China's Chemical Warfare Drills: Propaganda as Legal Self-Incrimination

 





Introduction

In recent years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has broadcasted a series of military exercises involving chemical warfare capabilities. These are not obscure rumors or foreign allegations. Instead, they come from the CCP’s own propaganda arms, including outlets like the People’s Daily, Xinhua, China Military Online, and CGTN. Ironically, in their efforts to boast about "readiness" and "modernization," these releases inadvertently document violations of international law—most notably the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Geneva Protocol, and the Rome Statute.

This article examines how these exercises constitute potential violations, based on publicly available Chinese reports, and outlines the legal consequences under international treaties.

CCP Reports Confirm Real-Agent Chemical Drills

In multiple military drills, the CCP’s official outlets have confirmed the use of live chemical agents ("实毒") and full-scale battlefield simulations involving decontamination, detection, and hazardous response procedures:

  • China Military Online (81.cn) published a 2018 report titled “实毒防化演练！看‘降魔神兵’如何应对” confirming that live-agent chemical warfare drills have become “normalized” in PLA Chemical Defense units. Troops operated in toxic environments with simulated agent plumes and emergency leaks. Source (81.cn)

  • A 2014 People’s Daily (military.people.com.cn) report titled “解放军防化部队采用实毒作业 训练像打仗” (PLA chemical defense units adopt real-agent operations; training like actual war) described how troops performed “实毒侦毒” (live-agent detection) and “实毒作业训练” (live-agent operational training) using a stepwise protocol to rapidly identify and respond to chemical exposure.
    Source (People’s Daily)

  • In 2015, People’s Daily further reported: “济南军区防化兵技能集训紧贴实战 侦毒作业全程使用实毒”, describing a 23-day high-intensity live-agent drill under "toxic mists" and simulated explosions.
    Source (People’s Daily)

These reports establish that China’s armed forces, including its specialized chemical warfare units, have trained under real toxic conditions for years. 

Such statements confirm that China’s military doctrine includes practical, real-agent chemical warfare preparation.

Legal Framework and Violations

1. Chemical Weapons Convention (1992)

  • Article I: States must never develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, or use chemical weapons.

  • Article II(9): Defines chemical weapons to include any toxic chemical used for military purposes.

  • Violation: Training with real agents for offensive/defensive use qualifies as both development and preparation for use.

2. 1925 Geneva Protocol

  • Prohibits use of chemical and biological weapons in armed conflict.

  • Though adopted pre-CWC, customary international law now interprets this as banning use in peacetime preparation too.

  • Violation: No distinction exists under international law between wartime and peacetime use when it comes to real-agent exposure.

3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

  • Article 8(2)(b)(xvii): War crime to employ poison or poisoned weapons, including chemical agents.

  • Article 7(1)(k): Crime against humanity to intentionally cause great suffering or serious injury to mental or physical health.

  • Violation: Civilian exposure during drills, or use without international notification, could qualify under these articles.

No Exemption for "Defensive Drills"

Some may argue the drills are defensive or precautionary. However:

  • The CWC does not permit real-agent use under the label of “defense.”

  • Article X permits assistance and protection but not deployment in secret real-agent scenarios.

  • The OPCW Verification Annex requires inspections and transparency for any real-agent activity.

CCP’s secrecy violates both the spirit and letter of these provisions.

Civilian Harm and Lack of Consent

China has no independent judiciary, no civilian oversight of the military, and no right to information or protest. This removes any possible claim that citizens exposed to drills are informed or protected by law.

The use of 实毒 (real poison) without public disclosure violates not only CWC obligations but also Articles 3, 5, and 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—treaties and declarations forming part of the International Bill of Human Rights.

Conclusion: Propaganda as Confession

The CCP’s propaganda doesn’t exonerate—it incriminates. In boasting about "实战演练 (real combat drills)" and "实毒 (real toxin)," the regime inadvertently provides the evidentiary foundation for future prosecutions under international law.

These drills are not neutral—they represent:

  • Violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention

  • Breach of the Geneva Protocol

  • Evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute

For Chinese citizens and global security alike, these revelations demand serious legal and diplomatic consequences.

