The Constitutional Incompatibility of the PRC Framework with the Terms “People’s” and “Republic” under the UN Charter and UNGA Resolution 2758

 

A forensic textual and constitutional analysis reveals a fundamental divergence between the actual power structure of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) Beijing regime and the international legal frameworks under which China holds its global standing.

I. Textual Non-Conformity under Article 23 of the UN Charter and UNGA Resolution 2758

Under foundational principles of international law—codified in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)—terms in international legal instruments must be interpreted in good faith, strictly according to their ordinary textual meaning in context and in light of their object and purpose. A rigorous textual examination reveals a fundamental misalignment between the present political reality in Beijing and the governing legal texts.

1. Unamended Literal Text of Article 23

Article 23 of the United Nations Charter explicitly mandates that the "Republic of China" (ROC) is a permanent member of the Security Council. To date, this express textual designation has never been formally amended under the mandatory amendment mechanisms established by Article 108 of the Charter. Under strict textualism, the ongoing substitution of the governing entity in Beijing without a formal textual amendment constitutes an unreconciled variance from the explicit terms of the UN Charter.

2. Textual Deconstruction of UNGA Resolution 2758

While United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 references the "People’s Republic of China" (PRC), an analysis applying standard legal semantics reveals structural non-conformity with the literal terms "People's" and "Republic":

• The Semantic Scope of "People’s" vs. Institutional Reality:

  From a strict legal and textual standpoint, the qualifier "People’s" denotes popular sovereignty—a system belonging to and governed by the entire citizenry through meaningful representation and oversight. However, Article 1 of the PRC Constitution expressly establishes a "People’s Democratic Dictatorship." In practice, this constitutional structure denies citizens independent electoral and supervisory rights over the party-state apparatus, creating a direct textual and operational conflict with the ordinary legal meaning of "People’s."

• The Legal Meaning of "Republic" vs. One-Party Party-State Fusion:

  In public international and constitutional law, a "Republic" fundamentally presupposes the separation of powers, institutional checks, an independent judiciary, and a military subordinate to civilian constitutional authority. Conversely, the regime in Beijing operates as a one-party system where the armed forces (the PLA) are constitutionally and structurally subordinate to the Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC) rather than a civilian state mechanism. Active-duty military delegates in the National People's Congress (NPC) exercise structured block-voting power, institutionalizing military influence over legislative organs and maintaining immunity from civilian judicial oversight.

Consequently, measured against standard textual canons of international law, the structural reality of the Beijing regime strictly diverges from the constitutional and rule-of-law thresholds embodied in the plain text of both Article 23 of the UN Charter and Resolution 2758.

When UNGA Resolution 2758 references the “People’s Republic of China” and UN Charter Article 23 anchors the permanent seat of the "Republic of China”, the literal definitions of “People’s” (popular sovereignty and universal self-determination) and “Republic” (a public governance structure founded on civilian constitutionalism, constitutional supremacy, and the separation of powers) serve as essential legal benchmarks.

A rigorous textual examination of the Constitution of the PRC aka CCP Beijing regime demonstrates that its structural articles and ideological preamble explicitly negate the literal legal definition of both “People’s” and “Republic.”

Textual Deconstruction: Why the PRC Constitution Contradicts the Literal Meaning of “People’s”

The term “People’s” in legal theory and international governance mandates that ultimate sovereign authority originates from the citizenry through genuine popular sovereignty, uncoerced political participation, and universal, equal suffrage without ideological qualification.

Literal Requirement of "People's" (Popular Sovereignty)
  └── Universal suffrage & uncoerced political agency for ALL citizens
      VS.
PRC Constitutional Text
  ├── Preamble & Art. 1: Subordinates state to "Leadership of the CCP"
  ├── Preamble & Art. 1: Mandates "Dictatorship" against ideologically defined "enemies"
  └── Art. 51: Subordinates individual rights to "interests of the State"

The text of the PRC Constitution structurally denies popular sovereignty through four primary constitutional mechanics:

1. Constitutional Monopolization by a Single Vanguard Party (Preamble & Article 1):

   • Textual Provisions: The Preamble explicitly subordinates the national destiny to the directive that the populace shall “continue under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.” Article 1 further codifies that “The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”

   • Literal Contradiction: In a true “People’s” sovereign state, the people retain the right to alter, choose, or dismiss their governing authorities. Codifying a single political party’s permanent monopoly as a foundational constitutional requirement strips the populace of political choice, reducing “the people” from sovereign masters to constitutional subjects under mandatory party guidance.

