大费城华人枪友会的军事化游行Armed Parade in Philadelphia’s Chinatown: Chinese Gun Club Demonstrates Military Discipline

 According to a report originally published in Chinese-language media, members of the Great Philadelphia Chinese Gun Club (GPCGC) staged what was described as an unprecedented public demonstration in October 2016. The group organized a parade through Philadelphia’s Chinatown and downtown areas in which participants openly carried firearms — including rifles, shotguns, AR-15s, AK-pattern weapons, M1 carbines, and handguns.

The demonstration, which drew more than 50 individuals from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and even Florida, was accompanied by a significant police escort. Patrol cars and officers from the Philadelphia Police Department’s Civil Affairs Unit provided front and rear security for the armed marchers. Reports note that long guns were carried unloaded with visible safety flags, while handguns were holstered with magazines loaded but safety mechanisms engaged. Participants wore hats with the club’s logo and displayed gun permits on their chests.

During the march, members carried signs reading “Stop Crime,” “Protect Families,” and “Refuse to be Victims.” The group halted at City Hall, where they publicly read a bilingual statement framing their action as a protest against violent crime affecting Chinese restaurant owners and immigrant communities. Organizers emphasized that their goal was to raise awareness of crime victimization and to assert their constitutional rights under the Second Amendment.

Notably, the event also featured coordination with another Chinese-led rally against violence, held simultaneously at City Hall. Organizers presented this as proof of Chinese community solidarity, despite reported disagreements before the event. The GPCGC leaders stated that all participants had undergone multiple safety checks before being allowed to march armed.

While the group presented the event as a lawful demonstration of self-defense rights, the imagery of Chinese nationals and immigrants marching in a military-like formation through Philadelphia’s streets with firearms has raised concerns among observers. Critics note that the insistence on “multiple reviews of participant documents” and the emphasis on discipline and uniformity resemble the operational methods of Leninist organizations, which prioritize control, hierarchy, and ideological conformity over spontaneous civic action.

Such spectacles — complete with banners, chants, and police escorts — echo staged displays more typical of state-controlled demonstrations abroad rather than civic activism rooted in American traditions of individual liberty. Instead of reflecting grassroots pluralism, the march projected an image of an organized bloc, disciplined and controlled in ways that appear inconsistent with the decentralized spirit of American civil society.

Philadelphia police motorcade escorts the parade along major streets.

Security analysts have warned that organizations like the Great Philadelphia Chinese Gun Club may not be purely grassroots. Their activities, slogans, and methods resemble coordinated political theater, which could be influenced by or aligned with narratives promoted by the Chinese Communist Party. This blending of American constitutional language with militarized posturing risks undermining trust and raises questions about foreign-linked networks cultivating influence inside diaspora communities.

In short, what appeared in local coverage as a “first-ever” Chinese American armed march was not simply a neighborhood protest against crime. It also served as a striking reminder of how diaspora associations, sometimes under the banner of cultural or civic groups, can stage spectacles in ways that blur the line between genuine local advocacy and performances that resonate with foreign authoritarian influence — at odds with U.S. values and national security interests.

On February 27, 2016, the Great Philadelphia Chinese Gun Club,”大费城华人枪友会”, (GPCGC) staged what it called a “New Year Family Paintball Tournament” at Outdoor Extreme, a paintball range north of Philadelphia. According to the group’s own statement, more than forty participants—mostly Chinese families, including children—joined the mock battles.

Photo from Wenxuecity.com. Here.

Founded in 2013, the GPCGC presents itself as an educational and community organization, focusing on firearm safety, legal knowledge, and home defense. It is formally affiliated with the National Rifle Association (NRA) and claims more than 260 members, including NRA-certified instructors and registered senior members. Beyond paintball tournaments, the club regularly organizes live-fire shooting experiences, lectures on gun laws, and tactical drills. These activities are framed as community-building events but also underscore a deliberate effort to normalize firearms culture within the Chinese diaspora in Philadelphia.

The New Year paintball event, while outwardly promoted as a recreational and family-friendly competition, was described in military terms by the organizers. Participants were divided into two squads and rotated through woodland and urban-style arenas, where they practiced maneuvers ranging from prone firing and ambushes to coordinated assaults. Even children were reportedly involved, guided by parents and older players to mimic tactical techniques. The organizers highlighted the importance of battlefield awareness, team coordination, and “firepower cross-covering,” suggesting the activity was as much about martial discipline as it was about sport.