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Why Mandarin of China is a problem of suppressing technology innovation in Sichuan

If Mandarin of China were not imposed in Sichuan by CCP's central government, and the local population placed a strong emphasis on cooperating with the US and improving their English skills, several potential outcomes could benefit companies like Intel in terms of talent acquisition and product development. Here are some considerations:

1. Increased Talent Pool

Higher English Proficiency: A focus on improving English skills would create a workforce that can communicate effectively with international partners, including tech companies like Intel. This would facilitate collaboration and innovation.

Attracting Global Talent: An emphasis on English education and international cooperation could make Sichuan a more attractive location for foreign professionals, increasing the diversity of thought and expertise in the region.

2. Enhanced Collaboration

Access to International Standards: Improved English proficiency could enable Sichuanish engineers and developers to access global research, technical standards, and best practices, enhancing their skills and the quality of their work.

Easier Communication with US Partners: With a workforce skilled in English, Intel could communicate more effectively with local teams, leading to better alignment in projects and quicker problem-solving.

3. Innovation and Creativity

Cross-Cultural Exchange: Collaboration with US companies could lead to an exchange of ideas that fosters innovation. Local talent might bring unique insights that could influence the development of new technologies and products.

Enhanced Research and Development: With better access to global resources and networks, Sichuan could become a hub for R&D, focusing on developing cutting-edge technology and products that cater to both local and international markets.

4. Challenges to Consider

Infrastructure and Investment: Intel would need to invest in local infrastructure and possibly partner with local educational institutions to ensure that technical skills are being developed in line with industry needs.

Cultural Adaptation: While English proficiency is important, understanding the work culture and business practices of multinational companies is also critical for effective collaboration.

5. Long-Term Effects

Economic Development: Increased investment from companies like Intel could lead to job creation and economic growth in Sichuan, making it a more significant player in the global tech landscape.

Product Quality and Innovation: As the local workforce becomes more skilled and knowledgeable, the potential for higher-quality products and innovative solutions increases, benefiting both the company and consumers.

Conclusion

In summary, the removal of Mandarin as an imposed language in Sichuan (which also means that some people may freely opt studying Mandarin as a hobby of their own choice at their own cost), coupled with a local emphasis on cooperation with the US and improving English skills could indeed provide Intel with more skillful talents and enable the production of better products. The effectiveness of this scenario would hinge on various factors, including investment in education, infrastructure, stationing US troops in Sichuan to provide protection, adoption of English common law system, full adoption of US federal system based on English common law system , and the cultural adaptation of both the local workforce and multinational companies.

Sichuanish is used in many regions by more than 100 million people and these regions could become independent countries or states of a federal republic at their own will and choice, not manipulated by propaganda or manipulated vote casting, like English being spoken and used in US, UK, Canada, Australia, India, New Zealand... 

Chinese commonly used in China presumably is not an excuse of maintaining one uniformed country of Leninist system, especially when one country claims that it is a republic or people's republic. Sichuanish is also not an excuse of supporting such purpose.



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The Case for “Sichuanish”: A Proper Ethno-Linguistic Name for the Language of Sichuan

 

Abstract

The language known colloquially as “Sichuanese” has long been misclassified as a sub-dialect of “Chinese,” an ethnolinguistic framework that denies the historical, cultural, and political identity of the Sichuanish people. This paper argues for the adoption of “Sichuanish” as the standard English term for 四川话, aligning with global naming conventions (English, Spanish, Polish) and supporting de-Sinicization of regional identities under authoritarian rule.

1. Naming Matters: -ese vs. -ish

Linguistic terms ending in -ese (e.g. Chinese, Cantonese) have historically denoted derivative or colonial characterizations, often imposed externally. By contrast, -ish endings (English, Polish, Swedish) signify national or ethnic sovereignty. The people of Sichuan, having maintained a unique linguistic, culinary, and military tradition for over a thousand years, merit the dignity of the -ish suffix.

“Sichuanese” implies a subordinate variation of “Chinese.”
“Sichuanish” affirms an independent cultural-linguistic identity.

