Summary: On 22 April 2025, a delegation from the Beijing-based Center for China and Globalization (CCG) visited the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in New York. Among the attendees was Gao Zhikai (Victor Gao), a senior CCG leader whose public roles include being a standing director of the Western Returned Scholars Association (WRSA / 欧美同学会), an organization described by Chinese official sources as led by the CCP Central Secretariat and overseen by the Central United Front Work Department. These institutional links suggest that CCG’s outreach should be interpreted not only as academic or policy engagement, but also as potentially connected to state-directed influence channels.
Who is Gao Zhikai and why his profile matters
Gao Zhikai is vice director of CCG and a public intellectual with leadership and advisory roles across energy, law, and policy networks. His professional portfolio includes positions at domestic and international forums, public commentary roles, and transnational institutional memberships. This combination of public influence, policy access, and network connectivity makes his participation in U.S.-based policy events strategically noteworthy.
Gao Zhikai – Deputy Director of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), J.D. from Yale Law School. Concurrently holds multiple positions:
Director, China Institute for Energy Security
Vice President, Beidou Industry Promotion Association
Executive Director, Western Returned Scholars Association (WRSA / 欧美同学会) — key position linking to the CCP Central Secretariat
Chairman, Hong Kong OBOR Group
Member, Global Council of the Asia Society (New York headquarters)
Member, International Advisory Board, Energy Intelligence Group (EIG, London headquarters)
Advisor, Saudi Aramco
Commentator, CCTV English Channel (operated by CCP Party Leadership Group of China Media Group under CCP Central Propaganda Department)
The WRSA link: institutional significance
Gao’s public listing as a standing director of WRSA is highly relevant. Official Chinese sources describe WRSA as led by the CCP Central Secretariat and managed by the United Front Work Department. This is not a neutral alumni association; it is a state-linked organization that channels CCP influence among returned scholars. Gao’s WRSA affiliation is therefore a clear institutional connection to the CCP’s united-front and diaspora-management apparatus.
The CFR meeting in context
The CCG delegation’s April 2025 visit to CFR included discussions on the current state and future trajectory of U.S.–China relations. Attendees included senior U.S.-based China specialists and multiple CCG leaders. Gao’s presence is notable because it combines elite networking, public diplomacy, and message testing. Given his WRSA affiliation, his participation represents engagement by an actor operating across both civil-society/think-tank channels and formal CCP-linked networks.
According to CCG’s public reporting, the CFR meeting included (Chinese names anglicized where applicable):
-
CCG visitors / delegation: CCG President Wang Huiyao; co-founder & Secretary-General Miao Lu; CCG Vice President Victor (Victor Zhikai) Gao; CCG Deputy Director Gao Zhikai (profiled below); and other senior CCG researchers and directors.
-
CFR / U.S. participants and guests:
-
Susan Shirk (former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Honorary Director, 21st Century China Center, UC San Diego)
-
Huang Yanzhong (CFR senior fellow on global health)
-
Carl Minzner (CFR senior fellow on China; Professor, Fordham Law)
-
Dr. Shuxian Luo (CFR Stanton Nuclear Security researcher)
-
Earl Carr (founder & CEO, CJPA Global Advisory)
-
Professor Sun Yanhui (Political Science, City University of New York)
CCG’s account lists these names and describes “candid, in-depth exchanges” on the current state and future trajectory of U.S.–China relations.
-
Implications for U.S. policy and institutions
Institutional connections are material. Titles such as “WRSA standing director” are linked to CCP personnel and united-front management. They provide Beijing with channels to organize, influence, and amplify strategic messaging among returned scholars and elite networks.
Track-two forums have dual functions. While nominally academic, these forums can serve to project narratives, test messaging, and map networks. Gao’s dual roles amplify this effect.
Vetting and transparency should be adjusted accordingly. U.S. institutions should treat WRSA-linked titles as meaningful institutional affiliations. For sensitive forums, this may require disclosure of funding, agendas, and participant lists, as well as enhanced device security and access controls.
Policy guidance for host institutions. Clear post-meeting reporting and staff awareness of united-front linkages help ensure that engagements with WRSA/CCG-affiliated actors are managed with appropriate caution.
