🚨 THE FINANCIAL TRAIL: How Public Budgeting Exposes the PLA Control Chain over the Wuhan Institute of Virology 🚨

In global discourse surrounding the origins of COVID-19 and dual-use pathogen research, defensive arguments often rely on a clean administrative boundary: asserting that academic institutions under the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)—such as the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV)—operate strictly as civilian public health entities unless explicitly partnered with the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

However, an analysis of the regime's budget approval mechanics and structural line items reveals a fundamentally different reality.

The 2020 Central Public Financial Settlement Report: Hard Budgetary Evidence

The 2020 official Financial Settlement Report (决算报告) for the Wuhan Institute of Virology under the CAS central public budget serves as primary documentation of state funding flow:

• Direct Central Appropriations: The WIV operates as a state-funded institution directly supported by the Central General Public Budget (中央一般公共预算).

• Monopolized Funding Allocation: Key high-consequence pathogen research, infrastructure maintenance for the BSL-4 laboratory, and specialized biological data gathering are bankrolled directly through central fiscal transfers rather than purely private or commercial contracts.

Under a standard constitutional framework, public expenditure implies civil parliamentary oversight. Within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) state architecture, however, the legislative body approving this budget presents an entirely different character.

The Structural Mechanism of Military Oversight

Every dollar allocated via the Central General Public Budget must pass formal approval by the National Assembly (NPC). Analyzing the structural leverage within this legislative body highlights the true nature of budget control:

1. The Sole Armed Delegation: The PLA and Armed Police delegation represents the largest and only faction within the NPC possessing physical force and direct command over violence.

2. Subordination to the Central Military Commission (CMC): Per the absolute principle of "the Party commands the gun," this delegation votes in lockstep under direct orders from the CMC leadership.

3. Fiscal Supremacy: In an authoritarian legislature where the armed delegation wields ultimate institutional coercion, the approval of general public budgets operates under the structural veto power and strategic priorities of the military command.

The "Civilian Cover" Myth: Dual-Use Science under Military Supremacy

• The Civil-Military Fusion National Strategy: Under mandatory national mandates, the boundary between civilian research institutions and defense applications is administratively non-existent. Civilian assets are required to yield to defense priorities upon demand.

• Inherent Dual-Use Capability: High-containment virus isolation, genetic manipulation, and gain-of-function experiments are inherently dual-use. The same laboratory protocols funded under "public health defense" serve as foundation technical assets for biological warfare capabilities.

• Covert Personnel and Budgetary Masking: Highly sensitive military-directed biological research routinely operates under civilian institutional affiliation to evade international scrutiny and chemical/biological weapons conventions.

The Conclusion

When public funding sources are traced to a central budget dictated by the institutional dominance of the Central Military Commission, civilian designations become merely cosmetic.

The 2020 WIV Financial Settlement Report does not document isolated academic spending; it records state-directed resource allocation within a regime where civilian science remains structurally subordinate to military strategy. 

#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #独立自治

THE MILITARIZED SEAT OF POWER: CCP Central Military Commission Forces Encroach Upon the Beijing Municipal Assembly

Beijing serves as the capital of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime, yet the Beijing Municipal Assembly (Beijing Regional Soviet) is directly infiltrated and co-opted by active-duty military and paramilitary officers operating under the explicit command of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC).

Rather than functioning as a civilian body representing municipal residents, the assembly's delegate roster is rigged with active PLA commanders, garrison staff, and Communist Armed Police (CAP) commissars. This armed presence guarantees that the regime's central military-security apparatus maintains absolute physical and political command over the capital's municipal administration.

Active CCP Military & Paramilitary Delegates in the Beijing Assembly:

• Ma Xinjian (马新建): Staff Officer, Joint Staff Department of the CCP Central Military Commission. Represents direct military intelligence and central operational command staff operating inside the municipal assembly.