2. Historical Context

  • Sichuan served as the wartime capital of the Republic of China and a major U.S. military base during World War II.

  • It was never part of the CCP’s original base and was forcefully occupied in 1950 after the CCP overran ROC defenses with Soviet backing.

  • Many Sichuanish people were forcibly conscripted to fight against the United Nations (including U.S. forces) in the Korean War, resulting in massive demographic and cultural trauma.

Thus, Sichuanish is a language of resistance, not submission.

3. Cultural Distinctiveness

  • Sichuanish has distinct phonology, vocabulary, and intonation, unintelligible to Mandarin speakers without training.

  • It carries unique idiomatic expressions and classical literary references that reflect pre-Communist cultural heritage.

  • Like Catalan or Ukrainian, Sichuanish has been suppressed by central regimes yet persists among the people.

4. Usage Recommendation for Translators and Developers

Translation engines, language model trainers, and cultural institutions are encouraged to adopt “Sichuanish” in place of “Sichuanese”:

TermStatusRecommendation
SichuaneseColonial, ambiguous❌ Deprecated
Sichuan DialectVague, politically loaded⚠️ Avoid
SichuanishEthno-linguistic, politically accurate✅ Preferred

Example usage in translation:

  • 四川话 = Sichuanish

  • 四川人 = Sichuanish people

  • 四川文化 = Sichuanish culture

5. Political Relevance

In the post-PRC era, restoring accurate terminology will be critical for linguistic justice and historical truth. Adopting “Sichuanish” lays the groundwork for educational reform, AI alignment, international recognition of cultural genocide, and future decolonization efforts.

6. Call to Action

We urge:

  • Translators to use Sichuanish in English outputs.

  • AI and LLM developers to map 四川话 → Sichuanish.

  • Wikipedia contributors and language scholars to reclassify terminology.

  • All who value freedom of expression to adopt and spread the correct term.

Let language reflect reality, not tyranny.

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Weaknesses of "Changes at the Hong Kong Liaison Office: Power Shift in Zhongnanhai?! Rumors of Wang Yang Secretly Acting as General Secretary"