The club went out of its way to note affordability, stressing that group tickets brought costs down to $25 per person, while also praising the choice of venue for its authenticity. Their report portrays the competition as an intense, five-hour session of simulated combat, complete with mud, natural and artificial cover, and fast-paced close encounters. Organizers insisted the emphasis was on “training first, competition second, fun above all,” though the detailed description of tactics indicates a stronger focus on combat realism than on casual recreation.

Beyond the battlefield, the event also served as a platform to reinforce group identity and cohesion. The club made a point of cleaning the grounds afterward to demonstrate collective discipline, earning compliments from staff. Immediately following the event, leaders began planning their next live-fire range session for April, underscoring a constant cycle of organized gun-related activity.

The GPCGC has also actively sought publicity. It maintains a WeChat presence under the account “GPCGC4U” and has been featured in interviews with China’s state-controlled media, including CCTV, with videos later posted to YouTube. This raises questions about the role of Chinese state-linked platforms in promoting and legitimizing U.S.-based gun associations within diaspora communities.

Li Jia (贾莉), the CCTV employee, who interviewed GPCGC in 2017

CCTV employee interviewed Zhihua Tang (汤志华), the member of GPCGC, in 2017. Here

CCTV employee interviewed Ran Li (李然), a committee member of GPCGC, in 2018. here

The blending of family-friendly cultural branding with organized tactical training highlights the club’s role not merely as a hobbyist group but as a well-connected firearms network within the Chinese diaspora in the United States.

In June 2017, the Reading Regional Airport in Pennsylvania hosted one of the largest World War II reenactments in the United States, drawing an audience estimated at 300,000. Among the many groups participating was an unusually large Chinese contingent, organized by the New Jersey Chinese Fishing & Hunting Outdoor Sports Association (新泽西华人渔猎协会) and the Great Philadelphia Chinese Gun Club.

According to their own announcements, these organizations mobilized more than 100 participants, making the Chinese group one of the most visible reenactment units on site. They were joined by supporters from across the United States, including New York, Connecticut, North Carolina, Texas, and even Seattle. What makes this noteworthy is not simply the size of the group, but the roles they chose to portray.

The organizers divided their participants into three units: the National Revolutionary Army’s 29th Army, the National Revolutionary Army’s New Fourth Army (Third Division), and, significantly, the Soviet Red Army’s 88th International Brigade — a formation made up of Chinese Communist fighters under Soviet command. In other words, the event featured Chinese diaspora groups in the U.S. staging performances of Communist-controlled military forces. They not only marched under the banners of these units, but also reenacted episodes drawn from Chinese Communist propaganda narratives, such as New Fourth Army soldiers rescuing American pilots in 1944 and the exploits of the Northeast Anti-Japanese guerrillas aligned with Moscow.

The groups actively promoted their participation through Chinese-language media, including CCTV, and circulated recruitment forms soliciting volunteers’ personal information, including names, addresses, phone numbers, emergency contacts, and even clothing sizes for uniforms. They asked volunteers to donate at least $100 each, describing the event as non-profit but explicitly linking donations to tax benefits. They also boasted about acquiring original weapons, including a rare Maxim heavy machine gun from a museum, to increase the “authenticity” of their battlefield displays.

On-site, these groups reportedly staged “living newspaper” plays with nationalist themes, dispatched squads in uniform to patrol the grounds, and corrected spectators who mistook them for Japanese soldiers — all in an effort to reinforce a particular Chinese wartime narrative. At times, they even filled in for missing Japanese reenactors, casting their own members as enemy troops to dramatize atrocities and surrender scenes.

While presented as cultural and educational outreach, the deliberate choice to highlight Communist-aligned forces, promote them through Chinese state-linked media, and solicit donations under the guise of U.S.-based cultural organizations raises concerns. The blending of entertainment, political symbolism, and fundraising suggests a coordinated effort to normalize narratives aligned with the Chinese Communist Party, while simultaneously embedding them in American public commemorations of World War II.