Conclusion
The 22 April 2025 CCG–CFR exchange is, on the surface, a routine track-two policy meeting. However, Victor Gao Zhikai’s WRSA affiliation — an organization led by the CCP Central Secretariat and managed by the Central United Front Work Department — turns this engagement into a strategically significant interaction. U.S. policy actors and institutional hosts should treat such meetings with calibrated caution, recognizing the institutional affiliations as indicators of potential influence operations.
Given the structural realities of governance and institutional control in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), any engagement with senior officials or leadership from the PRC government, the Western Returned Scholars Association (WRSA / 欧美同学会), CCP-controlled universities, research institutes, think tanks, secondary schools, or corporations should be treated as equivalent to interacting with the PRC government or its ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
A clear example is Huawei: the company claims to be controlled by its trade union committee, yet the trade union itself is legally mandated to follow PRC law and union charter, both of which require adherence to CCP leadership. This illustrates that ostensibly “private” entities in China are often institutionally bound to the party-state hierarchy.
Implication: U.S. policy, academic, and corporate institutions should adopt a precautionary principle: when dealing with senior representatives of PRC or party-affiliated institutions, treat interactions as if they are with the CCP or the PRC government itself. This includes heightened scrutiny, mandatory disclosure of institutional links, careful vetting, and risk assessment for sensitive engagements.
The CCG delegation’s visit to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) — with participation from CFR’s Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow (Luo Shuxian) and CFR’s Senior Fellow for Global Health (Huang Yanzhong) — raises nontrivial strategic concerns. However, whether it constitutes illegal influence depends on specific evidence of covert intent or coordination, which is not publicly documented. What can be stated clearly is the following:
1. Structural Risk: CCG and WRSA Are Not Independent Civil Institutions
The delegation included WRSA-linked leadership (e.g., Victor Gao), and WRSA is institutionally associated with the CCP Central Secretariat and the United Front Work Department.
This means the visiting group is not simply a “think tank delegation.”
It represents entities embedded in China’s political system that conduct coordinated political influence work.
Thus, any closed-door or semi‑private policy exchanges involving U.S. nuclear or health security researchers carry inherent national-security vulnerabilities, even without evidence of wrongdoing.
2. Topic Proximity: Nuclear Security and Biosecurity Are Core CCP Intelligence Targets
The PRC’s intelligence services prioritize:
U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine
U.S. response thresholds
Biological threat preparedness
Public health emergency escalation paths
White House crisis decision-making processes
Having a nuclear security fellow and a global health (biosecurity-relevant) senior fellow present at a meeting with a PRC delegation linked to the CCP’s united-front system creates the potential for influence attempts, narrative operations, or mapping of U.S. experts’ threat perceptions.
This does not prove wrongdoing — but it absolutely constitutes a measurable risk category in U.S. counterintelligence frameworks.
3. Influence, Not Espionage, Is the More Likely Mechanism
This is strategically plausible because the CCP’s united-front system frequently aims to:
shape elite U.S. perceptions of China’s intentions
reduce political will for U.S. countermeasures
cultivate sympathetic expert voices who might oppose strong responses
Especially in domains where U.S. retaliation capability is crucial — nuclear, biological, cyber, and space.
Therefore, the strategic scenario you describe fits the CCP’s documented influence toolkit, even if no illegal acts are demonstrated.
4. The Key Vulnerability: Pre‑Attack Narrative Conditioning
If the CCP were to consider a coercive action, including cyber‑bio threats or strategic brinkmanship, it would be enormously valuable to:
identify which U.S. scholars are likely to oppose retaliation,
cultivate voices who will argue that escalation is too risky,
and pre‑shape the expert consensus the White House relies on in emergencies.
A united-front–linked delegation engaging with CFR scholars in nuclear security and global health could serve precisely this function — subtly, indirectly, and without violating U.S. law.
Final Assessment
Could this interaction be part of a CCP effort to weaken U.S. nuclear or biological response readiness?
Yes, it is absolutely possible and consistent with PRC influence doctrine.
Is the scenario plausible enough to warrant White House or FBI counterintelligence attention?
This is why the United Front Work Department’s involvement — via WRSA, CCG, and individuals like Victor Gao — should not be treated as an academic or benign policy exchange.
References and Sources
CCG official reports on the CFR delegation visit. CCG News
Victor Gao Zhikai public biographies and professional profiles. CCG Leadership Page
Detailed breakdown of WRSA’s institutional structure: WRSA under CCP Central Secretariat and United Front Work Department oversight.
No comments:
Post a Comment