Based on Yang Tianhong’s meticulous legal‑historical study (“Legal Evidence Study of Cao Kun’s ‘Vote‑Buying’ Accusation,” Historical Research, 2012,”杨天宏：曹锟“贿选”控告的法律证据研究”), many of the commonly cited “bribery” allegations have serious evidentiary shortcomings. Even CCP’s own researcher provided arguments undermining the CCP’s long-standing narrative of Cao Kun’s bribery for the presidency. Here are the main problems, drawn from Yang’s own presentation:
Amount Matching Arrears
Yang notes that the money “allegedly bribed” to legislators matches closely with the unpaid salary (arrears). According to his sources, the 5,000-yuan checks correspond almost exactly to the amount legislators claimed they were owed.
This raises a serious legal question: was it bribery, or was it simply retroactive payment of wages? The fact that amounts align so precisely significantly weakens the argument that every check was a vote-buying instrument.
Distribution Was Broad, Not Selective
Yang documents that around 600 checks were issued, matching closely with the number of legislators present. If almost all attending legislators received equal payments, it undermines the idea that the checks were targeted inducements to swing votes.
This uniformity makes the “bribery” theory less plausible: why would Cao (or his supporters) pay everyone, including people who might not vote for him?
Lack of Conditionality
According to Yang, many legislators insisted the checks were paid with no conditions attached. For example, some said they were purely arrears (“补发岁费”) and not linked to any requirement to vote for Cao.
Legally, without proof of an agreement like “you vote for me, I pay you,” proving a criminal bribe is extremely difficult.
Evidence Comes Mostly from Check Receipts
Yang points out that the main documentary evidence is the collection of check stubs (receipts) found by prosecutors. While these show that payments were made, they do not conclusively prove why they were made.
Prosecutors found many stubs, but according to Yang, they lacked corroborating records (e.g., signed promissory notes or tested testimony) that explicitly tie the money to a vote deal.
Attendance and Counting Irregularities
Yang highlights conflicting reports about how many legislators were present for key sessions—some say 431, others report over 500 or fewer.
These inconsistencies make it difficult to precisely trace which legislators received checks and whether those receipts correlated to votes.
Opposing Faction Also Paid Delegates
Yang documents that anti‑Cao (“anti‑straight /反直”) forces themselves were reported to pay large sums (6,000–10,000 yuan) to persuade attendees or delegates.
This complicates the prosecution’s narrative: if multiple sides were paying, attributing a vote specifically to the 5,000-yuan check from Cao’s side becomes legally problematic.
Lack of Successful Prosecution
According to Yang, although there was a legal investigation (searching homes, checking for evidence), the courts never achieved convictions. No full trial concluded with “bribery” judgments.
The absence of prosecutions suggests that even contemporary legal actors doubted whether the evidence met the threshold for criminal liability.
Most points relevant to the understanding nature of payment constituting bribery or not, English translation followed by original Chinese paragraph
Legislator Wang Jiangang, who received a 5,000-yuan check, once stated: “Although I accepted the supplementary annual stipend of 5,000 yuan sent by the House of Representatives’ Secretariat, there were no attached conditions, nor did I ever write Cao Kun’s name on the ballot. I consider myself fairly clean and often clarified this to others.” Wang provided two important historical details: first, the funds he received were the “supplementary annual stipend sent by the House Secretariat,” and second, the payment “did not come with any conditions.” This should be a crucial clue for characterizing the 5,000-yuan check.Regarding the first point, anti-Zhili forces have always described it as a “vote price,” but Wang emphasized that he accepted it as a “supplementary annual stipend.” While this contains an element of self-justification, the fact of overdue payments was real. Under this context, it is reasonable for a legislator to interpret a check issued by the Zhili faction as a “supplementary annual stipend.” Chen Yuan, who was personally involved, reflected thirty years later and also noted that Cao Kun “used the guise of supplementing overdue salaries; anyone participating in the election would receive a 5,000-yuan check upon attending.” Since it was “supplementary to overdue salaries, one had no shame in accepting it,” the check was therefore accepted. Although official documents at the time did not formally use the term “supplementary annual stipend,” a confidential cable from Jiang Yanxing to Cao Kun indirectly reveals the compensatory nature of the payment. More importantly, whether there were attached conditions is central to judging the nature of the check. On this point, Wu Jingleian publicly stated that he could “attend without voting for Cao,” and Ye Xiasheng even called Kuomintang legislators urging them to “attend and vote for Sun.” For legislators who had previously “boycotted” but later attended the election, the Zhili faction also promised that “attendance is voluntary; the stipend is paid regardless,” confirming Wang’s claim that the check had no attached conditions.
