Lude Media membership program releases key evidence on Chinese Communist regime's coverup of covid19 pandemic outbreak

 



Lude Media membership program releases key evidence on Chinese Communist regime's coverup of covid19 pandemic outbreak on 30 November 2021. In December 2019, the Wuhan CDC recommended emergency isolation measures. On 26 December 2019, the Wuhan CDC suggested that the WHO should be notified as soon as possible, but it was banned by the CCP. Why did the CCP try to conceal the real information about the covid19 in the first place? Pandemic won't cease without taking down Chinese Communist regime.

This picture below shows part of the dialogue between Wuhan CDC and Hangzhou Matridx Biotechnology Co.,Ltd. shown on the Lude Media program. Hangzhou Matridx Biotechnology Co Ltd is an enterprise which focuses on the molecular diagnosis of infectious diseases, with the headquarter  in Hangzhou, Zhejiang.It utilizes gene editing (CRISPR/Cas) and high-throughput sequencing (NGS) as the technology platforms and has already built Multi-level, high-quality product lines and service system in the area of diagnosis of infectious diseases. Its address: 4 th Floor Building 2-4, NO.2073, JinChang Road, LiangZhu Street, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China, TEL: 0571-88980656, Email: alex@matridx.com. 



Twitter user lynnli@lynnli77091240 said that after the Wuhan Health Commission did issue red-head documents on 31 December 2019 stating that there was an atypical virus for unknown reasons, he or she saw this file plus some gossip from overseas forums before, and quickly placed an order to buy two boxes of N95 mask for family. 










Owner of Chinese Largest Banks Made Significant Misstatements in the Financial Statements

 Central Huijin Investment Ltd (CHI,中央汇金投资有限责任公司) is an enterprise whose paid-in capital 828 billion Chinese Yuan is completely from China Investment Corporation (CIC,中国投资有限责任公司) which is wholly owned by the State Council of the People's Republic of China (PRC) under the leadership of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) whose General Secretary is Jinping Xi.

On 30 Nov 2021 CHI published 2021 Q3 financial statements as of 30 Sep 2021. The total assets as of 30 Sep 2021 is 6.12 trillion, mostly long-term equity investment 5.46 tn, and comprehensive income is 418 billion for the first nine months increasing 18 billion year on year.  Operating cashflow is 197 billion increasing 121 billion year on year. Investing cash net inflow is maily from collected investment income 150 billion. In contrast, many private entities and even some state-owned enterprises are struggling for life. The operating cashflow didn't benefit ordinary Chinese taxpayers despite its capital being mainly from Chinese taxpayers.

Financial Statements of CHI as of 31 Dec 2020 was given an unqualified audit opinion by Tianzhi International CPA, a Chinese member of Baker Tilly International Limited, on 22 June 2021.




According to annual report of 2020, its investment was mainly consisted of investment in state-owned large financial institutes, among other things, including Bank of China (64% of equity of Bank of China,BOC中国银行), China Construction Bank (57%,CCB中国建设银行), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (35%,ICBC中国工商银行), Agricultural Bank of China (40%,ABC中国农业银行), China Development Bank (35%,CDB国家开发银行), China Reinsurance (Group) Corporation(72%,中国再保险(集团)股份有限公司), etc. CHI owned 20% of equity in Shenwan Hongyuan Group Co.,Ltd(申万宏源集团股份有限公司) which is in Xinjiang where crime against humanity and genocide are ongoing. The financial institutes investees have financed genocide in Xinjiang via lending and rendering underwriting services  to other CCP owned entities such as China Communication Construction Company(中交集团), China State Construction Engineering Corporation Ltd(中国建筑) or other companies. 

CHI claimed that 2020 annual financial statements complied with Chinese Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (CAS,企业会计准则). But it didn't consolidate financial statements of subsidiaries such as BOC, CCB and China Reinsurance (Group) Corporation. It reasoned that the Caijinhan【2008】98 issued by the PRC Finance Ministry gave an exemption allowing it to carry it through equity method but it failed to outline the specific content of such document to help financial statements users to understand of what nature the document is. CAS 33 Consolidating Financial Statement amended in 2014 stated that an entity must be either an investment entity or not an investment entity. An investment entity should account for all the investments in subsidiaries at fair value through profit or loss except for those that supply supporting services to parent company. 

Many thought falsely that consolidating financial statements would greatly increase financial situation viewed by readers. But it isn't the case. Financial statements shall faithfully represent what they purport to represent. Besides, its banks investees are mostly heavy debted and liability ratio would have increased tremendously if subsidiaries were consolidated. Increased debt ratio is not good for a bond issuer. CCB's liability ratio to assets under CAS in 2020 is 91% (25.7 trillion/28.1trillion *100%). BOC's ratio is 91%(22.2 trillion/24.4 trillion*100%)CHI's ratio is 9.27% (0.54 trillion/5.82 trillion*100%) based on its financial statement without consolidation, which leaves a false impression that CHI has a good standing in resolving debt overally.

CHI, in fact, carried its investment in subsidiaries both in equity method and at fair value through profit or loss.