2. Institutionalization of “Dictatorship” Over Sovereignty (Preamble, Articles 1 & 28):

   • Textual Provisions: Article 1 defines the state as a “socialist state under the people’s democratic dictatorship,” explicitly equated in the Preamble with the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” The Preamble further asserts that “class struggle will continue to exist within a certain scope,” and Article 28 mandates that the state “suppresses treasonable and other criminal activities.”

   • Literal Contradiction: A dictatorship is legally antithetical to popular sovereignty. By embedding class struggle and “dictatorship” into the constitutional baseline, the state reserves the unilateral authority to strip citizenship rights from any individual or group designated as an “enemy” or “hostile force,” violating the prerequisite of universal, equal political belonging.

3. Subordination of Fundamental Rights to State and Collective Interests (Article 51):

   • Textual Provisions: Article 51 explicitly mandates: “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China, in exercising their freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society or of the collective.”

   • Literal Contradiction: In popular constitutional theory, rights belong inherently to the people to protect them against state overreach. Article 51 inverts this hierarchy: individual rights listed in Articles 35–37 (freedom of speech, assembly, press, person) are legal conditional privileges that vanish the moment their exercise conflicts with state or party interests.

4. Absence of Direct Universal Suffrage for Supreme State Organs (Articles 59 & 97):

   • Textual Provisions: Article 97 specifies that direct elections occur only at the lowest administrative levels (county and township), while provincial and national representatives are elected indirectly by lower-level congresses. Article 59 establishes that National People’s Congress (NPC) delegates are chosen through indirect multi-tiered processes managed by Standing Committee of the NPC.

   • Literal Contradiction: Genuine popular sovereignty requires direct accountability. The multi-tiered indirect election system filters popular will through party-controlled electoral committees, ensuring the citizenry exercises no direct legal mechanism to choose or recall national lawmakers or executive officers.

Textual Deconstruction: Why the PRC Constitution Contradicts the Literal Meaning of “Republic”

A “Republic” (res publica—a public affair) legally requires a government governed by public law rather than private or party decree, structured around civilian supremacy, an independent judiciary, constitutional checks and balances, and the complete institutional separation of state power from private or party control.

Literal Requirement of "Republic" (Res Publica & Rule of Law)
  └── Civilian supremacy, independent judiciary, structural separation of powers
      VS.
PRC Constitutional Text
  ├── Art. 3: Rejects separation of powers in favor of "Democratic Centralism"
  ├── Art. 93: Places armed forces under the Central Military Commission (CMC)
  └── Arts. 133 & 138: Mandates courts and procuratorates are accountable to State Power Organs

The PRC Constitution explicitly dismantles the fundamental requisites of a republic through five key structural arrangements:

1. Explicit Rejection of Separation of Powers in Favor of Concentrated Power (Article 3):

   • Textual Provisions: Article 3 establishes that state organs operate under the principle of “democratic centralism” and that executive, supervisory, judicial, and procuratorial organs are all generated by, responsible to, and supervised by the People’s Congresses.

   • Literal Contradiction: A republic prevents tyranny by separating executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Under Article 3, all state power is unified under a single organ (”centralism”), eliminating horizontal checks and balances and concentrating total authority under whatever political body controls the legislative leadership.

2. Subordination of the Judiciary to Political Organs (Articles 133, 138):

   • Textual Provisions: While Articles 131 and 136 state that courts and procuratorates exercise their power “independently,” Articles 133 and 138 mandate that the SUPREME COURT (SPC) and SUPREME PROCURATORATE (SPP) are directly “responsible to the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee.”

   • Literal Contradiction: In a legal republic, the judiciary must possess final power to interpret the constitution and review the legality of legislative and executive acts. Under the PRC Constitution, the judiciary is structurally subordinated to the legislature, creating a self-referential system where the state organ that enacts laws is also the sole interpreter of their constitutionality (Article 67), leaving citizens with no independent judicial recourse against legislative or executive overreach.

3. Institutional Insertion of Military Command Over State Organs (Articles 59 & 93–94):

   • Textual Provisions: Article 93 specifies that the Central Military Commission (CMC) leads the armed forces under a system where the “Chairman of the Central Military Commission has overall responsibility” (Article 93). Article 59 explicitly establishes the military as an independent voting delegation within the NPC (“The National People’s Congress is composed of deputies elected from... and the armed forces”).

