中共国财政部、司法部联合印发的《关于政府采购支持监狱企业发展有关问题的通知》

 

中华人民共和国财政部、司法部《关于政府采购支持监狱企业发展有关问题的通知》(财库〔2014〕68号)The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice of the People's Republic of China issued the Notice on Government Procurement to Support the Development of Prison Enterprises (Cai Ku 〔2014〕 No. 68) /(Finance Exchequer〔2014〕No. 68)

党中央有关部门，国务院各部委、各直属机构，全国人大常 委会办公厅，全国政协办公厅，高法院，高检院，有关人民 团体，中央国家机关政府采购中心，中共中央直属机关采购 中心，全国人大机关采购中心，各省、自治区、直辖市、计 划单列市财政厅（局）、司法厅（局），新疆生产建设兵团 财务局、司法局、监狱管理局Relevant departments of the CPC Central Committee, ministries and commissions of the State Council, directly affiliated institutions, the General Office of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the General Office of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, relevant people's organizations, the Government Procurement Center of the Central State Organs, the Procurement Center of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Procurement Center of the National People's Congress, the Department of Finance (Bureaus) and the Department of Justice (Bureaus) of all provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government and cities with independent planning status, the Finance Bureau, the Justice Bureau and the Prison Administration Bureau of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps：

        政府采购支持监狱和戒毒企业（以下简称监狱企业）发 展对稳定监狱企业生产，提高财政资金使用效益，为罪犯和 戒毒人员提供长期可靠的劳动岗位，提高罪犯和戒毒人员的 教育改造质量，减少重新违法犯罪，确保监狱、戒毒场所安 全稳定，促进社会和谐稳定具有十分重要的意义。为进一步 贯彻落实国务院《关于解决监狱企业困难的实施方案的通 知》（国发[2003]7 号）文件精神，发挥政府采购支持监狱企业发展的作用，现就有关事项通知如下Government procurement to support the development of prison and drug rehabilitation enterprises (hereinafter referred to as prison enterprises) is of great significance to stabilizing the production of prison enterprises, improving the efficiency of the use of fiscal funds, providing long-term and reliable jobs for criminals and drug rehabilitation personnel, improving the quality of education and transformation of criminals and drug rehabilitation personnel, reducing recidivism, ensuring the safety and stability of prisons and drug rehabilitation facilities, and promoting social harmony and stability. In order to further implement the spirit of the State Council's "Notice on the Implementation Plan for Solving the Difficulties of Prison Enterprises" (Guofa [2003] No. 7) and give full play to the role of government procurement in supporting the development of prison enterprises, the following matters are hereby notified：

一、监狱企业是指由司法部认定的为罪犯、戒毒人员提供生产项目和劳动对象，且全部产权属于司法部监狱管理局、戒毒管理局、直属煤矿管理局，各省、自治区、直辖市监狱管理局、戒毒管理局，各地（设区的市）监狱、强制隔离戒毒所、戒毒康复所，以及新疆生产建设兵团监狱管理局、戒毒管理局的企业。监狱企业参加政府采购活动时，应当提供由省级以上监狱管理局、戒毒管理局（含新疆生产建设兵团）出具的属于监狱企业的证明文件。I. Prison enterprises refer to enterprises that are identified by the Ministry of Justice as providing production projects and labor objects for criminals and drug addicts, and whose entire property rights belong to the Prison Administration Bureau, Drug Rehabilitation Bureau, and Coal Mine Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice, the Prison Administration Bureau and Drug Rehabilitation Bureau of each province, autonomous region, and municipality directly under the Central Government, prisons, compulsory isolation drug rehabilitation centers, and drug rehabilitation centers of various regions (districted cities), and the Prison Administration Bureau and Drug Rehabilitation Bureau of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. When participating in government procurement activities, prison enterprises shall provide certification documents issued by the Prison Administration Bureau and Drug Rehabilitation Bureau at or above the provincial level (including the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps) that they are prison enterprises.

二、在政府采购活动中，监狱企业视同小型、微型企业，享受预留份额、评审中价格扣除等政府采购促进中小企业发展的政府采购政策。向监狱企业采购的金额，计入面向中小企业采购的统计数据。II. In government procurement activities, prison enterprises are treated as small and micro enterprises and enjoy government procurement policies that promote the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, such as reserved quotas and price deductions during evaluation. The amount purchased from prison enterprises is included in the statistical data of procurement from small and medium-sized enterprises.

三、各地区、各部门要积极通过预留采购份额支持监狱企业。有制服采购项目的部门，应加强对政府采购预算和计划编制工作的统筹，预留本部门制服采购项目预算总额的30%以上，专门面向监狱企业采购。省级以上政府部门组织的公务员考试、招生考试、等级考试、资格考试的试卷印刷项目原则上应当在符合有关资质的监狱企业范围内采购。各地在免费教科书政府采购工作中，应当根据符合教科书印制资质的监狱企业情况，提出由监狱企业印刷的比例要求。III. All regions and departments should actively support prison enterprises by reserving purchase quotas. Departments with uniform procurement projects should strengthen the overall planning of government procurement budgets and plan compilation, and reserve more than 30% of the total budget of their department's uniform procurement projects for procurement specifically for prison enterprises. In principle, the examination paper printing projects for civil service examinations, admissions examinations, grade examinations, and qualification examinations organized by government departments at or above the provincial level should be purchased from prison enterprises that meet the relevant qualifications. In the government procurement of free textbooks, local governments should propose the proportion requirements for printing by prison enterprises based on the situation of prison enterprises that meet the qualifications for textbook printing.

