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The Chinese Communist Party routinely advertises its annual legislative session—the National Soviet Assembly of Communist China—as a venue for policy deliberation. Yet behind the synchronized applause lies a stark reality: the assembly functions as an operational mechanism to institutionalize single-handed dictatorship and enforce total military obedience.
While much of the world focuses on civilian delegates or high-profile diplomats, the true structural nature of the system is exposed by military discipline inspectors sitting in the assembly—individuals whose sole function is to codify political purge mechanisms into law.
Consider Liu Xu, a military delegate to the 13th National Soviet Assembly who served as head of the Discipline Inspection Group sent by the Central Military Commission (CMC) Discipline Inspection Commission to the General Office of the CMC. Liu sits as an unelected representative of the armed forces and internal security apparatus. His legislative proposals do not address public welfare, economic stability, or civic governance; instead, they focus strictly on legalizing the absolute authority of a single ruler while eliminating civilian oversight over the armed forces.
Deconstructing Liu Xu’s 2018 Proposals: Codifying Dictatorship into Law
During a plenary session of the armed forces and internal security delegation in March 2018, Liu Xu laid out a three-point blueprint for institutionalizing absolute military submission under the “Chairman Responsibility System” of the Central Military Commission. In CCP terminology, the Chairman Responsibility System ensures that all supreme command authority over the armed forces rests entirely with one individual—Xi Jinping—bypassing state organs, parliament, and civilian government.
Liu’s specific recommendations reveal how political coercion is transformed into binding military law:
Pervasive Ideological Indoctrination: Liu demanded expanding political indoctrination beyond active-duty troops directly into “national defense education for all citizens”—effectively weaponizing public education to enforce societal submission to military dictatorship.
Codifying Total Loyalty into Military Regulations: He advocated for drafting a dedicated Work Regulations on Safeguarding and Thoroughly Implementing the Chairman Responsibility System. Crucially, Liu demanded embedding absolute loyalty requirements directly into the PLA’s core statutory regulations: the Three Major Regulations (Discipline, Interior Service, and Formation Regulations) and the Political Work Regulations.
Disciplining the Brass Through Political Purges: Liu urged strict disciplinary enforcement, designating senior party secretaries and unit commanders as “personally accountable” for political loyalty. He explicitly called for utilizing the military discipline inspection apparatus to punish any perceived hesitation or political deviation.
The Closed-Loop Legal Trap: Statutory Supremacy and Total Public Exclusion
The assertion that military delegates like Liu Xu represent the public is contradicted directly by the governing statutes of the Chinese Communist Party’s electoral framework:
Statutory Party Supremacy: Article 2 of the Electoral Law for the National Soviet Assembly and Local Soviet Assemblies (2020 Revision) mandates that all elections must “adhere to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party,” legally subordinating democratic choice to party control.
Complete Segregation of Military Elections: Article 6 of the Civil Electoral Law mandates that the armed forces conduct elections entirely separately under distinct regulations (Electoral Measures for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army). Under Articles 2, 5, and 16 of the military election measures, voters are strictly restricted to active-duty personnel, civilian staff, and managed retirees. Civilian citizens have zero legal right to vote for, monitor, or recall military delegates.
Insulated Indirect Voting: Article 3 restricts direct popular voting strictly to county-level assemblies and below. Delegates to the national assembly are chosen through multi-tiered indirect votes conducted by lower assemblies and military conferences, ensuring national legislators remain insulated from direct public accountability.
The Global Danger of an Autocratic Command Structure
Liu Xu’s legislative proposals carry dangerous implications for international security and regional peace across the Indo-Pacific:
Elimination of Civilian and Institutional Checks: In democratic nations, military forces answer to elected civilian governments, and internal debates ensure that strategic decisions are subjected to institutional scrutiny. By legalizing absolute loyalty to a single chairman, Liu’s framework removes all internal friction or policy debate within the Chinese military apparatus.