• Maj. Gen. Wang Shijie (王世杰): Political Commissar of the CAP (PAP) Beijing General Corps. Oversees primary paramilitary strike forces responsible for regime defense, internal social suppression, and armed surveillance across the capital.  

  
  
  

• Maj. Gen. Wang Xianglong (王向龙): Deputy Political Commissar and Secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the PLA Beijing Garrison. Enforces internal political discipline, political warfare operations, and party loyalty across armed forces garrisoned inside Beijing. 

  
  
  

• Senior Colonel Wang Jun (王军): Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA Beijing Garrison. Directs tactical garrisoning operations, physical troop mobilization, and emergency security deployments throughout the capital. 

  
  
  

Substantive Impact on Capital Governance:

1. Direct CMC Political Oversight: Placing active officers from the Joint Staff Department and the Beijing Garrison directly into municipal delegate seats ensures that Beijing's local administrative apparatus operates under the immediate observation and veto power of the CCP Central Military Commission.

2. Co-optation of Municipal Resources: Active-duty military delegates secure municipal budget allocations, land access, and urban infrastructure priority directly for garrison troops and CAP paramilitary posts under the guise of municipal planning.

3. Militarized Control Grid: The presence of senior political commissars and armed commanders inside the local assembly converts municipal governance into an extension of the regime's armed suppression grid, keeping the civilian population under perpetual military coercion.

This heavy military delegation confirms that Beijing’s municipal government is an administrative arm subverted by the CCP’s armed forces to guarantee regime survival at the center of power.

由中共中央军事委员会领导的中国人民解放军和武警部队选出的第16届北京市人大代表举例：

1. 中共中央军委联合参谋部员工马新建

2. 武警北京总队政治委员王世杰

3. 中国人民解放军北京卫戍区副政治委员兼纪委书记王向龙

4. 中国人民解放军北京卫戍区副参谋长王军

https://cpajim.substack.com/p/chinese-communist-armys-deputy-to?r=a5afj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

https://cpajim.substack.com/p/the-unmasked-enforcer-beijing-municipal

https://cpajim.substack.com/p/decoding-the-soviet-style-hereditary?r=a5afj

#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #独立自治

UNMASKING THE BIOWARFARE & INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS: Active PLA Command and Medical Infrastructure inside Xinjiang's 14th Regional Soviet

The delegate roster for the 14th Xinjiang Regional Assembly (Xinjiang Regional Soviet) demonstrates the deep integration of active-duty PLA command, CCP paramilitary cadres, and military bio-medical infrastructure into regional legislative governance.

By placing active political warfare officers, frontline border troopers, and PLA military medical personnel into legislative seats, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains a direct mechanism to align regional policy, civilian health resources, and border infrastructure with military operational mandates and internal security directives.

Military & Paramilitary Delegates in the 14th Xinjiang Regional Soviet:

• Senior Colonel Kong Xiangyu (孔祥宇): Director of the Political Work Department at the Urumqi Campus of the Communist Armed Police Engineering University. Manages political warfare strategies and cross-regional talent pipelines, co-opting minority linguistic expertise to build "dual-use" intelligence and surveillance capabilities across the western borderlands. 

  
  
  

• Patrol Trooper Ding Xiaojie (丁晓杰): Communications Operator and Border Patrol Trooper of the PLA Keketuoluke Border Defense Company on the Pamir Plateau (5,200m elevation). 

  
  
  

• Head Nurse Li Shuhong (李书红): Head Nurse of the Outpatient Department at the PLA General Hospital of the Xinjiang Military Region. Operates within the PLA’s military medical ecosystem—an integral operational component of the CCP’s bio-warfare and clinical sampling infrastructure. https://cpajim.substack.com/p/the-hypoxic-chamber-shield-plas-xinjiang?r=a5afj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true 

  
  
  

中共中央军事委员会领导的军队和武警选出的第14届新疆人大代表举例：

1. 武警工程大学乌鲁木齐校区政治工作处主任孔祥宇 https://cpajim.substack.com/p/the-linguistic-intelligence-pipeline?r=a5afj&utm_campaign=post-expanded-share&utm_medium=web