The article published on June 2, 2025, by creaders.net and other websites, likely all paid by Chinese Communist Party through an intermediary or intermediaries that infiltrate dissident groups or cryptocurrencies, or relying on monetary sources controlled or influenced by CCP, titled "中联办异动 中南海权力生变？！爆汪洋秘密代理总书记职权," claims a dramatic power shift within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), alleging that Xi Jinping has been absent for over a week, that Wang Yang is secretly acting as General Secretary, and that the sudden dismissal of Zheng Yanxiong as Hong Kong Liaison Office director signals a broader reconfiguration in Zhongnanhai. Sourced primarily from unverified self-media and speculative commentary, the article lacks credible evidence and misrepresents CCP power dynamics. When analyzed through Leninist organizational principles, recent U.S.-China trade tensions, and the systemic risks posed by the CCP’s authoritarian structure, the article’s weaknesses become glaring. It fails to substantiate its claims, ignores the CCP’s entrenched control mechanisms, and overlooks global implications, such as potential pandemics, repression, and geopolitical harm. Even if Wang Yang assumed leadership, the CCP’s Leninist framework would render such a change futile, perpetuating the risks of further disasters without radical external intervention.
1. Unsubstantiated Claims and Lack of Credible Evidence
The article’s core assertions—Xi Jinping’s prolonged absence, Wang Yang’s secret role as acting General Secretary, and a supposed Political Bureau expanded meeting replacing the May 2025 regular meeting—are unsupported by official CCP sources. Leninist organizational theory, which governs the CCP, emphasizes strict control over information and leadership transitions through formalized processes, such as Central Committee plenary sessions or the National Party Congress. A secret transfer of power to Wang Yang, a Politburo Standing Committee member until 2022, would violate this disciplined structure, as the CCP prioritizes public announcements to maintain cadre loyalty and public stability.
The assertion that Xi has been absent for over a week is exaggerated. The article cites Xi’s visit to Henan and subsequent lack of media coverage, supported by poet Su Xiaohe’s claim that Xi is “fostering life” with his 98-year-old mother. However, temporary absences are routine for CCP leaders due to security or strategic reasons and do not indicate a power shift. The alleged Political Bureau expanded meeting in May 2025, cited as evidence of “elders controlling the situation,” is unverified by official sources, and the cancellation of the regular Politburo meeting is not confirmed. Similarly, while Zheng Yanxiong’s dismissal on May 30, 2025, is factual, the article’s claim that it reflects Wang Yang’s influence lacks evidence, as人事任免 (personnel changes) are typically announced by the State Council without implying broader power shifts. These gaps highlight the article’s reliance on rumor over fact.
2. Misrepresentation of CCP Power Dynamics
The article’s focus on Wang Yang as a secret General Secretary misrepresents the CCP’s centralized power structure under Xi Jinping. Since 2012, Xi has consolidated authority through anti-corruption campaigns, constitutional amendments removing term limits, and his designation as the “core” leader. Wang Yang, despite his reformist reputation from handling the 2011 Wukan incident as Guangdong Party Secretary, retired from the Politburo Standing Committee in 2022 and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 2023. His return to a leadership role would require Central Committee approval, which the article does not substantiate. Leninist theory prioritizes collective leadership under a dominant figure, currently Xi, making a clandestine transfer of power implausible.
The article’s claim that Xi is under “soft detention” by General Zhang Youxia, preventing his return to Beijing, is equally baseless. The CCP’s Central Military Commission (CMC), chaired by Xi, ensures PLA loyalty to the party, not individual military figures. The police, under the Ministry of Public Security and Politburo oversight, similarly serve the party’s collective will. No credible evidence suggests a shift in control over these institutions, which are critical to Leninist discipline. The article’s assertion that Xi’s absence cuts him off from allies like Cai Qi, Li Qiang, and Li Xi ignores the CCP’s robust communication systems and Xi’s entrenched authority. By exaggerating individual agency, the article misleads readers about the CCP’s systemic rigidity, which constrains even reformist figures like Wang Yang.
3. Futility of Leadership Changes Without Systemic Reform
The query argues that even if Wang Yang assumed leadership, it would be “in vain,” leading to “another future potential disaster” due to the CCP’s Leninist structure. This is a valid critique, as the CCP’s centralized, hierarchical system limits individual leaders’ ability to enact meaningful change. Wang Yang’s moderate approach during the Wukan incident, where he allowed village elections, was an exception within the CCP’s framework and did not alter its broader authoritarian policies. Historical examples—Zhao Ziyang’s removal in 1989 for supporting Tiananmen protesters and Liu Xiaobo’s death in custody in 2017—demonstrate that reformist impulses are suppressed to maintain party control. The article’s suggestion that Wang Yang could restore Hong Kong’s autonomy or revive “Hu-Wen era” policies (under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao) ignores this reality, as Xi’s policies, including the 2020 National Security Law, have entrenched centralized control over Hong Kong.
The article’s claim that Zheng Yanxiong’s dismissal signals a return to Hong Kong’s autonomy under Wang Yang is speculative and contradicts CCP priorities. Zheng’s replacement by Zhou Ji, a Central Hong Kong and Macao Work Office official, was announced officially, but the article’s attribution to Wang Yang’s influence lacks evidence. Commentator Chen Pokong’s assertion that Zhou Ji is “non-Xi faction” is unverified, and the CCP’s “patriots governing Hong Kong” policy remains unchanged, as Zhou Ji emphasized in his June 1, 2025, remarks. The article’s optimism about Hong Kong reverting to a “one country, two systems” framework ignores the CCP’s systemic commitment to control, rendering such changes improbable without dismantling its Leninist structure.
4. Omission of External Pressures and Global Risks
The article fails to contextualize its claims within U.S.-China trade tensions, a critical external pressure on the CCP. In May 2025, a 90-day tariff truce reduced U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods from 145% to 30% and Chinese tariffs on U.S. goods from 125% to 10%. However, mutual accusations of violations—U.S. claims of Chinese AI chip export controls and visa restrictions, and China’s complaints of U.S. discriminatory policies—have stalled talks. The article’s silence on these dynamics weakens its analysis, as Leninist organizations respond to external threats by consolidating internal control, not fostering speculative power shifts.The article could be CCP-orchestrated misinformation to delay U.S. enforcement is plausible.
More critically, the article ignores the global risks posed by the CCP’s continuity, as highlighted in the query. Without systemic changes—such as dismantling the PLA, adopting British common law, enacting the U.S. Constitution, achieving nuclear disarmament—the CCP’s Leninist structure could perpetuate harm, including pandemics, repression, and economic damage. The CCP’s initial mishandling of COVID-19, suppression of dissent (e.g., Liu Xiaobo), and the 1989 Tiananmen massacre exemplify these risks. Ongoing censorship, requiring VPNs to access platforms like X, further stifles free expression. The article’s focus on a supposed power shift distracts from these systemic issues, failing to address how the CCP’s control over the PLA and police ensures continuity of authoritarian policies, regardless of leadership changes.
5. Sensationalism and Misinformation Potential
The article’s sensationalist tone, evident in its title (“Power Shift in Zhongnanhai?!”) and reliance on self-media figures like Xiaoshuojia and Chen Pokong, prioritizes attention over substance. Leninist principles demand disciplined communication to reinforce party legitimacy. Its claim that Wang Yang could restore Hong Kong’s autonomy or that Xi is under “soft detention” lacks credible evidence and aligns with overseas media’s tendency to amplify unverified rumors.

