July China First-Industry Electricity Use Surges Over 20%, Possibly Linked to Mountain-Based Military Facilities and Data Centers

In July 2025, electricity consumption in China’s first industry (primarily agriculture) rose by over 20% year-on-year, far exceeding rural retail and catering growth. This unusual increase may be linked to high-energy military facilities and some data centers located in mountainous areas, reflecting the unique logic behind sensitive project registration and site selection.


1. Official Data Overview

According to the National Energy Administration and National Bureau of Statistics:

  • First-industry electricity consumption: 17 billion kWh, +20.2% YoY

  • Rural retail sales: 516 billion CNY, +3.9% YoY

  • Catering revenue: 450.4 billion CNY, +1.1% YoY

While rural retail and catering growth remains modest, first-industry electricity use shows a sharp rise, suggesting non-agricultural factors may be involved.


2. Mountain-Based Military Facilities and Potential Data Centers

a. CASC Qinling Rocket Engine Facility

  • Video link: Rumble Video 1

  • Location: Deep in the Qinling mountains, highly concealed.

  • Processes: Engine assembly, fuel handling, test stands.

  • High Energy Demand: Manufacturing and testing rocket engines are energy-intensive, with independent power systems ensuring continuous operation.

  • Secrecy & Registration Logic: Remote or underground facilities may be officially registered under forestry or research projects to avoid exposing sensitive information.

b. China Gezhouba Group Chongqing Mountain Explosives Factory

  • Video link: Rumble Video 2

  • Location: Deep mountainous areas in Chongqing, using natural terrain for concealment.

  • Processes: Raw material mixing, pressing, forming, packaging.

  • Safety Measures: Blast walls, fire prevention systems, emergency exits.

  • Energy Supply: Independent and backup power systems for high-energy operations.

c. China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO), and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASIC) operate high-energy-consuming military factories in forested and mountainous areas:

CNNC: Chongqing's 816 underground nuclear plant and "underground Great Wall" tunnel system, both of which are energy-intensive and concealed.

China North Industries Group: Military production plants for explosives, missiles, and other products in forested and mountainous areas in northern China.

CASIC and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC): Core manufacturing and R&D operations are often located in mountainous or forested areas for enhanced confidentiality and security, while testing and launch operations are conducted in open areas.

These facilities are likely registered as forestry projects and statistically classified as primary industry electricity consumption, potentially leading to an abnormal increase in agricultural electricity consumption.

d. Potential Data Centers

  • Some large-scale or surveillance-related data centers may be in mountain areas, e.g., in Shaoguan, Guangdong, leveraging geographic concealment and independent power and network systems.

  • High energy consumption and concealment may also result in these facilities being recorded under first-industry electricity usage.


Registration and Secrecy Logic

  • Highly sensitive projects directly registered as “industrial” risk disciplinary or even criminal consequences for officials.

  • Party disciplinary and audit personnel focus on irregular registrations due to national security, energy use, and funding implications.

  • Therefore, many projects are registered under forestry or other cover categories to reduce accountability risk while making their true purpose difficult to detect externally.


3. Data Anomaly Logic Chain

  1. High-energy consumption by military factories or data centers → First-industry electricity rises sharply

  2. Agricultural output does not enter the consumer market → Rural retail and catering growth remains low

  3. Concealed location and registration → Military facilities and data centers are difficult to identify in official statistics

This chain suggests electricity anomalies may be closely related to sensitive facility operations rather than ordinary agricultural activity.


4. Conclusion

  • July first-industry electricity use rose +20.2% YoY, far above consumption growth.

  • Mountain-based nuclear, explosives, aerospace facilities, and some data centers may be major contributors.

  • Sensitive projects are often registered under forestry categories to reduce accountability risk and evade direct oversight.

  • Electricity anomalies can serve as an important indicator for potential military operations or high-energy, concealed facilities.