四、各地区可以结合本地区实际，对监狱企业生产的办公用品、家具用具、车辆维修和提供的保养服务、消防设备 等，提出预留份额等政府采购支持措施，加大对监狱企业产品的采购力度。IV. Each region may, based on its local conditions, propose government procurement support measures such as reserving a share for office supplies, furniture and appliances, vehicle repair and maintenance services, fire-fighting equipment, etc. produced by prison enterprises, and increase procurement efforts for prison enterprise products.

五、各地区、各部门要高度重视，加强组织管理和监督，做好政府采购支持监狱企业发展的相关工作。有关部门要加强监管，确保面向监狱企业采购的工作依法依规进行。各监狱企业要不断提高监狱企业产品的质量和服务水平，为做好监狱企业产品政府采购工作提供有力保障。V. All regions and departments should attach great importance to, strengthen organizational management and supervision, and do a good job in government procurement to support the development of prison enterprises. Relevant departments should strengthen supervision to ensure that procurement for prison enterprises is carried out in accordance with laws and regulations. All prison enterprises should continuously improve the quality and service level of prison enterprise products to provide strong guarantees for the government procurement of prison enterprise products.

中华人民共和国财政部Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China

中华人民共和国司法部Ministry of Justice of the People's Republic of China

2014 年 6 月 10 日10th June 2014

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中国科学院武汉病毒研究所2020年度部门决算报告2020 Annual Financial Report of Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences

 

中国科学院武汉病毒研究所于2024年3月1日发布的2020年度部门决算报告，原始链接（https://whiov.cas.cn/xxgk_160268/xxgk2023/202312/P020240301599632280960.pdf）的内容已经被删除。
为了帮助所有人了解新冠病毒的真相，调查武汉病毒研究所的财务报表真实性，现将其已经公开的部门决算报告在此重新发布。
2020 Annual Final Accounts Report of Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Science released by Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences on 1st March 2024 with the original link https://whiov.cas.cn/xxgk_160268/xxgk2023/202312/P020240301599632280960.pdf has been deleted by Wuhan Institute of Virology.
In order to help everyone understand the truth about COVID-19 and investigate the truthfulness of the financial statements of Wuhan Institute of Virology, the departmental final accounts report that has been made public is now republished here.
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北京军区联勤部和服务于中国共产党的核生化战争计划的中国人民解放军军事医学科学院发表的“病原微生物实验室实验操作产生气溶胶风险定量研究”论文

 

北京军区联勤部和服务于中国共产党的核生化战争计划的中国人民解放军军事医学科学院发表的“病原微生物实验室实验操作产生气溶胶风险定量研究”论文
The paper "Risk quantification of microbiological aerosol generated by experimental operations in pathogenic microbiology labs" published by the Joint Logistics Department of the Beijing Military Command and the Academy of Military Medical Sciences of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which serves the atomic or nuclear, biological and chemical(ABC) warfare plan of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP).
原始网站下载链接（存在原始网站被中共网信、网警下架、不再有附件的风险）Original website download link (there is a risk that the original website will be removed by the CCP's Internet Information Office and Internet Police and no longer have attachments) https://jsyx.magtechjournal.com/CN/Y2015/V39/I12/0


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Chinese Communist Party tried to cover up problems of quality, corruption and flaws in relation to T- 59 modified tanks (T-59G) resulting in casualties in target shooting test in Bangladesh


Li-Meng Yan and Lude Media revealed that Chinese Communist Party tried to cover up problems of quality, corruption and flaws in relation to T- 59 modified tanks (T-59G) resulting in casualties in target shooting test in Bangladesh.

 It is claimed by Dr Li-Meng YAN that they just obtained a top classified document of “Briefing on the serious accident of Bangladesh T-59G tank during target shooting in the army” from Central Military Commission of Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 

On 5 May 2024, The newly delivered T- 59 modified tanks (T-59G) to Bangladesh were tested in Chattogram for target shooting, resulting in casualties. The CCP and Bangladeshi militaries strictly blocked the news, involving the CCP's large-scale corruption of the military of the Belt and Road countries. Experts of People's Republic of China (PRC) are going to blame Pakistan-made ammunition for the accident, and cover-up the fatal flaws of Chinese T-59G tanks.

Here is the CCP's report translated by Dr Li-Meng Yan, with original contents in Chinese of Lude Media.

- On 5th May 2024, the expert team for Bangladesh T-59G tanks received a notice from the Bangladesh 902 workshop that during the tank shooting process, a personnel accident occurred in the Seventh Regiment of Bangladesh using the T-59G tanks delivered by us. The commander of one of the tanks, and a gunner suffered burns and one loader died.

- Our expert team immediately reported to the relevant departments. On May 6, after receiving a notice from Bangladesh, the expert team and CCP’s Central Military Commission representative office, together with personnel from the Bangladesh Armor Bureau, took the flight to go to the Chittagong accident site.
 On May 7, the Chinese on-site accident investigation team learned and reported the following situation:
1. The accident vehicle number is 260198. The vehicle is one of the fourth batch of vehicles recently delivered to Bangladesh (the fourth batch was delivered from March to April 2024, with a total of 30 tanks delivered to the foreign customer. - The vehicles were successively delivered to the troops for use in full compliance with the acceptance technical requirements.
- One of the users, the 7th Bangladesh Regiment, followed the original plan and immediately went to Chittagong for target practice after picking up four newly delivered tanks in early May).
- The vehicle fired a total of 60 rounds of ammunition before the accident.

