I. The Central Question
How much military spending is concealed in CCP regime public budget accounts under civilian items across Communist China?
This investigation examines the 2026 budget of the CCP regime’s Beijing Municipal Veterans Affairs Bureau, the participation of military representatives in Beijing’s local budget process, and the classification of military-related support expenditures.
The central issue is straightforward: military-related services are being financed through budget classifications that are not labelled national defence expenditure.
The official budget documents make it possible to examine the amounts, the stated purposes of the expenditure, and the institutions responsible for providing the services.
II. Active-Duty Military Personnel Participate in Beijing’s Local Budget Process
In January 2026, Beijing held the Fourth Session of the Sixteenth Beijing Municipal Assembly. The session considered the municipal budget and the report on the execution of the 2025 budget, together with the 2026 budget proposal. https://www.beijing.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengcefagui/202602/t20260206_4495110.html
Among the representatives participating in Beijing’s Assembly are military personnel elected through military constituencies and serving under the command structure of the CCP Central Military Commission and the PLA Central Theater Command. https://haokan.baidu.com/v?pd=wisenatural&vid=13717298552931602307
https://weibo.com/tv/show/1034:5259781619777538
This raises a fundamental public-accountability question:
Active-duty military personnel participate as Assembly representatives in deliberations concerning a local public budget that includes expenditure for services supporting military units stationed in Beijing.
The issue is not simply that military representatives attend a local legislative meeting. It is that the same budget process concerns the allocation of public funds for military-related services.
The official Beijing municipal budget report was submitted for deliberation at the Assembly session on January 25, 2026. The Assembly subsequently adopted the resolution concerning the 2025 budget execution and the 2026 budget on January 29.
III. Wang Xianglong: A Beijing Garrison Leader Who Is Also Listed as an Assembly Representative
On January 15, 2026, the PLA Beijing Garrison’s Tenth Party Committee held its Ninth Plenary Session. https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20260114V06A0D00
The official report identified Wang Xianglong among the Beijing Garrison leaders attending the meeting, alongside Chen Yuan, Zhang Lin, Liang Feng, Xu Yuxi and Guo Jinhai.
Wang Xianglong also remains listed as a Beijing Municipal Assembly representative. https://www.bjrd.gov.cn/rdzl/ljrd/ljsrddbmd/dbmd/202212/t20221231_2888377.html
IV. Wang Shijie: From Military Delegation Membership to the Standing Committee
Wang Shijie provides another important example.
Wang Shijie was among members of the PLA and CCP Armed Police delegations.
The official list of members of the Standing Committee of the Sixteenth Beijing Municipal Assembly, adopted on January 29, 2026, includes Wang Shijie as a committee member. https://www.bjrd.gov.cn/rdgk/cwhzcry/202601/t20260130_4478391.html
This establishes his position in the Beijing Municipal Assembly’s Standing Committee in 2026.
His documented association with military delegations, together with his membership of the Standing Committee, raises questions about military participation in Beijing’s permanent local legislative institutions.
https://www.bjrd.gov.cn/rdzl/ljrd/ljsrddbmd/dbmd/202212/t20221231_2888378.html
V. The 2026 Veterans Affairs Bureau Budget: Military Support Under Social Security and Employment
The 2026 department budget of the CCP regime’s Beijing Municipal Veterans Affairs Bureau describes responsibilities that include:
Organising and directing military supply services.
Undertaking support work for the military.
Providing preferential treatment and benefits for active-duty military personnel, retired military personnel, military civilian personnel and military dependants.
Organising services and support for sick and disabled retired military personnel.
The bureau has four subordinate budget units:
The bureau itself.
Beijing Military Retired Cadres Placement Affairs Centre.
Beijing Military Supply Station.
Beijing Veterans Affairs Service Centre.
The CCP regime’s Beijing Municipal Veterans Affairs Bureau reported total planned expenditure of RMB 10,633,717,765.40 for 2026. beijing.gov.cn/gongkai/caizheng/czzt/2026ys/202602/t20260228_4545823.html
Its 2026 budget includes a specific allocation of RMB 2,054,300 under the functional expenditure classification “Military Supply Support” (2082805), within Social Security and Employment Expenditures.
The allocation is for military supply support services, including the operation and maintenance of military supply stations and the provision of military transportation, accommodation and food supplies.
VI. The Military Supply Support Allocation: RMB 2,054,300
The 2026 budget includes the functional expenditure item:
2082805 — Military Supply Support (军供保障)
The planned allocation is RMB 2,054,300, entirely classified as general public budget project expenditure.
The bureau also provides for a separate project titled Military Supply Support Work Operating Expenses, with a planned allocation of RMB 653,570.
The stated project objective is to meet the requirements of military supply support tasks.
1. Equipment and other expenditure
The 2026 budget identifies the following planned expenditure components:
2. Performance indicators
The bureau’s performance indicators for military supply services include:
Food safety complaint rate: no more than 1%.
Troop meal-service rate: at least 90%.
Equipment acceptance within 12 months.
Waiting time beyond the prescribed meal time for military units: no more than one hour.