For U.S. observers, the activities of the New Jersey Chinese Fishing & Hunting Outdoor Sports Association and the Great Philadelphia Chinese Gun Club go beyond hobbyist reenactment. They reveal a willingness to project CCP-influenced historical memory onto American soil, to collect and organize diaspora volunteers under militarized imagery, and to present Communist-controlled forces as central to the Allied victory. These choices are at odds with American values, raise potential national security questions, and underline the need to scrutinize how foreign-linked narratives are being promoted in U.S. civic and cultural spaces.

On November 20, 2021, a shooting incident in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, drew national attention when a Chinese-American man was confronted by three armed assailants. The man, reportedly a member of the Great Philadelphia Chinese Gun Club (GPCGC), drew his firearm in self-defense, resulting in one suspect dead and another injured. The event sparked widespread discussion in Chinese-American communities. Here.

A GPCGC representative told Red Star News that the individual involved is a club member and, despite disruption to his daily life, “everything is generally fine.” The incident reportedly triggered an increase in firearms purchases among Chinese-Americans.

Beyond Philadelphia, other Chinese-American gun associations, most prominently in Chicago, are also active. The Chinese-American Network of Firearm Owners (CANFO), founded in 2016, has organized community safety events, shooting training, and patrols. During the 2020 racial unrest in Chicago, CANFO established armed volunteer patrols to protect Chinatown businesses, reportedly operating on rotating shifts and coordinating via radio. Members received anonymous donations and support from local businesses for their efforts.

Analysis of CANFO’s social network suggests connections to organizations and individuals with links to Chinese governmental and quasi-governmental entities:

  1. Interaction with Chinese visiting delegations

    • On November 2, 2016, CANFO hosted a shooting activity for a “Chinese visiting delegation.”

    • This implies that officials or semi-official personnel from mainland China—potentially with government, military, or scientific affiliations—were facilitated in firearms training within the U.S., establishing direct contact with the gun association.

      canfire.org:

  1. Participation in Chinese hometown associations

  • On September 3, 2016, the CANFO president attended a Hubei hometown association event.

  • These associations often interact closely with Chinese local governments and United Front/overseas Chinese liaison systems. Attendance highlights CANFO leadership’s integration into influential Chinese diaspora networks.

3.Engagement with the Chinese Scientists and Engineers Association (CSEA)

  • CANFO members appeared at CSEA events, including a picnic (August 13, 2016) and a Spring Festival gala (February 25, 2017).

  • The CSEA has historically been linked to Chinese talent recruitment and United Front activities, maintaining connections with Chinese academic, scientific, and professional networks. CANFO’s repeated presence at these events demonstrates a stable relationship with CSEA and its broader network.

4.Collaboration with university alumni associations

  • On May 20, 2017, a CANFO instructor gave a lecture at the Southeast University Chicago Alumni Association.

  • While alumni events are generally apolitical, they remain part of Chinese diaspora social networks, allowing the gun association to expand its influence among educated and connected Chinese-Americans.

While these associations publicly frame their activities as lawful exercises of Second Amendment rights and self-defense, their militarized structures—armed marches, coordinated patrols, and tightly organized training—combined with documented interactions with Chinese delegations and diaspora networks linked to Chinese governmental influence, raise questions about the potential for paramilitary-style organization and external influence within U.S. communities.

Beijing Wants to Run the Planet

 For decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has pursued a mission far beyond its borders. Mao Zedong once framed the world as “three layers”: the West as the First World, the Soviet Union as the Second World, and China as the natural leader of the so-called Third World. That idea was never about equality among nations. It was about leadership — China’s leadership.

Today, that ambition has evolved into what the CCP itself calls its “century-old mission”: to manage the planet. The strategy rests on three enduring pillars: nuclear weapons, biological warfare, and espionage. And it operates under three “unchangeables”: the Belt and Road Initiative, unrestricted biological warfare, and the intelligence services of the PLA’s former General Staff Department (Second and Third Departments).


Armed Chinese Associations in the U.S.

This global ambition does not stay in Beijing. It manifests through overseas networks, including Chinese community organizations in the United States.

The Great Philadelphia Chinese Gun Club and the Chinese-American Network of Firearm Owners in Chicago present themselves as hobbyist associations defending constitutional rights. But their activities often bear the markings of Leninist organization: tightly disciplined membership, choreographed events, and a close relationship with other Chinese diaspora groups.

In 2016, the Chicago club even hosted a shooting range event for a Chinese “visiting delegation.” That raises an alarming possibility: officials or researchers from mainland China — potentially with government or military ties — were given direct exposure to American firearms in a controlled environment.