2. 中国人民解放军帕米尔高原克克吐鲁克边防连巡逻队成员丁晓杰　https://cpajim.substack.com/p/the-frontline-militarization-facade?r=a5afj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

3. 中国人民解放军陆军新疆军区总医院门诊部护士长李书红

   https://substack.com/@cpajim/note/c-304237774

#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #独立自治

UNMASKING THE GARRISON STATE: How PLA & CAP Officers Direct Policy inside Xinjiang's 14th Regional Soviet

The delegate roster for the 14th Xinjiang Regional Soviet highlights the systemic penetration of active-duty PLA command and CCP paramilitary cadres into regional legislative governance.

By placing active political warfare, logistics, and border officers directly into legislative seats, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) creates a direct pipeline to convert military operational needs, civil-military fusion (MCF) budgets, and demobilization placement quotas into binding provincial laws.

Key Military & Paramilitary Delegates in the 14th Xinjiang Regional Soviet:

• Qing Liangliang (卿亮亮): Cadre of the Demobilization Office under the Political Work Department of the PLA Xinjiang Military Region. Directs the mandatory 100% absorption of demobilized military personnel into local civilian bureaucracies, public security organs, and state-owned enterprises to militarize regional administration. 

• Senior Colonel Huang Jiqian (黄继谦): Deputy Commander of the PLA / CAP Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) Military Department. Manages civil-military fusion pipelines, leveraging military-sponsored "educational grants" to funnel state funds into CCP-controlled schools across Southern Xinjiang for ideological indoctrination.  

  
  
  

• Senior Colonel Huang Xuesong (黄雪松): Deputy Political Commissar of the PLA Air Force Urumqi Base. Manages front-line air combat logistics and coordinates with regional housing, health, and education departments through civil-military "dual-list" demand systems to support Western Theater Command operations.

• Lieutenant Colonel Zhen Zetao (甄泽涛): Deputy Political Commissar of a PLA Xinjiang Military Region Regiment. Enforces combat readiness, holiday emergency mobilization, and field operations along the Tianshan borderlands, converting tactical military directives directly into provincial defense advocacy.

This heavy legislative footprint guarantees that active military command structures maintain unchecked leverage over Xinjiang’s local government, siphoning civilian tax dollars and administrative capacity directly into the CCP's internal security and border militarization network.

中共中央军事委员会领导的中国人民解放军和武警部队选出的第14届新疆人大代表举例：

中国人民解放军新疆军区政治工作部转业办干部卿亮亮

中国人民解放军新疆生产建设兵团军事部副部长黄继谦

中国人民解放军空军乌鲁木齐基地副政委黄雪松

中国人民解放军某团副政委甄泽涛

https://cpajim.substack.com/p/the-demobilization-security-grid?r=a5afj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

https://cpajim.substack.com/p/the-front-line-military-civilian?r=a5afj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

https://cpajim.substack.com/p/subcontracting-indoctrination-how?r=a5afj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

https://substack.com/@cpajim/note/c-308788089

#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #独立自治

UNMASKING THE GARRISON STATE: Military & Paramilitary Directives inside Xinjiang's 14th Regional Soviet

The official publication of the delegate roster for the 14th Xinjiang Regional Soviet exposes the deep, structural integration of active-duty PLA command and CCP paramilitary leadership into regional legislative governance.

Far from being a standard civilian parliament, the legislative delegation representing the forces under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Military Commission and the Communist Armed Police (CAP / PAP) serves as a key political warfare apparatus. These active-duty officers convert borderland military directives, military-civilian fusion (MCF) budgets, and garrisons into provincial statutes and local governance.

Key Military & Paramilitary Delegates in the 14th Xinjiang Regional Soviet:

• Captain Remina Mutalip (热米娜·穆塔里甫): Leader of the PLA Xinjiang Air Force Base "Tianshan Snow Lotus" Cultural Service Team. Serves as a soft-power ethnic shield and political warfare agent conducting frontline surveillance across high-altitude border posts under the guise of cultural outreach.