Heightened Risk of Strategic Miscalculation: When political discipline inspectors enforce absolute obedience, frontline commanders in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, or the South China Sea are incentivized to execute aggressive orders without questioning strategic consequences or international law.
Escalation in Regional Flashpoints: A command structure stripped of internal dissent accelerates gray-zone coercion against the Philippines, intensifies coercive military posture toward the Republic of China (Taiwan), and heightens the probability of unintended encounters with U.S. and Japanese forces.
An Apparatus of Regime Survival
The presence of military discipline inspectors like Liu Xu in the assembly demonstrates that the Chinese Communist Party’s legislative architecture exists exclusively to preserve autocratic regime power. By embedding absolute loyalty into military regulations and insulating military delegates from public oversight, the system deprives 1.4 billion citizens of political representation while building a command structure designed for absolute domestic compliance and unchecked external force projection.
The National Soviet Assembly of Communist China operates as an authoritarian rubber-stamp body, insulating military delegates from civilian oversight while legalizing regime security and war preparation. Representatives like Wang Wenquan—former political commissar of the Joint Logistics Support Force—answer exclusively to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), benefiting from a closed-loop electoral cycle that segregates military elections and excludes 1.4 billion citizens from democratic representation.
Legislative Priorities & Regional Threats
Wang’s 2018 legislative proposals to amend the Military Service Law and Law on Officers codify real-combat metrics, harsher penalties for draft evasion, and strict training enforcement. This statutory shift accelerates offensive readiness against the Republic of China (Taiwan), challenges U.S.-Japan deterrence in the First Island Chain, and incentivizes gray-zone maritime coercion against the Philippines in the South China Sea. Furthermore, expanding “non-war military operations” blurs dual-use boundaries, raising significant compliance and verification risks under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Policy Recommendation: Joint Declaration on Hazardous Exercises
Unannounced military exercises involving intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), live chemical or biological agents, or bio-defense protocols carry catastrophic risks of strategic miscalculation and accidental pathogen leaks. The United States, Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and global allies should issue a joint declaration demanding that the Central Military Commission mandate advance global notifications for high-risk exercises. This framework is essential to preserve strategic stability, enforce international treaty accountability, and activate immediate biosurveillance protocols to prevent potential global pandemic spillover.
Wang Wenquan, Political Commissar of the PLA 72nd Group Army
The Chinese Communist Party routinely advertises its annual legislative session—the National Soviet Assembly of Communist China (aka “National People’s Congress“, “NPC“, or “全国人大“)—as the pinnacle of “whole-process democracy.” Yet, behind the performative voting and choreographed applause lies a stark reality: China’s 1.4 billion citizens possess zero voice in their national government. Nowhere is this democratic vacuum more pronounced or dangerous than in the presence of military brass who occupy seats in this assembly.
Once legislative sessions of NPC conclude, the military apparatus immediately translates these party directives into internal political mobilization. Reports from the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force show top leadership—including Commander Wang Liyan, delegate of 14th Chinese National Assembly, and Political Commissar Wang Wenquan, delegate of 13th Chinese National Assembly,—directing hospital staff, logistics units, and support personnel to convert legislative outcomes into tangible combat readiness. Healthcare workers and support staff are instructed to view themselves first as combatants, redirecting public resources away from civilian needs and toward military expansion.
Wang Liyan
Wang Wenquan
Consider Wang Wenquan, a high-ranking military officer who served as political commissar of the PLA 72nd Group Army and later as political commissar of the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force. Wang sits as an assembly delegate representing the armed forces. He was not chosen through a public ballot, nor does he answer to any civilian constituency. His political ascent illustrates a profound structural betrayal of the populace and underscores a growing military threat to global stability.
The Legal Framework: Closed-Circuit Military Selection Without Public Suffrage
The assertion that military delegates like Wang Wenquan do not represent the general public is backed directly by Chinese law. Under the Electoral Measures for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army for the National Soviet Assembly and Local Assemblies at and Above the County Level(revised in 2012), military elections operate within a completely separate, closed-loop framework:
Complete Exclusion of Civilian Voters: Article 2 and Article 5 establish that only active-duty military personnel and specific personnel affiliated with the armed forces participate in military elections. Ordinary citizens in local geographical constituencies have no right to vote for military delegates.
