Abnormal deaths in Sichuan Province around 1960

Ding Shu


　　"(Li Jingquan) turned the "Land of Abundance" into a "Land of Hell", so many people died! If Sichuan was an independent kingdom, it would have perished long ago. ——quoted

　　from Xiao Feng’s investigation report “Sichuan Situation” in 1962 [[1]]

　　The number of dead people reported by the Sichuan Provincial Department of Civil Affairs was 4 million, the Ministry of Public Security’s investigation was 8 million, and here is another figure of 1. Tens of thousands, I don't know what the hell is going on in Sichuan! [[2]] 　　——Yang Shangkun 　　,

　　alternate secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee in June 1962 It is the largest province in China. This chart is the death rate of Sichuan Province from 1954 to 1962. We can see that from 1954 to 1957, the national mortality rate decreased year by year, while the population mortality rate in Sichuan Province increased year by year. [[3]] Let's see why. 　　2. Mao Zedong's "Socialism" 　　When Mao Zedong launched the agricultural cooperative movement in 1953, he said that peasants had the freedom not to join the cooperatives, but in reality, peasants were forced to join the cooperatives everywhere. According to statistics from ten counties in the Jiangjin area of ​​Sichuan, only 15% of the farmers who joined the cooperative did so voluntarily. [[4]] 　　Agricultural cooperatives are called "primary cooperatives", because land and farm implements can be invested in shares and participate in dividends together with the labor of the members. For example, in Jingyan County, Sichuan, “land distribution accounts for 60%, and labor days account for 40%.”[[5]] According to the teachings of Marxism, sharing the labor of others by virtue of the possession of means of production is exploitation. Mao Zedong also ordered the establishment of "high-level cooperatives". The so-called "high-level" means that the dividends of land and means of production are cancelled, and all the communists belong to the cooperatives. Many junior clubs have become "senior clubs" without cashing out even a single land dividend. In Jiangjin, Sichuan, 80% of the cooperatives have never paid dividends.[[6]]

　　Landlords and rich peasants have long been deprived during the land reform, and this time the targets of deprivation are the middle peasants. In some places, all the land certificates of farmers were taken away, and farmers became proletarians. Taking Jingyan County in Sichuan as an example, it is said that the price of farm animals and farm tools is discounted and the payment is made in installments. In fact, most senior cooperatives do not pay at all. [[7]] As Peng Zhen, the first secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, said: "The reason why the peasants support us is because our party leads them to acquire land. Now you just start an agricultural production cooperative, and you lose their land. "There is no dividend from the land, and the animals are discounted at a low price, which is equivalent to borrowing an agricultural production cooperative to dig a piece of meat from the property of the middle peasants to supply the poor peasants." "It is not acceptable to treat non-dividends from land as a general policy."[[8]] However, he said that it does not count. Under Mao Zedong's coercive implementation, the only little property of the peasants was "commonly" lost.

　　3. "Unified purchase and sales"

　　However, the establishment of a "socialist" high-level cooperative will at most result in a reduction in production, and will not directly cause farmers to starve to death. The increase in mortality is due to the CCP’s policy of “uniform purchase and sales” since 1953, when the primary cooperative was established. This is similar to the "surplus grain collection system" of the CPSU. The purchase and sale of major agricultural products such as grain, oil, cotton, and hemp are all monopolized by the state. Except for the "reserved grain" stipulated by the government (including rations, feed grains, seed grains, etc.), all of them are purchased and distributed uniformly by the state. According to Mao Zedong, “Unified purchase and sale is an important step to realize socialism”, “Unified purchase and sale means to manage the food of 600 million people.”[9]

　　The annual “unified purchase” figure is determined in Zhongnanhai. When the grains in the fields have not yet grown, the purchase quota has already been allocated to the provinces and counties, which has become a "national task". It is obviously a compulsory acquisition, but it is called "selling surplus grain". As for whether there is surplus grain or not, the farmers themselves say that it doesn't matter, because the party decides how much "reserved grain" should be. In this way, with just one figure, "the food of the 600 million people is managed."

　　Since coming to power, the CCP has implemented the policy of exploiting farmers to accumulate funds to develop heavy industry. In October 1950, due to involvement in the Korean War, financial constraints were tight. At the meeting of the Central Finance Committee on November 15, Chen Yun once said: "Please ask the peasants for help. We can't ask the workers for help, and we can't find a way out from the bourgeoisie, and the public servants don't have much oil and water... It's better to exploit the peasants. "[[10]]"In 1962, Deng Xiaoping admitted that "the peasants were exploited a lot in the past."[[11]] The

　　peasants are not enough to eat, and the state will allocate some of the grain back in the coming years, which is called "reselling", "" Recruit and sell later.” Not to mention the waste of round-trip transportation, when cadres have to reach out to sell food back, they often starve to death.

　　The peasants resisted, and the authorities suppressed them on the charge of "opposing unified purchases and sales." Many farmers were arrested as a result. For example, in Guanxian County, Sichuan "today is called Dujiangyan City", in August 1955, a campaign to "suppress counter-revolutionaries" was launched. , counter-revolutionaries who sabotage agricultural co-operation.”[12] A large number of poor and lower-middle peasants should support the Communist Party.

　　The task of "requisitioning" is heavy - falsely reporting output - over-requisitioning - "reselling" too late or too little - farmers starve to death. Before 1958, this phenomenon had already occurred, but the scale was not as large as that of 1958-1961.

　　In November 1953, Chongqing County began to implement unified purchase and sales. The county's unified purchase task was originally 14 million kilograms, but the cadres convened a meeting of farmers to announce the apportionment amount. Whoever complained about the amount being too much bundled up on the spot. Due to layers of overweight, 18.64 million kilograms were actually purchased. [[13]] In 1954, when the peasants were short of grain and asked the government to "monopoly sales", the government disappeared. There were riots in Wenjiang, Pixian, and Chongqing, which were the richest and most prosperous. At this time, the government came out to suppress, arresting and executing a total of 116 "class enemies and counter-revolutionaries who undermined the state's unified purchase and sales of grain." At the same time, there has also been an increase in "universal grain sales", but it is far from enough. In one and a half months from mid-June to the end of July, 18 people starved to death in Baimiao Village, Yangma Township, Chongqing County, all children under the age of 15 and middle-aged and elderly people over the age of 50. 5 people died in 78 poor peasant households, 8 people died in 55 middle peasant households, and 5 people died in 14 landlords. [[14]]

　　The abnormal death in Sichuan Province began in 1954 after the implementation of unified purchase and sales.

　　4. The hardest hit area of ​​the anti-

　　rightist movement Sichuan is the hardest hit area of ​​the anti-rightist movement. In the anti-rightist movement in 1957, there were not only about 600,000 "rightists", but also "center-rightists". Nationally, the "centre-right" population is roughly three-quarters of the right-wing figure. In Sichuan, not only more than 50,000 rightists, but also more than 60,000 "center-rightists" [[15]]. There are more "center-rights" than rightists.

　　Since Mao Zedong instructed that "workers, peasants and handicraftsmen should generally not be labeled as rightists"[16], there were basically no rightists among the workers and peasants, but "anti-socialist elements".

　　In Sichuan, "about 400,000 people in the whole province wear the hat of "anti-socialist elements" during the movement. "[[17]]

　　How can workers and peasants be "anti-socialist"? Peasants and rural grass-roots cadres are mostly on the matter of fact, and they do not involve socialism, nor do they have anything to do with the Communist Party’s regime. Let’s look at two examples:

　　More than 1,400 peasants and grass-roots cadres in Guanxian County were accused of "anti-socialist elements" and were charged with "denying co-operation and unified purchase and sales, and sowing the relationship between workers and peasants." In Rongchang County, in 1956, the county party secretary forcibly promoted the cultivation of double-cropping rice , resulting in no harvest of 60,000 mu of rice fields, and many farmers and grassroots departments criticized the county party committee for its blind command.

　　However, the county party committee said it was "drug release" and beaten more than 5,800 of them into "anti-socialist elements", and 47 of them were arrested and sentenced. [[18]]

　　Of the 337 "anti-socialist elements" in Xichong County, only 27 were workers and salesmen, and the other 310 were farmers. [[19]] After arresting 121 rightists in Shifang County, with only 200,000 people, 978 "anti-socialist elements" were arrested among workers, peasants, and urban residents. The number of "anti-socialist elements" in Guanxian County was seven to seven times the number of Rightists, eight times in Shifang County, and nine times in Shuangliu County. [[20]]

　　The rightists are "anti-Party and anti-socialist", and the "anti-socialist elements" are only one less "anti-Party" than the rightists. According to Liao Gailong, an expert on the history of the CCP, anti-socialist elements are also treated as enemies. [[21]]

　　In addition, there are various elements of various names. For example, Tangchang Town, Pixian County, Sichuan Province, created another group, and found 31 "bad-speaking elements" among the residents. [[22]]

　　There are also a large number of unnamed molecules. As Liao Gailong said: "Some anti-socialist elements in the countryside, what, etc., or those who have no names, there are more, I am afraid there are always millions of people. Those who have no statistics are not counted."[ [23]

　　Luo Yiqun, a member of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang in Guangdong Province, once criticized the CCP's agricultural policy, saying that "peasants are on the verge of starvation." In July 1957, Mao Zedong mentioned him at the Qingdao Conference where he deployed to dig deep into the rightists: "We want to talk about how the rightists attacked and how we captured a group of rightists, such as Guangdong Luoyiqun."[24] The Guangdong Provincial Party Committee Luo Yiqun was carefully arranged to go to the countryside for an "inspection", but in fact he organized a struggle meeting along the way, saying how happy life is and how ridiculous "the peasants are on the verge of starvation". However, in less than two years, farmers across the country fell from "the brink of starvation" to "the abyss of starvation". At this time, the "big rightist" Luo Yiqun was never mentioned again.

