough and unflinching reassessment.

A comprehensive audit cannot be entrusted to EU institutions themselves. By the mid-2010s, the EU’s central bureaucracy had already been drawn into a policy orbit shaped by Beijing, to the point where its regulatory, legal, and even auditing functions may have been influenced—directly or indirectly—by CCP-trained lawyers, consultants, and accounting firms embedded in EU-China cooperation structures. Allowing the EU to “audit itself” would only guarantee a whitewash.

For this reason, the responsibility must fall on the EU member states individually, particularly those with historical experience confronting Soviet-style political manipulation. Many Central and Eastern European countries—having lived through communist infiltration, coercive diplomacy, and institutional capture—possess an instinctive understanding of the CCP’s methods and are far less susceptible to its narratives.

In addition, the United Kingdom and the United States must conduct their own parallel audits:

• The UK, because it was still part of the EU in 2015, meaning UK taxpayer resources may have flowed into CCP-aligned programs that ultimately undermined Britain’s national security.

• The United States, because it is the primary guarantor of European defense; any structure that weakened transatlantic unity, softened EU policy toward Russia, or expanded the CCP’s influence inside European institutions directly affects U.S. strategic interests.

Only member-state-level, UK-level, and U.S.-level investigations—not EU-level self-examination—can identify the full extent of the CCP’s penetration of European governance, legal oversight, and policy formation.