• Senior Colonel Chen Sheng (陈胜): Deputy Commander of the PLA Urumqi Garrison. Directs urban defense readiness, mobilization pipelines, and military-civilian fusion strategies across Xinjiang's capital.

• Major General Halimulati Abudureheman (哈里木拉提·阿不都热合曼): Standing Committee Member of the CCP PLA Xinjiang Military Region Party Committee. Operates as a top-tier ethnic minority general legitimizing high-level military strategy and internal security operations across the region.

• Zhang Lianguo (张连国): Deputy Director of the Political Work Department of the PLA Xinjiang Military Region. Oversees ideological indoctrination, troop morale, political warfare, and veteran demobilization pipelines into civilian governance. 

  
  
  

• Song Weijun (宋伟军): Headquarters Cadre of the PLA Xinjiang Military Region Logistics/Support Department. Manages supply lines, high-altitude infrastructure, and regional budgetary allocations for military logistics.

• Major General Shi Sheping (史社平): Political Commissar of the CAP Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) General Troop. Oversees the ideological enforcement and combat readiness of the primary paramilitary force enforcing demographic control and internal security across Xinjiang.

This legislative presence ensures that the CCP military-industrial complex maintains direct, unmediated leverage over provincial administration, siphoning civilian tax dollars directly into border militarization and internal control.

第十四届新疆人大代表名单：

https://www.xjpcsc.gov.cn/article/2eb50f8acc484992917f8610ec3232b3

中共中央军事委员会领导的军队和武警选出的第14届新疆人大代表举例：

中国人民解放军新疆空军基地“天山雪莲”文化服务队队长热米娜·穆塔里甫

中国人民解放军乌鲁木齐警备区副司令员陈胜大校

中国共产党中国人民解放军新疆军区党委常委哈里木拉提·阿不都热合曼少将

中国人民解放军新疆军区政治工作部副主任张连国

中国人民解放军新疆军区保障部机关干部宋伟军

中共中央军委的武警新疆生产建设兵团总队政委史社平

https://cpajim.substack.com/p/the-soft-power-operational-shield

https://cpajim.substack.com/p/the-military-industrial-integrator?r=a5afj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

https://cpajim.substack.com/p/the-war-preparation-commander-unmasking?r=a5afj&utm_campaign=post-expanded-share&utm_medium=web

https://cpajim.substack.com/p/the-recruitment-and-veteran-mobilizer

https://cpajim.substack.com/p/unmasking-song-weijun-and-the-xinjiang?r=a5afj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

https://cpajim.substack.com/p/the-propaganda-facade-of-militarized?r=a5afj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #独立自治

THE CHAIN OF MILITARY COMMAND: How Xinjiang’s Unanimous NPC Vote Demonstrates Absolute CMC Control over Executive Power

The unanimous re-election of Xi Jinping as State President at the 1st Session of the 14th NATIONAL ASSEMBLY(aka NPC) in March 2023 provides a direct, logical empirical proof of how the military command structure controls civilian political outcomes.

A rigorous analysis of the delegation selection process reveals an unbroken line of institutional control running from the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) directly to the ballot box in Beijing:

  ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  │                   CCP CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION (CMC)                │
  ├────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
  │ Commands all active PLA combat divisions and CAP paramilitary corps   │
  └─────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
                                    │ (1. Absolute Command & Selection)
                                    ▼
  ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  │      MILITARY & PARAMILITARY UNITS IN XINJIANG PROVINCE                │
  ├────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
  │ PLA Xinjiang Military Region & CAP Xinjiang General Corps              │
  │ Elects active officers into the Provincial Assembly                   │
  └─────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
                                    │ (2. Armed Voting Block / Veto Power)
                                    ▼
  ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  │         XINJIANG PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY (XINJIANG PROVINCIAL SOVIET)      │
  ├────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
  │ Active PLA / CAP delegates (Liu Lin, Yang Cheng, Shi Sheping, etc.)    │
  │ Votes to confirm the provincial slate sent to Beijing                  │
  └─────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
                                    │ (3. Backed by Hard Military Force)
                                    ▼
  ┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  │     NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (NATIONAL SOVIET) DELEGATION            │
  ├────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
  │ Xinjiang delegates deliver a 100% unanimous ballot for Xi Jinping      │
  └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Analytical Breakdown of the Logical Chain:

1. Mathematical Necessity of the Xinjiang Vote: Because Xi Jinping received 2,952 out of 2,952 votes in 2023, every single delegate representing Xinjiang Province in Beijing voted in favor.

2. Substantive Representation of the Xinjiang Delegation: The Xinjiang provincial delegation sent to Beijing does not represent an independent civilian electorate. Its roster is vetted, selected, and approved inside the Xinjiang Provincial Assembly (Xinjiang Provincial Soviet), where active-duty PLA generals, commanders, and CAP(communist armed police) commissars hold decisive voting power backed by military force.

3. The Military Veto Power: No provincial representative could be placed on the slate sent to Beijing without the explicit approval of the military command structure in Xinjiang. Delegates like Lt. Gen. Liu Lin (Commander, PLA Xinjiang Military Region) and Lt. Gen. Yang Cheng (Political Commissar) guarantee that every civilian delegate from Xinjiang acts strictly in accordance with military directives.

4. Direct CMC Chain of Command: By institutional definition, all PLA commanders and CAP officers operate under the centralized leadership and command of the CCP Central Military Commission. The armed forces elect their representatives to the provincial assembly.

The 2023 unanimous presidential vote is not a measure of civilian consensus, but a demonstration of militarized political discipline. The affirmative votes delivered by Xinjiang’s national delegates represent the direct will of the PLA and CAP units stationed across Xinjiang Province. Because these armed forces operate entirely under the command of the CCP Central Military Commission, the unanimous vote reflects the military apparatus endorsing its own Commander-in-Chief—proving that executive state authority in Beijing is fundamentally installed and secured by hard military power.

Understanding the identities of delegates seated in the Xinjiang Provincial Assembly (Xinjiang Provincial Soviet) exposes the underlying nature of the region as a militarized provincial apparatus. In substance, the region functions as Xinjiang Province, governed under direct military and paramilitary oversight.

The presence of active Communist Army (PLA) generals, commanders, political commissars, and Communist Armed Police (CAP / PAP) cadres—backed by violent military force—demonstrates how provincial leadership is selected. The delegation sent from Xinjiang to the National Assembly (National Soviet) in Beijing requires explicit clearance and consensus from the CCP Central Military Commission. Without the backing of the military and paramilitary voting blocks, delegates could not be passed.

60 delegates to China’s 14th National Aeembly claimedly representing Xinjiang were selected on January 18, 2023, by the 14th Xinjiang Provincial Assembly, which included at least 87 active-duty military personnel. This inaugural session of the 14th Xinjiang Provincial Assembly also passed the Xinjiang Provincial Assembly Rules of Procedure and adopted resolutions regarding the reports on government work, the economic and social development plan, the 2022 budget execution and 2023 financial budget, as well as the work reports of the Provincial Assembly Standing Committee, the Procuratorate, and the Court. Furthermore, it chose the leaders and constituent members of Xinjiang’s state apparatus—including the Xinjiang Provincial Assembly Standing Committee, the Xinjiang Supervisory Committee, the Xinjiang High Court, and the Xinjiang Procuratorate—along with the Governor and Vice Governors of Xinjiang. These decisions were not only approved by the Chinese Communist Party organization but also received the voting consent of active-duty military personnel from the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, the Communist Army (PLA), and the Armed Police, all commanded by the CCP Central Military Commission.