领取了5000元支票的议员汪建刚曾表示，“虽然接受了众议院会议科所送补发的岁费五千元，但并未附带什么条件，也没有在选票上写过曹锟的名字，自认为比较干净，常常向人撇清”。(46)汪氏提供了两个重要的历史细节：一是他接受的款项系“众议院会议科所送补发的岁费”，二是付款“并未附带什么条件”。对于5000元支票的定性而言，这应该是非常重要的提示。关于前一点，反直人士一直将其说成是“票价”，但汪氏则强调他接受的是“补发的岁费”。这虽然带有自我辩解的成分，但欠薪是事实，在欠薪的前提下议员将直系所开支票理解成“补发的岁费”，应该说得过去。身与其事的陈垣30年后检讨既往，亦称曹锟系“利用补发欠薪的名义，凡参与选举者就在出席时交给你五千元支票一张”；既系“补发欠薪，受之何愧”，故接受了支票。(47)虽然当时官方文件中未见“补发岁费”的正式提法，但蒋雁行给曹锟的密电罗列的支款名目前间接透露了支款的补欠性质。(48)而有无附加条件对于判断支票性质更为重要。关于这一点，吴景濂曾发表可以“出席不选曹”的谈话；叶夏声则致电国民党议员，要求“出席选孙”；(49)对此前曾“拆台”后又出席大选的议员，直方亦有“投票自出，票价照付”的承诺，(50)足证汪氏开具支票无附加条件的说法。Issuing a check without attached conditions implies that there was no binding relationship between the payer and the voter. There is abundant evidence demonstrating the absence of such a relationship, some of which was even provided by anti-Zhili forces themselves. For example, Luo Jihan, a legislator from the political-academic faction who, in principle, would not have voted in favor of Cao Kun, clearly distinguished between money and voting. During discussions among various factions about whether to accept the check, he explicitly stated: “Since Cao has shown such generosity, we need not make a fuss.” He calculated that over a three-year term, legislators were entitled to a total of 15,600 yuan in annual stipends and travel expenses. After deducting the living allowances already received during the Protection of the Constitution period, even for just the Beijing meetings, “the amount owed to us by the government exceeded 5,000 yuan,” leading him to advocate accepting the check and voting according to his own judgment.
Additionally, some legislators (such as Chen Jiushuo) believed that Cao, being neither as cruel as Yuan or Duan nor as capable as them, could be elected president, which might benefit parliamentary oversight of the government and facilitate constitutional completion, bringing the nation onto a path of constitutional governance. Therefore, their votes in support of Cao Kun were not directly linked to accepting the check.
原文中文段落：
开具支票无附加条件意味着支款方与投票人无约束性关系。能证明两者无此关系的材料很多，有些还是反直人士自己提供的。例如属于反直营垒、按理不会投曹锟赞成票的政学系议员骆继汉就将钱票关系分得很清楚，在各政团商议是否领取支票时他明确表示：“曹氏既有这番盛意，我们也不必过分鸣高。”他算了一笔账：众议员任期三年，应得岁费与旅费共15600元，扣除护法时期已领之生活维持费，单是北京开会期间的旅费和岁费，“政府欠我们的数字也有五千元以上”，因而主张领取支票并按自己的想法投了票。此外，还有一部分议员(如陈九韶)，以为曹氏既无袁、段之凶，亦无袁、段之才，推为总统，或有利于国会对政府的监督，并借此完成制宪，将国家带入宪政轨道，故投票支持曹锟，其投票与接受支票并不发生直接联系。Procedurally, the Beijing Parliament also followed certain formalities. The records indicate that before the checks were issued, the direct faction of the Zhili clique had “smoothed relations with other parties” and “convened thirty-six political factions” to discuss the amount to be disbursed. After “two weeks of thorough negotiation,” the amount was set at 5,000 yuan, which was then issued in the form of checks by the Parliamentary Affairs Section. Although the detailed records of these negotiations are not available, common sense suggests that bribery—an act contrary to political ethics—would not be determined through negotiations, especially involving so-called “other parties” (where “other parties” may not necessarily be opposition parties, but presumably were not part of the same faction). Conversely, since the amount was decided through consultation among multiple parties, it is difficult to assert that only Cao Kun and his direct faction of the Zhili clique were “buying votes.” However, if one were to claim that all parties were jointly “buying votes,” it is not necessarily true that the other factions had any subjective intent to bribe.