1.1 Among them, 30 rounds of ammunition were fired during the tank acceptance (22 rounds armor-piercing, 7 rounds grenade, and 1 round high-explosive anti-tank. All ammunition types were supplied by us and passed the target shooting test).

1.2 The remaining 30 rounds were fired from May 1 to 4, all of which were armor-piercing rounds. The accidental ammunition was the 31st armor-piercing round fired this time and the fifth round fired that day.

- All ammunition for this shooting was produced by POF of Pakistan. Production date in 2022.

2. The accident occurred at around 2:40 pm on May 4, and operations such as loading ammunition before shooting were normal. The shooting uses the simple working mode and is fired manually.

- After firing, the gunpowder retreated normally, but about 152mm of the retrieval process was not completed, the gun bolt was not opened, and the cartridge case remained in the gun bore. The ammunition was fired forward and fell about 700-800 meters (it failed to reach the target range).

3. According to the description of the soldiers on site, in order to observe the ammunition loading position, Bangladesh side did not install an aluminum alloy protective plate on the right side. In addition, the initial pressure and final pressure of the gun were not checked before shooting.

4. After the shooting, the commander was burned, the gunner was burned, and the right chin of his face was shattered by the bolt body baffle flying out, and the bolt body baffle was deformed; the loader died and was burned, and the left half of his head was shattered by the baffle plate flying out.

- The source of the force that caused the bolt body baffle and gear plate to fly out and injure people cannot be determined at the scene and requires analysis by relevant domestic experts in China.

5. The on-site working group observed the inside of the vehicle body and found basically no traces of fire damage to the interior of the tank.

6. Some of the 125 armor-piercing bullets used by Bangladesh on the vehicle were seen at the scene (Bangladesh purchased them from Pakistan, which is cheaper).

- Except for a few cases of external water accumulation (it just rained on the morning of May 7), the ammunition is in a dry state. Desiccant, ammunition packaging, etc. are in good condition.

Bangladeshi attitude: The Bangladeshi side held an on-site meeting today, led by G1 （codename given by CCP), the first secretary of the Director of the Armor Bureau, CO and some officers of the 7th Regiment, the Chinese working group and our military agents were present.

- At the meeting, G1 stated that the inside of the tank should be a safe space isolated from the gun barrel. It is difficult to accept the casualties inside such a tank, and hoped that China would answer three questions:

1. The cause of the accident

2. Whether accident-related protective measures exist on the vehicle and why they are ineffective

3. Why the re-advancement was not completed.

- In addition, the Bangladeshi side did not complain about the Norinco Company during the entire investigation process. They just felt that the protective design of the Chinese T-59G vehicles was somewhat weak and could not effectively prevent personal injury in a vicious incident.
Technical team work on site in Bangladesh 
As soon as the accident occurred, Norinco’s First Department of Military Affairs reported it to the relevant departments of the company in a timely manner, and communicated with domestic factories in China, including 447, 803 and other departments, as soon as possible. 
- A Chinese working group was set up on site to conduct on-site investigation and recording. 
- The situation is as follows: 
1. The tank was checked internally and no fire was found. The tank's three defense systems are not activated and the inside of the tank is clean. 
2. Only photos can be seen of the injured personnel in the tanks. The fragments of the gear plate and bolt body that caused casualties were left at the scene and photographed. 
- The Bangladeshi operator violated target practice requirements and failed to install the right artillery protective plate.
3. The tank bolt body is stuck and cannot be opened at present, and the state of the steel bottom for ammunition firing cannot be seen. - (This fault phenomenon has happened when the Bangladesh side using the third batch of T-59G tanks provided by us in 2022 during daily target training in Chittagong in February this year. - During the tank shooting, 2 of the 6 tanks suffered from this type of failure. The bolt body became stuck after firing. 
- The faulty tank could not be rectified in the field. The Bangladeshi side deliberately sent the faulty tank to the 902 workshop and asked Chinese experts to help solve the problem. Even though the team used special tooling and other technical measures, it was impossible to open the bolt body and take out the bottom of the bomb. 
- Therefore, we sent a 447 artillery disassembly expert to work in Bangladesh in mid-April, preparing to complete the disassembly of the turret and artillery in late May 2024. 
- After the jamming failure occurred in March 2024, the Chinese expert team informed the 902 Factory that the cause of the failure was not the tank problem, but the jamming caused by the use of Pakistani ammunition, and there was a risk of future use. 
- The Chinese side reminded Bangladesh of the ammunition issue. 902 Factory also reported to the Armored Bureau via phone simultaneously).
4. The on-site Chinese working group, with the cooperation of Bangladeshi personnel, used on-site iron wire testing, and basically found that the stuck steel bottom had holes underneath, and the iron wire could easily pass through. The steel bottom of the Pakistan artillery used has been penetrated and holes have appeared. 
5. Ten sets of AP (armor-piercing ammunition) steel bases already used by the Bangladeshi side were sampled on site. The steel numbers were exactly the same and indistinguishable. 
- China has asked Bangladesh to seal some of the unused ammunition together with the first three items and send it to the 902 factory, waiting for further instructions from China.
After one day of research, the Chinese domestic opinions on the three issues raised by Bangladesh are as follows: 
1. Cause of the accident: 
- Domestic experts have initially judged that the damage caused by the accident must have come from the ammunition. 
- And due to the problem of the ammunition, it also caused serious ablation and further damage to the inside of the artillery. 
- The following method is planned:
1.1 Send the tank to the 902 Factory, and China and Bangladesh will jointly open the bolt. If the bolt cannot be opened, the gun must be disassembled and the stuck steel bottom must be removed. 
- Then, without ammunition, check whether the bolt opening action is normal to determine whether the performance of the gunpowder is normal. 
1.2 Observe the stuck steel bottom to determine the condition of the cartridge case, including cracks and deformation.
- (Based on the position of the jet airflow at the end of the run at the scene, it should be that there are cracks in the upper right and lower right sides of the steel bottom of the cartridge case.)
- To be specific, you need to open the bolt body and observe the condition of the steel bottom. 
1.3 The penetration of the steel bottom is a serious ammunition accident. 
- It is recommended that foreign parties immediately stop using this batch of ammunition.
2. Whether accident-related protective measures exist on the vehicle and why they are ineffective:
- For safety reasons, the tank factory specially designed the artillery hazard protection plate, including a latch plate on the left side and a latch cover on the right side. However, the design of the anti-hazard plate cannot fully protect against serious ammunition accidents. 
- The left protective plate has already played some role in protecting the commander and gunner in serious accidents. However, in order to observe the ammunition loading position, the loader removed the aluminum plate - bolt guard plate on the right side, which ultimately caused a vicious accident.
3. Why was the re-advancement not completed? 
- The problem of insufficient re-advancement. The mechanism action during artillery firing: 
- After the artillery enters the chamber and closes the latch, the primer is ignited. High pressure is generated in the chamber, and the high-temperature gas pushes the artillery forward. The recoil part moves backward, and when the recoil position is reached, the energy stored in the recuperator is used to push the recoil part forward. 
- During the re-advance movement, the breech block is opened by a semi-automatic machine, the cartridge is drawn out, and the barrel is drawn out to hang the bolt body. 
- According to the on-site measurement, the distance before re-advance is 152mm. After analysis, this position is the starting position of the latch, which is consistent with the normal working condition of the artillery. 
- At the scene, the breech block was not opened, the cartridge case was left in the chamber, and the re-advancement was not in place. It is related to the resistance encountered by the re-advance latch. The resistance comes from the compression of the latch body and the running tail by the cartridge case.
Report on the domestic processing situation in Norinco Company 
1. Norinco’s regional department, quality department, representative office, first department of military affairs, and related factories established an accident investigation team. 
2. The Chinese on-site working team has coordinated with the Bangladeshi side to seal up the tanks, ammunition and other materials involved in the accident as necessary and send them to the 902 factory.
3. Chinese experts will arrange on-site Chinese personnel or domestic personnel to conduct technical appraisals related to the accidental artillery. At the same time, they will prepare the procedures for technical personnel from relevant ammunition factories and steel bottom factories to go labroad, and provide certain technical support to Bangladesh when necessary. 
4. China recommends that Bangladesh suspend the use of this ammunition to prevent the next injury, and that Bangladesh should request the ammunition supplier POF to conduct on-site identification and processing of ammunition as soon as possible. - Before issuing written opinions to foreign personnel in China, it is recommended that the representative office inform Bangladesh of the cause of the accident and domestic measures as soon as possible.
• (From) PRC's State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, on 7 May 2024

This news is firstly reported by Dr Li-Meng Yan in English at X and by Lude Media in Chinese at YouTube and Rumble.

According to my professional experience in China as an financial auditor previously hired by PRC's government agencies and state-owned enterprises, some of which have now been designated as military-industrial entities by US Department of Defence, the above incident was highly likely true and really. When I audited a highway project, I discovered that some project sectors were subcontracted to companies not established at the date of construction work,and records of labour work were made using pencils providing flexibility of falsifying, while bidding comparison records or records of randomly selecting samples from products to be installed for quality testing were missing. Randomly selecting samples from products delivered or to be installed matters, as cheators like employees of CCP could produce fake quality reports by testing the few good quality products not selected from products delivered or to be installed. Pakistan's National Auditor has also discovered significant problems of projects completed by PRC's companies. It is not surprised at all that CCP often installed surveillance function in the hidden part of project to compromise national security of host countries. PRC's government often paid subsidies to companies and should surely expect that compensated parties provide consideration for the subsidies, then the consideration being likely the intelligence or data collected from consumers and users of host countries as materials for cloud computing or big data analysis performed by PRC's military force and police, or loyality from host countries' government officials. You should really think twice before considering hiring, using, procuring or paying your hard-earned money for products, labour work or machines of PRC's companies. 
It is further revealed by Lude Media at X in Chinese that the barrel material processing technology of CCP's Type 59 modified tank failed following Western sanctions, and it deformed after firing dozens of shells, causing air leakage to make shock waves that caused death. The Chinese Communist Party deceived the Bangladeshi military and shirked responsibility by saying that it was attributed to the use of cheap shells from Pakistan.
James shared the same thought in Chinese at X, translated as follows, 
    The tanks delivered by the Chinese Communist Party to Bangladesh had a serious accident. It sounded like the barrel exploded! And there was no protective plate installed. It could be a problem with the quality of the gunpowder, or it could be that explosives were put in the gunpowder! In short, I think the quality of the Chinese Communist Party’s weapons is not good.


Original report by Lude Media in Chinese at Rumble
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Le nouveau virus de type Ebola en provenance de la République populaire de Chine est-il une arme biologique ? Opinion de Li-Meng Yan

 


Le nouveau virus de type Ebola en provenance de la République populaire de Chine (RPC), tel que rapporté ici, est sans aucun doute un nouveau produit à gain de fonction du programme d'armes biologiques de l'Armée populaire de libération du Parti communiste chinois (PCC-PLA) ! Il DOIT faire l'objet d'une enquête. par la société internationale dans les plus brefs délais !