The club also maintains links with hometown associations, alumni networks, and the Chinese Scientists and Engineers Association (CSEA) — a group long associated with Beijing’s talent recruitment and technology transfer programs. These connections embed the gun clubs into a broader lattice of pro-PRC organizations, often overlapping with China’s United Front system.

When such groups march in the streets of Philadelphia with firearms, banners, chants, and even police escorts, the spectacle looks far less like American civic activism and far more like a state-organized demonstration.


Exporting Chinese Law to the World

At the same time, Beijing is constructing a legal architecture that extends its reach far beyond China’s borders.

On May 26, 2024, China’s Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Justice issued guidelines for punishing so-called “Taiwan independence diehards.” The provisions:

  • Allow for death sentences in cases deemed “especially serious.”

  • Criminalize not only direct political acts, but also speech in media, education, culture, and history that contradicts Beijing’s narrative.

  • Permit stacking of charges such as “financing activities that endanger national security.”

China’s Criminal Law, Article 8 further claims jurisdiction over foreigners abroad if their actions “harm China or its citizens.” Judicial interpretations have expanded this to mean that if data crosses into China or online speech reaches Chinese audiences, the “result occurred in China.” Thus, even acts committed entirely on U.S. soil could be prosecuted in absentia by Chinese courts.

In other words: Beijing now claims the right to try and sentence foreigners — including Americans — for speech or actions taken legally outside China.


The Combined Threat

These developments are not isolated. Put together, they reveal the CCP’s true strategy:

  • Overseas networks like gun clubs and community associations function as influence nodes, presenting a friendly face while maintaining ties to the United Front and Chinese consulates.

  • Militarized symbolism — armed marches, flags, chants — project state power into American streets under the cover of “self-defense rights.”

  • Weaponized law extends Chinese jurisdiction across borders, threatening anyone who challenges Beijing’s narratives.

All of this reflects a single guiding principle: the CCP wants to run the planet. Its goal is not coexistence under international norms, but global governance under Beijing’s terms — enforced through intimidation, networks of influence, and the ever-present threat of extraterritorial punishment.

The danger for the United States is clear. What looks like a cultural association or a gun club may in fact be a beachhead of Beijing’s global project — the project to manage not just China, but the entire world.

中共的“全球管控”野心与华人组织的角色

 中共的初心并不是局限在国内治理,而是要把整个地球纳入管辖。毛泽东提出所谓“第三世界”理论,把欧美划为第一世界,把苏联划为第二世界,而自己则要当“第三世界”的领袖。这种思路背后是一种霸权逻辑:不承认平等的国际秩序,而是要成为新的中心,新的帝国。

这种野心延续到今天,表现为所谓“百年初心”: 要把地球管起来。而实现这一目标,中共依靠三大核心力量:核武器、生物战和间谍战。同时,它还有“三个永远不变”:一带一路、超限生物战、以及总参二部三部主导的全球情报与影响力行动。


海外华人社团与枪友会的危险角色

在美国,一些表面上以爱好或文化交流为名的华人组织,实际上可能承担中共对外渗透和统战的任务。以 Chinese-American Network of Firearm Owners(大芝加哥华人枪友会)Great Philadelphia Chinese Gun Club(大费城华人枪友会) 为例,这些组织在美国社会环境中进行的公开活动看似合法,却往往带有与中共模式相似的特征。

他们组织游行、军事化队列、旗帜口号,甚至得到当地警方的护送(police escorts),看上去与美国宪法保障的第二修正案挂钩,但实际上更像是 列宁式组织的外在表演。他们还与中国背景的社团(同乡会、校友会)、以及敏感的科技人士网络(如科工专,Chinese Scientists and Engineers Association)保持密切联系。尤其值得警惕的是:2016年,该枪友会还曾接待过“中国访问团”射击体验活动。这说明,某些来自中国大陆、可能带有政府或军方背景的人士,已经通过这种渠道直接接触美国枪械环境。


中共的“域外管辖”与缺席审判机制

与此同时,中共在法律和司法解释层面,也在搭建一个对全球华人、甚至外国人进行长臂管辖的框架。

  1. 2024年5月26日发布的《关于依法惩治“台独”顽固分子分裂国家、煽动分裂国家犯罪的意见》 已明确:

    • 对认定为“分裂国家”的行为可判处无期、十年以上徒刑,甚至死刑。

    • 言论表达也可被定性为“分裂国家罪”,哪怕仅仅是媒体报道或历史表述。

    • 其他罪名可叠加,比如“资助危害国家安全犯罪活动罪”。

  2. 中华人民共和国刑法第八条 规定,外国人在境外实施的行为,如果“对中国或中国公民构成犯罪”,也可能被追诉。通过司法解释,中共进一步扩大了“犯罪地”的定义:只要数据流入中国、信息被中国网民看到,就可以认定“结果发生在中国”,从而声称有管辖权。

  3. 最高法、最高检、公安、国安等部门的联合规定,也为这种缺席审判提供了程序保障。即便一个人在美国从事合法活动,中共也能在国内法院启动“缺席审判”,宣布其有罪。


全球治理野心的结合点

把这些线索结合起来,可以看到一个清晰的脉络:

  • 海外组织:华人枪友会、同乡会、校友会、科工专等,既是社区网络,也是统战工具;

  • 军事化符号:在美国街头进行整齐划一的武装游行,更像是国家行为的投影,而不是公民自发的权利实践;

  • 法律武器化:中共通过刑法、司法解释和缺席审判,试图把自己的法律扩展到全球,把所有言行都纳入管辖范围。

这一切的背后是同一个逻辑: 中共要把地球管起来。它不仅要在海外塑造舆论阵地和力量网络,还要通过法律、科技和军事威慑,把任何人、任何地方的行为纳入“国家安全”的框架之中。

这不仅威胁到美国的国家安全和宪政价值,也冲击了全球秩序。如果任其发展,所谓的“第三世界领袖”幻想,实际上就是在重建一个带有极权色彩的全球帝国。

Chinese Gun Clubs in U.S. Raise Red Flags Over CCP Influence and Security Risks

 

In recent years, a number of Chinese gun associations have emerged in the United States, most notably the Great Philadelphia Chinese Gun Club (GPCGC) and the Chinese-American Network of Firearm Owners (CANFO) in Chicago. On the surface, these groups present themselves as advocates for lawful gun ownership and community self-defense under the Second Amendment. But their activities, structure, and social networks point to something far more troubling.

In Philadelphia, GPCGC has staged armed parades with participants marching in strict formation, carrying firearms under the escort of police vehicles. Organizers emphasized that every participant underwent multiple vetting and training steps to ensure “discipline and safety.” Such choreography resembles state-managed mobilization typical in authoritarian countries, rather than grassroots civic activism rooted in America’s tradition of individual liberty.

In Chicago, CANFO has gone even further. During the 2020 racial unrest, it organized armed patrols in Chinatown, presenting itself as a “self-defense force.” More concerning, however, is its web of connections:

  • Direct contact with Chinese delegations: In November 2016, CANFO arranged firearms activities for an official or semi-official “visiting delegation” from China — a shocking overlap between U.S.-based gun clubs and potential PRC government or military-linked visitors.

  • Ties to pro-PRC community networks: Its leadership has participated in Chinese hometown associations, which are closely linked to Beijing’s United Front system.

  • Links to Chinese Scientists and Engineers Association (CSEA): A group long viewed as part of China’s talent-recruitment and political influence operations. CANFO repeatedly appeared at CSEA events, including those attended by Chinese diplomats.

  • Outreach through alumni associations: Its instructors have been invited to speak at Chinese university alumni gatherings in Chicago, expanding recruitment channels within the Chinese diaspora.

Taken together, this is not simply a “gun hobbyist group.” It looks more like a Leninist-style social organization: highly disciplined, embedded in Chinese community networks, and potentially aligned with Beijing’s political agenda.

This concern becomes sharper when viewed alongside the CCP’s aggressive legal doctrine. In May 2024, China’s top judicial and security organs jointly issued rules enabling the prosecution of so-called “Taiwan separatists” with penalties up to death. The rules expand the notion of jurisdiction, allowing Chinese courts to claim authority if speech or online content abroad “produces harmful effects” inside China. In practice, this is a framework for long-arm jurisdiction over foreigners — including Chinese-Americans — whose speech is deemed hostile to Beijing.