　　5. The anti-rightist movement made the Great Leap Forward unimpeded

　　Before 1957, Mao Zedong's "class struggle" was limited to the ideological field, and all kinds of criticism did not attack the workers and peasants. Spreading out the "class struggle" among the whole people, including the workers and peasants, began with the anti-rightist movement. It was from the end of 1957 to the middle of 1958 that hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants were labeled as "anti-socialist elements," and millions of peasants were labeled as "elements" with or without names. Chinese farmers have never seen political repression on this scale. The anti-Rightist struggle not only made the intellectuals shudder, but also made the workers and peasants tremble with fear.

　　Therefore, when Mao Zedong launched the Great Leap Forward in the spring of 1958, the workers and peasants, like the intellectuals, dared not speak. No one dared to make irresponsible remarks as soon as Mao Zedong said that "all people should make steel."

　　Since the Ministry of Public Security has delegated the power of arrest to the production brigade, the cadres of the production brigade have the right to arrest and detain people at will. [[25]] As long as the cadres of the brigade think that your attitude towards the Great Leap Forward is "negative", they can arrest you for labor reform. The peasants, who have no personal freedom, are careful to keep their mouths shut, and they don't even dare to say a word when the iron pot at home is smashed into "steel making".

　　Liushahe, a Sichuan poet who was named a "rightist" by Mao Zedong at the time, said: "If the anti-rightist struggle did not start in 1957, the chaos of the Great Leap Forward in the following year would never go on, and tens of millions of people would not He starved to death. If he dared to do it like that, many intellectuals would come out and say that it was impossible to do it. But if he did it like that, all the chickens who liked to bark were killed, and the rest were not barked. How did Mao Zedong make it big? No one dares to speak out about the Leap Forward. This is a great misfortune for the nation and the nation.”[26]

　　6. One of the provinces most affected by the

　　Great Leap Forward Sichuan is the birthplace of the Great Leap Forward.

　　On March 4, 1958, Mao Zedong flew to Chengdu by special plane and stayed at the Jinniuba Guest House in the western suburbs. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a work meeting here for nearly 20 days. Mao Zedong launched the Great Leap Forward movement here.

　　On March 16, during the meeting, Mao Zedong visited the Pixian Hongguang Cooperative, a few kilometers west of Jinniuba. The Hongguang Society became a model for the Great Leap Forward movement. At the end of July, when the early rice was harvested, the Hongguang Society released a satellite with a yield of 3,752 jin per mu. "Sichuan Daily" reported that this high-yield field is located near the ridge where Chairman Mao walked. This is the place where Chairman Mao walked. It must grow good crops! On the night of August 5, more than 200,000 people in Pi County, holding lanterns and torches, went to the county seat to celebrate the harvest. Then, Hongguang Society re-opened safflower, "created a high-yield "satellite" with an average yield of 10,681 jin per mu on a piece of 3.07 mu of land. [[27]]

　　In August, Xipu Township, Pixian County “transplanted” more than 30 mu of medium-sized rice into one mu of field, announcing a yield of 27,600 kilograms per mu. On September 12, the front page of "Sichuan Daily" published the big news that "The Ninth Community of Youai Township, Pi County produces 82,500 catties of dry grain per mu"! [[28]]

　　At that time, "transplanting" was the legal way to create high-yield satellites. "Sichuan Daily" reported that Yingjing County's satellite yielded 5,985 kilograms per mu. "It was formed by the labor force of the commune who moved and merged 187 paddy fields of 24.5 mu and 187 paddy fields in three days and nights."[[29]] The Quxian County Party Committee set up a "demonstration field with a yield of 10,000 catties per mu", and moved 24 mu of rice that was about to start heading into a field of one mu. Unfortunately, the rice ears were all squeezed to death and no grains were harvested. [[30]]

　　In order to create ten thousand catties of land per mu, fertilizers are needed. At that time, there were no fertilizer plants, so they had to come from the soil.

　　Farmers in Sichuan mostly live in thatched huts. The Renshou County Party Committee required 200,000 catties of fertilizer per mu to produce 10,000 catties of grain per mu. The commune cadres had no choice but to resort to the idea of ​​peasants' thatched huts, saying that they used mud as fertilizer. A large number of houses were demolished throughout the county. The Guanxian County Party Committee requires each household to accumulate 150,000 catties of fertilizer. In some places, if the task cannot be completed, they simply burn the house to accumulate fertilizer. [[31]]

　　Qianwei County demolished more than 18,700 private houses. There are hundreds of farmers in Zizhong County who had to live in caves after their houses were demolished. Thirty years later, they are still living in damp caves, the joints of their hands and feet are deformed. [[32]]

　　Demolition of private houses is for the Great Leap Forward, and opposing the demolition of private houses is "opposition to the Great Leap Forward". "Opposing the Great Leap Forward" is "counter-revolution". In China, where everyone hears about "counter-revolutionary" and turns disgusting, every place demolishes a fraction of the houses without encountering any resistance, relying on the deterrent power of the "counter-revolutionary" hat.

　　Jingyan County is rich in rapeseed oil, so rapeseed oil is used as top dressing and applied to paddy fields. [[33]]

　　At the Central Conference in May, Mao Zedong called for dense planting, saying: "Dense planting is to make full use of air and sunlight. Isn't it time to fight waste? We should also reverse the waste of air and sunlight. Sunshine works hard every day. You don’t take advantage of the hard work!” [[34]] So all parts of the country competed for dense planting. Whoever opposes dense planting is opposed to the Great Leap Forward. Some people in Chongqing want to plant 1,000 catties of seeds per mu of land, so that the yield per mu can be 100,000 catties. Deng Xiaoping saw it, raised objections, and stopped it just now. [[35]]

　　In 1958, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China ordered various places to build "Wan Pig Farm" and "Wanji Mountain", and cadres went from house to house to collect livestock and poultry. Then, no matter how many pigs were searched, they were all called "10,000 pig farms". In Sichuan, all the pigs of farmers in the province were collected into the "Wan Pig Farm". In one winter, 10 percent of the pigs in the province died, totaling more than three million. [[36]]

　　The Dujiangyan in the Chengdu Plain has benefited the people for more than 2,000 years. Now, in order to make a leap forward, the Yuzui hydropower dam has been built near its upper reaches. 20,000 or 30,000 people worked hard for more than two years, costing more than 40 million yuan. After the dam was built, it was discovered that the problem of sediment deposition could not be solved. General Secretary Deng Xiaoping said to Sichuan leaders Li Jingquan and Li Dazhang: "Don't (make it)" Li Bing's father and son "Er Li" have been famous for thousands of years. "He ordered a "return to the original", blowing up the dam of the Yuzui hydropower station. [[37]]

　　Great Leap Forward, everything has to be done. The Wenjiang Special Zone dispatched 100,000 migrant workers to build the Minjiang Power Station and the railway from Chengdu to Guanxian, but they all gave up halfway.

　　In August, there were only one million peasants making steel in Sichuan. By September, eight million peasants had been mobilized to bring their own rations to the mountains to make steel. [[38]] For example, in Xuanhan County, "150,000 rural laborers were dispatched, and 2,500 were built in the mountains." To the "Iron Corps" on the mountain. Shuangliu County sent 48,000 young and strong laborers to Chongqing and Guanxian to build blast furnaces, and tens of thousands of people worked day and night to provide them with living and production materials. There are 100,000 peasants making steel in Renshou County, of which 30,000 were transferred to Hongya County, 100 kilometers away, to make steel. [[39]]

　　The result is as recorded in the "Wushan County Chronicle": "The young and young laborers in the countryside go to the mountains to make steel, and the production in the fields only depends on the old women, women and children. The mature grains are too rotten in the fields, and the harvest cannot be returned to the warehouse."[[40] ]

　　According to the investigation and statistics of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee later, the waste of food in the province accounted for 10% of the total output of the year, about 2.2 million tons. [[41]] The people's commune canteens do not need money for meals, and the waste caused by running water tables is not included.

　　7. The false high-yield led to the purchase

　　of "10,000 catties per mu" by the real high-yield.

　　The rural grain output reported by the Chengdu Municipal Committee is 1.8 times that of the actual output. [[42]] The province's real grain output in 1958 was 22.5 million tons, which was doubled to 45 million tons when the provincial party committee announced it. [[43]]

　　Since farmers' "reserved grain (including rations, fodder grain, seed grain, etc.)" is determined by the party, except for the land tax (agricultural tax) and "reserved grain", they are all included in the purchase. Therefore, the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee issued a requisition target far exceeding that of 1957. "The (grain) purchased into the warehouse accounted for one-third of the actual output."[44]

　　In 1959, the grain output decreased by 6.63 million tons compared with 1958, but the purchased grain increased by 730,000 tons. Grain handed over to the central government increased by 460,000 tons. [[45]]

　　This is the number of grain production and purchases in Sichuan in the years before and after the Great Leap Forward:



　　In 1959, Sichuan dispatched so much grain that the original means of transport were insufficient. At the beginning, Sichuan organized a transport army. By May, military vehicles from the Shenyang, Chengdu, and Wuhan military regions were dispatched to transport grain. In August, military vehicles in Jinan and Nanjing Military Regions began to increase grain transportation.

　　8. Before the Lushan Conference

　　Sichuan's three-year average death rate from 1955 to 1957 was 10.55‰, and the two-year average death rate from 1956 to 1957 was 11.24‰. In 1958, the death rate was 25.17‰, and at the height of the Great Leap Forward, the number of abnormal deaths had reached one million! [[46]] For example, in Fushun County, more than 10,000 people died abnormally. There were also 14,000 unnatural deaths in Qu County. [47]

　　Under such circumstances, the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee was blindly optimistic, and in November issued the "Instructions on Carrying Out the 1959 Large-scale High-yield Campaign", calling for the implementation of "less planting, high yield, and more harvest". This slogan was raised again in June 1959. In that year, there were 166.57 million mu of arable land in the province, and 24.81 million mu were not planted. 15% of the farmland is vacant for nothing! [[48]] The result was "less planting, less yield, and less harvest", and the grain output in 1959 was only 70% of that in 1958. [[49]]

　　Tian Jiaying, secretary of Mao Zedong and deputy director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was born in Chengdu. people. At the beginning of 1959, he led a working group to Chongyi County, Sichuan Province, to investigate the people's commune with a large satellite "24,000 catties of rice per mu" in 1958. He found that the peasants were already starving, and "the porridge eaten in the public canteen was stagnant." At first, the peasants were afraid to tell the truth, but it was not until he refused the small stove arranged by the commune for several months and ate the same meal as everyone else, took off his shoes and went to the field to harvest wheat, and pulled the cart with the commune members, and then he gradually believed in him. They told Tian Jiaying that the yield of grain per mu was only a few hundred catties, and the cadres boasted that they had taken more grain, so they had to sell more "surplus grain" and took away all the rations of the commune members. [[50]]

　　In May, many commune canteens in the Wenjiang area, the main granary in Sichuan, ran out of food and closed their doors, making it impossible to complete the task of requisitioning food.