   • Literal Contradiction: A genuine republic demands absolute civilian supremacy over the armed forces and the complete exclusion of active-duty military units from national legislative governance. By granting the armed forces formal, direct block-representation within the national legislature, the PRC Constitution codifies a political-military hybrid structure, contradicting the civilian mandate of republican constitutionalism.

4. Party-State Fusion and the Non-Public Character of Power:

• Textual Provisions: The Preamble and Article 1 legalistically bind the entire state machinery—including administrative organs , judicial bodies, and military command—to the ideological leadership of a self-selected political party.

• Literal Contradiction: Res publica requires that public offices exist independently of any private organization or ideological faction. The legal fusion of the state apparatus with the administrative structure of the ruling party transforms public state authority into a private political instrument, violating the foundational requirement that governance remain a truly public institution accountable to all citizens equally.

5. 
   

This structural roster analysis examines the operational backgrounds, institutional postings, and command appointments of active-duty military National People’s Congress (NPC) delegates serving within the 13th NPC delegation.

By mapping personnel across theater commands, service branches, specialized research academies, logistics hubs, and political enforcement bodies, this dataset documents how the Central Military Commission (CMC)of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) projects legislative authority, integrates dual-use civil-military infrastructure, and enforces internal regime security.

Key institutional sectors represented across the delegation include:

• Theater Commands and Regional Defense Districts: Operational command leadership across theater-level armies, air forces, and provincial military districts—including senior commanders and political commissars from the Central, Eastern, Western, Southern, and Northern Theater Commands, as well as the Beijing, Shanghai, Hainan, Zhejiang, and Hebei provincial jurisdictions.

• Central Military Commission Organs: Senior officials embedded across primary CMC functional departments, including the Joint Staff Department, Strategic Planning Office, Training and Management Department, Logistics Support Department, Science and Technology Commission, and the Joint Operational Command Center.

• Internal Enforcement and Political Surveillance: Flag officers occupying pivotal nodes within the internal discipline apparatus, including the CMC Commission for Discipline Inspection, the CMC Politics and Law Commission, and political work departments across the Ground Force, Air Force, Navy, and Rocket Force.

• Advanced Military Research, Biological Warfare, and Cyber Defense: Academic and technical specialists operating within the Academy of Military Sciences, National University of Defense Technology, Chemical Defense Research Institute, Air Force Engineering University, and cyber warfare teaching facilities.

• Naval Aviation, Carrier Integration, and Strategic Domain Oversight: Flag officers and technical leads directing aircraft carrier procurement, South China Sea island/reef garrison operations, submarine technology, and space exploration via the astronaut corps and satellite launch centers.

• Joint Logistics and Military Medical Networks: Leadership overseeing strategic supply chain hubs, weapon disposal depots, and military medical institutions responsible for combat trauma research and joint logistical mobilization.

Through this legislative block, active-duty military NPC delegates exercise unified voting power under direct CMC command to ratify state leadership appointments, endorse national budgets, and subordinate state judicial organs—including the SUPREME COURT (SPC) and SUPREME PROCURATORATE (SPP)—ensuring total structural exemption of military operations, procurement networks, and internal disciplinary purges from civilian legal oversight.

1. Wang Wenquan, Political Commissar of the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force中国人民解放军联勤保障部队政委王文全

   

2. Zhang Xuefeng, Deputy Commander of the Eastern Theater Command Army, PLA中国人民解放军东部战区陆军副司令员张学锋

3. Zhang Xiongwei, Professor, Cyberspace Security Teaching and Research Office, College of Command and Control Engineering, PLA Army Engineering University中国人民解放军陆军工程大学指挥控制工程学院网络空间安全教研室教授张雄伟

4. Chen Liming, Professor, Operational Command Teaching and Research Office, Department of Operational Command, PLA Naval Command College中国人民解放军海军指挥学院作战指挥系作战指挥教研室教授陈黎明

5. Ling Xi, Political Commissar of the PLA Shanghai Garrison中国人民解放军上海警备区政委凌希

   

6. Wu Shaohua, PLA Army Service Academy中国人民解放军陆军勤务学院教授吴少华

   

7. Xiao Dongsong, Political Commissar of the PLA Army Command College中国人民解放军陆军指挥学院政治委员肖冬松

   

8. Yu Feng, Radar Platoon Commander, Unnamed South China Sea Island/Reef Garrison, PLA Navy中国人民解放军海军南中国海某岛礁雷达分队长于峰

   