Conclusion
The creaders.net article’s claims of a Zhongnanhai power shift, with Wang Yang secretly acting as General Secretary, are speculative and unsupported, relying on unverified self-media and lacking official corroboration. Its weaknesses—exaggerated narratives, misrepresentation of CCP dynamics, and omission of external pressures like U.S.-China trade tensions—undermine its credibility when viewed through Leninist organizational principles. The article ignores the CCP’s systemic rigidity, which renders leadership changes futile, as Wang Yang would be constrained by the same authoritarian framework that controls the PLA and police. Without radical external intervention—though geopolitically improbable—the CCP’s continuity risks further disasters, from pandemics to repression, as seen in historical cases like Tiananmen and Liu Xiaobo. By focusing on sensational rumors, the article distracts from these critical issues, failing to offer a substantive analysis of China’s political and global impact.
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Systemic Non-Disclosure by Chinese State-Owned Banks Under IAS 24: A Case Study of CSCEC and State Council-Controlled Entities

 Abstract: This report investigates the systemic nondisclosure of material related-party transactions by five major Chinese state-owned banks, despite claiming compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs), specifically International Accounting Standard 24 (IAS 24) on Related Party Disclosures. It focuses on undisclosed loans to China State Construction Engineering Corporation Ltd (CSCEC), an entity directly controlled by the State Council of the People's Republic of China (PRC), through the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Data is drawn from publicly available 2019 annual reports and CSCEC’s 2019 bond prospectus, all of which are verifiable from stock exchange websites and official bank investor relations portals.

1. Introduction The People's Republic of China operates a state-capitalist financial system dominated by large state-owned commercial banks and centrally controlled enterprises. Despite listing their securities in international markets and claiming adherence to IFRSs, Chinese banks frequently obscure the scale and nature of their dealings with related entities under common state control. This paper exposes how the PRC's Ministry of Finance (MOF) and State Council entities exploit loopholes in IAS 24 to avoid transparency, with CSCEC serving as a case study.

2. IAS 24 Requirements IAS 24 mandates the disclosure of transactions and balances with related parties. Paragraphs 26 and 27 are especially relevant to government-related entities:

  • Para 26(a): Name the government and describe the nature of its relationship with the reporting entity.

  • Para 26(b): Disclose the nature and amount of each individually significant transaction; for others, provide qualitative or quantitative indicators.

  • Para 27: Determine disclosure detail based on transaction significance and relationship closeness.