　　In June, news of farmers starving to death in Renshou County reached Chengdu, the provincial capital. Yan Hongyan, secretary of the provincial party committee, led a working group to investigate and allocated 5 million catties of grain to Renshou. [[51]] However, the county's population is nearly 1.2 million, and the average per capita is less than five kilograms. The drop in the bucket cannot contain the death.

　　At the beginning of May, Deng Zili, secretary of the Luzhou prefectural party committee, held a meeting of the secretaries of the county party committees and decided to dissolve the commune canteen, and implement "public-owned and private-feeding" for pigs that were returned to the public after the commune, and the private land that was taken away from the commune members was used as "fodder land". ” and other names were returned to farmers, and production teams were divided under production teams to implement contract production. These measures were welcomed by farmers. He was called "Deng Qingtian" by the people.

　　In Yingjing County, Ya'an Prefecture, serious abnormal deaths have also been found. Liu En, deputy head of the propaganda department of the prefectural party committee, went to investigate the situation of the dead and wrote a report. Cadres at all levels have already understood the serious consequences of the Great Leap Forward. Due to the situation, the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee once allowed some people who insisted on quitting the cafeteria to quit and start their own business.

　　9. After the Lushan Conference

　　But the Lushan Conference in July 1959 reversed the situation. At the meeting, Li Jingquan, as the leader of the Southwest Group, resolutely opposed Peng Dehuai[[52]] and made a contribution to Mao Zedong.

　　After returning to Sichuan, he continued to oppose the rightist movement, criticizing the "rightist opportunism represented by Deng Zili of the Luzhou Prefectural Party Committee", and labeled Deng Zili, Cui Zhang, Secretary of the Prefectural Party Committee, and Chen Huaitang, Commissioner of the Administrative Office, into an "anti-Party group". [[53]] Even the Luzhou prefecture was abolished, and the counties were divided into other areas.

　　Liu En, deputy head of the propaganda department of the Ya'an Prefectural Party Committee, who went to Yingjing County to investigate the unnatural deaths, was also labeled as a "three anti-elements" because his report mentioned the seriousness of the deaths.

　　The methods of searching for right-leaning elements vary from place to place, but Li Jingquan's method is the quickest and most accurate. At the same time as the enlarged meeting of the Provincial Party Committee criticized more than 50 right-wing elements, the following regions followed his instructions to punish cadres above the 17th level, "about the level of chief and deputy county magistrates, county party committee chiefs, deputy secretaries, and prefectural party chiefs and deputy ministers. Cadres" conducted a "quiz" and sent them Peng Dehuai's speech at Mount Lu, asking them to express their views. Since the cadres did not know that Peng had become the head of the "anti-Party clique", they all agreed with him, and they were arrested one after another. 102 county party secretaries, county magistrates and above were designated as "right-leaning opportunists" or "committed serious right-leaning mistakes". [[54]]

　　There are farmers in the mining area under the jurisdiction of Li Zhiping, the head of Nantong District, Chongqing. When his superiors forced him to pay more food, he asked, "What do peasants eat?" As a result, he was labelled a "right opportunist".

　　10. "Anti-Hidden Production", "Anti-Rightist", and Gao

　　Requisition The initiator of the Gao Requisition was Mao Zedong. When approving the 1959 Grain Requisition Report during the Lushan Conference on July 5, it also expressed disapproval of the 42.75 billion kilogram plan of grain sales "for urban supplies and for re-sale of grain in some rural disaster-stricken areas". He thinks it is "a little bit more" and advocates adjusting it to 40 billion kilograms, or 40.5 or 41 billion kilograms, which is 10 billion kilograms less than in 1958. He instructed: "Tell the peasants to restore the half-yearly grains of bran and vegetables... After one, two, three years of hardship, they turned around."[55]

　　In early 1959, the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee reported that "the food shortage is a complete illusion . It was caused by the production teams and sub-teams concealing production and private distribution.” At the time, Mao Zedong personally drafted a document and distributed the report to the whole country: “The situation of the commune leader and the team leader’s concealment of production and private distribution of food is serious... It is a common phenomenon in the whole country. The existing problems must be solved immediately.”[56] So the provinces used Mao Zedong’s instructions as the basis to loot the peasants’ grain.

　　Mao Zedong's new instructions to "restore the half-yearly grains of bran and vegetables" are equivalent to permitting rations to be dug out of farmers' mouths. Immediately after the Lushan Conference ended, the provinces launched a campaign of "anti-confidence of property and private divisions" while fighting the rightist movement.

　　Li Jingquan was a member of the Politburo newly promoted during the Great Leap Forward, and the grains handed over to the state accounted for a large share of the total national purchases. He wants to maintain this honor with Mao Zedong, only by digging the grain out of the peasants' hands at all costs. In November, the provincial party committee decided to hold major debates on "whether agricultural production will increase" and "whether the commune canteen is good or not". At the same time, "verify" grain production and launch a "fight against concealment".

　　Chongqing County is also located on the fertile Chengdu Plain. Since 1958, peasants have "unnaturally died" and people have starved to death. The head of the county party committee, without compromising himself, launched a "public security campaign" to launch a brutal struggle against peasants who stole and eat green due to starvation, and treated peasants at will. Twelve cases of home searches, fines, struggles, beatings to death and forced suicides.

　　[[57]]

　　In Yibin City, the city committee dispatched a working group to its subordinate Shima Commune, convened hundreds of grass-roots cadres to hold a "anti-confidence of private property division" conference, and bound and beat 19 cadres on the spot. The Yibin Municipal Party Secretary also promoted this practice as "experience" throughout the city, fighting and beating more than 2,500 grass-roots cadres. [[58]]

　　Yibin County, (the county party committee) "not only messed up the command, but also engaged in high targets, overestimated production, and high purchases. When the masses raised their opinions, they engaged in on-site criticism and "fire line rectification." In 1960, the people's communes in the whole county generally reduced production, and the grain yield per mu was only 83 kilograms. [[59]]

　　The Renshou County Party Committee called the commune cadres of the whole county to a meeting. At the meeting, the commune cadres were called to the stage one by one, and the militiamen beat them and asked, "Where did you put the grain? Recruit!" So I immediately called back to search. The little food left by the farmers was handed over in this way.

　　In Fengdu County, the county party committee held an on-site meeting on "anti-grain concealment", forcing grassroots cadres to hand over grain, and if they failed to do so, they would fight.

　　Liu Weizi, the first secretary of the county party committee, proposed to "hit the first line (the commune's branch secretary, brigade leader, accountant, and custodian), then the second line (the production leader), and then the wealthy farmers." "7 people were hanged and beaten on the spot, of which 1 person was killed. After the meeting, the (each) district and township held an on-the-spot beating meeting, 173 people were killed on the spot, and 1,179 people were dismissed from their positions as cadres."[[60]]

　　" The results of “anti-grain concealment” are reflected in the number of requisitions. Take Jiajiang County, for example, “In 1959, the county’s grain production decreased by 10.98 million kilograms compared to 1958, but the requisition increased by 7.5 million kilograms.”[61]

　　11. The lowest food ration standard in the country

　　In addition to the Chengdu Plain, Sichuan has many hills and mountains, a large population and low productivity. Except for farmers' own consumption, the commodity rate of rural grain production is only between 2 and 30%. Before 1958, the average annual purchase of grain in Sichuan accounted for 31% of the output. In 1959, 15.82 million tons of grain were produced, 6.63 million tons less than in 1958. There was no grain, so the provincial party committee announced that it had produced 35 million tons, an increase of 730,000 tons of grain compared with 1958, and an increase of 460,000 tons of grain handed over to the central government. [[62]] The amount of grain purchased is as high as 49% of the output. [[63]]

　　The grain purchase rate in Sichuan is nearly ten percentage points higher than the national average, and the per capita grain retention by farmers is one quarter to three points lower than the national average. one. [[64]] “In 1959, the per capita grain reserves (including seeds, feed and rations) of farmers in Sichuan dropped sharply from 512 catties (256 kg) in 1958 to 278 catties (136 kg), and continued to drop to 260 catties (136 kg) in 1960 ( 130 kilograms), which was lower than the national average of 378 kilograms (189 kilograms) of grain reserve per capita in rural areas in both years.”[65] After removing the seeds and fodder grains, there was not much left in the rations.

　　The Sichuan Provincial Party Committee stipulates the ration standard: "Urban residents are 21 jin, cadres are only 19 jin, and rural commune members are generally four to five taels of raw grain. Even such a low standard is not implemented in some places, only empty quotas are not implemented. Grain.”[[66]] Calculated in five taels, it is 156 grams of raw grain, equivalent to only 117 grams of rice.

　　Because the amount of grain that farmers can eat is determined by the provincial and county committees, the abnormal death has nothing to do with whether the land is rich or not. In the prosperous Jiajiang County, the county party committee stipulated that "the ration standard is divided into 5 grades according to age and labor, and 16 taels of old scales are 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 taels." [[67]] "0.063, 0.125, 0.188 , 0.25, 0.313 kg” 2 two raw grains, converted into rice, less than 50 grams, not enough to feed chickens. In the absence of other food, people who eat 2 or 4 taels will surely die, and laborers who eat 6, 8, and 10 taels may not survive.

