This article examines the misconceptions surrounding ethnic identity and resource conflicts in Xinjiang. Many Uyghurs attribute exploitation or resource competition to “Han people,” but historical and structural analysis shows that the real power lies with the CCP regime, not any ethnic group.
Ethnic labels are misleading: Terms like “Han” or “Uyghur” often obscure the reality that power and policies are centralized in the CCP, with many perpetrators and beneficiaries of state actions being of varied ethnicities, including Uyghurs themselves.
Rights under CCP control: All ethnic groups are subjects of the CCP, and their rights are defined not by law or citizenship but by party priorities and the state’s coercive system.
NGO limitations and incentives: Uyghur human rights organizations, even in the U.S., may operate under CCP oversight. Success in rescuing individuals or mitigating repression depends on party-sanctioned approval, border control, and national security laws. NGOs may be forced to deprioritize or avoid politically sensitive issues like COVID-19 accountability or fentanyl trafficking to maintain leverage.
Infiltration risk and operational constraints: The CCP could plausibly embed loyal officers within NGO operations to monitor compliance and control outcomes, highlighting the controlled and risk-managed nature of human rights interventions.
Cycle of impunity: Even when limited interventions succeed, institutional oppression continues, responsibility rarely reaches top leaders like Xi Jinping, and accountability is shifted to local officials. This structure allows the CCP to extend its control regionally and internationally, from East Asia to the U.S., while maintaining domestic power.
Policy implications: Misattributing grievances to ethnic identity rather than CCP control strengthens the regime’s narrative, perpetuates misunderstandings, and undermines real accountability. Recognizing the structural and political mechanisms behind “resource disputes” is essential for understanding Xinjiang’s human rights challenges and the global influence of CCP power.
1. Introduction
In discussions among some Uyghurs, it is often claimed that “Han people have taken Uyghur resources.” On the surface, this seems straightforward, but it misrepresents the true responsibility. This article analyzes the issue from the perspective of history, politics, human rights, and equal citizenship, making clear that the real responsible party is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a coercive regime, not any ethnic group.
2. Han Identity: Cultural and Historical, Not a Political Actor
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“Han” is a historical and cultural label, not a unified political entity.
Han communities vary greatly in language, customs, and historical integration; many groups cannot understand each other without using a third language, such as English, French, or Mandarin.
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Individual Han people, if it exists, do not possess collective political will or authority; thus, they cannot collectively seize resources.
In other words, attributing resource inequality to “Han people” is logically incorrect.
3. The CCP: The Coercive Regime Responsible
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The CCP maintains control through force, ideological enforcement, and party appointment systems, depriving citizens of basic freedoms.
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Resources, land, and economic policies in Xinjiang are centrally controlled by the CCP, unrelated to any ethnic group’s inherent traits.
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Uyghur or Han officials may participate in policy execution, but decision-making power lies entirely within the CCP structure.
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All resource seizures, land acquisitions, and policy enforcement are actions of the CCP, not of any ethnic group.
4. Education and Policy Misinterpretations
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Some Han people believe Uyghurs receive preferential treatment in university admissions, creating perceptions of “inequality.”
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These policies are tools of the CCP, designed to manage education and social resources, not privileges inherent to any ethnic group.
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Emphasizing ethnic comparisons obscures the CCP’s responsibility and fosters misunderstanding.
5. Citizenship and Equal Rights
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According to the U.S. Declaration of Independence, all individuals have equal rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness:
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Uyghurs are not inherently more “noble” than Han people
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Han individuals are not inherently superior to Uyghurs
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CCP-designated “Han” is an administrative and historical label, not a basis for assigning responsibility.
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In a coercive regime, rights are stripped, and ethnic labels do not change this reality.
6. Misreading Ethnic Narratives
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When Uyghurs speak of “Han people,” they often conflate central policy executors with ethnic labels.
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This confusion can create the false impression that “Han collectively are seizing resources,” when responsibility actually lies with the CCP and its coercive structures.
7. Historical Analogy
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During the Soviet era, famines in Ukraine were often misattributed to “Russians,” but the real cause was centralized policies and the Communist Party’s power structure.
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Ethnic groups were only implementers or affected parties, not the responsible entity.
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Similarly, in Xinjiang, the CCP’s coercive power—not any ethnic group—is the root cause of resource and policy inequality.
8. CCP Members Within Uyghur Communities
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Do not assume that CCP members among Uyghurs represent the interests of the entire Uyghur community.
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Their actions—sometimes escalating ethnic tensions—serve the CCP’s regime and its security logic, providing justification for expanding coercive control nationwide.
