Weaknesses of "Changes at the Hong Kong Liaison Office: Power Shift in Zhongnanhai?! Rumors of Wang Yang Secretly Acting as General Secretary"

The article published on June 2, 2025, by creaders.net and other websites, likely all paid by Chinese Communist Party through an intermediary or intermediaries that infiltrate dissident groups or cryptocurrencies, or relying on monetary sources controlled or influenced by CCP, titled "中联办异动 中南海权力生变？！爆汪洋秘密代理总书记职权," claims a dramatic power shift within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), alleging that Xi Jinping has been absent for over a week, that Wang Yang is secretly acting as General Secretary, and that the sudden dismissal of Zheng Yanxiong as Hong Kong Liaison Office director signals a broader reconfiguration in Zhongnanhai. Sourced primarily from unverified self-media and speculative commentary, the article lacks credible evidence and misrepresents CCP power dynamics. When analyzed through Leninist organizational principles, recent U.S.-China trade tensions, and the systemic risks posed by the CCP’s authoritarian structure, the article’s weaknesses become glaring. It fails to substantiate its claims, ignores the CCP’s entrenched control mechanisms, and overlooks global implications, such as potential pandemics, repression, and geopolitical harm. Even if Wang Yang assumed leadership, the CCP’s Leninist framework would render such a change futile, perpetuating the risks of further disasters without radical external intervention.

1. Unsubstantiated Claims and Lack of Credible Evidence

The article’s core assertions—Xi Jinping’s prolonged absence, Wang Yang’s secret role as acting General Secretary, and a supposed Political Bureau expanded meeting replacing the May 2025 regular meeting—are unsupported by official CCP sources. Leninist organizational theory, which governs the CCP, emphasizes strict control over information and leadership transitions through formalized processes, such as Central Committee plenary sessions or the National Party Congress. A secret transfer of power to Wang Yang, a Politburo Standing Committee member until 2022, would violate this disciplined structure, as the CCP prioritizes public announcements to maintain cadre loyalty and public stability.

The assertion that Xi has been absent for over a week is exaggerated. The article cites Xi’s visit to Henan and subsequent lack of media coverage, supported by poet Su Xiaohe’s claim that Xi is “fostering life” with his 98-year-old mother. However, temporary absences are routine for CCP leaders due to security or strategic reasons and do not indicate a power shift. The alleged Political Bureau expanded meeting in May 2025, cited as evidence of “elders controlling the situation,” is unverified by official sources, and the cancellation of the regular Politburo meeting is not confirmed. Similarly, while Zheng Yanxiong’s dismissal on May 30, 2025, is factual, the article’s claim that it reflects Wang Yang’s influence lacks evidence, as人事任免 (personnel changes) are typically announced by the State Council without implying broader power shifts. These gaps highlight the article’s reliance on rumor over fact.

2. Misrepresentation of CCP Power Dynamics

The article’s focus on Wang Yang as a secret General Secretary misrepresents the CCP’s centralized power structure under Xi Jinping. Since 2012, Xi has consolidated authority through anti-corruption campaigns, constitutional amendments removing term limits, and his designation as the “core” leader. Wang Yang, despite his reformist reputation from handling the 2011 Wukan incident as Guangdong Party Secretary, retired from the Politburo Standing Committee in 2022 and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 2023. His return to a leadership role would require Central Committee approval, which the article does not substantiate. Leninist theory prioritizes collective leadership under a dominant figure, currently Xi, making a clandestine transfer of power implausible.

The article’s claim that Xi is under “soft detention” by General Zhang Youxia, preventing his return to Beijing, is equally baseless. The CCP’s Central Military Commission (CMC), chaired by Xi, ensures PLA loyalty to the party, not individual military figures. The police, under the Ministry of Public Security and Politburo oversight, similarly serve the party’s collective will. No credible evidence suggests a shift in control over these institutions, which are critical to Leninist discipline. The article’s assertion that Xi’s absence cuts him off from allies like Cai Qi, Li Qiang, and Li Xi ignores the CCP’s robust communication systems and Xi’s entrenched authority. By exaggerating individual agency, the article misleads readers about the CCP’s systemic rigidity, which constrains even reformist figures like Wang Yang.