　　After "concealing production" and forcibly requisitioning grain, the rations of farmers are completely insufficient to sustain their lives. For example, in Jiangjin County, “In 1959, the rural people in the county equally shared 83 kilograms of grain.”[68] On average, each person per day was only 0.23 kilograms of raw grain, equivalent to only 170 grams of rice. Even one meal is not enough, let alone three meals a day?

　　In Yibin City, after "confessing production and private distribution," the 160,000 farmers in the city's rural villages have an average of only a few dozen kilograms of food per person per year. [[69]] In Yibin County, “When the population ration was the lowest, it was reduced to 32,700,500 yuan (0.188 kg) per day for the original grain, which resulted in sudden swollen diseases and serious abnormal deaths in the county.”[[70]]

　　Farmers in Rong County rations are lower. "From 1959 to 1961, grain production decreased, and the proportion of requisitioned grain increased to 40-45%. The grain reserve in rural areas was greatly reduced. In 1960, the average grain of the agricultural population was only 62 kilograms." One person only has 0.17 kilograms of raw grain a day. [[71]]

　　In 1961, in Sichuan province, “the per capita food ration in rural areas was only 129 kilograms.”[[72]

　　Xiao Juren, then deputy director of the Propaganda Department of the Chengdu Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, once recalled: “I saw with my own eyes how many people were hungry. He died. At that time, I was asked to take a medical team to the countryside to treat swollen and swollen diseases, and asked the patients to prepare a good meal. The so-called good meal means that each person has six taels of grain and a few dollars of oil a day.... One day I saw porridge being carried out, and a farmer took it It’s terrifying.”[73]

　　In 1962, Xiao Feng, head of the Finance and Trade Section of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was sent to Sichuan to investigate. In his investigation report, he said: "Rations. In 1959, the plan was for one catty per person per day. After 1961, 6 taels or 4 taels of trade grain (16 taels, the same below) were stipulated for trade. In particularly serious areas with a population of 6 million, daily There are only 2 to 3 taels.” [[74]] The raw grains of 3 taels, equivalent to rice, are only 70 grams. No one can survive on this meter.

　　At that time, the urban and rural people in Sichuan were already seriously short of food, but on September 1, 1960, the provincial party committee issued an order announcing that the food stamps in Sichuan Province were invalid, depriving the urban residents of the province of 48 million kilograms of food rations every day. [[75]] Two weeks later, the provincial party committee forced urban residents to save two catties of grain per month, which in fact lowered the grain standard again.

　　According to a recollection of Liao Bokang, a member of the Communist Youth League Central Committee and secretary of the Chongqing Youth League Committee at the time: "Premier Zhou proposed to transfer hundreds of millions of kilograms of grain to Sichuan to solve the problem after knowing that Sichuan was very difficult, but he (Li Jingquan, the first secretary of the provincial party committee) insisted that Sichuan No problem.”[76] Li Jingquan earned enough face from Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and the people of Sichuan paid the price of tens of millions of lives for him! 　　12. In the "Sichuan Provincial Chronicle"

　　of counties with more than 10% of abnormal deaths , there is a statistical table "Sichuan Province's natural population growth rate in 1960 (excluding mechanical changes or migration)", in 1960, 173

In 161 counties, 161 counties lost more than 5% of their population: 65 counties exceeded 5%, 41 counties exceeded 6%, 23 counties exceeded 7%, 17 counties exceeded 8%, and 8 counties exceeded 9%. Seven counties have more than 10%.[[77]]In fact, most counties have more than 10% of abnormal deaths.

　　Let's take some examples to see.

　　1. Guanxian: The so-called "Land of Abundance" historically refers to the fertile western Sichuan plain in the Wenjiang area, including eleven counties including Guanxian, Pixian, Chongqing, Jintang, Dayi and Qionglai where the Dujiangyan Irrigation District is located. This area is the granary of Sichuan. Thanks to Dujiangyan, Guanxian has been drought and flood for 2,000 years. On March 21, 1958, when Mao Zedong presided over a meeting in Chengdu and launched the Great Leap Forward, he enthusiastically drove to Lianhua Village and Dujiangyan Temple, and sighed: "Guanxian is a good place, with beautiful mountains and rivers!"[78 ]] In 1959 and 1960, the state requisitioned 44% and 50% of the grain, resulting in 12.3% of the population and more than 42,000 people starved to death. [[79]] "Picture 1"



　　2. Look at Pixian County between Dujiangyan and Chengdu, that is, Pixian County where the Hongguang Cooperative "later called Hongguang People's Commune Hexing Branch" was located when Mao Zedong launched the Great Leap Forward Movement. .

　　In 1958, Mao Zedong visited the Hongguang Society in the county, which became an advanced model of the province's Great Leap Forward. After the Lushan meeting, the anti-rightist movement was reversed, and Pi County took the lead again, and was the first to complete the task of purchasing grain. But soon the Wenjiang prefectural committee found that the commune canteens in the county were running out of food and closed, and decided to give them some relief food. However, the Pixian County Party Committee refused to accept it, and the farmers had to starve to death. In 1957, the county's population was 281,500, and in 1960 it was only 229,200. Of those, 43,865 died in 1960 alone, or one-sixth of the county's population. Three years of famine, 20% of the population died abnormally. [[80]]

　　After Mao Zedong inspected the Pixian Hongguang Cooperative on March 16, 1958, "Hongguang Club, the red flowers bloom, Mao Zedong came to our home" is something that every schoolchild in Pi County and even in Sichuan has to recite. ballad. How many schoolchildren who sang "Chairman Mao Came to Our Home" starved to death can no longer be tested!

　　3. Guanghan County, 12.1% of the population, 41,000 unnatural deaths.

　　4. Shifang County: 40,000 "unnatural deaths", accounting for 13% of the population. [[81]]

　　5. North of Chengdu, Mianzhu County, 36,000 unnatural deaths, 10.0%.[[82]]

　　6. From South of Chengdu, Xinjin County, 21,500 unnatural deaths, 11.5%. [[83]]

　　7. Jianyang County: 17.0%. 200,000 unnatural deaths among 1.22 million people! [[84]]

　　8. Jiajiang County, the picturesque Qingyi River passes through it and joins the Minjiang River in Leshan. The meeting point is where the famous Leshan Giant Buddha is located. In this prosperous place, one out of every eight people starved to death! [[85]]

　　9. Jingyan County: 13.2%, one in eight people died. "Jingyan County Chronicle" said that "the death rate of the population has exceeded the highest level in history" [[86]], which is true.

　　10. Dazu County, 14.3%. The peak was in 1961. [[87]]

　　11. From Chongqing along the Jialing River to the junction of the Jialing River, the Qujiang River and the Fujiang River, it is Hechuan County with beautiful and rich scenery. There were 85,000 unnatural deaths there, accounting for 8.2% of the population.[[88]]

　　12. Qianwei County, 48,000 people died unnaturally, accounting for 13.2% of the population in 1958. [[89]]

　　13. Yibin City and its rural areas: 12.4%. If 90% of unnatural deaths occurred in the city’s rural areas, The unnatural deaths in rural areas were 21.2%. A total of 38,000 people died unjustly. [[90]]

　　14. Yibin County: 100,000 people starved to death, accounting for 12.9% of the population. [[91]]

　　15. Dianjiang County, 81,000 people, abnormal mortality rate of 15%. [[92]] "Figure 2" The abnormal deaths were concentrated in 1959 and 1960, and returned to normal in 1961.

　　16. Xuanhan County, with a population of 710,000, had 119,000 deaths in four years, of which nearly 100,000 died abnormally. [[93]] Abnormal deaths were also concentrated in 1959 and 1960. "Picture 3"

　　17. Fushun County: More than 90,000 people starved to death. The abnormal mortality rate was 11.94%.1, 399 children were orphaned due to the death of both parents. [[94]]

　　18. In Wushan County, famous for its “Wushan Goddess Peak”, the abnormal mortality rate was 15%. [[95]]

　　19. By the end of 1961, the population of Renshou County was 143,000 less than at the end of 1958. In 1959, In 1960, the number of deaths was very high, but in 1961, 42,500 people

　　died. [[97]]

　　There are already 20 counties, and some counties in Sichuan with the most serious abnormal deaths have not yet been discussed.



　　13. The "Ghost City" Fengdu

　　Official's "Compendium of Major Events in Contemporary Sichuan" states that the "unnatural deaths of the population" in Sichuan at that time were "the most serious in the four prefectures of Ya'an, Leshan, Fuling and Jiangjin."[[98]]1962 In 2009, Miao Qianming, deputy head of the Organization Department of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee, went to Chongqing after a meeting in Fuling, and told the cadres of the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee: "In the Fuling area, "the counties combined have killed more than two million people."[[99]]

　　Fengdu County, known as a "ghost city", belongs to the Fuling area and was called Fengdu at that time. Down along the Yangtze River, it is not too far to go to Fengdu. The county has a population of 570,000 and 100,000 unnatural deaths. "Picture 4" In March 1960, Liu Weizi, the first secretary of the county party committee, was dismissed. [[100]]

　　In June 1962, Liao Bokang, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League and secretary of the Chongqing Youth League Committee, reported to Yang Shangkun, alternate secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee: "The most serious places in Sichuan are the Ya'an area. Yingjing County, and Fengdu County in Fuling area.”[101]

　　In fact, the abnormal death in Fengdu was not the most serious. Dayi County had a higher mortality rate of 347,000, of which 20.4% and 71,000 died unnaturally. [[102]] "Figure 5"

　　Rong County in Neijiang Prefecture is far more serious than Fengdu. "From 1958 to 1961 ... 189,500 people died." The abnormal death rate was 24.4%, almost a quarter. [[103]]



　　Fourteen, Yingjing Massacre Let’s

　　look at Yingjing County again. According to Liao Bokang's recollection: "(March 1962) During the work meeting of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee, the secretary of the Yingjing County Party Committee in Ya'an said that half of the population of his county had died. He also described a village where no one was left, and it was even buried. The people were gone, so they had to send people from another village to this village to bury the people. The people who buried the people had no food, and they had to dig a pit, which was a heavy manual labor. As a result, the people who buried the people also died, so they had to Then transfer people from other villages to bury the buried people.”[104]

　　If we calculate the population figures provided by the county annals, from 124,000 to 70,000 from 1958 to 1962, the reduction was nearly half. However, according to the county annals, the number of abnormal deaths is only 28,700, or about 23%. The reason is that 27,000 people are "missing". At that time, the number of migrants was negligible. If the "missing persons" are also included in the number of deaths, the number of unnatural deaths in Yingjing County is 45% [[105]], which is roughly in line with the statement of Yingjing County Party Secretary Yan Guifang in 1962 that "half of the population died." The editors of the county annals had apparently suppressed and fabricated the death toll for some purpose.