9. The “July 5th Incident” and Power Logic
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One plausible scenario is that CCP members within the Uyghur community played a role in planning or pushing the July 5th Incident to protect central authority.
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After the incident, officials in Xinjiang who demonstrated loyalty and the ability to maintain stability were promoted to central positions, consistent with the CCP’s reward logic for maintaining order.
10. Mechanism Similarity with Tiananmen
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Some Xinjiang officials may have designed stability plans, directing Uyghur CCP members to manufacture conflict under the guise of ethnic tension, then restore order.
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Promotions after the incident reflect the CCP’s centralized reward system for capable stabilizers, similar to the logic seen in the Tiananmen crackdown: incidents are leveraged to strengthen centralized control.
11. Contemporary Evidence
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Multiple international media and human rights organizations have reported that the CCP monitors, pressures, and even threatens Uyghurs overseas, sometimes using Uyghur community members as instruments. This confirms that leveraging ethnic insiders to enforce regime stability is an existing reality, lending plausibility to the above analysis.
Uyghur human rights NGOs in the U.S., even those facilitating the release of detainees, may operate under tacit or explicit CCP supervision. The PRC controls all borders and exit/entry through passport and national security laws, meaning that success in any rescue or relocation depends entirely on party-sanctioned permission. It is therefore plausible that the CCP could assign a loyal officer or intelligence operative to pose as a “released Uyghur” within NGO operations. Such placement allows the party to monitor NGO activities, enforce compliance with CCP priorities, and control sensitive outcomes, ensuring that interventions remain aligned with regime security interests. This prevents NGOs from engaging in advocacy that could challenge the party on politically sensitive issues, such as COVID-19 accountability or fentanyl trafficking. Staff and beneficiaries may not realize that some participants are acting under CCP direction, highlighting the controlled and risk-managed nature of CCP-sanctioned human rights work and the central role of border control as a tool of leverage.
Uyghurs are not a monolithic group. While many are devout Muslims, others are secular, and some are long-standing members of the Chinese Communist Party — including cadres tied to historical networks built during Xi Zhongxun’s involvement in minority policy. Xi Zhongxun’s personal ties to certain Uyghur elites in the 1950s–1960s may have evolved into a United Front network that his son, Xi Jinping, now leverages. This background raises a sensitive possibility: some Uyghur human rights NGOs, especially those reliant on negotiating releases or operating within channels influenced by the CCP, may avoid topics that directly threaten Xi Jinping’s legitimacy — such as the PLA’s role in COVID-19’s origins, fentanyl trafficking, or military-linked repression — not out of ignorance, but because their access and effectiveness depend on not crossing the personal and political red lines tied to the Xi family.
12. Conclusion
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Han individuals cannot be treated as responsible parties; ethnic identity does not determine culpability.
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Responsibility for Xinjiang policies and coercion lies entirely with the CCP as a coercive regime, not any ethnic group.
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Policies that appear to favor certain groups (education, resources) are tools of the CCP, not ethnic privileges.
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In practice, all ethnic groups in China are subjects under CCP control, not equal citizens. Rights are defined by the party’s coercive system, not by law, citizenship, or independent principles.
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Misinterpreting ethnic narratives obscures the CCP’s responsibility and fosters unnecessary division.
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Recognizing the CCP as the true authority highlights the importance of systemic reform, human rights protection, and independent oversight.
Extending the Logic: Hong Kong, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria NGOs
The structural constraints observed in Uyghur advocacy also apply to NGOs focused on Hong Kong, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, or Manchuria. Even in regions perceived as more open, such as Hong Kong’s free port, NGOs operate under CCP supervision, with exit and entry controlled through passports, national security provisions, and border law.
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Operational leverage tied to CCP compliance: NGOs’ ability to protect individuals or advocate for human rights depends on avoiding direct challenges to CCP authority, even when local populations face political repression.
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Risk of infiltration: The CCP could plausibly embed loyal personnel or intelligence officers in NGO operations to monitor compliance and influence outcomes, ensuring that interventions do not threaten regime security.
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Limits of advocacy: Efforts to expose highly sensitive issues—such as alleged CCP biological research, pandemic origins, or illicit activities—are effectively off-limits, as intervention could endanger both the NGO and those it seeks to help.
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Implications for human rights: Like Xinjiang, these regions demonstrate how structural constraints, border control, and party oversight shape what NGOs can achieve. Individual advocacy or whistleblowing outside sanctioned issues cannot rely on NGO support for safe exit, underscoring the pervasive reach of CCP authority.
This analysis warns that well-intentioned advocacy in any CCP-controlled region must account for structural power, regime priorities, and operational limitations, rather than assuming that free ports, ethnic framing, or international sympathy guarantee protection or accountability.
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