原文中文段落：
在程序上，北京国会方面也有讲究。资料显示，支票发出前直方曾“疏通异党”，并“邀集三十六政团”讨论支款额度，(52)“经两旬期间之切实协商”，(53)确定为5000元，由国会会议科以支票形式签发。虽各方协商的具体材料未见其详，但揆诸常理，行贿这种有违政治道德的行为，是不会通过协商特别是与“异党”(所谓“异党”虽不一定是反对党，却应当不是“同党”)沟通方式决定的。反过来说，既系各方协商决定，就很难认定只是曹锟及其统领的直系一方在“贿选”，但如果认定系各方共同“贿选”，则其他方面又未必有行贿的主观动机。From the perspective of the principles for accepting evidence, although the claim that issuing checks to legislators was meant to solicit votes for Cao Kun aligns with the political reality of the time and seems reasonable, legal evidence must satisfy the principle of objectivity. At that period in China, there was no system akin to the Western concept of a judge or jury making determinations based on “free evaluation of evidence”; one could not judge a person’s motives merely through logical reasoning or moral conscience. When the “June 13th” coup occurred and Li Yuanhong’s departure was described as Cao Kun paving the way to resolve the “supreme issue,” some criticized this as a “judgment of intent.”Regarding the 5,000-yuan checks, the Zhili clique had a very clear purpose: to satisfy legislators’ demands for back pay in order to reach the legal quorum and allow the election to proceed, without necessarily concerning themselves with whom the legislators would vote for. Since the Zhili clique had defeated the Anhui and Feng factions and their power was at its peak, within the political culture of China at the time—where “the victor becomes king, the vanquished become outlaws”—the Zhili clique actually did not need to campaign; as long as the electoral assembly could be convened, the presidency was essentially Cao Kun’s by default.If one overlooks this context and hastily concludes that Cao Kun’s motive was to solicit votes—that is, to “buy votes”—this too borders on a “judgment of intent.” Although it may appear reasonable, it cannot be accepted as legal evidence.
原文中文段落：
从证据采信原则来看，尽管给议员开具支票是为曹锟拉选票的说法与当时的政治生态具有认识上的吻合性，甚谙情理，但法律证据需要符合客观性原则。中国斯时并无西方意义上由法官或陪审团“自由心证”的制度，不能仅凭逻辑推理或道德良知来判断人的行为动机。当“六·一三”政变发生，黎元洪出走被说成是曹锟为解决“最高问题”铺路时，曾有人批评这是“诛心之论”。(54)就5000元支票而言，直系的目的其实很明确，即以应付议员索要欠薪的办法求得法定开会人数，使选举得以进行，至于投谁的票，则可不在考虑之列。因为在直系战胜皖、奉，势力如日中天的当时，在中国“胜者为王败者为寇”的政治文化语境中，直系其实无须拉票，只要能开成选举会，总统就非曹莫属。(55)如果见不及此，率尔断定曹锟的动机就是拉票，就是“贿选”，恐怕也迹近“诛心”，虽合情理，却不能作为法律证据采信。
Implications of These Weaknesses
The weaknesses in the evidence regarding Cao Kun’s alleged vote-buying cast significant doubt on claims that Feng Yuxiang’s anti-Zhili clique actions were motivated purely by a moral opposition to electoral corruption. If the 5,000-yuan checks were largely a procedural measure to satisfy legislators’ back pay, as many firsthand accounts suggest, then Feng’s alignment with Sun Zhongshan and his planning to overthrow Cao Kun may have been influenced more by political calculation and external pressures than by a principled reaction to bribery. Moreover, Sun Zhongshan’s decisions to engage with Feng and to accept the involvement of Soviet advisors indicate that the narrative of moral rectitude against “Cao Kun’s corruption” might have been overemphasized to justify political maneuvering. This suggests that what has often been framed as an ethical crusade against electoral malfeasance may, in fact, reflect broader strategic interests and foreign influence, particularly from the Soviet Union, rather than a purely domestic legal or moral imperative.