声称代表新疆的60名中共国第十四届全国人大代表由包括至少87名现役军人在内的第十四届新疆人大第一次会议于2023年1月18日选出，十四届新疆人大一次会议还通过了《新疆人大议事规则》以及关于政府、国民经济、2022年预算执行情况和2023年财政预算、人大常委会及检察院、法院工作报告的决议、新疆人大常委会、新疆监察委员会、新疆省长、副省长和新疆法院、新疆检察院等新疆政权机构领导人及组成人员。这些决定不仅经过中共党组织同意，还经中共中央军委指挥的新疆生产建设兵团，中国人民解放军和武警的现役军人同意。

Within the Xinjiang Assembly, the hard-power faction (the “guns and swords” elements) participating in the vote consisted of at least: 55 delegates from the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, and 32 delegates from the stationed PLA and Armed Police forces, as follows.

新疆人大代表中的枪杆子、刀把子成员至少包括如下人员：

Part I Stationed Communist Army (PLA) and Armed Police Forces (32 delegates)

1. Ding Xiaojie (female, Mongolian) (丁晓杰)

2. Nabijan Sadiq (Uyghur) (乃比江·沙迪克)

3. Ma Fenglong (Hui) (马凤龙)

4. Muzaffar Mijit (Uyghur) (木扎帕尔·米几提)

5. Ulan (Kazakh) (乌兰)

6. Kong Xiangyu (孔祥宇)

7. Aereti Maimaiti (Uyghur) (艾热提·买买提)

8. Lu Yong (卢勇)

9. Yerzhan Zhaleken (Kazakh) (叶尔江·贾列肯)

10. Shi Sheping (史社平)

11. Nijat (Uyghur) (尼加提)

12. Yaqub Abdu (Uyghur) (亚合甫·阿不都)

13. Yan Qian (female) (闫倩)

14. Su Yong (苏勇)

15. Li Shuhong (female) (李书红)

16. Yang Cheng (杨诚)

17. Yang Yong (杨勇)

18. Shen Wen (沈文)

19. Song Weijun (宋伟军)

20. Zhang Ke (female) (张珂)

21. Zhang Lianguo (张连国)

22. Abdurahman (Uyghur) (阿不都热合曼)

23. Chen Sheng (陈胜)

24. Zhou Hui (周辉)

25. Liu Lin (柳林)

26. Hou Fawu (侯法武)

27. Ramina Mutallip (female, Uyghur) (热米娜·穆塔里甫)

28. Qing Liangliang (卿亮亮)

29. Huang Jiqian (黄继谦)

30. Huang Xuesong (黄雪松)

31. Han Mingjian (韩明剑)

32. Zhen Zetao (甄泽涛)

The examples of active-duty military and armed police deputies in the Xinjiang Assembly are as follows新疆人大代表中的现役军人示例如下：

1. Colonel Kong Xiangyu, Director of the Political Work Department of the Urumqi Campus, Armed Police Engineering University武警工程大学乌鲁木齐校区政治工作处主任孔祥宇上校。

2. Ding Xiaojie, member of the patrol team of the Keketuluke Border Defense Company on the Pamir Plateau, Communist Army (PLA)中国人民解放军帕米尔高原克克吐鲁克边防连巡逻队成员丁晓杰

3. Ma Fenglong, Army Aviation Pilot of the Xinjiang Military Command, Communist Army (PLA)中国人民解放军新疆军区的陆军航空兵飞行员马凤龙。

4. Su Yong, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Xinjiang Armed Police General Corps武警新疆总队副参谋长苏勇

5. Lieutenant General Yang Cheng, Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Military Command, Communist Army (PLA)中国人民解放军新疆军区政治委员杨诚

6. Lieutenant General Liu Lin, Commander of the Xinjiang Military Command, Communist Army (PLA)中国人民解放军新疆军区司令员柳林

7. Nabijan Sadiq, Deputy Political Commissar of PLA Bayingolin Military Sub-command中国人民解放军新疆巴音郭楞军分区副政治委员乃比江·沙迪克

8. Li Shuhong, Chief Nurse of the Outpatient Department at the General Hospital of the Xinjiang Military Command, PLA Army中国人民解放军陆军新疆军区总医院门诊部护士长李书红