Le général XIA Xian-Zhu (夏咸柱) du Parti communiste chinois est le principal scientifique du nouveau projet de virus de type Ebola rapporté par . Bien que le général XIA utilise sa position dans les instituts de fusion militaro-civil pour publier des articles maintenant, il est le principal responsable des armes biologiques. expert en zoonoses et immunologie, au 11ème Institut (recherche vétéran) de l'Académie des Sciences Médicales Militaires (AMMS).

XIA est également académicien de l'Académie chinoise d'ingénierie (CAE), qui est le plus haut niveau d'académie de fusion militaro-civile en RPC, tandis qu'une autre est l'Académie chinoise des sciences (CAS). • Les preuves montrent que de nombreux universitaires du CAS et du CAS ont été profondément impliqués dans le développement du virus #COVID19 et dans la guerre de l'information qui y est associée (en particulier les faux récits d'origine naturelle et les données falsifiées).

Quelles autres nouvelles armes biologiques candidates ont été testées dans cette étude ? R : Outre le virus de type Ebola, les chercheurs du CCP-PLA ont également testé de nouveaux virus recombinants en utilisant les protéines GP du virus mortel Soudan et du virus Lassa dans cette étude. Bien que les taux de mortalité des deux autres nouveaux virus ne soient pas aussi « bons » que ceux du virus de type Ebola, cela ne signifie pas qu’ils cesseraient d’« améliorer » les autres virus pour en faire de nouvelles armes biologiques. • Conseils : Taux de létalité de ces virus de la fièvre hémorragique Virus Ebola : 25 à 90 % Virus du Soudan : 53 à 100 % Virus Lasso : 1 à 15 %

La protéine Ebola-GP appliquée dans le nouveau virus armé de la RPC a été étudiée à l'origine par des scientifiques dans le cadre d'un programme d'armes biologiques en Union soviétique dans les années 1990 ! • La protéine Ebola GP conçue dans le nouveau virus mortel de CCP-PLA est une protéine GP complète du virus Ebola (Genbank NO. AF086833.2). • Selon NIH GenBank, la protéine Ebola GP a été étudiée initialement et à plusieurs reprises par un groupe de scientifiques de l'institut des armes biologiques de l'URSS à Koltsovo, en Russie. • L'ancien directeur du projet d'armes biologiques de l'URSS, le Dr Kenneth Alibek, a confirmé que le laboratoire de vecteurs de Koltsovo est très dangereux, car il travaille sur des armes biologiques virales. • Q : POURQUOI les chercheurs du CCP-PLA se concentreraient-ils sur la même protéine Ebola GP ?

Étude du site de clivage de la furine et de la même protéine Ebola GP (Genbank NO. AF086833.2) • Voici quelques articles publiés dans les années 1990 par les chercheurs en armes biologiques de l'ancienne URSS du laboratoire Koltsovo Vector (V E Volchkov, V A Volchkova), liés au même Protéine Ebola-GP (NO. AF086833.2) dans le nouveau virus de type Ebola de la RPC. • Notamment, dans l'article intitulé « Traitement de la glycoprotéine du virus Ebola par la proprotéine convertase furine » en 1998, les chercheurs de l'ancienne URSS et leurs collègues allemands de l'époque se sont concentrés sur les fonctions du site de clivage de la furine (FCS) de cette protéine GP d'Ebola. • « (Ebola) GP est clivé par la proprotéine convertase furine. Ceci a été indiqué par l’observation selon laquelle le clivage ne s’est pas produit lorsque la GP était exprimée dans des cellules LoVo défectueuses en furine, mais qu’elle était restaurée dans ces cellules par la furine exprimée par un vecteur. • Par ailleurs, développer un vaccin est un prétexte courant pour la recherche sur les armes biologiques dans les régimes communistes. • Q : Est-ce une coïncidence si la même protéine Ebola GP est choisie par les experts en armes biologiques du CCP-PLA qui ont fabriqué le virus #COVID19 avec du FCS en laboratoire ?

La nouvelle est rapportée pour la première fois par Li-Meng Yan sur X.

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Opinion of Michael Pettis on China's comparative advantage argument






"China denied generating overcapacity and accuses the EU of protectionism. Xi Jinping reiterated that position in talks with Macron, saying there is no capacity issue viewed from the perspective of comparative advantage or global market demand."

Xi is right to argue that overcapacity in any particular industry can simply be an expression of comparative advantage. In a well-functioning global trade environment, countries will indeed "overproduce" those products in which they have a comparative production advantage in order to exchange them for products in which they have a comparative production disadvantage. That causes total global production to rise, and is the main benefit of international trade.

But, as argued in a twitter thread posted five days ago, there are two important points that must be part of the trade discussion. These two points are often conflated, even though they are very separate.