9. Chen Xueli, Chief of Staff, Second Scrapped Weapons and Ammunition Disposal Depot, PLA Joint Logistics Support Force中国人民解放军联勤保障部队报废武器弹药销毁二队参谋长陈雪礼

   

10. Zhang Mingzhu, Carrier Aircraft Director, PLA Navy Aircraft Carrier Liaoning中国人民解放军海军辽宁舰舰载机引导员张明珠

    

11. Chen Yuan, Deputy Commander of Jiangsu Provincial Corps of Communist Armed Police 江苏省武警总队副司令员陈源

    

12. Zhang Jianchao, Deputy Commander of Zhejiang Provincial Corps of Communist Armed Police武警浙江省总队副司令员张建超

    

13. Huang Ming, Commander of PLA Unit 31675 中国人民解放军31675部队部队长黄铭

    

14. Song Shanyu, Deputy Director of the Political Department of PLA Unit 71620 中国人民解放军原71620部队政治处副主任宋善玉。

    

15. Yu Hailong, Political Instructor of the PLA Airborne Corps中国人民解放军空降兵政治教导员余海龙

    

16. Wu Jieming, Political Commissar of PLA National Defence University. 中国人民解放军国防大学政委吴杰明

    

17. Zhao He, Political Director of a Company, 1st Mobile Mobile Division of the Armed Police Force武警第一机动总队某中队指导员赵贺

    

18. Yin Dong, Operational Staff Officer of PLA Rocket Force Unit 96753 中国人民解放军火箭军96753部队作训参谋尹东

    

19. Yang Yang, Deputy Operations Officer of the PLA Amphibious Transport Dock Yimengshan中国人民解放军沂蒙山舰副作战长杨扬

    

20. Feng Wei, Deputy Regiment Commander of an Aviation Regiment of the Western Theater Command Air Force, PLA中国人民解放军西部战区空军航空兵某团副团长冯玮

    

21. Xiu Changzhi, Political Commissar of PLA Zhejiang Provincial District 中国人民解放军浙江省军区政治委员修长智

    

22. Wang Quanli, Engineering Maintenance Technician of a Regiment of the PLA Army Engineering Maintenance Corps中国人民解放军陆军工程维护总队某团工程维护技师王全理

    

23. Ma Hepali (a/k/a Maqpal, Makpal, the Political Commissar of the 2nd Tank Company of a Combined Arms Regiment in the Xinjiang Military District中国人民解放军新疆军区某合成团坦克二连政治指导员马和帕丽；

    

24. Yang Zheng—Commander of the PLA Hainan Provincial Military Command 中国人民解放军海南省军区司令员杨征

    

25. Xin Yi, Deputy Director of the Science and Technology Commission of the Central Military Commission中共中央军委科学技术委员会副主任辛毅

    

26. Miao Runqi, Professor of Political Work Teaching and Research Section, Department of Political Work and Director of the Political Department at the PLA Air Force Command College中国人民解放军空军指挥学院政治系主任、政治工作教研室教授苗润奇苗润奇

    

27. Cheng Jian, Director of the Political Work Department of the PLA Rocket Force中国人民解放军火箭军政治工作部主任程坚

    

28. Zhao Yanquan, commander, formerly Captain of the Type 052D destroyer Hefei and later of Type 054A frigate Yueyang, in the PLA Navy South China Sea Fleet中国人民解放军海军合肥舰、岳阳舰舰长赵岩泉

    

29. Wu Zhongliang, former Political Commissar of the PLA 80th Group Army’s “Eagle” Special Operations Brigade and Deputy Director of the PLA 80th Group Army Political Work Department中国人民解放军陆军第八十集团军“雄鹰”特战旅政委武仲良

    

30. Wang Huiqing, Director of the Strategic Planning Office of the CCP Central Military Commission中共中央军委战略规划办公室主任王辉青

36. Zhang Yihu, Deputy Commander of PLA Central Threater Command中国人民解放军中部战区副司令员张义瑚

37. Dang Zenglong, Deputy Director of the PLA Army Political Work Department Department中国人民解放军陆军政治工作部副主任党增龙

38. Guo Puxiao, Deputy Political Commissar of PLA Central Theater Command and Political Commishsar of the PLA Central Theater Command Air Force中国人民解放军中部战区副政委兼中部战区空军政委郭普校

39. Li Wei, then Political Commissar of the PLA Xinjiang Military District新疆军区政委李伟

40. Zhu Cheng, Director of the PLA Air Force Equipment Department中国人民解放军空军装备部部长朱程

    