Party-Controlled Nominations: Article 18 explicitly grants Chinese Communist Party organizations within the military the power to nominate candidates.
Indirect Elections for Top Assembly Roles: Article 16 specifies that national-level assembly delegates are chosen through internal “soldier representative conferences” held at major military command and central military headquarters levels, entirely bypassing universal suffrage.
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| MECHANICS OF MILITARY DELEGATION |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Statutory Basis | Selected under separate PLA electoral rules (2012 Measures) |
| | exclusively by active military and Party bodies. |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Selection Basis | Party loyalty, internal rank, political commissar track |
| | record. Zero input from civilian voters. |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Voting Alignment | 100% unanimity with Central Committee directives and |
| | Xi Jinping's personal mandate. |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Primary Mandate | Absolute obedience to the Party; military modernization for |
| | offensive readiness and internal regime survival. |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Unanimous Voting and Zero Accountability
Because military delegates answer strictly to party leadership rather than civilian constituents, their legislative behavior serves as an unconditional echo chamber for executive authority:
Unanimous Rubber-Stamping: During the 2018 constitutional amendments that abolished presidential term limits and cemented Xi Jinping’s indefinite rule, the military delegation recorded zero negative votes, while Xi was re-elected state president unanimously.
Broad Governance Approvals: Every year, military delegates vote to approve broad national policies, overall state budgets, state audit settlements, and judicial reports from the supreme court and procuratorate—decisions impacting 1.4 billion citizens without a single public debate or dissenting vote.
Zero Civilian Recall Mechanism: Under Article 32 and Article 34 of the PLA electoral rules, the power to monitor, discipline, or recall a military delegate rests solely with internal military organs and military representative conferences. The civilian public has no legal mechanism to hold delegates like Wang accountable.
The Closed-Loop Military Electoral Cycle
The structural fraud of China’s parliamentary system is anchored in a built-in conflict of interest: the Standing Committee of the National Soviet Assembly—the permanent body that writes election laws—is itself elected by the full assembly, including delegates from the armed forces and internal security units.
Step 1: Unelected military delegates help vote into office the members of the Standing Committee.
Step 2: The Standing Committee passes tailored electoral laws governing military and civil elections.
Step 3: Military leadership utilizes these rules to send unelected officers back into the assembly.
This legislative reciprocity was on display in April 2021, when the 13th Standing Committee passed Decision on Amending the Electoral Measures for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army for the National Soviet Assembly and Local Assemblies at and Above the County Level:
Integrating Internal Security (Article 40): The 2021 amendments formally integrated internal security forces directly into these separate military electoral rules.
Expanding Scope Beyond Active Soldiers (Articles 2 & 5): Amendments replaced “active-duty military personnel” with broader terminology encompassing “military personnel, civilian staff, and managed retirees,” extending internal military elections while keeping civilian voters completely excluded.
Circumventing Representative Assemblies (Article 38): The addition of a fourth paragraph to Article 38 allows military election committees to conduct by-elections directly if representative conferences “cannot be held due to mission execution or other reasons,” further concentrating electoral power in the hands of military officers and political commissars.
Dual Statutory Paradoxes: Total Exclusion and Statutory Party Supremacy
The assertion that military delegates like Wang Wenquan do not represent the general public is backed directly by both military and civil election statutes:
Civil Electoral Law (2020 Revision): Article 2 explicitly stipulates that election work must “adhere to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party,” placing a single political party above the electoral process itself. Article 6 mandates that armed forces conduct elections separately, ensuring military commanders never face civilian voters. Article 3 restricts direct popular voting exclusively to local assemblies at the county level and below, insulating national legislators from direct popular accountability.