How British Diplomats Observed the Secret Ties between Sun Yat-sen, Ma Boyuan, and Feng Yuxiang
British Observers on Sun Yat-sen’s Northern Expedition
In early 1922, Ma Boyuan, under Sun Yat-sen’s instructions, went to the Northwest Army to promote revolutionary propaganda and mobilize Feng Yuxiang for revolutionary purposes. On March 18, Ma arrived in Xi’an and, under the guise of missionary work, secretly met with Feng Yuxiang along with Zhang Yaxiong. On April 14, Ma and Zhang also met Hu Jingyi at Sanyuanli, where Ma asked, “What is Hu’s attitude towards Sun Yat-sen?” Hu replied in writing: “Though physically distant, our hearts are aligned; we are consistent from beginning to end.” These observations highlight the active coordination between Sun, Ma, and northern military figures in revolutionary planning. (中文原文: “一九二二年(民国十一年)初，马伯援受中山先生之命，到西北军作革命宣传工作，运动冯玉祥革命……胡提笔书写了八个字‘人远心近，始终一致’。”)
In October 1923, Ma met Sun Yat-sen at the Grand Marshal’s office in Guangzhou to report on Feng Yuxiang. Sun stated: “If Feng Yuxiang is truly revolutionary, he must join the Kuomintang.” Ma replied: “Joining the party can show his commitment, but if party membership obstructs the revolution, it is not necessary.” By April 1924, Feng organized the Nationalist Army and executed a Beijing coup, displacing the last Qing emperor, Puyi. Feng simultaneously requested Sun to travel north and sent Ma as his envoy to welcome Sun in Guangdong. These exchanges illustrate a direct line of communication between Sun and Feng mediated by Ma, evidencing coordination and mutual revolutionary intent. (中文原文: “一九二三年(民国十二年)十月二十五日，马在广州大元帅府，谒见中山先生……派马伯援（是冯的顾问）代表冯玉祥、胡景翼和国民军赴广东欢迎中山先生。”)
British consuls, however, viewed these events with suspicion and openly recorded their concerns. For example, they insisted that on the day Sun landed, “red-flag groups” were present and noted that Sun’s journey north was indeed propagating communist ideas. The consul even attempted to prevent local gatherings where Sun would speak, asserting that, on Chinese soil, the local leader could not address the people. Such reports reveal the British perception of a covert revolutionary network and portray Sun, Ma, and Feng as actively coordinating communist political-military efforts that alarmed foreign observers. (中文原文: “英国领事硬说当日欢迎孙总理登岸，有赤旗团体参加，并说孙总理北上，确系宣传共产等等。怂恿法领事禁止当晚集会。在中国领土内，不准中国的领袖向民众讲话，这是一件痛心的事。”)
Soviet directional work on Feng — the pivot
By mid-1924 the political calculus changed materially: Feng and his inner circle were actively planning a decisive move against the Zhili military leadership; contemporaneous reporting shows they resolved to “take advantage of the situation and act opportunely” and, if successful, to invite Sun north to assume leadership. At the same time, a Soviet representative in China began working on Feng in a step-by-step fashion, and that contact is the key causal pivot linking outside influence to domestic action. “与此同时，苏联政府驻华全权代表加拉罕也开始有步骤地做冯玉祥的工作。”
Sequence and opportunity — war, defeats, and the coup
When the Second Zhili–Fengtian War erupted in September 1924, Zhili forces repeatedly faltered on the Rehe front. Those battlefield setbacks created the very “opportunity” Feng’s group had discussed: with Zhili weakened and attention focused at the front, Feng was able to break ranks and return to Beijing. The October coup — occupying the capital, detaining Cao Kun, removing Wu Peifu from office, ejecting the Qing figurehead Puyi from the Forbidden City, and proclaiming the National Army — followed directly and very quickly. The chronological order is decisive: Soviet outreach → battlefield reverses for the Zhili clique → Feng seizes the political opening. That order makes a causal reading plausible, not fanciful.
Why this looks like deliberate external design
Taken together, the documentary seams form a pattern: (a) outside intelligence/observers flagged communist organizing and influence; (b) the Soviets renewed and systematized political work with a high-profile, opportunistic general; (c) military reverses provided the tactical window; (d) a rapid political seizure produced an outcome that advantaged Soviet strategic interests in northern China. The pattern is consistent with directed influence rather than mere coincidence — especially once one accepts the contemporaneous Soviet–Feng contact as more than incidental.
Implications — what this re-reading changes
If we treat the timeline and the diplomatic observations as trustworthy, several implications follow. First, long-running narratives that treat Feng’s coup as an almost entirely internal, spontaneous Chinese military event must be revised: external actors and their timing were integral. Second, British diplomatic observation — often dismissed as merely biased snapshots — should be re-weighed as valuable, accurate eyewitness corroboration. Third, historians who separate “domestic motive” from “foreign design” blur a crucial causal chain: influence operations plus battlefield dynamics can and did produce regime-level outcomes in 1924.
Conclusion (call to re-examine sources)
The combination of an accurate outside witness and contemporaneous evidence of Soviet engagement with Feng demands a more skeptical reading of sanitized, teleological narratives that treat the coup as purely domestic. Re-examining these primary records (British dispatches, the contemporaneous Chinese reporting of Soviet contacts, and the precise battlefield chronology) produces a much stronger case that the Beijing events of 1924 were the intended — or at least thoroughly exploited — result of coordinated outside influence.
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