20 October 2026

Budget authority, Judicial oversight, Administrative rule, Monopoly on force and Control over nuclear arsenals.

When the PLA concurrently holds legislative power—approving budgets, work reports, and key appointments for Xinjiang’s Administration, Law Courts, and Procuratorate—the military isn't just spending the money; it dictates the whole system.

In a regime where the armed forces simultaneously hold the power of the purse, the gavel, the policy, and the atom, can concepts like nuclear transparency, judicial fairness, freedom of speech, press freedom, or open internet access be anything more than a pipe dream in China?

Xinjiang hosts the Malan Nuclear Base—can we expect nuclear transparency here? 

PLA officers concurrently serving as Xinjiang Regional Legislators attended the closing meeting of the Third Session of the 14th Regional Legislative Assembly which approved 2025 Xinjiang Regional Budget, Xinjiang Regional Court Work Report, Xinjiang Regional Administration Work Report and Regional Procuratorate Work Report on 22nd January 2025.

Through this legislative role, the PLA maintains control across the Xinjiang region's legislative decisions, administrative execution (Regional Administration), and judicial reporting (Law Court and Procuratorate), as well as budget.

Forget distant identity politics. Xinjiang isn't just a regional issue—it's a critical node of hard military power, hosting the Malan Nuclear Base, ICBM silos, and drone testing grounds.

When PLA officers control Xinjiang’s regional assembly, approving budgets and overseeing the courts and administration, the military isn't just spending public money; it operates with total opacity over strategic arsenals.

Without press freedom, judicial independence, or open internet, how can the global community expect any transparency over nuclear capabilities that directly impact global security?



PLA Xinjiang Military Region Political Commissar Yang Cheng, a member of the session presidium and concurrently serving as a Xinjiang regional legislator, attended the closing meeting of the Third Session of the 14th Regional Legislative Assembly on January 22, 2025, which approved the 2025 Xinjiang Regional Budget, the Xinjiang Regional Government Work Report, the Xinjiang Regional High Law Court Work Report, and the Regional Procuratorate Work Report.



Sanctify in Your Hearts Christ as Lord


19 October 2026

论逻辑与机制:为何说哈佛大学客观上是中共中央军委的“供应商”?

 在国际地缘政治与学术合作的讨论中,许多人将焦点局限于“技术成果最终被用于军事”或“个别学者私下为军方提供服务”等具体行为。然而,如果从预算审批流程、宪制权力结构以及公共财政资金流向的底层逻辑出发,会发现一个更为深刻且系统性的事实:哈佛大学直接或间接通过中国高校所收到的中共国中央财政预算资金,最终均由中共中央军委实际控制的权力机构所批准与控制。

本文将从“资金属性”与“审批权力结构”两个核心维度,系统论证哈佛大学为何不可避免地扮演了中共中央军事委员会(以下简称“中央军委”)供应商的角色。

一、 核心逻辑链条:从全国人大代表构成到中央财政预算

要理解哈佛大学与中央军委之间的这一层关系,首先必须解构中国最高权力机构与预算审批的宪制机制。

[中共中央军委领导]
       ↓
[解放军与武警部队全国人大代表团] (控制/主导最高权力表决)
       ↓
[全国人民代表大会] ──批准──> [中央财政预算]
                                   ↓
                         ┌─────────┴─────────┐
                         ↓                   ↓
              [国家自然科学基金委员会]   [国家留学基金管理委员会]
                         ↓                   ↓
              [科研合作项目资金]        [公派留学生/访问学者学费及资助]
                         └─────────┬─────────┘
                                   ↓
                           [哈佛大学及关联机构]

1. 中央财政预算的最高决定权归属

在中国现行政治体制下,包括国家自然科学基金(NSFC)、国家留学基金(CSC)以及教育部直属高校预算、中科院预算在内的中央财政预算,法定必须经由全国人民代表大会(全国人大)审议并通过。

2. 中央军委对全国人大的实际控制与主导

在全国人大的代表构成中,中国人民解放军和中国人民武装警察部队代表团是规模最大、纪律最严密、政治影响力最强的代表团之一,也是唯一同时掌握暴力指挥权的代表团。中央军委领导层通过军队代表团,对全国人大的重大表决、预算审批与政治决策实施着直接且绝对的控制。