9. Yerjan Jaleken, Deputy Commander of PLA Altay Military Sub-command中国人民解放军阿勒泰军分区副司令员叶尔江·贾列肯

10. Shi Sheping, Political Commissar of Armed Police for Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Contingent武警新疆生产建设兵团总队政委史社平

11. Nijat, Squad Leader inside the 8th Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Regiment of the PAP Xinjiang Regional Corps武警新疆总队第七支队三大队八中队班长尼加提

12. Song Weijun, a senior cadre within PLA Xinjiang Military Region Logistics Department Headquarters中国人民解放军新疆军区保障部机关干部宋伟军

13. Zhang Lianguo, Deputy Director of the Political Work Department of the PLA Xinjiang Military Region holding the rank of Major General中国人民解放军新疆军区政治工作部副主任张连国

14. PLA Major General Halimurat Abdurehman, Standing Committee Member of CCP PLA Xinjiang Military Region Committee中国共产党中国人民解放军新疆军区党委常委哈里木拉提·阿不都热合曼少将

15. Senior Colonel Chen Sheng, Deputy Commander of the PLA Urumqi Garrison中国人民解放军乌鲁木齐警备区副司令员陈胜大校

16. Remina Mutalip, Captain of the PLA Xinjiang Air Force Base’s “Tianshan Snow Lotus” Cultural Service Team中国人民解放军新疆空军基地“天山雪莲”文化服务队队长热米娜·穆塔里甫

17. Qing Liangliang—Cadre of the Demobilization Office under the Political Work Department of the PLA Xinjiang Military Region中国人民解放军新疆军区政治工作部转业办干部卿亮亮

18. Huang Jiqian, Deputy Director of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) Military Department中国人民解放军新疆生产建设兵团军事部副部长黄继谦

19. Senior Colonel Huang Xuesong, Deputy Political Commissar of the PLA Air Force Urumqi Base中国人民解放军空军乌鲁木齐基地副政委黄雪松

20. Zhen Zetao, Deputy Political Commissar of a PLA Xinjiang Military Region regiment中国人民解放军某团副政委甄泽涛

21. Zhou Hui, Chief of Staff of PLA Urumqi Garrison中国人民解放军乌鲁木齐警备区参谋长周辉

Part II. Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (55 delegates)生产建设兵团（55名）