3. Futility of Leadership Changes Without Systemic Reform

The query argues that even if Wang Yang assumed leadership, it would be “in vain,” leading to “another future potential disaster” due to the CCP’s Leninist structure. This is a valid critique, as the CCP’s centralized, hierarchical system limits individual leaders’ ability to enact meaningful change. Wang Yang’s moderate approach during the Wukan incident, where he allowed village elections, was an exception within the CCP’s framework and did not alter its broader authoritarian policies. Historical examples—Zhao Ziyang’s removal in 1989 for supporting Tiananmen protesters and Liu Xiaobo’s death in custody in 2017—demonstrate that reformist impulses are suppressed to maintain party control. The article’s suggestion that Wang Yang could restore Hong Kong’s autonomy or revive “Hu-Wen era” policies (under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao) ignores this reality, as Xi’s policies, including the 2020 National Security Law, have entrenched centralized control over Hong Kong.

The article’s claim that Zheng Yanxiong’s dismissal signals a return to Hong Kong’s autonomy under Wang Yang is speculative and contradicts CCP priorities. Zheng’s replacement by Zhou Ji, a Central Hong Kong and Macao Work Office official, was announced officially, but the article’s attribution to Wang Yang’s influence lacks evidence. Commentator Chen Pokong’s assertion that Zhou Ji is “non-Xi faction” is unverified, and the CCP’s “patriots governing Hong Kong” policy remains unchanged, as Zhou Ji emphasized in his June 1, 2025, remarks. The article’s optimism about Hong Kong reverting to a “one country, two systems” framework ignores the CCP’s systemic commitment to control, rendering such changes improbable without dismantling its Leninist structure.

4. Omission of External Pressures and Global Risks

The article fails to contextualize its claims within U.S.-China trade tensions, a critical external pressure on the CCP. In May 2025, a 90-day tariff truce reduced U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods from 145% to 30% and Chinese tariffs on U.S. goods from 125% to 10%. However, mutual accusations of violations—U.S. claims of Chinese AI chip export controls and visa restrictions, and China’s complaints of U.S. discriminatory policies—have stalled talks. The article’s silence on these dynamics weakens its analysis, as Leninist organizations respond to external threats by consolidating internal control, not fostering speculative power shifts.The article could be CCP-orchestrated misinformation to delay U.S. enforcement is plausible.

More critically, the article ignores the global risks posed by the CCP’s continuity, as highlighted in the query. Without systemic changes—such as dismantling the PLA, adopting British common law, enacting the U.S. Constitution, achieving nuclear disarmament—the CCP’s Leninist structure could perpetuate harm, including pandemics, repression, and economic damage. The CCP’s initial mishandling of COVID-19, suppression of dissent (e.g., Liu Xiaobo), and the 1989 Tiananmen massacre exemplify these risks. Ongoing censorship, requiring VPNs to access platforms like X, further stifles free expression. The article’s focus on a supposed power shift distracts from these systemic issues, failing to address how the CCP’s control over the PLA and police ensures continuity of authoritarian policies, regardless of leadership changes.

5. Sensationalism and Misinformation Potential

The article’s sensationalist tone, evident in its title (“Power Shift in Zhongnanhai?!”) and reliance on self-media figures like Xiaoshuojia and Chen Pokong, prioritizes attention over substance. Leninist principles demand disciplined communication to reinforce party legitimacy. Its claim that Wang Yang could restore Hong Kong’s autonomy or that Xi is under “soft detention” lacks credible evidence and aligns with overseas media’s tendency to amplify unverified rumors.

Conclusion

The creaders.net article’s claims of a Zhongnanhai power shift, with Wang Yang secretly acting as General Secretary, are speculative and unsupported, relying on unverified self-media and lacking official corroboration. Its weaknesses—exaggerated narratives, misrepresentation of CCP dynamics, and omission of external pressures like U.S.-China trade tensions—undermine its credibility when viewed through Leninist organizational principles. The article ignores the CCP’s systemic rigidity, which renders leadership changes futile, as Wang Yang would be constrained by the same authoritarian framework that controls the PLA and police. Without radical external intervention—though geopolitically improbable—the CCP’s continuity risks further disasters, from pandemics to repression, as seen in historical cases like Tiananmen and Liu Xiaobo. By focusing on sensational rumors, the article distracts from these critical issues, failing to offer a substantive analysis of China’s political and global impact.