Military Electoral Measures: Articles 2, 5, and 16 restrict voters exclusively to active-duty personnel, civilian staff, and retirees, explicitly barring all civilian input.
Unanimous Voting and Zero Accountability
Because military delegates answer strictly to party leadership rather than civilian constituents, their legislative behavior serves as an unconditional echo chamber for executive authority:
Unanimous Rubber-Stamping: During the 2018 constitutional amendments that abolished presidential term limits and cemented Xi Jinping’s indefinite rule, the military delegation recorded zero negative votes.
Blanket Budget Approvals: Every year, military delegates vote to approve overall state budgets, government work reports, state audit settlements, and supreme court/procuratorate reports—decisions shaping the everyday lives of 1.4 billion civilians—without a single public debate or dissenting vote.
Absence of Public Accountability: Under internal military electoral measures, the authority to monitor, discipline, or recall a military delegate rests strictly with internal military bodies. Civilian voters have no legal mechanism to question or remove delegates like Wang.
A System Built for War: Deconstructing Wang Wenquan’s 2018 Proposals
During parliamentary sessions, General Wang Wenquan (王文全)’s uncompromising proposals focused heavily on legalizing and accelerating military readiness. In 2018, Wang advocated for sweeping statutory overhauls to the Military Service Law, Law on Officers, and Regulations on Military Ranks:
Statutory Overhauls for Combat: Codifying strict readiness standards into law to force frontline officers to prioritize war preparation above all civilian metrics.
Punitive Enlistment Measures: Revising the Military Service Law to harsher statutory penalties against draft evasion and raising the legal costs for citizens who refuse military service.
Enforcing Training Discipline: Accelerating the formulation of “training punishment regulations” and integrating training oversight into political inspection tours to aggressively enforce real-combat exercises.
Resource Prioritization: Expanding military allowances and securing legally enforced civil service placements for military personnel at the expense of civilian job seekers.
Wang’s emphasis on real-combat readiness and “major non-war military operations” carries direct, dangerous implications for regional security and international arms control treaties:
Republic of China: Codifying combat metrics accelerates readiness for amphibious invasion operations across the Taiwan Strait, forcing frontline commanders to prioritize rapid mobilization over peacetime administration.
United States & Japan: Institutionalizing combat performance over political maneuvering accelerates Chinese Communist Party military parity in the First Island Chain, directly threatening U.S. deterrence and raising collision risks around the Senkaku Islands.
Philippines: Legally rewarding performance in “non-war military operations” incentivizes aggressive gray-zone coercion against Philippine vessels in disputed South China Sea waters, including Second Thomas Shoal.
Biological (BWC) & Chemical (CWC) Conventions: Expanding high-intensity drills blurs the line between conventional defense and dual-use chemical/biological research. Codifying military secrecy reduces transparency, complicating international verification under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
The Imperative for a Joint Declaration on Unannounced Hazardous Exercises
The potential for unannounced, realistic military exercises—particularly those involving live chemical/biological agents, novel pathogens, or intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—creates severe risks of international miscalculation and global public health catastrophes.
A joint declaration by the United States, the Republic of China, Japan, the Philippines, and international allies must demand that the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party adhere to strict advance notification standards:
Preventing Strategic Miscalculation: Mandatory advance notice for ICBM launches and strategic tests prevents early-warning military systems from misinterpreting drills as incoming preemptive strikes.
Mitigating Global Pandemic Risks: Real-combat drills involving live pathogens or bio-defense protocols carry inherent risks of accidental leakage or transmission. Advance global notification allows international health bodies and sovereign nations to activate biosurveillance and epidemiological containment protocols immediately, preventing an accidental military leak from triggering a global pandemic similar to COVID-19.
Upholding International Norms: Establishing a clear global standard that unannounced testing of strategic weapons or biological assets constitutes an unacceptable threat to both international security and public health.