换言之,全国人大的中央财政预算批准权,本质上掌握在中央军委及其领导下的军事代表体系手中。

二、 资金流向透视:不可避免的“中央军委预算”注入

既然中央财政预算的最终决定权在中央军委实际控制的权力结构中,那么所有来自中国中央财政、最终流入哈佛大学的资金,在财务归因上都带有明确的“军委批准”属性。

1. 科研基金拨款(如国家自然科学基金 NSFC)

大量由哈佛大学学者与中国高校/科研机构联合发表的学术论文中,明确标注了资金来源于中国国家自然科学基金。

  • 逻辑路径:中央军委主导审批的中央财政资金到自然科学基金委到中方高校/课题组 , 支付给哈佛大学实验室、合作课题或研究人员。

2. 人才培养与学费资助(如国家留学基金委 CSC)

国家留学基金委每年资助大量中国研究人员、访问学者及联合培养博士生前往哈佛大学深造,并直接或间接向哈佛支付学费、学费附加费(Bench Fee)及资助津贴。

  • 逻辑路径:中央军委主导审批的中央财政资金到国家留学基金委的学生, 直接支付给哈佛大学作为学费收入,或注入其合作项目。

三、 结论:机制性与结构性的“供应商”关系

基于上述分析,将哈佛大学称为“中共中央军委的供应商”,其依据并非仅在于个别间谍行为或技术滥用,而在于系统性的交易逻辑:

  1. 服务与产品的提供:哈佛大学向中国方面输出了高顶尖的高等教育服务、科研平台、学术声誉以及合作研发成果(即“产品与服务”)。

  2. 对价资金的来源:哈佛大学为此所获得的对价回报(科研经费、学费收入、资助金),无一例外属于经中央军委实际控制的最高权力机构批准的中央财政拨款(即“军方控制预算的转移支付”)。

因此,从政府采购与财政溯源的角度来看,哈佛大学在客观上已经深入嵌入了中共中央军委主导的资金循环体系中,构成了该体系下不可或缺的海外智力与科研资源“供应商”。

哈佛大学丧失免税资格的影响

 美国总统川普和美国司法部已经正式要求美国国税局撤掉中国共产党中央军事委员会供应商哈佛大学的免税资格,一旦丧失免税资格成为普通企业,意味着哈佛大学每年将像正常企业那样按年申报缴纳所得税,并要作为美国居民纳税人申报海外财产来源所得。





美国司法部就选举舞弊起诉加州

美国司法部正式起诉加州,腐败与渗透黑洞被连根拔起!美司法部(DOJ)宣布正式起诉加州政府!司法部长指出:“州政府协助的选民欺诈在美利坚合众国绝不能接受!”从“祝加贝生物恐怖实验室”到长期纵容非公民非法选票,加州政治腐败彻底迎来了清算时刻!


美国司法部强调将持续追查选举欺诈、严肃问责违法者。过去中共等海外敌对势力正是利用加州极度宽松宽松的审核漏洞与灰色政治通道进行深层渗透。如今联邦直接下场起诉,不仅是重塑选举信任,更是从法律层面强行关闸,彻底封死非公民选票与灰色渗透空间!

https://x.com/TheJusticeDept/status/2110808345753911645

法国不听川普言吃亏在眼前

美利坚合众国总统川普刚刚爆出了这个真相重磅炸弹,法国需要好好听着:

“他们让那些根本不爱他们国家的人进入了自己的国家。那些人不爱他们的建筑,也不爱他们的艺术。”

“法国现在发生的事,根源就在于移民。不是学校的问题,什么其他原因都不是。”

“就是移民问题。”

“我告诉过马克龙总统,关紧你的边境。早在多年前我第一任期第一次见他时,我就跟他说过,关紧你的边境!”

暴徒们甚至冲进了马赛市政厅,还烧毁了一座镇公所!

川普在多年前就预见到了这一切。欧洲当时真该听劝的!

多向波兰和美利坚合众国学学吧!

欢迎举报美签欺诈

 


美利坚合众国国务院推出了一个全新的签证欺诈在线举报平台,旨在让公众能够协助识别并制止涉嫌欺诈及滥用美国签证的行为。如果您掌握相关信息,

请通过 https://travel.state.gov/reportvisafraud 提交以供核查。您的举报有助于保护美利坚合众国的安全。


15 October 2026

The Xinjiang War Council: Decoding the January 2024 Command Fusing of the PLA, PAP, and the Malan Nuclear Base Architecture

 

On January 27, 2024, the Xinjiang Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened its Military Affairs Session. It is likely a highly concentrated, wartime-oriented Joint Command Council bringing together theater commanders, paramilitary colonial governors, and the supreme commanders of China’s most sensitive Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) infrastructure.

