Soviet official Peter Vladimirov's eyewitness account from 1942–1945 while stationed in Yan'an as the Comintern liaison and TASS correspondent

The following is from Soviet official Peter Vladimirov's eyewitness account from 1942–1945 while stationed in Yan'an as the Comintern liaison and TASS correspondent

In September 1942, the troops in Yan'an received no money, nor any significant supplies. Commanders such as He Long, Liu Bocheng, Nie Rongzhen, Chen Guang, and Xiao Ke controlled their own armies and territories, maintained independent arms factories, issued their own currencies, and taxed the local populations without a unified fiscal structure. The atmosphere in the army was one of passivity and indifference; the leadership waited for events to unfold rather than actively seeking wartime intelligence or confronting the enemy. Though initially welcoming, Communist leaders soon sought to distance themselves from us. The Eighth Route Army coexisted peacefully with the Japanese invaders. Japanese forces prepared comfortably for winter in occupied territories, while the Communist troops hovered nearby without engaging. In Xingxian, Japanese garrisons of only five to forty men occupied villages surrounded by numerically superior Communist troops under He Long. When asked why they didn’t retake the villages, the soldiers admitted they had been ordered not to engage. “We’ve been told not to touch them,” they said, “because if we take that outpost, the Japanese will send reinforcements. Then what?” This doctrine of non-engagement—"we don’t bother them, they won’t bother us"—prevailed. The Eighth Route Army showed no interest in the Soviet-German front; their inaction was deliberate. Despite repeated Soviet requests for military action to prevent Japan from mobilizing against the USSR, Communist leaders ignored these appeals. Instead, they scaled down Eighth Route Army operations in North China. The propaganda and military focus of the Communist troops was not against the Japanese, but the Nationalist forces; propaganda and strategic preparation targeted the Kuomintang. Orders from Yan'an emphasized preserving Communist forces at all costs, even at the price of retreating before minor Japanese advances. Mao Zedong's principle was to preserve his own strength, not defeat the enemy. To achieve this, he relaxed resistance and ceded territory. Years of inaction degraded the Red Army’s discipline—desertions increased, weapons were mistreated, and training ceased. Cooperation among units broke down. Claims of strict Japanese blockades were fabrication; we saw that frontlines were permeable. The leadership exaggerated hardships to enhance their own mythology. My journey to the front confirmed the Communists did not intend to fight the Japanese. They saw the war as an opportunity to build power bases—not through combat, but by exploiting the clash between Japan and the Kuomintang. If Japan defeated the central government, Communist troops would quickly move in and take control. They were prepared to eliminate their own allies in the United Front to seize power. Mao retreated before the invaders but exploited the conflict for political gain. At a time when the nation suffered under fascist occupation, this strategy was not merely opportunistic—it was treacherous. Mao had no genuine sense of internationalism; even his own people were tools in his struggle for power. To him, the blood, suffering, and sacrifices of millions were merely abstract concepts. Ah, the role of the individual in history—we have too often oversimplified it.