41. Miao Jing, Assistant, Barracks Bureau, General Administration of Offices, CCP Central Military Commission中共中央军委机关事务管理总局营房局副师职助理员缪静

    

42. He Lei, Distinguished Chief Expert and Former Vice President of the Academy of Military Sciences中国人民解放军军事科学院特聘首席专家、原副院长何雷

43. Liu Shilei, Deputy Director of the Military Chemistry Research Institute under at the Research Institute of Chemical Defense, PLA Academy of Military Science中国人民解放军军事科学院防化研究院军事化学研究所副所长刘石磊

44. Cheng Cheng, Captain of the PLA Honor Guard Women’s Battalion 中国人民解放军仪仗大队女兵中队中队长程诚

    

45. Jiang Yongxin, an Associate Professor at the PLA Naval Dalian Warship Academy and a member of its Optoelectronic Technology Research Institute 中国人民解放军海军大连舰艇学院基础部、大连舰艇学院光电技术研究所副教授蒋永馨

    

46. Zhang Hongying,Senior Engineer in the Command and Control Systems Office of the Communication Support Group at the Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Operational Command Center and Senior Engineer in the 2nd Department of PLA Unit 31006 中共中央军委联合作战指挥中心通信保障大队指控系统室正高级工程师、中国人民解放军31006部队2室高级工程师张洪英

    

47. Zhang Xiaoyan, Commander of Company 1, Battalion 3, Information and Communication Regiment, PLA Southern Theater Command中国人民解放军南部战区信息通信团三营一连连长张小燕

    

48. Wu Yingxia, Senior Engineer at PLA Hua Yin Ordnance Test Center Key Laboratory of Guided Weapons Test and Evaluation Simulation Technology中国人民解放军中国华阴兵器试验中心制导武器试验鉴定仿真技术重点实验室高级工程师吴颖霞

    

49. Yang Lixia, Director of Cardiology at the No. 920 Hospital of the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force中国人民解放军联勤保障部队第九二〇医院心内科主任杨丽霞

    

50. Liu Jingju, the Director of the Network Department at Electronic Countermeasures Institute of PLA National University of Defense Technology中国人民解放军国防科技大学电子对抗学院网络系主任刘京菊

    

51. Fu Ning, Senior Engineer of an institute of General Office of the CCP Central Military Commission 中共中央军委办公厅某研究所高级工程师付宁

    

52. Gu Qingyue, Lecturer at the Equipment System Engineering Teaching and Research Office, School of Equipment Management and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Engineering, PLA Air Force Engineering University 中国人民解放军空军工程大学装备管理与无人机工程学院装备系统工程教研室讲师古清月

    

53. Wang Jian, an attending physician in the Department of Military Sick and Wounded Management at PLA Joint Logistics Support Force No. 985 Hospital中国人民解放军联勤保障部队第985医院军队伤病员管理科主治医师王健

    

54. Wang Na, a major-rank staff officer and engineer at the Office of the PLA Army Military Transportation University 中国人民解放军陆军军事交通学院办公室参谋兼工程师王娜

    

55. Pan Jiaying, political instructor of the Communications Company of the Guard and Service Unit under the PLA Henan Provincial Military Command中国人民解放军河南省军区警卫勤务队通信中队政治指导员潘佳瑛

    

56. Cai Hongxia, head nurse of the Psychiatric Department at the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force 984th Hospital中国人民解放军郑州联勤保障中心984医院精神病科护士长蔡红霞

    

57. Cui Yuling, Chief Engineer of the Equipment Department of the PLA Nanjing Military Command中国人民解放军南京军区装备部总工程师崔玉玲

    

58. Yuan Yuan, Commander of the Women’s Howitzer Battery, Tibet Military District中国人民解放军西藏军区女子战炮班班长、中国人民解放军77611部队52分队班长袁远

    

59. Jiang Yong, Political Commissar of the PLA Beijing Garrison中国人民解放军北京卫戍区政委姜勇

    

60. Kang Xiaohui, Deputy Director of the Political Work Department of the PLA Northern Theater Command中国人民解放军北部战区政治工作部副主任康晓晖

    

61. Wang Xuanyu,Professor at PLA Army Chemical Defense College中国人民解放军陆军防化学院教授王玄玉

    

62. Zhang Mingzhu, Petty Officer First Class in the Aviation Department of the Liaoning Aircraft Carrier, the PLA Navy中国人民解放军海军辽宁舰士官长张明珠

    

63. Wu Changjie , soldier of an elite special operations brigade in the PLA 75th Group Army第75集团军某旅指挥通信连特战士兵吴昌洁

    