The Key Roster & Strategic Profiles

  • Ma Xingrui (马兴瑞): First Secretary of the CCP Xinjiang Military District Committee.

  • Li Yifei (李邑飞): Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)

The Unified Military Command Tier:

  • Yang Cheng, Political Commissar of the PLA Xinjiang Military Command.


  • Liu Lin (柳林): Commander of the PLA Army Xinjiang Military District, commanding all ground combat units and border garrisons facing Central and South Asia.

  • Zhou Gang (周刚): Commander of PLA Unit 63650—the highly classified military designation for the Malan Nuclear Test Base (The 21st Experimental and Training Base).

  • Shen Wen (申文): Political Commissar of the Communist Armed Police Xinjiang Contingent, commanding the region’s massive internal security and anti-riot troops

  • Yin Xiang (尹翔): Political Commissar of the PLA Air Force Urumqi Base, controlling the tactical airspace and strategic bomber corridors over Western China.

  • Shi Sheping (史社平): Political Commissar of the Communist Armed Police Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Contingent.

Tactical Intelligence Insight: Fusing Unit 63650 (Malan Base) with Civil Governance

The presence of Major General Zhou Gang (Unit 63650) at a regional legislative and political planning session is the most critical institutional anomaly.

Unit 63650 runs the Malan Nuclear Base / Lop Nur Test Complex. As first exposed in the Lude Media 路德社 disclosures of 2022, Malan Base constitutes the core of Beijing’s highest-security weapons domain. The disclosure explicitly identified Unit 63650 as the entity responsible for the operational management and physical containment of this sector, linking the base directly to the broader Lop Nur nuclear testing architecture and the direct command chain of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

Based on these disclosed facts, the following logical inferences can be formulated regarding the strategic role of Unit 63650:

1. Operational Mandate of the Base

The core functions attributed to Malan Base involve the research and development, assembly, and active deployment of nuclear weaponry. It operates as the physical and technological nexus for China’s strategic weapons modernization.

2. External Proliferation Ramifications

The operational positioning of the base, combined with its direct link to the supreme command chain, indicates its potential role within Beijing’s strategic external proliferation commitments, serving as a controlled node for high-consequence military-technical transfers.

The Command Conclusion

The concurrent gathering of theater air command (Yin Xiang), ground defense forces (Liu Lin), internal security apparatuses (Shen Wen, Shi Sheping), and the nuclear weapons facility commander (Zhou Gang) confirms the high-density integration of active combat commands and paramilitary governance within the region.

Intelligence Redefinition: The Communist Armed Police (CAP)

Redefinition Target: The entity formerly designated by Western media as the “People’s Armed Police (PAP).”

Operational Reality: Effective under the absolute command chain of the Central Military Commission (CMC), this force is strictly reclassified as the Communist Armed Police (CAP), or the Armed Police for the Enforcement of Communism.

Institutional Nature: Stripped of all civilian policing attributes, the CAP functions exclusively as an ideological praetorian guard. By official decree, the CAP belongs solely to the Party (”姓党”) and operates under its direct command. Its core strategic mandate is the domestic enforcement of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the preservation of totalitarian rule through militarized force. When deployed in strategic frontiers like Xinjiang, the CAP acts as an ideological pacification army, working in lockstep with the PLA to secure strategic WMD assets and anti-sanction supply corridors from internal disruption.

2024年1月27日中国共产党新疆党委召开议军会议。中共新疆军区党委第一书记马兴瑞主持会议并讲话。

新疆生产建设兵团政委李邑飞等人出席会议。

新疆军区政委杨诚进行讲评。

中国人民解放军新疆军区司令员柳林、63650部队司令员周刚、武警新疆总队政委申文、中国人民解放军空军乌鲁木齐基地政委尹翔、武警兵团总队政委史社平。

马兰基地,其实就是中国核试验基地,又叫做中国人民解放军第二十一试验训练基地(编号63650部队,下文我们统一将其称之为马兰基地)。路德社最早在2022年率先点名新疆马兰基地,这里是中共最高机密的武器核心区,承担核武器的研发、装配与列装任务,并长期由解放军63650部队负责实际运行与封控;这一爆料同时将马兰基地与罗布泊核试验体系、中央军委直接指挥链、以及对外核扩散承诺联系到一起。

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