When the existence of quasi-militarized gun groups in U.S. cities intersects with the CCP’s willingness to claim legal control over overseas Chinese, the risk is clear: Chinese nationals and immigrants in America could be pressured or mobilized as instruments of Beijing’s agenda, in ways fundamentally incompatible with U.S. security and values.

These developments deserve scrutiny not only from law enforcement but also from policymakers. What is being built is not a cultural association or a neighborhood watch. It is the scaffolding of an authoritarian influence operation, weaponized through community organizations, legal intimidation, and — most alarmingly — firearms.

【路德社】川普发文彻底打开对联合国展开全面系统调查通道,为什么说联合国总部的豁免权已经被川普这个post彻底剥夺了?中共在联合国渗透将会被一锅端...

Utah Valley University Students Attend Fuzhou ‘Gu Ling Yuan’ Choir Week: Xi Jinping’s Educational Legacy and CCP Propaganda Influence

Students from Utah Valley University (UVU), together with several other American youth choirs, participated in the “Gu Ling Yuan” U.S.-China Youth Choir Week, performing at Fujian Normal University, Minjiang University, and Fuzhou No. 16 High School. While framed as a musical and cultural exchange, the program operates under strict Chinese government oversight, highlighting the influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) United Front and Propaganda apparatus.Minjiang University, where UVU students performed, maintains a deeply institutionalized CCP presence. Its Party Committee and Propaganda Department orchestrate cultural events, guide students’ participation, and ensure alignment with CCP messaging. The university has historical ties to Xi Jinping, who oversaw its development in the 1990s and emphasized Party leadership, socialist education, and ideological guidance. Current departments—Propaganda, United Front, Student Affairs, and Organizational Departments—continue to enforce Party-directed educational and cultural policies. 

Observers suggest that such exchanges give the CCP a mechanism to influence foreign youth, exposing them to curated messaging while framing China positively and Western countries comparatively negatively. For Utah Valley University students, this represents both a cultural and educational experience—but one conducted within a politically controlled environment. Readers are left to consider the possible long-term implications of participating in CCP-supervised cultural diplomacy.
For detail, go to here.
#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #联邦制 #独立自治

【路德社】克格勃普京,为什么是Trump联俄灭共的关键?国会连推多份调查,深度清理PLA学术渗透 9/20/2025 【ludepress...

Xiaohui Yu & Associates and Its Connections to Chinese Military-Linked Biotech PLA



Law Offices of Yu & Associates, led by Xiaohui Yu, operates in Washington D.C. with a focus on international business, immigration, and cross-border legal services. While the firm’s public-facing work emphasizes corporate compliance and legal advisory for Chinese clients entering the U.S., the actual scope of Yu’s collaborations suggests a far more sensitive role with potential national security implications. 
Notably, the firm advises JOINN China (昭衍新药), a Chinese biotech firm whose leadership includes personnel with People’s Liberation Army (PLA) backgrounds.
Yu was officially appointed Senior International Advisor to Beijing Interlaw Consulting Co., Ltd. (北京绿山律师事务所) and its partner platform. Interlaw is a Beijing-based law firm with deep connections to Chinese state institutions, including the CCP’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission (政法委). Cooperation between a U.S.-based lawyer and a CCP-aligned Beijing law firm is unlikely to be limited to routine compliance.

The Political and Legal Affairs Commission is responsible for domestic surveillance, suppression of dissent, and enforcement of CCP priorities. Its operations have been shown to extend beyond China’s borders, targeting dissidents, journalists, and activists abroad through a combination of legal, financial, and social pressure. U.S. federal authorities have previously indicted or sanctioned operations linked to such cross-border suppression.
The combination of CCP-linked law firms and U.S.-licensed advisors raises multiple potential risks:

Assistance in avoiding U.S. sanctions for Chinese entities.

Legal and operational advice facilitating cross-border suppression or influence campaigns.

Leveraging Chinese diaspora networks for monitoring, reporting, or influencing individuals critical of the CCP.

Providing a legally shielded conduit for CCP priorities under the cover of commercial or educational programs.

This is not mere speculation: similar operations have been documented by U.S. law enforcement and open-source reporting, involving political pressure, surveillance, and threats against dissidents abroad.
For details, go to here.




#Democracy #Christ #Peace #Freedom #Liberty #Humanrights #人权 #法治 #宪政 #独立审计 #司法独立 #联邦制 #独立自治

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