CHI also failed to disclose whether it had control or material impact over investee in accordance with CAS 41 Disclosing Interests in Other Entities.

CHI failed to disclose intangible assets by classes. State-owned entities often obtain land use rights  carried under intangible assets free of charge or for low cost. Acquiring land use rights from state is a related party transaction for a state-owned enterprise. 

Disclosure of details of short-term borrowings, accrued interest and other payables isn’t understandable as it failed to outline specific detailed items. CAS required that financial statements must be understandable.

CHI stated that there was no events after reporting period that must be reported. The date of authorising the financial statement was 22 June 2021 but it stated that in the other parts of annual report outside financial statements that it issued 5.5 billion bonds on 8 March 2021. It failed to diclose the 5.5 billion bonds issuance as event after reporting period.

There were many material misstatements in disclosing related party transactions.

In section 4 of Part 8 Related Parties and Related Party Transaction, it disclosed the balances of debts due to and from banks but it didn't disclose related party transactions that have lead to the change in balances and corresponding related interest revenue and interest expense. It failed to disclose the credit facility related banks granted. ICBC,  ABC, BOC and CCB granted credit 170 billion Chinese Yuan, 150 billion, 100 billion and 100 billion respectively to CHI  as of 31 Dec 2020. 

Just as Chinese state-owned banks systemtically omitted disclosure of relation party transactions with other major state-owned enterprises such as CSCEC group, CNPC group,  CRGLgroup, CCCCL group, CHI also systemtically omitted disclosure of such class of relate party transactions with these state-owned enterprises. 

Currency Unit: RMB in billions

Credit Facility transactions of CHI's investee banks with other state-owned enterprises as of 30 September 2019:

Borrower Name

BOC(中国银行)

CCB(中国建设银行)

ICBC(中国工商银行)

BOCOM(交通银行)

ABC(中国农业银行)

CDB(国家开发银行)

CSCEC group 中国建筑

350

320

140

230

300

150

CNPC group中国石油天然气集团有限公司

60

30

86

30

180

 -

CRGLgroup中国中铁

280

271.8

117.6

72.64

179

10.43

CCCCL group中交集团

324.35

198.1

 -

88.5

271.59

375.68

Total

1,014.35

819.9

343.6

421.14

930.59

536.11

There were no evidences to show that these banks ceased lending relation with the state-owned enterprises mentioned above. For example, one of the subsidiaries of CSCEC got credit facility 14.16 billion CNY from CCB as of 31 March 2020. As of 31 December 2020,CRGL obtained credit facilitiy from CHI's investee banks CDB, ABC, ICBC, CCB and BOC for 231.7 bn, 256.26 bn, 213.42 bn, 271.8 bn and 290.2 bn. 
CNNC(中核集团), an enterprise also owned by PRC State Council, obtained credit facilitiy from CHI's investee banks CDB, ABC, ICBC, CCB and BOC for 250 bn, 110 bn, 200 bn, 150 bn and 200 bn as of 30 June 2020.

136 billion underwriting services had been rendered by related banks in 2020 but were omitted in the disclosure of related party transactions. As an issuer of bonds, CHI failed to disclose in prospectus that its bond were underwritten by related parties and its financial situation hadn't been scrutinied independently by underwritters.







It omitted disclosure of key management's compensation. Key management are those that decide how, when and where to invest the money, operate or decide other significant. Key management personnel, among other things, include but are not limited to Chun Peng, Rujun Shen, Yong Wang and Zhibin Xu.

The misstatements have been repeated again and again every year. No one in the CCP including Jinping Xi corrects the misstatements.

The board of directors, the board of supervisors and executives in the CHI, mainly consisted of CCPers,  failed to maintain integrity and objectivity and failed to excercise due diligence and professional judgement. A CCPer is a member of the Chinese Communist Party or a member of the Communist Party of China whose General Secretary is Jinping Xi,the general director of Xivirus pandemic.



Given the facts mentioned above, it's not difficult to cast doubt on whether CCP is unwilling to follow international accounting convention, which includes consolidating subsidiaries or carrying at fair value and fullying disclosing related party transactions and corresponding nature of associated relations, and ineligible to administer accounting affairs fairly.







China Datang Group New Energy Co., Ltd made material misstatement of financial statements and influenced state security of Singapore and Australia

 China Datang Group New Energy Co., Ltd(Datang) is to issue twelfth phase of ultra-short-term financing bonds for 750 million CNY on 3 Dec 2021 and collect proceeds on 6 December 2021 maturing on 4 March 2022 at annual rate between 2.15%-2.45% underwritten by the Agricultural Bank of China. Datang is a company controlled by the State Council of People's Republic of China under the rule of Chinese Communist party(CCP) and is in effect controlled by CCP.

In the 2020 annual accounts, Datang omitted disclosure of related party transactions with key management personnel in terms of compensation, state-owned banks in terms of credit facility including China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, ICBC and China Development Bank and bonds underwriting services and local governments in terms of acquiring sea use rights and land use rights. State-owned enterprises often obtained land use rights from government for free or at abnormally low prices by exploiting related party relation. China occupied South China Sea illegally.