The presence of military officials like Wang Wenquan in the assembly demonstrates that the Chinese Communist Party’s legislative system exists to preserve regime power, not to represent the public. By institutionalizing absolute military loyalty to a single ruling party, the system deprives 1.4 billion people of genuine political representation while directing national wealth toward war preparation.
Operational Case Study: PLA Biological Training and the Reality of Live-Agent Exercises
The proposal for mandatory international notification of high-consequence military drills is not a theoretical exercise; it addresses an active, documented component of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) operational doctrine. Public disclosures from official military channels demonstrate that the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force routinely conducts tactical field exercises involving dangerous pathogens, nuclear materials, and chemical agents under real-combat conditions.
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| CASE STUDY: WESTERN THEATER COMMAND CDC DRILL ANALYSIS |
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| Operational Unit | Western Theater Command Center for Disease Control and |
| | Prevention (PLA Joint Logistics Support Force). |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Drill Scenario | Emergent CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) |
| | leak and bioweapon attack response in western training areas. |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Field Protocols | Deployment of mobile P3 (BSL-3) laboratories, pathogen |
| | sequencing, sample extraction under Level-2 protection. |
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Live-Agent Focus | Utilization of "Three Reals" doctrine: Real Sources, Real |
| | Toxins, and Real Pathogens (attenuated/treated for field use).|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Key Operational Findings and Strategic Implications
1. Deployment of Mobile High-Containment Assets in Field Conditions
Official accounts confirm that PLA Center for Disease Control (CDC) units field-deploy mobile Biosafety Level 3 (P3) laboratories during regional drills. These units execute rapid sample collection, pathogen isolation, and genetic sequencing in open-air environments. Operating high-containment platforms outside static laboratory environments inherently elevates the risk of containment breaches, field contamination, or unintended vector exposure during transit and field operations.
2. Adoption of the “Three Reals” (实源、实毒、实菌) Training Doctrine
To bridge the gap between simulation and actual combat, PLA logistics and biodefense units operate under a training mandate known as the “Three Reals”—utilizing Real Sources (radiological), Real Toxins (chemical), and Real Pathogens (biological). While state media highlights that pathogens undergo “attenuation or rendering harmless” for field dissemination, the routine handling, transport, and open-air release of live or attenuated biological strains across tactical training grounds presents severe biosafety challenges:
Mutation and Reversion Risks: Attenuated or modified microbial strains released into open ecosystems carry unpredictable risks of genetic recombination, mutation, or persistence in local wildlife hosts.
Verification Ambiguity: External observers and regional neighbors cannot independently verify whether a field-disseminated agent is fully attenuated or poses an active biohazard, creating significant intelligence miscalculation risks during unannounced drills.
3. Institutional Linkages to Military Command Structures
The Western Theater Command CDC operates directly within the Joint Logistics Support Force—the same command apparatus overseen by senior political commissars like Wang Wenquan. The institutional imperative to enforce “real-combat readiness” directly drives these medical and biodefense units to treat CBRN emergency response not as civilian public health work, but as a critical enabler of offensive war-fighting capability.
The Imperative for Global Advance Notification
This operational reality highlights why unannounced bio-defense and CBRN field maneuvers present an immediate danger to international health security and regional stability:
Eliminating Containment Ambiguity: Without prior public disclosure and transparent protocols, unannounced deployments of mobile P3 laboratories and live-agent field releases risk being interpreted by neighboring states as dual-use offensive weapons testing or active biological warfare preparations.
Preventing Epidemiological Spillover: In the event of an accidental breach, field exposure, or equipment malfunction during a “Three Reals” drill, neighboring sovereign states and international health bodies (such as the World Health Organization) require immediate notification to activate regional biosurveillance networks. Advance warning ensures that any localized containment failure can be intercepted before evolving into a cross-border public health emergency.
The documented field routines of PLA CDC units confirm that the integration of live-agent protocols into real-combat training is already operational. Establishing a mandatory international advance notification framework for all CBRN and pathogen-adjacent military exercises is an indispensable requirement to protect global public health and prevent catastrophic military miscalculation.