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拉大旗做虎皮在中共大规模杀伤性武器开发策略上的运用研究

在研究中共的大规模杀伤性武器(Weapons of Mass Destruction, WMD)发展历程时,有一种策略值得关注:“拉大旗做虎皮”。这一策略的核心在于利用第三方的权威、声望或技术资源,为自身行动提供掩护或正当性,同时促使外部力量按照自身利益行事。虽然历史资料有限,但通过公开记录与事件,可以勾勒出一种可能的运作逻辑。

一、策略概念与机制

“拉大旗做虎皮”是一种典型的政治心理策略,其基本思路包括:

借用第三方旗号:通过国际组织、外国科学家或技术机构的名义,制造外部认可或“合法性”。

掩饰真实意图:实际目标可能是军事应用、技术突破或战略积累,但对外呈现为科研合作、和平用途或国际贡献。

诱导外部参与:利用目标方的心理动机,如害怕落后、科研使命感或国际责任感,使其主动提供技术、资金或合作。

这种策略在中共发展核武器和生物武器的历史中,可能被多次运用。

二、核武器研发中的可能运用

根据公开报道与回忆材料:

1940s–1950s,中国早期原子能科研骨干如钱三强、杨承宗曾在法国居里实验室接受培训。

一种可能的策略是,中共利用法国科学家的声誉和国际地位,在与苏联或其他国家技术交流中暗示已有国际支持,以获取更多援助。

具体表现可能包括:

强调法国科学家提供过实验设备、放射源或学术指导;

对苏联或其他科学机构呈现为“中国科学体系已有基础”,暗示援助可事半功倍;

通过这种“拉大旗”,增加外方对合作的心理依赖。

这种运作模式可能帮助中共在1950年代获得苏联的核技术转让,同时降低外方对潜在风险的敏感度。

在对外宣传中,中共可能强调核武器发展是为了国家安全和世界和平,挂和平旗号,同时积累战略威慑能力,这与“拉大旗做虎皮”的逻辑高度契合。

中共可能对苏联编织的叙事

  1. “技术补链”

    • 对苏联说:你们要是被美国、英国卡了某个脖子,法国的朋友能帮忙绕过去。

    • 实际内容:法国确实更容易买到某些精密仪器、材料(比如高纯石墨、真空泵、电子管、计算机元件)。

  2. “多元渠道”

    • 美国和英国紧盯你们,但法国不完全听美国的。

    • 你们看,我们中国人有法国朋友,这不仅是科研领域的专家,也包括我们高层的军事领导——周恩来、邓小平,他们都在法国学习过,熟悉西方技术体系和科研方法。我们可以利用这些国际关系和经验,替你们分担风险,帮助获取关键技术资料,让你们不用自己冒全部不确定性。换句话说,你们可以依靠我们的桥梁作用,把外部资源安全、有效地转化为可用能力,同时还能节省时间和精力。相信我们,这样合作会对你们更有利,也能让战略布局更稳妥。

  3. “计算机与模拟能力”

    • 1960年代初,中国科学界确实在追赶电子计算机,用于核计算(爆轰方程、热核模拟)。

    • 如果中共有法国渠道能接触到计算机或零件,就能对苏联说:“别担心,我们不是从零开始,法国朋友也能帮我们。”


三、生物安全和可能的类似策略

在生物安全领域,也存在类似逻辑的可能运用:

武汉病毒研究所(WIV)获得国际关注及合作资源,其中部分基础设施和技术可能源自法国援助或法国企业供给。

即便实验室中有军方人员,中共也可以宣称这是生物防御研究,目的是防范潜在外部生物威胁,提高识别、检测和消除能力。

对外呈现为科研与公共卫生合作,但实验室技术和能力的积累可能同时具有战略或军事潜力。

这种策略逻辑与核武器研发阶段类似:挂科研或防御旗号,隐藏战略目的,利用国际合作资源。

四、策略共性与效果

中共在核武器与生物安全领域可能运用“拉大旗做虎皮”策略的核心逻辑包括:

这种策略可能带来三个潜在效果:

增加外部援助:通过第三方权威,降低外部拒绝技术或合作的可能性。

增强战略模糊性:外部难以判断真实意图,从而无法精准控制技术流向。

推动科研与战略并行:挂科研或和平旗号积累战略能力,同时获得国际资源和技术支持。




五、结语

尽管历史资料有限,但通过对核武器发展、放射化学人才培养、生物安全实验室建设和国际合作的分析,可以看到一种可能的策略模式:借用外部权威或技术资源作为“旗帜”,掩饰真实战略目标,诱导外部力量为己所用。

这种模式显示,中共在发展大规模杀伤性武器时,不仅重视物质和技术积累,也可能系统利用心理策略和国际关系手段。研究这种策略,有助于理解中共在科技与军事领域的运作逻辑,以及国际合作中潜在的风险与隐性影响。


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