Satisfaction rate among military personnel passing through the supply service: at least 90%.
Satisfaction rate among equipment users: at least 90%.
These indicators specifically refer to military units and military personnel.
The planned expenditure therefore concerns the provision of military supply services, not simply general public welfare.
VII. The Official Definition of Military Supply Support
The official definition of the budget classification Military Supply Support, under Veterans Affairs Administration within Social Security and Employment Expenditures, states that it covers:
The operation of military supply stations.
Their management and maintenance.
Expenditure supporting military transportation.
Accommodation and food supplies for military personnel.
This definition explicitly places military transportation, accommodation and food supply services within a civilian functional expenditure category. https://tyjrswj.beijing.gov.cn/zwgk/cwgk/202608/P020260902368510456409.pdf
The classification is particularly important because these are services directly supporting military units.
The question is why expenditure for these military supply functions is recorded under Social Security and Employment Expenditures rather than National Defence Expenditures.
VIII. Actual Expenditure: Beijing’s 2025 Final Accounts
The 2025 final accounts provide evidence of actual expenditure, rather than merely planned budget allocations. tyjrswj.beijing.gov.cn/zwgk/cwgk/202608/t20260828_4841391.html
The Beijing Municipal Veterans Affairs Bureau’s 2025 final accounts reported actual expenditure of:
RMB 1,287,349.48 under Military Supply Support. tyjrswj.beijing.gov.cn/zwgk/cwgk/202608/P020260902368510543297.pdf
The Beijing Military Supply Station separately reported project expenditure of:
RMB 679,017.48.
The official project description states that the expenditure supported continuing military supply tasks and major-event support operations. It also covered food services for new recruits undergoing pre-enlistment education and recruits being transported.
The RMB 679,017.48 project expenditure and the RMB 1,287,349.48 functional classification total should not be added together: the former is a specific project expenditure within the broader military supply support category.
These 2025 final-account figures demonstrate that military supply services were actually financed through the Social Security and Employment Expenditures classification.
The CCP regime’s Beijing Municipal Veterans Affairs Bureau reported RMB 6,608,700 in expenditure for its 2025 Military Support and Outreach Program.
In its official performance report, the bureau described visiting active-duty military personnel and donating karaoke entertainment systems to military barracks. According to the bureau, these activities helped soldiers relax after training, improve their physical and mental well-being, enrich their recreational lives, increase their enthusiasm for military training, strengthen military–government and military–civilian relations, consolidate the political standing of the military-support program, and — in the bureau’s own words — “enhance the combat effectiveness of military units.”
The bureau’s own performance report therefore explicitly identifies enhancing military combat effectiveness as an objective of this publicly funded program.
The reported expenditure was recorded under civilian expenditure classifications, while the bureau’s 2025 final accounts reported zero under National Defence Expenditures.
IX. The Broader Issue: Military-Related Spending Outside the National Defence Category
The Beijing case raises a nationwide question.
If military supply stations, military transportation, accommodation and food supplies for troops are financed through veterans affairs departments and classified under Social Security and Employment Expenditures, then the National Defence Expenditures category alone does not show the full extent of public expenditure supporting the military.
The same investigation should be conducted across other provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions.
The investigation should focus on actual final-account expenditure, not simply proposed budgets.
Why the classification matters
A public account labelled Social Security and Employment Expenditures may contain actual expenditure supporting military units.
Consequently, an examination limited to the National Defence Expenditures heading risks overlooking military-related spending recorded elsewhere.
XI. Questions Requiring Answers
1. How much military-related expenditure is recorded under civilian functional expenditure classifications across Communist China?
2. How much actual military-related expenditure is recorded under Social Security and Employment Expenditures rather than National Defence Expenditures?
3. Do other provincial and municipal veterans affairs departments finance military supply stations, military transportation, accommodation and food supplies through similar civilian budget classifications?
4. How much military-related expenditure is financed through local public budgets?
5. What role do active-duty military representatives play in deliberating and voting on local budgets that include expenditure supporting military units?
6. Why are military supply operations and services for military personnel classified under Social Security and Employment Expenditures?
7. Where is the consolidated account of military-related expenditure across all public budget classifications?
XII. Conclusion: The Published Defence Budget Is Not the Whole Picture
The 2026 Beijing budget provides a concrete example of military-related expenditure being allocated under civilian budget classifications.
The Beijing Municipal Veterans Affairs Bureau planned RMB 2,054,300 for Military Supply Support under Social Security and Employment Expenditures.
Its official budget documentation identifies services for military units, including food supply, military personnel accommodation, transportation support, military supply station operations and equipment.
The 2025 final accounts also reported RMB 1,287,349.48 in actual expenditure under the same Military Supply Support classification, including RMB 679,017.48 in project expenditure for the Beijing Military Supply Station.
Meanwhile, active-duty military personnel participate in Beijing’s local Assembly and budget deliberations.
These records raise a question extending far beyond Beijing:
How much military spending is concealed in CCP regime public budget accounts under civilian items across Communist China?
A full accounting requires examining actual expenditures across all relevant public budget classifications, rather than relying solely on the officially reported National Defence Expenditures category.