　　So, why did the tragedy of "half of the population die" happen?

　　"Yingjing County Chronicle" "After the rural people's communes were transformed in 1958, the agricultural tax...was changed to a proportional tax system calculated and levied on a (community) commune." This is an increase of 132.57% over the previous year’s 1.965 million kilograms.” This alone accounted for 36.6% of that year’s grain output. In addition, there was the “uniform purchase” that was implemented when the agricultural cooperative was established in 1953. "In 1959, the grain production was greatly reduced, but the total amount of 4.81 million kilograms in the warehouse was collected, which was 1.14 times more than the previous year."

　　Looking at these figures, it is not surprising that nearly half of Ying Jing starved to death.

　　In March 1960, Sichuan Province appointed a person to investigate Ying Jing's abnormal death. Li Jingquan spared He Yunfu, the first secretary of the Ya'an area, and ordered the arrest of Yao Qing, the secretary of the Yingjing County Party Committee, and sentenced to eight years in prison. The county section and director were all replaced; 170 commune presidents and secretary-level cadres were arrested and jailed. Li Zhizhou, director of the general office of the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee, was from Yingjing. Li Jingquan said to him, "I have arrested your county party secretary." In fact, Yao Qing only took office in June 1959. If you want to be held accountable, you should first remove him from office. Its predecessor, Li Chengdong. But Li Jingquan was just looking for a scapegoat.



　　15. Similarities and Differences in the Deaths of Men and Women

　　Take Peng County as an example. In 1958, there were 503,000 people. By 1960, the number of women increased by 12,000, which is a normal increase, while the number of men decreased by 19,000. This may be because the farmers are only short of food, but not without food, so the men who work hard and cannot tolerate hunger die first. In 1961, Sichuan ran out of grain, and the grain transferred from other provinces arrived in early 1962. Before that, the countryside had run out of food, so men and women starved to death alike. Therefore, in 1962, the number of men in Peng County decreased by 16,000, and the number of women in Peng County also decreased by 14,000. Only 466,000 people remain in the county. The county starved to death about 50,000 people, about 10% of the population, most of whom were men. [[107]]

　　The situation is similar in Nanchuan County, where the death rate exceeds 10%. In 1959, the population was 400,000. In the three years to 1962, the number of men decreased by 37,500, and the decrease of women was only 17,300. The ratio of male to female population dropped from 109.16:100 to 98.43:100. [[108]]

　　Zuo Xuefu, an employee of the Land and Resources Bureau of the Shuangliu County Government, was from Xiehe Township, Huayang County, and was 14 years old. According to his recollection: "The staple food at that time was wild vegetables and bran. ... I remember that a lot of people died of starvation, and every family suffered from edema. My eldest brother and sister-in-law also suffered from edema, and then my sister-in-law died.”[109] So many people died, and the social conscience seemed to be overwhelmed by starvation. At that time, someone in the rural town of Gao County was surrounded by people who openly cooked a child who died in a cauldron, but no one questioned whether the cook was the murderer, and no one took him to the public security organ.

　　In April 1962, Liao Luyan, Minister of Agriculture, and Chen Zhengren, Minister of the Eighth Machinery Ministry (ie, the Ministry of Agricultural Machinery Industry), sent an investigation team headed by Gu Dachuan to Sichuan to investigate. In the "Rural Survey" written by the group, there is this paragraph:

　　"At that time, people died every day in the whole commune, and more than 100 people per day. In serious cases, people died and no one was carried, and sometimes for four or five days. It has not been buried yet. At the same time, the phenomenon of eating dead children has also occurred. For example, Hu Yaosao once cooked and ate her own four or five-year-old children (after death) in order to survive...”[[110]]

　　In 1961, the Chongqing Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China Liao Bokang, deputy director of the general office, once went to the Duzhou Commune in Changshou County, and he wrote in his memoirs: "What is "Family Disciple Four Walls", what is "Wild Hungry Death", and what is "Eat by Yi Zi"! This is what I really see is believing. [[111]]

　　16. "The main reasons for the high number of dead people"

　　In the 1962 investigation report of the General Office of the Communist Party of China, Xiao Feng said: "Comrades in Sichuan reported that the main reasons for the high number of dead people are: first, high indicators, great reforms The farming system has resulted in a major reduction in yields; the second is overestimation of yields and the pressure on ration standards; the third is the implementation of the "Left" policy... [[112]]

　　"Natural disasters" are not mentioned in this report.

　　In the early 1990s, Liao Zhigao, secretary of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee (the first secretary of the Provincial Party Committee from 1965 to 1967), who was in charge of the agricultural work of the province at that time, thought that there were three reasons for the severe famine in Sichuan:

　　First, the canteens of the People’s Commune

　　” (1961 On July 21, 2008, the provincial party committee decided to cancel the supply system in the distribution of the people’s communes and not to open public canteens.” “Compared with most provinces and cities across the country, Sichuan is about half a year to a year later. The

　　canteen was disbanded. The later the time, the greater the difficulties and losses suffered by the masses, and the more serious the swollen diseases and abnormal deaths. This was a major mistake in the work of Sichuan at that time."

　　Second, the farmers' private plots

　　"during difficult times, the masses called private plots as " private plots". "Life-saving food", Sichuan has delayed the restoration of private land for too long and solved it too late, failing to play its "life-saving" role in time, resulting in an increase in the number of edema and abnormal deaths. "

　　Third, refusing to conceal production

　　" (peasants) even if they had a little grain that they could control, they were forcibly confiscated by 'anti-deception and private distribution'. At that time, when there was a shortage of food and people starved to death due to excessive grain adjustment, these three mistakes actually added fuel to the fire, thus exacerbating the serious situation that the people in Sichuan suffered from difficulties in life and a large number of abnormal deaths. [[113]] As a result of "covering up production", "in 1959, the per capita allowance of farmers in Sichuan (including seeds, feed and rations dropped sharply from 512 jin in 1958 to 278 jin, and in 1960 it continued to drop to 260 jin. Two). The annual rate is lower than the 378 kilograms of grain reserved per capita in rural areas across the country. . [114]] Liao Zhigao also did not mention “natural disasters”.

　　17. Basically normal climate

　　In Sichuan Province in 1957 and 1958, the weather was good, the weather was surprisingly good, and there were basically no natural disasters in the province.

　　[[115]] However, it has been Serious abnormal death occurred. It can be seen that the starved people have nothing to do with God.

　　There was a drought in Sichuan from 1959 to 1961, which was the regularity of the seasons of abundance, peace, and decline. People would never starve to death, let alone die by millions.

　　Adjacent to Chongqing, Jiangbei County, beside the Jialing River, saw a population decrease of 103,000 from 1957 to 1962, and 67,600 abnormal deaths. However, apart from the "mechanical changes" in 1958 and 1961, that is, 7,300 and 4,900 people who moved out, there are another 12,000 "missing people". Deaths should also be counted. The number of unnatural deaths in Jiangbei County was 80,000, accounting for one-ninth of the population before the Great Leap Forward. "Chongqing Party History Research Materials said that more than 100,000 people starved to death in Jiangbei County"[116]

　　Sichuan Ba ​​County, according to Liao Bokang: "Ba County adopted the method of "following yang and violating yin" against the blind command of the superior to resist... Reduced losses. In order to deal with Gao Zhengbu, the early rice and late rice were handed in, and more middle rice with "water-filled millet" was reserved, so that the members could eat as much food as possible. Therefore, there are not many people starved to death in Ba County. "[[117]]

　　The so-called "not much" is relative. Since "the proportion of grain production that the state purchases has increased from about 30% before 1958 to 47%, the average annual per capita grain reserve in rural areas is 82 kilograms." With such little food ration left for farmers, abnormal deaths are inevitable. The abnormal death rate in Ba County was 5.0%,

　　much lower than that in Jiangbei County, which is across the Yangtze River from Ba County. In Ba County, there were "nine droughts in ten years". From 1959 to 1961, there were droughts every year. This also proves that natural disasters are not enough to cause abnormal deaths. [[118]]

　　Serious deaths in the county occurred as early as 1959. In the same Jiangbei County, there were far fewer people dying of starvation in the Shishoe Commune (today's ten villages in Shishoe Township), because "solo activities are particularly serious." The secretary of the provincial party committee personally led the team to carry out the "squatting" of the four clean-ups. Criticize the cadres of the Dou Shixie commune who "destroy collective production, plan to work alone, and carry out the restoration of capitalism". [[119]] This also disproves that the cause of starvation was not a natural disaster.

　　South of Ba County is Nanchuan County. The county's population decreased by 15%. The unnatural deaths in 1959 and 1960 alone were as high as 7.6%. Although the number of deaths in 1958, 1961, and 1962 was not disclosed, we can still say that the unnatural deaths were above 10%. [[120]]

　　In Dayi County, where one-fifth of abnormal deaths occurred, the drought occurred from the end of 1960 to the beginning of 1961, which should have affected the 1961 summer harvest. The vast majority of unnatural deaths in the county occurred in 1959 and 1961 and were not related to natural disasters. [[121]]

　　Abnormal deaths have nothing to do with natural disasters, and Yingjing County is the best example. In the ten years before and after the Great Leap Forward, there were basically no natural disasters in the county [[122]], but almost half of the population died.

　　As far as the province is concerned, 1961 was a disaster year, a drought. But the 1966 drought was even more severe, not seen in decades.