64. Mihelunsha Abudu,aka Major Mihri Gulsha Abdu or Mihrunnisa Abdu, a Uyghur officer,director of a communications station in the PLA Air Force 中国人民解放军空军93886部队通信站站长米合伦沙·阿不都

    

65. Yaping Wang, Special Class Astronaut, PLA Astronaut Brigade中国人民解放军航天员大队特级航天员王亚平

    

66. Wang Fang, Deputy Commander of a Support Force under the PLA Central Theater Command Joint Operations Command Center and Political Instructor for the 2nd Battalion of PLA Unit 66736.中国人民解放军66736部队二营政治教导员、中国人民解放军中部战区联合作战指挥中心某保障队副队长王方

    

67. Liu Xu, the head of the Discipline Inspection Group sent by the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) Discipline Inspection Commission to the General Office of the CMC中共中央军委纪委驻军委办公厅纪检组组长刘旭

    

68. Zhuang Bingkun, Director of the Financial Bureau of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Logistics Support Department中共中央军委后勤保障部财务局局长庄炳坤

    

69. Yu Zhijian, the head of the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center of PLA unit 63710. 中国人民解放军63710部队太原卫星发射中心主任于志坚

    

70. Zhu Fuhai, Deputy Director of the PLA Air Force Political Work Department 中国人民解放军空军政治工作部副主任朱富海

    

71. Gao Bo, Director of the PLA Ground Force Equipment Department中国人民解放军陆军装备部部长高波

    

72. Xu Xinglin, Director of the Political Work Bureau of the CCP Central Military Commission Logistics Support Department中共中央军委后勤保障部政治工作局主任徐兴林

    

73. Jiang Guoping, Assistant to the Chief of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department中共中央军委联合参谋部参谋长助理姜国平

    

74. Gu Xiangbing, Vice Commander of the PLA Eastern Theater Command中国人民解放军东部战区副司令员顾祥兵

    

75. Chen Daoxiang, Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA Southern Theater Command中国人民解放军南部战区副参谋长陈道祥

    

76. Xu Yunpeng, Director of the Propaganda Bureau, PLA Western Theater Command Political Work Department中国人民解放军西部战区政治工作部宣传局局长徐云鹏

    

77. Li Huohui, Director of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) Training and Management Department 中共中央军委训练管理部部长黎火辉

    

78. Song Dan, Secretary of the Politics and Law Commission of the CCP Central Military Commission中共中央军委政法委书记宋丹

    

79. Lang Youliang, PLA Lieutenant General, Former Deputy Political Commissar the PLA Academy of Military Science中国人民解放军中将、军事科学院前副政委郎友良

    

80. Yang Chengxi, full-time Deputy Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission of the Central Military Commission中共中央军委纪委专职副书记杨成熙

    

81. Wang Huishan, Deputy Commandant and Director of Cardiovascular Surgery at the General Hospital of the PLA Northern Theater Command中国人民解放军北部战区总医院副院长兼心血管外科主任王辉山

    

82. Guan Yanmi, Armed Police Equipment Department Director武警部队装备部部长管延密

    

83. Li Xiubao, President of the PLA Daily中国人民解放军《解放军报》社长李秀宝

    

84. Li Yong, Commander of the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force中国人民解放军联勤保障部队司令员李勇

    

85. Liu Guangbin, President of the PLA Rocket Force Engineering University,中国人民解放军火箭军工程大学校长刘光斌

    

86. Zhong Zhiming, a member of the Expert Advisory Group of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) Reform Leading Group 中共中央军委改革领导小组专家咨询组成员钟志明

    

87. Wang Hai, Commander of the PLA South Sea Fleet中国人民解放军南海舰队司令员王海

    

88. Jiang Jianxin,Director of the Combat Trauma Medicine Center at the PLA Army Medical Center 中国人民解放军陆军特色医学中心战创伤医学中心主任蒋建新

    

89. Han Xiaodong, Political Commissar of the PLA Hebei Provincial Military District中国人民解放军河北省军区政治委员韩晓东

    

90. Ling Huanxin, Political Commissioner of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences 中国人民解放军军事科学院政治委员凌焕新

91. Song Xue, Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA Navy中国人民解放军海军副参谋长宋学

    

92. Zhan Houshun, Deputy Commander of the PLA Western Theater Command and Commander of the PLA Western Theater Command Air Force.中国人民解放军西部战区副司令员兼西部战区空军司令员战厚顺