In response to a question on Chinese overcapacity at a press conference, the Foreign Ministry's Lin Jian responded: "The “China overcapacity” accusation may look like an economic discussion, but the truth is, the accusation is built on false logic and ignores more than 200 years of the basic concept of comparative advantage in Western economics. All countries produce and export products of their comparative advantage and this is the nature of international trade." "If a country," he continues, "should be accused of overcapacity and asked to cut capacity whenever it produces more than its domestic demand, then what would countries trade with?" He's partly right. Trade should be based on comparative advantage, which means that countries must indeed produce more than they need of goods in which they have a comparative production advantage in order to exchange them for goods in which they don't. But this argument misses two important points. The first, and most obvious, is that comparative advantage can only be expressed in the exchange of goods. It would matter much less to the world if China were using its export revenues to import from the rest of the world. But it's not. China's competitiveness (very different from comparative advantage) is based on transfers from the household sector that leave Chinese demand too weak to absorb Chinese production. The purpose of China's trade surplus is to shift this weak demand abroad. The second point is that natural or permanent comparative advantage is very rare. In reality countries implement trade and industrial policies in order to create comparative advantage. There's nothing wrong with that. Its the whole point of trade and industrial policies. But this also means that if a country implements trade and industrial policies that create comparative advantage in a strategically important industry, other countries can regain comparative advantage in that industry by implementing their own trade and industrial policies. Lin Jian is right to say that "all countries produce and export products of their comparative advantage and this is the nature of international trade," but this doesn't mean comparative advantage is consistent with running permanent surpluses to resolve weak domestic demand, nor does it mean that other countries cannot implement trade and industrial policies designed to regain comparative advantage in those same industries. Comparative advantage is constantly fought over. That's almost the definition of economic development.


First, comparative advantage is almost always driven by trade and industrial policies designed to help a country dominate strategically important industries. This means it is a dynamic process, and there is no reason why, once it has been achieved by one country, other countries may not also implement similar trade and industrial policies to regain comparative advantage if they too believe the industry is strategically important. That is the whole point of trade and industrial policy.

Second, comparative advantage is expressed in the exchange of goods, and not in their production. Exporting goods without importing isn't an expression of comparative advantage. It is just how countries export excess savings and externalize the costs of weak domestic demand.

Yesterday Ursula von der Leyen said "For trade to be fair, access to each other’s market also needs to be reciprocal." If there weren't the problem of excess savings, access to each other's market would indeed be part of any resolution of trade disputes.

But the overall problem for China's trade partners isn't lack of access. It is China's persistent excess savings, driven by distortions in domestic income distribution. This is what China's trade partners must absorb.

The information is firstly posted by Michael Pettis at X.

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Is The new Ebola-like virus from People's Republic of China a bio-weapon? Opinion of Li-Meng Yan






The new Ebola-like virus from People's Republic of China (PRC) as reported,here, is definitely a new gain-of-function product of Chinese Communist Party's People's Liberation Army (CCP-PLA)’s bioweapon program!It MUST be investigated by international society as soon as possible!

Bioweapon General XIA Xian-Zhu (夏咸柱) of Chinese Communist Party is the principle scientist in the new Ebola-like virus project reported by .• Though General XIA uses his position in military-civil fusion institutes to publish articles now, he is the leading expert on zoonosis diseases and immunology, in the 11th Institute (veteran research) of Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS).
XIA is also an academician of Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE), which is the highest level of military-civil fusion academy in PRC, while another one is Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). • Evidence shows that many academicians of CAS and CAS have deeply involved in #COVID19 virus development and the related information war (esp. fake nature-origin narrative and falsified data).




What else novel bioweapon candidates have been tested in this study? A: Besides Ebola-like virus, CCP-PLA researchers also tested new recombinant viruses using GP proteins from lethal Sudan virus and Lassa virus in this study. Though the death rates of the other two new viruses are not as “good” as the Ebola-like virus, it doesn’t mean they would stop “improving” the other viruses to be novel bioweapons. • Tips: Case fatality rates of these hemorrhagic fever viruses Ebola virus: 25-90% Sudan virus: 53-100% Lasso virus: 1-15%
Here.






The Ebola-GP protein applied in the new PRC weaponized virus was originally studied by scientists in bioweapon program in Soviet Union in 1990s! • The Ebola GP protein engineered in CCP-PLA’s new lethal virus is full-length GP from Ebola virus (Genbank NO. AF086833.2). • According to NIH GenBank, Ebola GP protein was initially and repeatedly studied by a group of scientists in the USSR bioweapon institute in Koltsovo, Russia. • Former Director of USSR bioweapon project, Dr. Kenneth Alibek has confirmed that the Koltsovo vector lab is very dangerous, working on virus-bioweapons. • Q: WHY would CCP-PLA researchers focus on the same Ebola GP protein?







Study of Furin Cleavage Site & the same Ebola GP protein (Genbank NO. AF086833.2) • Here are some papers published in 1990s, by the former USSR bioweapon researchers in Koltsovo Vector lab (V E Volchkov, V A Volchkova), related to the same Ebola-GP protein (NO. AF086833.2) in the new PRC's Ebola-like virus. • Notably, in the paper titled “ Processing of the Ebola virus glycoprotein by the proprotein convertase furin” in 1998, the former USSR researchers and their then-colleagues in Germany, focused on functions of Furin Cleavage Site (FCS) of that Ebola GP protein👇🏻 • “(Ebola) GP is cleaved by the proprotein convertase furin. This was indicated by the observation that cleavage did not occur when GP was expressed in furin-defective LoVo cells but that it was restored in these cells by vector-expressed furin.” • BTW, to develop vaccine is a common pretext of bioweapon research in communist regimes. • Q: Is it coincident that the same Ebola GP protein is chosen by CCP-PLA bioweapon experts who made #COVID19 virus with FCS in labs?
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Opinions du Dr Li-Meng YAN sur la manière d'enquêter plus en profondeur sur la vérité sur l'origine du COVID-19


Le comité spécial du Parti communiste chinois de la Chambre des représentants américaine a commencé à prêter attention à la source du nouveau coronavirus. Auparavant, c’était principalement la sous-commission spéciale sur la pandémie de coronavirus qui s’occupait de la question.
"Notre incapacité à connaître la source du virus est, pour moi, le plus grand échec du renseignement depuis le 11 septembre", a déclaré Jason Kelly, président du Conseil national de sécurité sur les biotechnologies émergentes, à propos de la source du coronavirus.