　　And in 1966 no one starved to death. It can be seen that only natural disasters are not the cause of abnormal deaths. [[123]]

　　18. How many people died in Sichuan?

　　In terms of how long the famine lasted, Sichuan ranked first in the country. "After 1961, the situation in the whole country has begun to improve, and the abnormal deaths have basically stopped, and Sichuan ... people and animals are still dying in large numbers." [[124]] In early 1962, Sichuan was in an emergency. Zhou Enlai sent Vice Premier Li Xiannian, Grain Minister Chen Guodong and Vice Minister Yang Shaoqiao to study how to transfer grain from Jiangsu and other provinces to Sichuan to save lives. [[125]]

　　Then, how many abnormal deaths are there in Sichuan?

　　Let's take a look at a memory of Liao Bokang, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League and secretary of the Chongqing Youth League Committee at that time:

　　In June 1962, the Communist Youth League held the Seventh Plenary Session of the Third Central Committee, and Liao Bokang went to Beijing to attend the meeting. During the period, Hu Yaobang, the first secretary of the Communist Youth League Central Committee, and Yang Shangkun, alternate secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee and director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, respectively reported the situation of abnormal deaths in Sichuan. Yang Shangkun told Liao, "We know that the situation of the dead in Sichuan is serious, but the details cannot be confirmed. We asked for the Sichuan newspaper, but Sichuan has never reported it. We asked the Ministry of Civil Affairs how many people died in Sichuan? The Ministry of Civil Affairs said yes. 4 million. In fact, the central government did not believe the figure reported by the Sichuan Provincial Department of Civil Affairs. Then it went to the Ministry of Public Security. The Ministry of Public Security was in charge of household registration. All daily necessities are linked to household registration. If one person dies, one person will be wiped out. This number should be accurate! The Ministry of Public Security, through the Sichuan Provincial Public Security Bureau, said that 8 million died. The central government still does not believe it, but how many died. People, the center is not clear.”

　　Liao Bokang said in his memoirs that he told Yang Shangkun, who was also a native of Sichuan: the total population of Sichuan at the end of 1960 was 62.36 million, and the population in 1957 was 72.157 million, a decrease of 10 million. Actually more than that number. Because there was a natural increase from 1957 to 1960; at the same time, from 1961 to the first half of 1962, the whole country improved, but Sichuan was still dying. He said: "The people who died in Sichuan... There are documents that can be checked is 10 million, plus 2.5 million.... I think this number is more realistic, but my official report only said that 1,000 died. Wan. Comrade Shang Kun... Immediately instructed the secretary to open a safe in the small conference room of the secretariat, took out an old-style folded ledger-style book, opened it and said, "It's your number. !””[[126]]

　　However, the number “ten million” cannot be found from official documents.

　　From 1967, the Revolutionary War Report published by the Revolutionary Rebellion Headquarters of the National Bureau of Statistics published an article by the Sichuan Provincial Bureau of Statistics. The article said: "Li Jingquan and his associates have been falsely reporting statistics for a long time, and they have decided to report more and less according to their own political needs. ... Some comrades have been brutally persecuted by them because of their boycott, and some even Destroyed to death." "Over the past few years, our province has kept two accounts of national economic statistics: one is an account that has been tampered with and is specially directed against the central government and reported to the National Bureau of Statistics; the other is an account that reflects the actual situation. Stay in the province for your own use. After the central government discovered these problems, it reported several times and sent people to Sichuan for inspections several times. However, Li Jingquan and his associates arrogantly claimed that Sichuan was a "little State Council" and refused inspections by superiors. [[127]]

　　The literature that can be found now only says that from 1958 to 1962, the population of the Sichuan Rural People's Commune decreased by 7.79 million. [[128]] According to the official revision of the 1985 China Population Yearbook, the number of abnormal deaths in Sichuan in the years from the Great Leap Forward to the Great Famine was 8 million. [[129]]

　　However, the statistics of the national population in the 1985 China Population Yearbook are incorrect. (See another article) So, I believe Liao Bokang's "ten million" statement.

　　Nineteen, concluding remarks

　　Li Jingquan's old superior, Deng Xiaoping, who promoted Li before he left Sichuan to take up a post in Beijing in the 1950s, came to Sichuan in the spring of 1960 and spoke kind words for Li Jingquan at the provincial party secretary meeting: "The work in Sichuan, the central government considers satisfactory, is the work of the whole country. (Province) has done better.”[130] Just as the unprecedented disaster continued, Li Jingquan was promoted to the first secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in charge of the three provinces of Yun, Gui and Sichuan, more than nine years ago with Liu Bocheng Deng Xiaoping's authority was even greater when he co-governed the Southwest.

　　At the Central Work Conference in January 1962 (ie, the 7,000-person conference), someone wrote an anonymous letter accusing Li Jingquan that "the author was not identified that year, but during the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards identified the author as Ming Lang, the deputy head of the Propaganda Department of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee." The cadres attacked Li Jingquan over the serious problem of starvation. Li had to check at the Sichuan group's small meeting, and even shed tears. But Sichuan cadres were not satisfied with his review. Deng Xiaoping went to the Sichuan team twice to excuse him: "Everything that needs to be reviewed has been reviewed, there are just so many problems. The central government is also responsible for the problems that arise in Sichuan." Deng ordered to stop investigating Li Jingquan's personal responsibility, saying, "The meeting can no longer be like this. Continue to drive." Protecting Li passed the customs. [[131]]

　　Of course, Mao Zedong would not pursue the "unnatural death" in Sichuan, because if he did, he would have to pursue himself. Li Jingquan understands the principle that the law does not govern the public. He said at several meetings of the Sichuan Provincial Party Committee: "We have some problems in Sichuan, why do other provinces also have these problems? The reason is that everyone is raised by the same mother!" "In recent years Some mistakes were made, mainly because some people died... Why didn't we check before? Mainly to be considerate of Chairman Mao's hardships."[132]

　　During the Cultural Revolution, Li Jingquan was overthrown by Mao Zedong on the charge of "the biggest walker in the southwest region." The establishment of the capitalist road”, the reason is that he had a close relationship with Deng Xiaoping, He Long, Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing and others, and had nothing to do with the 10 million abnormal deaths.

　　Throughout the history of Sichuan, the population has dropped sharply twice. Once in the late Song and early Yuan Dynasties in the thirteenth century, the Mongolian army broke through dozens of cities including Chengdu several times, looting and looting, "searching and killing all the time." After the resistance of the Sichuan people for more than 30 years was finally overwhelmed by the Mongolian invaders, "the remnants of the Song Dynasty were slaughtered in many counties, or migrated or fled, but no one survived", leaving only less than 100 of the 6 million people in Sichuan. ten out of ten. Another time was in the late Ming and early Qing dynasties in the seventeenth century. The competition between the peasant uprising army, the Ming Dynasty official army, and the invading Qing soldiers lasted for decades, and the population dropped sharply from more than 3 million to 500,000. [[133]]

　　In China around 1960, there was neither civil strife nor external trouble, yet so many people starved to death. As Mr. Li Rui said: "This is a unique event in the history of China and foreign countries in the world of peace."[134] After starving to death one-seventh of the people, Li Jingquan was even promoted to the official level, which is even more It is unique in history.

　　Notes:

　　[1] "Contemporary Sichuan Essential Facts" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2005) p. 151.

　　[2] Ibid., pp. 158-159.

　　[3] The population at the end of 1954-1962 was 6649, 6791, 6945, 7081, 7078, 6897, 6620, 6459, 64.86 million. The death rate of the population is 8.43, 9.18, 10.41, 12.07, 25.17, 46.97, 53.97, 29.42, 14.62 per thousand. Source: "Compilation of Historical Statistical Data of Provinces, Autonomous Regions and Municipalities directly under the Central Government (1949-1989)" compiled by the General Department of the National Bureau of Statistics (China Statistics Press, 1988) p. 690. Original Note: This table is the number of public security departments. "1985 Population Yearbook" (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press) pp. 522, 523; "Summary of Contemporary Sichuan Events" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991) pp. 133, 148, 163, 176.

　　[4] "Chongqing Party History Research Materials", No. 1, 1989, p. 3.

　　[5] "Jingyan County Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1990) p. 148.

　　[6] "Chongqing Party History Research Materials", 1989, the first issue of the second page.

　　[7] "Jingyan County Chronicle" (1990 edition) p. 148.

　　[8] "Research on the History of the Communist Party of China", No. 2, 2000, pp. 76, 77.

　　[9] In January 1957, Mao Zedong's speech at the meeting of provincial and municipal party secretaries, "Study Materials (1957-1961)" (Beijing: Tsinghua University, 1967) 4, 16 pages.

　　[10] "Special Issue on Criticizing Chen Yun" (Beijing: "Comprehensive Criticism of Chen Yun Liaison Station" by the Red Congress of Capital Colleges and Universities, 1967.5), page 23 of the second issue.

　　[11] Deng Xiaoping’s speech at the West Building Conference in March 1962, quoted from the Compilation of Xiaoping’s Counter-Revolutionary Revisionist Speeches” (Beijing: Capital Red Congress, Renmin University, Sanhong, Deng Bingtuan, 1967.5.12).

　　[12] "Guanxian Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991) p. 29.

　　[13] "Chongqing County Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991) p. 28.

　　[14] Dongfu, "Wheat seedlings, cauliflower and yellow flowers - Chronicle of the Great Famine in Western Sichuan" (Hong Kong: Pastoral Bookstore, 2008), p. 37.

　　[15] "Sichuan in Contemporary China (Part 1)" (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1990), p. 599.

　　[16] On the afternoon of July 17, 1957, Mao Zedong's interjection at the Qingdao Conference, "Long Live Mao Zedong Thought (1949.9 ~ 1957.12)" [Editor Unknown] p. 193.

　　[17] "Summary of Contemporary Sichuan Events" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991), p. 113.

　　[18] "Chongqing Party History Research Materials", No. 2, 1989, pp. 13-14.

　　[19] "Xichong County Chronicle" (Chongqing: Chongqing Publishing House, 1993) pp. 149, 155.