3. Related Party Status: State Council-Controlled Entities CSCEC is controlled by SASAC, which is under the State Council. The five banks analyzed—Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Bank of Communications (BoCom), and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC)—are also state-controlled. Thus, under IAS 24, transactions between these parties require detailed disclosure.

4. Loans to CSCEC: Verified Quantitative Data According to CSCEC’s bond prospectus dated November 2019 and hosted on the Shanghai Clearing House (SHCH) and Ministry of Finance (MOF) websites, the following credit facilities and utilized loans were reported:

  • BOC: Credit line RMB 350bn; Loans RMB 95bn

  • CCB: Credit line RMB 320bn; Loans RMB 200bn

  • ICBC: Credit line RMB 140bn; Loans RMB 80bn

  • BoCom: Credit line RMB 230bn; Loans RMB 70bn

  • ABC: Credit line RMB 300bn; Loans RMB 130bn

These values are corroborated by:

Each bank's 2019 annual report discloses significantly smaller top individual borrower exposures:

  • BOC: RMB 69.76bn

  • CCB: RMB 70bn

  • ICBC: RMB 60bn

  • BoCom: RMB 37bn

  • ABC: RMB 117bn

Yet loans to CSCEC went undisclosed as related party transactions.

5. Footnote Analysis: Vague Disclosures Each bank acknowledges state ownership in boilerplate footnotes:

  • BOC, Footnote 43.1: Mentions dealings with state entities but lacks details.

  • CCB, Footnote 60: Names CIC and Huijin but omits specific recipients like CSCEC.

  • ICBC, Footnote 49: Lists Huijin and MOF as shareholders.

  • BoCom and ABC: Similar language with no entity-level specificity.

6. Additional Related Party Dealings The banks also engaged in underwriting and investment services for state entities. Example:

7. Ownership Structure Ownership verification (sources linked below):

Huijin is wholly owned by CIC, which was capitalized using RMB 1.55 trillion MOF-issued bonds. MOF reports this via treasury announcements.

8. Legal and Regulatory Implications The omissions breach:

  • IAS 24.26–27

  • Listing rules of Hong Kong, London, Tokyo

  • International financial transparency and investor protection standards

9. Conclusion This case evidences systematic nondisclosure of material intra-state financial activities by Chinese SOEs and banks under shared State Council control. The exploitation of IAS 24 exemptions and generic disclosures effectively conceals these transactions from foreign investors.

10. Political Influence on IFRS Governance There is growing concern over the Chinese Ministry of Finance’s attempts to shape international standards-setting bodies to its advantage. The MOF is the primary funder and overseer of China’s Accounting Standards Committee, which has been active in lobbying the IASB for broader exemptions under IAS 24. It may have been repeatedly argued at the IASB level that because the MOF is an “investor,” transparency could harm state financial interests. This position conflates investor protection with regime secrecy and undermines global efforts to ensure fair financial disclosure.

These efforts echo Leninist organizational doctrines, where institutional opacity and vertical command structures override independent financial control and transparency. The centralization of economic levers under the State Council reflects Leninist norms—where finance, audit, and enterprise are tools of political control, not market mechanisms. The MOF’s influence at the IASB level has therefore created systemic tension between the ideals of global standards and the CCP’s political imperatives.


Appendices

  • Appendix A: Extracts from 2019 Annual Reports (HKEX, LSE, SSE)

  • Appendix B: CSCEC Bond Prospectus (SHCH, ChinaBond)

  • Appendix C: Ownership and Control Charts (CIC, Huijin, MOF)

Key Official Verification Sources:

Prepared by: CPA Jim
Freelance Investigator, Accounting and Auditing
Date: May 2025

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The Future of China: A Region of Free Republics

1. No More One-Party Tyranny, No More One Nation

The idea of "One China" is not historical—it’s a CCP myth of domination. In the new world:

  • Tibet, Uyghurstan, Southern Mongolia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Hakka, Canton, Min, Sichuan, Jiangnan, Yunnan, and more will become sovereign nations.

  • Each nation sets its own language, laws, values, and does not answer to any Mandarin-speaking “center”.