Voici les opinions de Li-Meng Yan sur la manière d’enquêter plus en profondeur sur la vérité sur l’origine du COVID-19 et d’éviter un tel échec des services de renseignement à l’avenir.

Cependant, 1) DEFUSE a été rejeté par la DARPA. 2) Le site de clivage de la furine (FCS) n'est pas la seule fonction acquise dans le SRAS2 après une modification en laboratoire.3) Le but du développement du SRAS2 n'est PAS le développement d'un vaccin compte tenu des fonctions multi-origines en laboratoire ciblant l'humain dans le SRAS2.

Désormais, les Américains connaissent les liens cachés entre l'Institut de virologie de Wuhan, DEFUSE et des scientifiques américains comme Baric et Daszak. En fait, Dr Li-Meng YAN est le premier virologue à parler des liens et de la corruption entre ces scientifiques américains et les scientifiques du PCC comme Linfa Wang et Zhengli Shi.

En bref, ni ce que Li-Meng YAN a révélé dans les trois rapports Yan sur l'origine du COVID-19, ni les preuves que Li-Meng YAN a montrées d'une autre manière n'ont contredit les documents actuellement connus comme DEFUSE.

Il semble que la plupart des scientifiques ayant des opinions sur l'origine du COVID-19 en laboratoire, ignorant l'importance des CoV ZC45 et ZXC21 des chauves-souris de Zhoushan, soient tombés dans un autre piège de faux récits et de fausses données fabriqués par le Parti Communiste Chinois (PCC). Les faux récits et les fausses données créés par le PCC incluent les ancêtres falsifiés. RaTG13, les virus de type SRAS du pangolin, les virus de chauve-souris du Laos, du Cambodge ou d'autres régions d'Asie du Sud-Est sont des ancêtres falsifiés, comme le prouve le 2e rapport Yan.

Par conséquent, ils doivent continuellement discuter avec les scientifiques zoonotiques sur la base de ces mauvais virus qui n'existent PAS dans la nature, mais oublier les preuves fumantes de ZC45/ZXC21, comme l'explique Li-Meng YAN dans le premier rapport Yan. La stratégie nationale dominante de l'Armée populaire de libération et du PCC Xi en matière d'armes biologiques sans restriction serait dissimulée si le récit du RaTG13 était suivi.

À partir de RaTG13, tous les ancêtres falsifiés sont publiés après révélation de Li-Meng YAN sur le véritable backbone ZC45/ZXC21 le 19 janvier 2020. Li-Meng YAN l'a décrit aux pages 3-4 du 3ème rapport Yan.

Les coronavirus de chauve-souris ZC45 et ZXC21 ont été découverts dans la région de Zhoushan, dans la province du Zhejiang (est de la Chine), par le scientifique militaire Chang-Jun Wang du commandement de Nanjing avec d'autres. Wang a été promu colonel supérieur en 2020.

Après que les ZC45/ZXC21 aient été sauvés avec succès en laboratoire, ils ont été modifiés pour de multiples fonctions améliorées par différentes équipes, notamment des équipes de l'Armée populaire de libération chinoise et de Zhengli Shi.

C’est comme le constructeur automobile, qui peut disposer de nombreux ateliers de pièces et d’assemblage. L'Institut de virologie de Wuhan (WIV) est un « atelier ». Et d'autres équipes sont impliquées, telles que l'Académie des sciences médicales militaires et le laboratoire de l'OMS à HKU où travaillait Li-Meng YAN, ainsi que des laboratoires basés à l'étranger. Puisqu’il s’agit d’un projet confidentiel, il n’existe aucune trace publique à ce sujet dans WIV ou dans les laboratoires associés.

Pendant des décennies, le PCC a implanté des agents universitaires dans le domaine des maladies infectieuses pour obtenir/voler les technologies avancées des États-Unis et d'autres pays, et les encourager à « tenir la voix » dans ce domaine.

Pour obtenir de l'argent du gouvernement de l'Institut National de la Santé ou du Département de la Défense des États-Unis. Mais ce n'est pas une question d'argent (le PCC a investi beaucoup plus d'argent dans cette stratégie nationale), mais d'impacts et de réseau internationaux.

Par exemple, Linfa Wang est un agent du PCC, et Baric et Daszak sont des idiots utiles. (Il est possible que le PCC ait également implanté des agents académiques dans le domaine des maladies infectieuses pour obtenir/voler les technologies avancées de France).Pour en savoir plus sur l'actualité de la Chine en français, veuillez suivre le CPA Jim @CPAJim2021 sur X.


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 Jeff Nyquist a interviewé Lude Media le 23 février 2024 au sujet du programme d'expansion mondiale du Parti communiste chinois.

Lude Media a des sources au sein du PCC et de l’Armée populaire de libération.

Lude a déclaré qu'un programme du PCC appelé « Opération Dang Gui » [où Dang Gui signifie « devrait revenir »] comporte deux parties. Il y a l’opération « Small Dang Gui » et l’opération « Big Dang Gui ». Ce plan comporte plusieurs aspects. Ils vont encercler Taiwan sans l’attaquer. Et ils vont faire pression sur Taiwan, de l’extérieur. Ensuite, ils vont provoquer un conflit. L’objectif est de placer l’armée taïwanaise sous le contrôle du Parti communiste chinois. Le PCC va utiliser ses agents au sein du KMT [Parti nationaliste] tout en infiltrant et en utilisant les groupes religieux taïwanais locaux, le plan Mazu.