　　[20] "Shifang County Chronicle" (1988 edition) pp. 5, 78; "Guanxian Chronicle" (1991 edition) p. 73; "Chongqing Party History Research Materials" 1989 No. 2 pp. 14, 15.

　　[21] Liao Gailong, "Exploration of Party History" (Beijing: Central Party School Press), p. 238.

　　[22] "Tangchang Town" (1983) pp. 29, 32.

　　[23] "Teaching Reference: The Special Report and Speech Compilation of the Academic Symposium on the History of the Communist Party of the Communist Party of China in the National Party School System (Part 1)" (Hefei: Party School of the Communist Party of China Anhui Provincial Committee, 1980), p. 9.

　　[24] On the afternoon of July 17, 1957, Mao Zedong's interjection at the Qingdao Conference, "Long Live Mao Zedong Thought (1949.9 ~ 1957.12)" [Editor Unknown] p. 193.

　　[25] "Talking about Liu Shaoqi" (Beijing: Central Literature Publishing House, 2000), p. 132.

　　[26] "Once upon a time in the sea -- Liushahe's oral account of "Poems of Grass and Trees".

　　[27] "Upstream" magazine, 1959, third issue, sponsored by the Sichuan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, p. 31.

　　[28] "Pixian Chronicle" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1989) p. 254.

　　[29] "Yingjing County Chronicle" (Chongqing: Southwest Normal University Press, 1998) p. 29.

　　[30] "Quxian Chronicle" (Chengdu: Sichuan Science and Technology Press, 1991) p. 26.

　　[31] "Renshou County Chronicle" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1990) p. 366; "Guanxian Chronicle" (1991) p. 74.

　　[32] "Qianwei County Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991), p. 509, Huo Da "Food is the sky for the people", "Chinese Writers", No. 4, 1989.

　　[33] "Jingyan County Chronicle" (1990 edition) p. 149.

　　[34] Mao Zedong's speech at the Second Session of the Eighth National Congress on the afternoon of May 17, 1958, "Study Materials (1957-1961)" (Beijing: Tsinghua University, 1967), p. 235.

　　[35] 1959.2.20 Deng Xiaoping's speech at the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee.

　　[36] "Sichuan in Contemporary China (Part 1)" pp. 93, 94.

　　[37] "Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping's Words and Deeds, Volume 3" (excerpted from the Beijing Mining Institute's "Dongfanghong" criticizing and fighting against Liu and Deng Liaison Station, 1967), p. 32.

　　[38] "Sichuan in Contemporary China (Part 1)" (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1990), p. 92.

　　[39] "Xuanhan County Annals" (1994) p. 24, "Shuangliu County Annals" (1992) 53 pages; "Renshou County Annals" (1990) 18 pages.

　　[40] "Wushan County Chronicle" (1991) p. 22.

　　[41] "Sichuan in Contemporary China (Part 1)" (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1990), p. 92.

　　[42] "Chengdu Party History", No. 4, 1991, p. 9.

　　[43] "Sichuan in Contemporary China (Part 1)" (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1990), p. 92.

　　[44] "Sichuan Provincial Chronicle" (Chengdu: Sichuan Science and Technology Press, 1999) p. 102.

　　[45] "Summary of Contemporary Sichuan Events" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991), p. 148.

　　[46] "1985 Population Yearbook" (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press) pp. 522, 523: If 10.55‰ is used as the normal mortality rate, the number of abnormal deaths in 1958 is 7081×(25.13-10.55)‰=103.2 In 1956 and 1957, the mortality rate of Sichuan population was 10.41‰ and 12.07‰, and the average was 11.24‰. Take this as the normal mortality rate. The number of abnormal deaths in 1958 was 7081x (25.13-11.24)/1000=984,000.

　　[47] "Fushun County Chronicle" (Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1993) pp. 814, 815; "Quxian Chronicle" pp. 141, 142.

　　[48] ​​"Sichuan Provincial Chronicle" (Sichuan Science and Technology Press, 1999) p. 92.

　　[49] Ibid., p. 97.

　　[50] Guangming Daily, June 8, 1986.

　　[51] Li Yuan's "Only Realistic - A Tracing of the Past of General Yan Hongyan" (Yunnan People's Publishing House, 2003) p. 40; "Yan Hongyan Biography" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House,) p. 174.

　　[52] Li Rui, "Mao Zedong's Early Years and Later Years" (Guizhou People's Publishing House, 1992), p. 143.

　　[53] "Summary of Contemporary Sichuan Events" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991) pp. 139, 143; "Contemporary Sichuan Essential Facts" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2005) p. 70.

　　[54] "Sichuan Provincial Chronicle" (Chengdu: Sichuan Science and Technology Press, 1999) p. 95.

　　[55] Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the founding of the People's Republic of China, Volume 8 (Beijing: Central Literature Publishing House, 1993) pp. 336-338.

　　[56] "Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the founding of the People's Republic of China", Vol. 8, pp. 52 and 54.

　　[57] "Chongqing County Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991) p. 36.

　　[58] "Yibin City Chronicles" (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 1992) pp. 17, 18, 84, 88.

　　[59] "Yibin County Chronicle" (Chengdu: Bashu Publishing House, 1991) p. 452.

　　[60] "Fengdu County Chronicle" (Sichuan Science and Technology Press, 1991) p. 31.

　　[61] "Jiajiang County Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1989) p. 270.

　　[62] "Summary of Contemporary Sichuan Events" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991), p. 148.

　　[63] "Sichuan in Contemporary China (Part 1)" (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press), p. 100.

　　[64] "Sichuan in Contemporary China (Part 1)" (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1990), p. 104.

　　[65] "Contemporary Sichuan Essential Facts" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2005), p. 71.

　　[66] "Contemporary Sichuan Essential Facts" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2005), p. 158.

　　[67] "Jiajiang County Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1989) p. 270.

　　[68] "Jiangjin County Chronicle" (Chengdu: Sichuan Science and Technology Press, 1995) p. 525.

　　[69] "Yibin City Chronicles" (Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 1992) pp. 17, 18, 84, 88.

　　[70] "Yibin County Chronicle" (Chengdu: Bashu Publishing House, 1991) p. 452.

　　[71] "Rong County Chronicle" (Sichuan University Press, 1993) p. 243.

　　[72] "Sichuan in Contemporary China (Part 1)" (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1990), p. 103.

　　[73] On September 26, 2007, Xiao Juren talked to Yuan Timing, a former middle school student in Chengdu, at the Dujiangyan Army Cadre Rest Center. (2008.3.20 "Huaxia Express")

　　[74] "Contemporary Sichuan Essential Facts" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2005) p. 170.

　　[75] "Sichuan in Contemporary China (Part 1)" (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1990), p. 105.

　　[76] Ibid., p. 158.

　　[77] "Sichuan Provincial Chronicle" (Chengdu: Sichuan Science and Technology Press, 1999) p. 99.

　　[78] Wu Xiaomei and Liu Peng, "Mao Zedong Out of the Red Wall", p. 64.

　　[79] "Guanxian Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991), pp. 74, 130: For the sake of conservativeness, the average number of deaths per year in 1956 and 1957, when the number of deaths was the largest before and after the Great Leap Forward, was 3,896. number of deaths. 62,154 people died from 1958 to 1962. 62,154-5×3,896=42,674. The population in 1957 was 346,200. 42,674/34.62×100=12.3%.

　　[80] "Pixian Chronicles" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1989) pp. 121, 131: The mortality rate in 1957 before the disaster and in 1962 after the disaster was 14.09‰ and 10.58‰ , the birth rate was 21.96‰ and 10.58‰. In 1960, the birth rate was the lowest at 7.69‰, and the death rate was 175.07‰. The birth rate in 1958 was similar, but should be higher than 10.58‰. The birth rate in 1959 and 1961 was similar, but should be higher than 7.69‰. The mortality rate of 14.09‰ in 1957 is now taken as the normal mortality rate, so the result of calculating abnormal deaths will be low rather than high. In 1958, the population was reduced by 7.68‰, and the number of abnormal deaths was 281,512×7.68‰=2,162; in 1959, the population was reduced by 58.01‰, and the death rate was x , 7.69-x=-58.01, x=65.70‰, and 279 abnormal deaths. , 776×(65.70‰-14.09‰)=14,439 people. In 1960, the population decreased by 167.38‰, the death rate was x, 7.69-x=-167.38, x=175.07‰, and the abnormal death was 272,488×(175.07‰-14.09‰)=43,865 people. In 1961, the population decreased by 6.60‰, the death rate was x, 7.69-x=-6.60, x=14.29‰, and the abnormal death was 229, 292×(14.29‰-14.09‰)=46 people. "Abnormal deaths" 2,162+14,439+43,865+46=60,512 people. In 1957 the population was 281,500. 60, 512/281, 512=21.5%.

　　[81] "Shifang County Chronicle" (Sichuan University Press, 1988), p. 415: From 1955 to 1957 and from 1963 to 1965, there were around 2,000 normal deaths per year in the six years, with an average of more than 2,300 normal deaths per year in the six years. More than 51,000 people died from 1958 to 1962. 51,000-5×2,300=39,500. The population in 1959 was about 300,000.

　　[82] "Mianzhu County Chronicle" (Chengdu: Sichuan Science and Technology Press, 1992) p. 79.

　　[83] "Xinjin County Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1989), p. 965: The average annual death toll in 1956, 1957, and 1962 was 2,405, while from 1958 to 1961 a total of 31,100 died. 3.11-4x0.2405=2.15.1957 population 187,400. 2.15/18.74=0.115.

　　[84] "Jianyang County Chronicle" (Chengdu: Bashu Painting Society, 1995) p. 75: From 1953 to 1957, the five-year average of normal deaths per year (9911+6981+12210+14374+18997)/5 = 12,509 people. During the four years from 1958 to 1961, a total of (45878+71915+93472+46824) = 258,089 people, 258,089-4×12,509=208,053 people died abnormally. The county's 1958 population was 1.222 million. 208,053/1,221,529=17.0%.