Datang, an agent of CCP, set up subsidiaries in Singapore, Datang Renewables (Singapore) Pte. Ltd(UEN:201106638W) with invested capital 40 million or 100% of equity capital and in Australia, AusChina Energy Group (Registration Number: BN05275544) with invested capital 34.8 million or 87.5% of equity. Therefore, CCP is able to appoint CCPers to the board of directors to control the decision making of Datang Renewables (Singapore) Pte. Ltd and AusChina Energy Group which may hamper the state security of energy of Singapore and Australia to coerce policitians for the purpose of CCP. A CCPer is a member of the Chinese Communist Party or a member of the Communist Party of China.
A CCPer usually obeys the orders of Jinping Xi now.








Datang had debt due from Swedish Energy Agency for 34.6 million aged more than five years expected unrecoverable but it didn't disclose the reason for making the payment.

One of the suppliers of Datang is Xinjiang Goldwind Science Technology Co., Ltd(新疆金风科技股份有限公司) in Xinjiang where genocide is ongoing.

As a listed company issuing debt securities publicly, Datang failed to report segment information and failed to disclose detailed information of revenue as required by Chinese Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises.
 











2021年12月1日晚1.裡根研究所:72%民眾認為病毒來自實驗室。民主黨(61%)獨立選民(67%)共和黨(86%) 認為病毒來自實驗室 2.美空軍部長:美中軍備競賽已經開始。習氏必敗。 3.白雲觀道人視頻情報中提醒: 習並非真龍天子 若違逆天命死無全屍。無人機不是吃素的,蘇萊曼尼是現成的案例。 4.習仲勳墓地規劃還遠未結束 習規劃將其做成富平縣殯葬產業園。產業園必破產。我做過破產清算管理人。

Xi Jinping’s Road to China Emperor

 





Xi Jinping’s Road to China Emperor

The Corruption and Accounting Fraud of Communist China’s State-Owned Enterprises

The Dangerous Collaboration between Communist China and American Scientists On Infectious Diseases Research 

Are the management of vaccine sellers not corrupted?

CCSCEs’ Q3 Operating Cashflow Insufficient to Satisfy Debt Interest Payment

The Unrestricted Biowarfare Fought by PLA Nanjing Military Command


Review on 2020 Annual Accounts of Nokia Corporation

 



The position of auditor's report on 2020 annual accounts is on page 212 behind financial statements. Nokia's managers are downplaying the importance of auditor's report on corporate governance.I don't know why Nokia did so. Deloitte delivered an unmodified audit opinion on the financial statements prepared with International Financial Reporting Standards as adopted in EU. But the auditor mentioned two key audit matters that were most important in audit as follows: Fixed Networks goodwill valuation and revenue recognition. It set materiality at €170 million.

Therefore, readers to its accounts must pay special attention to material misstatement risk of goodwill and revenue and related items such as contract asset, contract liability, deferred tax,etc.

Profit before tax for year 2020 was 743 million, but income tax was 3.3 billion making profit after tax from continuing operations at loss of  2.5 billion. While in 2019, profit before tax 156 million was eaten by income tax 138 million, in 2018 income tax 189 million add loss before tax 360 million to arrive at loss after tax from continuing operations 549 million.

According to the footnote, larger part of income tax was 3 billion of deferred tax in 2020. Movement of intangible assets and property, plant and equipment gave rise to most change of deferred tax assets 2.2 billion. Movement in tax losses carried forward and unused tax credits gave rise to 581 million. But it was explained that it was not probable that it would be able to utilize the unused tax losses, unused tax credits and deductible temporary differences in Finland in the foreseeable future. This assessment was done primarily based on the historical performance without mentioning the impact of covid19 or other elements. It didn't disclose the detail of temporary differences change from intangible assets and property, plant and equipment.

The change in deferred tax assets may be due to a kind of accounting estimate or material misstatement. If it were misstatement, Nokia should restate income taxes in 2019, 2018 and earlier periods rather than reflecting all the change in 2020. Usually significant adjustment of assets either due to impairment or deferred taxes may be partly due to material misstatement in the prior periods. Auditor should review the judgement and accounting estimate made in the prior periods.

The management was possibly trying to make use of covid19 and material uncertainty in judgement required in measuring deferred tax to manipulate profit.

Net sales in Finland didn't reduce significantly from 2018 to 2020 while net sales in China and India decreased consecutively for two years by more than overall 40%.

International Accounting Standard 1 Presentation of Financial Statements required that Nokia to present information in a manner that provides understandable information and to provide additional disclosures when compliance with the specific requirements in IFRSs is insufficient to enable users to understand the impact of change in judgement on deferred tax assets on the entity’s financial position and financial performance.

I don't know whether the auditor failed to pay special attention to deferred tax assets and require auditee to make corresponding adjustment or given qualified audit opinion, given that the largest change in balance sheet arose from the item. Due to the inherent uncertainty, auditor should at least add emphasis matter paragraph to the auditor's report.





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