To fully understand why US national security officials sounded the alarm over Fufeng Group’s attempt to buy land near a strategic drone and missile base in North Dakota, one must look at the mathematical reality of its leadership’s integration into the Chinese party-state.
This is a comprehensive analytical breakdown of a 20-year structural intersection between Fufeng's Chairman, Li Xuechun (李学纯), and the active-duty "gunsticks" of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).
1. The 20-Year Provincial Lockstep (1998–2018)
In China's system, a provincial parliament term lasts 5 years, and delegates gather at least once a year for a full legislative summit. For four consecutive terms—spanning the 9th to the 12th Shandong Provincial People's Congress—Fufeng Chairman Li Xuechun served uninterruptedly as a lawmaker representing the Linyi (临沂) constituency.
Official government gazettes reveal that over those 20 years, across at least 20 mandatory legislative summits, Li Xuechun sat on the exact same benches, co-legislated, and approved policies alongside an overwhelming number of active-duty military enforcers:
9th Congress (1998–2003): At least 35 active-duty PLA personnel served alongside Li.
10th Congress (2003–2008): At least 34 active-duty PLA personnel served alongside Li.
11th Congress (2008–2013): At least 33 active-duty PLA personnel served alongside Li.
12th Congress (2013–2018): At least 33 active-duty PLA personnel served alongside Li.
This means for two decades, Fufeng's chairman was integrated into a decision-making body alongside at least 135 military figures tasked with rubber-stamping state budgets, surveillance apparatuses, and local military-civil mobilization.
When we say 'at least 33 active-duty military personnel,' we are only counting those who openly wore their uniforms and admitted their military status in official gazettes. In Beijing's shadow-governed system, the true number is likely much higher.
Many other delegates sitting in the 'civilian' sections are, in reality, undercover military tech experts, defense mobilization chiefs, or intelligence assets registered under fake corporate or bureaucratic titles. The 'civilian' parliament is completely compromised from within.
When analyzing Chinese parliamentary data—such as the overlapping seats between Fufeng Group’s Chairman and military figures—we strictly use the term "at least." This is not a casual modifier. It is a necessary investigative tool to counter a sophisticated, decades-long legislative shell game run by the Chinese Communist Party.
According to authoritative historical analyses published even within China’s heavily censored media networks (such as regional legislative archives), Beijing has, since the dawn of its regime in 1949, deliberately cross-registered its most high-ranking wartime generals into civilian regional delegations to mask the sheer scale of military control over the state.
The data from the foundational 1st, 2nd, and 3rd National People's Congress (NPC) establishes this "at least" reality as an ironclad institutional rule:
1. The 1st National People's Congress (1954)
The Official Smokescreen: The military was assigned a separate "PLA Delegation" consisting of 60 official seats.
The "At Least" Reality: In reality, the halls were crawling with hidden military commands masquerading as local representatives. Field Marshal Chen Yi (陈毅) was hidden inside the Shanghai Civilian Delegation. General Luo Ruiqing (罗瑞卿), the chief of the regime's secret police and military networks, was placed in the Hebei Delegation. General Yang Chengwu (杨成武) was slipped into the Tianjin Delegation, and General Wei Guoqing (韦国清) controlled the Guangxi Delegation.
The Supreme Commander's Camouflage: Even Mao Zedong (毛泽东), the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and supreme commander of the entire armed force, did not sit in the military block. He was registered under the civilian Beijing Delegation. This established a permanent precedent: to this day, the commander-in-chief of the military junta never sits with the military delegation on paper; they always wear the mask of a civilian regional delegate.
2. The 2nd National People's Congress (1959)
The Official Smokescreen: The PLA delegation remained fixed at 60 seats.
The "At Least" Reality: More than 20 top-tier battle-hardened military generals were cross-registered into local civilian provincial blocks.
The Shocking Case of Sichuan: As we documented earlier, during the height of the Great Famine, the Sichuan Civilian Delegation alone was heavily militarized. Beyond its local farmers and townsfolk, it secretly contained:
Two Field Marshals — Zhu De (朱德) and Nie Rongzhen (聂荣臻)
One Grand General — Luo Ruiqing (罗瑞卿)
Two Full Generals — Zhao Erlu (赵尔陆) and Yan Hongyan (阎红彦)
Two Lieutenant Generals — Zhang Jingwu (张经武) and Yu Qiuli (余秋里)
3. The 3rd National People's Congress (1964)
The Official Smokescreen: The official PLA delegation doubled to 120 seats.
The "At Least" Reality: Despite doubling the official military seats, the regime still chose to scatter legendary combat generals like Yang Dezhi (杨得志), Lu Zhengcao (吕正操), and Song Renqiong (宋任穷) across various regional civilian delegations.