　　[85] "Jiajiang County Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1989), p. 82: The number of deaths from 1956 to 1958, 1962, and 1963 were all 2,400. Five hundred or so, the five-year average of 2,345 deaths per year. From 1959 to 1961, a total of 30,519 people died. 30,519-3×2345=23,484. The population at the end of 1958 was 180,000. 23,484/180,000=13.0%.

　　[86] "Jingyan County Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1990) pp. 99, 98, 150: The population in 1957 was 305,200. Without abnormal deaths, the population should have grown to 313,000-315,000 by the end of 1959. The lower limit is now 313,000. In 1958 and 1959, 12,881 people moved out, and by the end of 1959, there should have been 31.3-1.288=300,000. The actual population at the end of 1959 was only 280,000 (1,962 people moved out in 1960, 17,861 died, 1,938 were born, and the population at the end of 1960 was 262,700. Therefore, the population at the end of 1959 was 262,700+1,962 +17, 861-1, 938=280, 585). 20,000 unnatural deaths and "disappearances". The traffic in Jingyan County is inconvenient. The nearest railway is dozens of kilometers away, so there are not many survivors. Therefore, the number of abnormal deaths in 1958 and 1959 was at least 15,000. The annual number of normal deaths in the county was 4,000, 17,861 in 1960, and 9,717 in 1962. The abnormal deaths in these two years are ( 17,861+9,717)-2×4,000=19,578. The number of deaths in 1961 is very similar, but the lower limit is 9,717. The abnormal death is 9,717-4,000=5,717.1958-1962 Normal deaths totaled 15,000+19,578+5, 717=40, 295.40, 295/305, 215=13.2%.

　　[87] "Dazu County Chronicle" (Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 1996), p. 127.

　　[88] "Hechuan County Chronicle" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1996) pp. 80, 66: The average annual normal death during the four years from 1955 to 1957 and 1963 (8649+9145+11671+12587)/4=10,513 People, 18469+31706+32544+30050+24847=137,616 people died from 1958 to 1962, and 137,616-5×10,513=85,051 people died abnormally. The county's population in 1957 was 1,038,800. 208,053/1,038,804=8.2%.

　　[89] "Qianwei County Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991) p. 114. In 1958 the county had 369,000 people.

　　[90] "Yibin City Chronicles" (Xinhua Publishing House, 1992) pp. 17, 18, 84, 88. The city averaged 2,624 normal deaths per year for the six years from 1955 to 1957 and 1962 to 1964. In the four years from 1958 to 1961, 48,642 people died. The number of abnormal deaths was 48642-4×2624=38. In 145.1958, Yibin City and its rural population totaled 307,000. 38,145/306,972=12.4%. Assuming that 90% of abnormal deaths occurred in rural areas, 38,145×90%/162,000=21.2%.

　　[91] "Yibin County Chronicle" (Chengdu: Bashu Bookshelf, 1991 ) p. 601.

　　[92] "Dianjiang County Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1993) pp. 116, 121.

　　[93] "Xuanhan County Chronicle" (Chengdu: Southwestern University of Finance and Economics Press, 1994) p. 122.

　　[94] "Fushun County Chronicle" (Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1993) pp. 814, 57, 816: The average mortality rate during the six-year period from 1954 to 1957, 1963 and 1964 (13.5+14.7+15.4+18.4+17.2+9.83 )/6=14.84‰, the mortality rate from 1958 to 1962 was 29.50‰, 33.40‰, 81.45‰, 53.50‰, 22.00‰. The abnormal death was 1.11+1.40+5.05+2.74+0.47=91,800. The county's 1957 population was 769,400. 9.18/76.94=11.94%.

　　[95] "Wushan County Chronicle" 1991 Edition, pp. 22, 91: 1955-1957 and 1961-1963, the average annual normal death for six years was 3,636, and the average death rate was 6.8 in 1958-1960 Ten thousand: 68,048-3×3, 636=57, 140. The population in 1958 was 368,000. 5.7/36.8=0.15.

　　[96] "Renshou County Chronicle" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1990) pp. 96, 97, 106, 366. In 1957, the population of Renshou County was 1.19 million. At the end of 1961, the population was 930,000. The population at the end of 1961 was 140,000 less than in 1958, and 260,000 less than in 1957 before the Great Leap Forward! "Renshou County Chronicle" said that "overestimated production, high procurement and flooding", farmers' rations were purchased by the county, and as a result, a large number of starved to death. Officially, there were 30,000 unnatural deaths in 1961 alone. Although the number of deaths in 1959 and 1960 has not been announced, since the population in 1961 was more than 140,000 less than in 1958, it can be concluded that the total number of abnormal deaths was more than 100,000. about ten percent of the population.

　　[97] "Gao County Chronicle" (Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 1998) pp. 112, 117.

　　[98] "Summary of Contemporary Sichuan Events" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991), p. 153.

　　[99] "Contemporary Sichuan Essential Facts" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2005), p. 156.

　　[100] "Fengdu County Chronicle" (Sichuan Science and Technology Press, 1991) pp. 94, 31.

　　[101] "Contemporary Sichuan Essential Facts" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2005) p. 156.

　　[102] "Dayi County Chronicles" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991), pp. 142-143: From 1955 to 1957 and from 1962 to 1963, the average annual death rate was 3,987 during the six-year period, and a total of 86,848 died from 1958 to 1961. people. The number of abnormal deaths was 86,848-4×3,987=70,000. In 1958, the population was 347,000. 70,900/347,000=0.204.

　　[103] "Records of Rong County" (Sichuan University Press, 1993), Vol. Population Chapter 1 Section 1: Between 1950 and 1957, there were 6,612 deaths per year. 189,500-4×6,612=163,052. The population at the end of 1957 was 668,800. 163,052/668,800=24.37%.

　　[104] "Contemporary Sichuan Essential Facts" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2005) p. 156.

　　[105] "Yingjing County Chronicle" (Chongqing: Southwest Normal University Press, 1998) p. 112.

　　[106] Ibid, pp. 452, 453.

　　[107] "Pengxian Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1989) p. 89.

　　[108] "Nanchuan County Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991) p. 57.

　　[109] Zuo Yingyi, "Hometown of Wind and Rain: The Documentary of the "Great Leap Forward" Movement of the People's Commune in the Upper Huayang County, Chengdu, Sichuan", "China Studies", No. 1, 2003.

　　[110] On June 10, 1967, Beijing Agricultural Mechanization Institute "Dongfanghongzhanbao".

　　[111] "Contemporary Sichuan Essential Facts" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2005), p. 151.

　　[112] "Contemporary Sichuan Essential Facts" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2005), p. 171.

　　[113] Liao Zhigao, "Retrospection and Reflection on the Adjustment of Foodstuffs in Sichuan", "Contemporary Sichuan Essential Facts" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2005) pp. 75-77.

　　[114] Ibid., p. 71.

　　[115] "Sichuan Province (Sequel)" (1987) pp. 1508, 1511.

　　[116] "Jiangbei County Chronicle" (Chongqing Press, 1996) pp. 136, 139;

　　[117] "Contemporary Sichuan Essential Facts" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2005) p. 132.

　　[118] "Ba County Chronicle" (Chongqing Press, 1994) pp. 244, 656.

　　[119] "Chongqing Party History Research Materials", No. 2, 1993, p. 42.

　　[120] "Nanchuan County Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991) pp. 57, 58.

　　[121] "Dayi County Chronicle" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1991) p. 136.

　　[122] "Yingjing County Chronicle" (Chongqing: Southwest Normal University Press, 1998) pp. 97, 352-354.

　　[123] "Sichuan Provincial Chronicle" (Chengdu: Sichuan Science and Technology Press, 1999) pp. 105, 127.

　　[124] "Contemporary Sichuan Essential Facts" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2005) p. 136.

　　[125] "Endless Thoughts" (Beijing: Central Literature Publishing House, 1987) p. 232.

　　[126] "Contemporary Sichuan Essential Facts" (Chengdu: Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2005) pp. 155, 156.

　　[127] "Resolving Li Jingquan's heinous crime of falsely reporting statistics to deceive the Party Central Committee to deceive Chairman Mao", June 30, 1967 "Revolutionary War Report" (Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics Revolutionary Rebellion Headquarters).

　　[128] "Sichuan Province" (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 1984) p. 208.

　　[129] "1985 China Population Yearbook" (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press) pp. 522-523: If the three-year average mortality rate in Sichuan from 1955 to 1957 is 10.55‰ as the normal mortality rate to calculate the number of abnormal deaths, In 1958 it was 7081×(25.17-10.55)‰=1.035 million; in 1959 it was 7078×(46.97-10.55)‰=2.578 million, in 1960 it was 6897×(53.97-10.55)‰=2.995 million, in 1961 it was 6620× (29.42-10.55)‰=1.249 million, in 1962 it was 6459×(14.62-10.55)‰=263,000, a total of 8.117 million. If the average death rate in Sichuan from 1956 to 1957 was 11.24‰ as the normal death rate, in 1958 it was 7081×(25.17-11.24)‰=986,000, and in 1959 it was 7078×(46.97-11.24)‰=2.529 million , 6897×(53.97-11.24)‰=2.947 million in 1960, 6620×(29.42-11.24)‰=1.204 million in 1961, 6459×(14.62-11.24)‰=218,000 in 1962, a total of 7.884 million. If the national average normal death rate is 10.80‰, the number of abnormal deaths is 8.035 million.

　　[130] "Down with Li Jingquan" (Red Guards Chongqing Garrison Area, Chongqing University Red Guards Regiment, "Eight. One-fifth Fighting Regiment", June 1967) p. 77.

　　[131] "Down with Li Jingquan" (Red Guards Chongqing Garrison Area, Chongqing University Red Guards Regiment, "Eight. One-fifth Fighting Regiment", June 1967) p. 78.

　　[132] "Down with Li Jingquan" (Red Guards Chongqing Garrison Area, Chongqing University Red Guards Regiment, "Eight. One-fifth Fighting Regiment", June 1967), p. 2.

　　[133] Li Shiping, "Sichuan Population History" (Sichuan University Press, 1987) pp. 129, 150, 151.

　　[134] Li Rui, "Mao Zedong's Early Years and Later Years" (Guiyang: Guizhou People's Publishing House, 1992), p. 160.

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