Introduction
Western analysis of China’s 2018 constitutional amendment—which abolished presidential term limits—frequently lapses into a simplistic, personalized narrative. It is routinely framed as the solitary hubris of Xi Jinping. However, this interpretation ignores the foundational reality of the Chinese party-state: power flows from the barrel of a gun. Xi’s consolidation of power was not a unilateral coup against the system; it was an institutional realignment actively pushed and backed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). To understand Xi is to understand him not merely as a civilian bureaucrat, but as the authentic representative of the military elite.
Furthermore, the vehicle that approved this historic amendment—the National People’s Congress (NPC)—is routinely dismissed as a mere "rubber stamp." This euphemism hides a far darker reality. The NPC is a pseudo-legislative body structurally penetrated, controlled, and flanked by the military. Recognizing this symbiosis fundamentally alters the blueprint for any future Chinese liberalization. If the core of the regime is a nuclear-armed, Leninist-military complex masquerading as a constitutional government, then true reform cannot be achieved by political tinkering. It demands a radical, structural tri-factor: De-nuclearization, Demilitarization, and De-Leninization.
Part I: Xi Jinping as the Avatar of the "Gun Barrel"
To understand why the military backed the 2018 constitutional change, one must examine Xi’s unique pedigree. Unlike his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao—who were pure civilian technocrats who cultivated military loyalty from scratch—Xi is a native son of the military establishment.
[Xi's Military Pedigree]
├── 1979-1982: Active Duty (Geng Biao's Secretary, Central Military Commission)
├── 1985-2007: Deep Roots in Nanjing Military Region (Fujian, Zhejiang, Shanghai)
└── Ideological: "Red Second Generation" (Son of revolutionary general Xi Zhongxun)
As the son of revolutionary pioneer Xi Zhongxun, Xi inherits deep institutional trust within the military. More importantly, his career began in uniform. From 1979 to 1982, Xi served as an active-duty officer and secretary to Geng Biao, then-Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Minister of National Defense. Throughout his subsequent decades in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai, Xi concurrently held top political-military roles (such as First Political Commissar) within the Nanjing Military Region—the strategic frontline for the Taiwan Strait.
Therefore, when Xi aligned the state presidency with the term-limitless positions of Party General Secretary and CMC Chairman in 2018, he was executing a strategy desired by the military high command. The PLA sought a permanent, authoritative commander-in-chief to oversee its massive structural modernization, manage geopolitical gridlock with the United States, and secure the regime's existential survival. Xi did not subvert the system; the "gun barrel" used Xi to institutionalize its own permanent dominance.
Part II: The Myth of the Civilian Legislature—PLA Hegemony in the NPC
The institutional complicity of the military is starkly evident in the structural composition of the National People’s Congress itself. Far from being a representation of the Chinese electorate, the NPC has been heavily militarized since its inception in 1954.
1. The Largest Voting Block
The PLA and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) do not just have token representation; they constitute the largest single delegation in the NPC. In recent congresses (such as the 13th and 14th NPC), the military delegation hovered more than 250 delegates. This dwarfs the representations of China’s most populous provinces, such as Henan or Shandong, despite the military representing a fraction of their populations.
中华人民共和国的中共党卫军政权性质：PRC国防部官网透露全国人大除了军队代表团由军人组成，各省市代表团里面也有PLA,第1到13届军队代表团的成员数量:
— CPA Jim (@CPAJim2021) April 25, 2026
第1 、2届60名；
第3、4届分别120、486名；
第5届503名；
第6到8届267名；
第9到12届268名；
第13届269名,有时少于269名https://t.co/vVcYlLHXso https://t.co/qnbZG1lUwu
2. Dual-Layer Infiltration
The military’s capture of the legislature operates on two distinct levels:
The Formal Delegation: The massive, unified PLA/PAP delegation that votes strictly as a single, disciplined bloc under military command.
The Embedded Agents: Since the 1st National People's Congress in 1954, high-ranking military commanders and officers have been intentionally embedded into various provincial and municipal delegations. Historically, revolutionary generals and commanders like Chen Yi (placed in the Shanghai delegation), Luo Ruiqing (Hebei), and Yang Chengwu (Tianjin) acted as local representatives while holding profound military weight. This dual-layer strategy ensures that the military's voice and oversight are woven into regional delegations, guaranteeing absolute obedience.
When the NPC voted nearly unanimously to alter the constitution in 2018, it was not a civilian legislature bowing to a dictator; it was an institution operating with a gun to its head, staffed internally by the very officers wielding the gun.
Part III: The Structural Barriers to Constitutional Reform
If the military and the Leninist party apparatus are the true authors of China's political trajectory, it follows that traditional Western hopes for "evolutionary political reform" are an illusion. The current regime is not a standard authoritarian government that can be gradually democratized through civil society or legal reforms. It is a totalizing organism designed to resist internal friction.
Hence, any meaningful path toward a free, constitutional China requires a complete dismantling of the coercive machinery that anchors the current state. This necessitates the "Three-Noes" framework:
1. De-Leninization
A Leninist organization operates on absolute vertical command, where the party permeates every cell of society, the judiciary, the economy, and the military. In a Leninist state, "constitutionalism" is a contradiction in terms, because the Party is explicitly placed above the law.
The Logic: You cannot build a constitutional democracy while a Leninist structure exists. A free society requires political pluralism, an independent judiciary, and autonomous civic groups. The Leninist party-state naturally treats these as cancerous cells to be destroyed. Therefore, the total dissolution of the Leninist organizational model is the baseline prerequisite for freedom.
2. Demilitarization
In China, the PLA does not belong to the nation; it belongs strictly to the Party ("The Party commands the gun"). The military is the ultimate guarantor of the party's monopoly on power, functioning as a domestic occupation force as much as a national defense force.
The Logic: Constitutional transition is impossible if an autonomous, highly politicized military holds a veto over political life. For democratization to succeed, the armed forces must either be entirely dissolved or fundamentally reconstituted from scratch as a neutral, civilian-controlled national military. True liberalization requires removing the military's ability to act as a political kingmaker.
3. De-nuclearization
The possession of nuclear weapons provides a Leninist-military regime with absolute geopolitical blackmail power. It insulates the ruling elite from external pressure and creates an existential shield behind which they can perpetrate domestic repression with impunity.
The Logic: A nuclear-armed totalitarian state is a threat not just to its own people, but to the world. During a volatile domestic political transition, nuclear weapons under the control of desperate, ideological, or fracturing military factions pose an tragic global hazard. De-nuclearization is essential to disarm the regime's ultimate tool of extortion, ensuring that the process of domestic liberalization can occur without the risk of global nuclear annihilation.
Conclusion
The 2018 constitutional amendment was the clearest signal yet that the Chinese party-state has closed all doors to internal, incremental reform. It revealed a regime completely aligned with its military core, prepared for long-term systemic confrontation, and structurally locked down by a heavily militarized NPC.
For international policymakers and democratic advocates, the lesson is clear: hoping for a moderate faction within the CCP to emerge and steer China toward freedom is a fantasy. Because the regime's power is structurally anchored by a nuclear-armed, military-backed Leninist state, true liberalization requires nothing less than a complete structural reset. Only through complete De-Leninization, Demilitarization, and De-nuclearization can the Chinese people finally break free from the cycle of autocracy and establish a genuine constitutional republic.