2. Zooming in on the Municipal Base: The Linyi Network
This integration is even more direct when you look at how Li Xuechun was chosen. On January 12, 2013, during the 2nd Session of the 18th Linyi Municipal People's Congress, Li Xuechun was elected to his seat in the provincial congress.
The very municipal body that put him in power was already governed in part by active-duty PLA military commanders. The 18th Linyi Municipal Congress, which commenced in 2012 with a five-year term, included at least two heavy-hitting active-duty officers from the Linyi Military Sub-district (临沂军分区):
Zhang Hongliang (张宏亮) – Commander of the Linyi Military Sub-district.
Jiao Haiwang (焦海旺) – Political Commissar of the Linyi Military Sub-district.
3. The Anatomy of a "Rongzhuang Changwei" (The Uniformed Committeeman)
The career of Commissar Jiao Haiwang (焦海旺) perfectly illustrates the "party-government-military" trinity we see in News Broadcasts (新闻联播) across China:
A career soldier who joined the PLA Army in February 1978.
By December 2009, he became the Political Commissar and Party Secretary of the Linyi Military Sub-district.
By April 2010, he crossed over into civilian governance, simultaneously holding a seat as a Standing Committee Member of the Linyi Municipal Communist Party Committee.
In Western terms, this means an active-duty military general sat on the city's executive council, held a seat in the city's parliament, and directly influenced the political ecosystem that sent Fufeng’s Chairman to the provincial legislature.
The Verdict: No Separate Lanes
When Westerners view a Chinese billionaire, they often mistake him for an independent commercial actor like Elon Musk or Warren Buffett. But the data from Linyi and Shandong tells the true story.
From the municipal military sub-district up to the provincial congress halls, Fufeng’s leadership has spent 20 years marinating in an ecosystem controlled by "the gun." When Fufeng tries to set up shop near an American military base, they are bringing three decades of military-civil fusion with them. In this regime, the corporate ledger and the military command chain are written in the exact same book.
Analyzing Chinese parliamentary data—such as the overlapping seats between Fufeng Group’s Chairman and military figures—requires the strict application of the term "at least." This is not a casual modifier. It is an indispensable investigative tool to counter a sophisticated, decades-long legislative shell game run by the Chinese Communist Party.
According to authoritative historical analyses published even within China’s heavily censored media networks, Beijing has, since the foundation of the regime, deliberately cross-registered high-ranking wartime generals into civilian regional delegations to mask the sheer scale of military control over the state.
The data from the foundational 1st, 2nd, and 3rd National People's Congress (NPC) establishes this "at least" reality as an ironclad institutional rule:
1. The 1st National People's Congress (1954)
The Official Smokescreen: The military was assigned a separate "PLA Delegation" consisting of 60 official seats.
The "At Least" Reality: In reality, the halls were populated by hidden military commanders masquerading as local representatives. Field Marshal Chen Yi (陈毅) was embedded inside the Shanghai Civilian Delegation. General Luo Ruiqing (罗瑞卿), the chief of the regime's security and military networks, was placed in the Hebei Delegation. General Yang Chengwu (杨成武) was slipped into the Tianjin Delegation, and General Wei Guoqing (韦国清) controlled the Guangxi Delegation.
The Supreme Commander's Camouflage: Even Mao Zedong (毛泽东), the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and supreme commander of the entire armed force, did not sit in the military block. The regime registered the leader under the civilian Beijing Delegation. This established a permanent precedent: the commander-in-chief of the military junta never sits with the military delegation on paper; the leadership always wears the mask of a civilian regional delegate.
2. The 2nd National People's Congress (1959)
The Official Smokescreen: The PLA delegation remained fixed at 60 seats.
The "At Least" Reality: More than 20 top-tier, battle-hardened military generals were cross-registered into local civilian provincial blocks.
The Case of Sichuan: During the height of the Great Famine, the Sichuan Civilian Delegation alone was heavily militarized. Beyond local farmers and townsfolk, it secretly contained:
Two Field Marshals — Zhu De (朱德) and Nie Rongzhen (聂荣臻)
One Grand General — Luo Ruiqing (罗瑞卿)
Two Full Generals — Zhao Erlu (赵尔陆) and Yan Hongyan (阎红彦)
Two Lieutenant Generals — Zhang Jingwu (张经武) and Yu Qiuli (余秋里)
3. The 3rd National People's Congress (1964)
The Official Smokescreen: The official PLA delegation doubled to 120 seats.