1. Ding Yiqiang (丁翊强)

2. Ma Siyong (马思永)

3. Wang Xue (female) (王雪)

4. Wang Shengping (王胜平)

5. Wang Xinge (王新革)

6. Mao Zhibing (毛知兵)

7. Yin Feihu (尹飞虎)

8. Ahmat Dani (Uyghur) (艾买·达尼)

9. Gulkyz Usman (female, Uyghur) (古丽克孜·吾斯曼)

10. Fu Jianglu (付江录)

11. Jamila Saydulla (female, Uyghur) (加米拉·赛都拉)

12. Xing Lijie (female) (邢丽杰)

13. Yasin Abduqadir (Uyghur) (亚生·阿不都卡地)

14. Zhu Wenxuan (朱文宣)

15. Liu Rang (刘让)

16. Liu Shichao (刘世超)

17. Liu Zhuangzhuang (刘壮壮)

18. Melikam Amulajan (female, Uyghur) (米力坎木·艾木拉江)

19. Kanza (Mongolian) (坎杂)

20. Li Xu (李旭)

21. Li Bin (李斌)

22. Li Chengsheng (李成盛)

23. Li Huabin (李华斌)

24. Li Yifei (李邑飞)

25. Li Zhenguo (李震国)

26. Yang Xuan (female, Hui) (杨璇)

27. Yang Hongbin (杨宏斌)

28. Yang Jiayan (female) (杨家艳)

29. Leng Changqin (冷畅勤)

30. Song Hongli (宋宏利)

31. Zhang Wensheng (张文胜)

32. Along (Uyghur) (阿龙)

33. Abdukerim Yusup (Uyghur) (阿不都克日木·玉斯甫)

34. Ayigul Alixi (female, Uyghur) (阿依古丽·阿力西)

35. Ainur Dalalhan (female, Kazakh) (阿依努尔·达拉力汗)

36. Chen Yang (陈洋)

37. Chen Xuegeng (陈学庚)

38. Luo Yu (female, Hui) (罗钰)

39. Luo Jianzhong (罗建忠)

40. Zhou Jun (周军)

41. Zhou Ling (female) (周岭)

42. Ru Pengyi (茹鹏义)

43. Jiang Xinjun (姜新军)

44. Hong Xuemei (female) (洪雪梅)

45. Ramila Raza (female, Uyghur) (热米拉·热扎)

46. Rehangul Rahman (female, Uyghur) (热汗姑丽·热合曼)

47. Mo Yinfei (莫银飞)

48. Chang Hong (female) (常虹)

49. E Hongda (Manchu) (鄂宏达)

50. Jiang Xin (蒋欣)

51. Jiang Jianlin (蒋建林)

52. Jiang Longjing (蒋胧菁)

53. Xie Yingzhou (谢映周)

54. Fan Wenming (樊文明)

55. Xue Bin (薛斌)

丁翊强、马思永、王雪（女）、王胜平、王新革、毛知兵、尹飞虎、艾买·达尼（维吾尔族）、古丽克孜·吾斯曼（女，维吾尔族）、付江录、加米拉·赛都拉（女，维吾尔族）、邢丽杰（女）、亚生·阿不都卡地（维吾尔族）、朱文宣、刘让、刘世超、刘壮壮、米力坎木·艾木拉江（女，维吾尔族）、坎杂（蒙古族）、李旭、李斌、李成盛、李华斌、李邑飞、李震国、杨璇（女，回族）、杨宏斌、杨家艳（女）、冷畅勤、宋宏利、张文胜、阿龙（维吾尔族）、阿不都克日木·玉斯甫（维吾尔族）、阿依古丽·阿力西（女，维吾尔族）、阿依努尔·达拉力汗（女，哈萨克族）、陈洋、陈学庚、罗钰（女，回族）、罗建忠、周军、周岭（女）、茹鹏义、姜新军、洪雪梅（女）、热米拉·热扎（女，维吾尔族）、热汗姑丽·热合曼（女，维吾尔族）、莫银飞、常虹（女）、鄂宏达（满族）、蒋欣、蒋建林、蒋胧菁、谢映周、樊文明、薛斌

On January 13, 2023, the Presidium of the First Session of the 14th Xinjiang Provincial Assembly included at least five Communist Army and Armed Police delegates commanded by the CCP Central Military Commission. This mechanism was used to vet and screen who could be designated as National Assembly delegates representing Xinjiang to cast votes supporting Xi Jinping, Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, for his re-election as State President.

These presidium members included:

• Li Yifei and Xue Bin from the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps;

• Lieutenant General Yang Cheng and Lieutenant General Liu Lin from the Communist Army (PLA);

• Su Yong from the Communist Armed Police.

  2023年1月13日第14届新疆人大第一次会议主席团成员包括至少5名中共中央军委领导的共军新疆人大代表，用于筛选谁可以在全国人大代表新疆投票支持中共中央军委主席习近平连任国家主席：
  来自新疆生产建设兵团的李邑飞、薛斌；
  中国人民解放军的杨诚和柳林中将；
  共军武警的苏勇。

  This dominance by active PLA and CAP personnel confirms that the Xinjiang Provincial Assembly (Xinjiang Provincial Soviet) is not a civilian legislature, but an administrative extension of the CCP Central Military Commission—ensuring that national representatives sent to Beijing are selected, vetted, and backed by military force.

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