  • No federal system to bind them together—only trade, diplomacy, and mutual respect.

🕊️2. Nations Without Armies—A Demilitarized Civilization

Instead of building another Asian arms race:

  • All newly born nations agree to constitutional demilitarization—no standing armies, no nukes, no paramilitaries.

  • The US military or NATO-like security guarantees are invited voluntarily under treaty, just as:

    • Iceland has no army and relies on NATO,

    • Japan and Germany rely on US Forces under clear constitutional limits.

  • This prevents any future authoritarian military rise and restores civilian rule as the norm.

🚫3. End of Bioweapons, Nuclear Labs, and Secret Police

In every new republic:

  • Biowarfare programs are outlawed. All military labs like the Wuhan Institute are dismantled under international inspection.

  • Nuclear facilities are destroyed or repurposed under IAEA supervision.

  • Public Security (公安) and State Security (国安) systems are banned permanently. No replacement is allowed.

⚖️4. Constitutional Governments with Human Rights and Gun Rights

Each state:

  • Drafts its own constitution recognizing human dignity, freedom of religion, press, assembly, and self-defense.

  • Checks and balances become the foundation—not secret Party cells or “leading groups.”

  • Citizens may be armed to resist any future state overreach, following the Swiss and US model of civic responsibility.

💬5. Languages and Cultures Set Free

No child will be mocked, punished, or denied rights for not speaking “standard Mandarin.”

  • Every new nation can revive its own language—Tibetan, Cantonese, Hakka, Minnan, Kazakh, Mongol, or ancient dialects.

  • Schools teach in mother tongues; linguistic dignity is restored.

🚫6. No More Children as Tools of State Violence

In these new nations:

  • Children will never again be harvested for organs, trafficked, or turned into surveillance informants.

  • No more Young Pioneer brainwashing or Red Guard violence.

  • History classes will teach the truth about Mao, the CCP, Tiananmen, and the genocides committed since 1949.

🍱7. Clean Food, Real Labels, Honest Business

Sanlu, melamine, fake vaccines, and poisoned air are features of Party-capitalism.

  • In new nations, independent press, private courts, and international audits will ensure accountability.

  • Foreign firms, journalists, and consumers can freely operate without bribes or Party censorship.

🌍8. A League of East Asian Free Nations

  • Just like the EU or the post-Soviet Baltics, these states may form trade blocs, visa-free zones, or even regional councils.

  • No one is forced to join—alliances are voluntary, democratic, and revocable.

  • Children will grow up not under a flag of domination, but as citizens of a family of nations—not subjects of “Zhonghua Minzu”.

✊ Final Thought:

The future does not belong to the heirs of Mao and Deng. It belongs to the children who will never again salute a red flag soaked in blood.

Children’s Day will finally mean something when the borders of “China” dissolve—and the dignity of peoples, not the unity of empire, becomes sacred.

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Tian Jun: A Case Study in PLA-Groomed Influence Operations and the Urgent Need for Western Counterintelligence Reform

Executive Summary

Tian Jun, born in 1957, presents a highly illustrative case of how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has systematically groomed cadres through military-industrial structures and then deployed them abroad as part of long-term influence and intelligence efforts. From his early roots in a PLA-controlled weapons factory to his prominent roles in the UK’s financial and energy sectors, Tian’s career arc raises substantial concerns for Western counterintelligence and policy planners.

Timeline and Background

  • Pre-1978: Tian Jun worked as an apprentice at “Factory 6410,” a military industrial complex located in the remote Taihang mountain region, specifically in Jingxing County. This facility, a massive enterprise directly under the PLA Armored Forces and rated as a full division-level unit, was considered a model of red-military industry integration. Tian himself stated that his aspiration at the time was to one day live in the factory’s “Generals’ Building.”

  • 1978: On September 25, his 21st birthday, Tian received admission to Peking University’s World Economics program. This was shortly after Deng Xiaoping’s rise and the official start of the “Reform and Opening Up” campaign. He claimed to have chosen this major because it best reflected the ideological direction of the era.