The "At Least" Reality: Despite doubling the official military seats, the regime still chose to scatter legendary combat generals like Yang Dezhi (杨得志), Lu Zhengcao (吕正操), and Song Renqiong (宋任穷) across various regional civilian delegations.
This historical blueprint explains the exact same phenomenon observed today with Fufeng Group in Linyi and Shandong Province.
When official records show that Fufeng's Chairman sat with 33 or 35 open military officers, that is only the floor, never the ceiling.
Just as Field Marshal Chen Yi wore the badge of a "Shanghai delegate" and General Luo Ruiqing wore the badge of a "Hebei delegate" while holding the triggers to the state's brute force, modern Chinese NPC sessions are systematically flooded with military-industrial chiefs, cyber-warfare executives, and defense mobilization handlers who are registered under "civilian" corporate, agricultural, or technical categories.
Therefore, when foreign intelligence and legislative bodies audit Chinese companies like Fufeng, reliance cannot be placed on official PLA delegation lists. The entire interlocking web must be evaluated through the lens of the "At Least" Doctrine. The civilian garment is merely a prop; underneath, the entire legislature has functioned as a garrison state since day one.
An analysis of official historical metrics reveals that the militarization of the National People's Congress (NPC) is an institutional mandate coordinated directly by the state’s defense apparatus. According to documentation originally published on the official website of the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the armed forces maintain a permanent, dual-track presence inside the national legislature.
The defense ministry’s records explicitly confirm that while a dedicated "PLA Delegation" exists, active-duty military personnel are systematically embedded within local provincial and municipal civilian delegations.
1. The Official PLA Delegation Framework (1st to 13th NPC)
The official, disclosed number of seats allocated exclusively to the military delegation has expanded steadily across the history of the regime, structured as follows:
1st and 2nd NPC: 60 delegates each
3rd NPC: 120 delegates
4th NPC: 486 delegates
5th NPC: 503 delegates
6th to 8th NPC: 267 delegates each
9th to 12th NPC: 268 delegates each
13th NPC: 269 delegates (with occasional localized fluctuations dropping below 269)
2. The Operational Reality of the Dual-Track System
The core revelation from the defense ministry's data is that these numbers represent only the visible baseline. The total military presence inside the NPC is significantly higher due to the deliberate dispersal of officers into non-military regional blocks. High-ranking commanders, regional garrison chiefs, and military-industrial planners routinely secure legislative seats through provincial selections rather than the official military portal.
This mechanism ensures that every provincial delegation—including those representing corporate and agricultural hubs—is permanently subject to domestic military surveillance and co-governance.
3. The Digital Geofencing and Erasure of State Records
The primary source documenting this structural militarization was long maintained on the PRC Ministry of National Defense educational sub-domain under the verified URL:
[http://mod.gov.cn/education/2020-05/26/content_4865762_3.htm]
In recent monitoring periods, this specific URL has become entirely inaccessible from IP addresses outside the borders of the PRC. This pattern indicates either an outright deletion of the historical record or the implementation of strict foreign domain geofencing.
The restriction of this data from international visibility underscores its sensitive nature. By blocking access to these statistical breakdowns, the regime attempts to obscure the structural reality of its garrison state from foreign regulators, intelligence agencies, and corporate compliance auditors who monitor the deep state connections of businesses like Fufeng Group.
The structural infiltration of civilian legislative bodies by active-duty military forces is not a secret theory; it was openly boasted about by the regime itself. On May 26, 2020, the PRC Ministry of National Defense published an official educational document tracking the history of PLA delegates. The ministry explicitly admitted that beyond the official military delegation, high-ranking generals were routinely laundered into regional civilian blocks (such as Field Marshal Chen Yi in Shanghai and Secret Police Chief Luo Ruiqing in Hebei).
Crucially, as international scrutiny intensified over China's 'military-civil fusion' and land acquisitions near Western strategic sites, this specific official page was weaponized with digital geofencing and scrubbed from international visibility. The sudden extraction of these records from the global internet is the ultimate proof of their sensitivity: Beijing is actively trying to hide the historical and constitutional blueprints of its garrison state. "官方
你知道历届全国人民代表大会军队代表有多少人吗? - 中华人民共和国国防部
2020年5月26日
第二十二条单独规定:人民武装部队应选全国人民代表大会代表60人。根据全国人民代表大会选举法分配的名额,历届全国人大解放军代表团人数如下: 第一届60名。除了解放军代表团的60名代表外,在各省市代表团里也有一些解放军将领,如陈毅在上海市代表团,罗瑞卿在河北省代表团,杨成武在天津市代表团,韦国清在广西省代表团等等,他们当中..."
---中华人民共和国国防部 党政机关"
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