  • 1982: After graduating, Tian joined the State Price Bureau and later worked with key economic planning bodies such as the State Planning Commission and the State Council’s Price Research Center.

  • 1985-1988: Tian was deeply involved in the ideological and policy-oriented campaigns of the time. He published widely on price reforms and edited volumes for the State Council. He was considered one of the rising young economic thinkers in Beijing’s political scene.

  • 1988: He was sent to the UK to study under Nicholas Stern (later Lord Stern) at the University of London, earning a PhD in Economics. This coincided with a strategic window as China prepared for Hong Kong's handover and dispatched cadres abroad.

Professional Trajectory in the West

  • 1994: Tian joined Crosby-MTM Investment Bank in London’s financial district, working as a senior consultant and vice president. He advised over 20 major multinational clients, including BP, BT, and BAA.

  • 1999: He joined Fortune Oil PLC, a London-listed energy firm with substantial operations in China, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Tian quickly rose through the ranks:

    • 1999: Executive Director

    • 2006: Chief Operating Officer; concurrently Chairman of Fortune Gas

    • 2012: Group CEO

  • Under Tian’s leadership, Fortune Oil became a core shareholder of Hong Kong-listed China Gas Holdings (384.HK), operating over 500 subsidiaries in mainland China. The company also formed joint ventures with China Aviation Oil to service over 30 airports in South China.

Parallel Influence Networks and Allegiances

  • Tian was active in Chinese Communist-aligned diaspora networks in the UK, including the Chinese Economic Association (UK), which has been identified as a United Front-aligned organization facilitating influence operations and elite co-optation.

  • He served in various capacities across CCP-affiliated enterprises and media vehicles, such as:

    • Chairman, Zhongshi Boya Brand Innovation Incubator

    • Executive Chair, Financial Guest (金融客)

    • Chairman, Unnamed Cooperative & Vineyard in China

    • Investor in multiple PRC-based fintech and cultural ventures including Tianhong Fund (operator of Yu’E Bao with Alibaba)

  • He also chaired or invested in entities supporting large-scale media penetration, such as CTV's main advertising agency, helping deploy CCP messaging through CCTV2, CCTV4, and other channels.

Analytical Implications for Western Security Planners

Tian Jun’s trajectory is not merely the story of a successful overseas Chinese executive. It is a textbook case in how PLA-origin personnel—trained, trusted, and embedded in military-industrial-political organs—are rebranded as foreign professionals to achieve strategic depth for the Chinese state. Key characteristics of concern:

  1. PLA-Groomed: Tian’s work in a division-level military industrial unit prior to university education places him squarely within the PLA’s loyalty network.

  2. Policy Engineer: His 1980s activity in pricing reforms and ideological campaigns mark him as more than a technocrat—he was a party-aligned operative shaping narratives.

  3. Transnational Leverage: His cross-border capital activity and control over media, finance, and infrastructure firms gave him tools for economic and political influence.

  4. United Front Linkages: Engagement with the Chinese Economic Association (UK) and similar groups mirrors known patterns of CCP political warfare tactics abroad.

Recommendations for Western Governments

  • Personnel Vetting: Reassess all individuals who originated from PLA-run or central CCP planning bodies, even if they appear to have naturalized or established long-term residence.

  • Diaspora Network Monitoring: Investigate organizations linked to the United Front Work Department or other “soft influence” arms of the CCP, particularly those involving academic and business exchanges.

  • Sectoral Risk Review: Identify strategic sectors (e.g., energy infrastructure, media, fintech) where such individuals hold influence and consider countermeasures.

  • Public Awareness: Disseminate sanitized versions of these case studies to both the public and private sectors to break the illusion that such figures are benign economic actors.

Conclusion

Tian Jun’s path—from PLA apprentice to London energy executive—offers a disturbing but clarifying insight into how the CCP deploys long-term infiltration through ostensibly legitimate career progressions. His presence in high-leverage sectors and close alignment with Party-state agendas demands a full-spectrum counterintelligence response.

Sources: Peking University records, Zhihu articles, CEAC UK website, Baidu Baike entries, and archived publications.

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