Le Parti démocrate progressiste est principalement basé sur des autochtones taïwanais. Le parti KMT représente en grande partie les nationalistes chinois installés à Taiwan. La partie Big Dang Gui du plan concerne la manipulation du peuple taïwanais et du Parti démocrate progressiste. Le Small Dang Gui est le plan visant à manipuler le parti KMT.

C'était prévu depuis longtemps. Le PCC a infiltré les temples et les communautés religieuses. Si le PCC veut influencer ces personnes lors d’une élection ou d’une opération militaire, il doit convaincre les dirigeants locaux d’agir conformément aux objectifs du PCC.

Dans la stratégie d’infiltration musulmane, le plus haut dirigeant de la mosquée est généralement la cible du recrutement du KGB soviétique. Lude a mentionné que Mazu est également une religion dans la province du Fujian, la province de Chine continentale la plus proche de Taiwan. Ce qu’ils veulent dire aux Taïwanais locaux, c’est qu’ils croient tous en Mazu – les Chinois du continent et les Taïwanais –, de sorte qu’ils font partie de la même culture, de la même racine, des mêmes ancêtres ; les Taïwanais ne devraient donc pas croire les Américains qui sont chrétiens et catholiques. L’un des principaux objectifs est d’amener la population taïwanaise locale à se méfier des Américains tout en faisant confiance à la République populaire de Chine.

Le Parti communiste chinois est en théorie capable de prendre le contrôle des systèmes militaires, policiers et de renseignement de Taiwan. Contrôler ces institutions n’est pas la même chose que prendre Taiwan par la force. Une telle prise de contrôle rend difficile l’intervention de forces occidentales.

Des tirs de missiles ont lieu au Moyen-Orient, des troubles éclatent en Extrême-Orient et de violents combats se déroulent également en Ukraine. Alors que tant d’endroits sont en feu en même temps, du point de vue de l’improvisation et du point de vue logistique, l’Occident n’a probablement pas la marge de manœuvre nécessaire pour donner la priorité à Taiwan.

En termes de diplomatie, la Chine a travaillé sur les moyens de tirer parti de cette situation ;

  par exemple, le PCC pourrait offrir son aide pour contenir la Corée du Nord si Washington détournait le regard face à l’intégration soudaine de Taiwan dans la République populaire.

Le PCC pourrait également proposer de freiner l’avancée de la Russie vers l’ouest de l’Europe. Ce plan de Taiwan a une date d’expiration, soit novembre 2024. De sérieuses manifestations pourraient avoir lieu à Taiwan si le plan se concrétise et si des élections ont lieu aux États-Unis – en novembre. En outre, l’isolationnisme grandit aux États-Unis. La Chine peut profiter de cette situation.

D’un point de vue global, Taiwan ne représente qu’une position parmi d’autres et fait partie d’une situation stratégique bien plus vaste. L’Asie-Pacifique est très vaste et s’étend du Japon au nord jusqu’au sud de l’Asie. Et le but de menacer Taïwan, du point de vue du PCC, est soit de prendre Taïwan, soit de créer une situation propice au naufrage des porte-avions américains. Le PCC aimerait notamment traquer les porte-avions américains. L’objectif stratégique le plus important du PCC n’est pas tant de prendre Taiwan, mais de progresser contre les États-Unis.

L’une des stratégies du PCC consiste à créer un piège pour les porte-avions américains.

L’Armée/Marine populaire de libération chinoise tend un piège dans la mer Jaune et la mer de Chine orientale. Ils ont posé des pièges sous-marins pour les navires et les sous-marins qui peuvent s'accrocher à l'hélice, afin que ces navires ne puissent pas quitter la zone. Ils veulent attirer des porte-avions dans ces régions et ils souhaitent également utiliser leurs propres sous-marins.

il y aura un piège dans la mer Jaune et la mer de Chine orientale ; par conséquent, l’avertissement est que les transporteurs doivent être prudents lorsqu’ils opèrent dans ces zones ; par conséquent, des provocations militaires pourraient survenir et forcer les États-Unis à pénétrer également dans d’autres domaines.

Cela correspond au plan contre Taiwan dont nous avons parlé. Ces petites îles japonaises sont situées au nord-est de Taiwan, et la base américaine d’Okinawa pourrait être impliquée. Tout ce qui arrive à ces positions insulaires ou menace la base américaine d’Okinawa pourrait entraîner le déploiement de porte-avions américains et pourrait être utilisé pour tendre le piège.

Attirer les porte-avions américains n’est pas qu’un piège. Une guerre plus vaste est en perspective. Il est désormais très clair pour le monde que la Chine, la Russie, l’Iran et la Corée du Nord sont des alliés. C'est l'Axe du Mal. Cela devrait être clair pour le monde occidental. Les dirigeants du PCC pensent qu’une guerre avec le monde occidental est inévitable. Par conséquent, tout est question de préparation à la Grande Guerre. Selon la réunion militaro-civile enregistrée dans le Guangdong en mai 2022, tout est en train d’être préparé pour une victoire stratégique sur les États-Unis.

Lorsque Biden est devenu président, les hauts dirigeants du PCC considéraient Joe Biden comme l’un de leurs atouts. ce qu’ils constatent actuellement – dans les domaines financier et militaire – c’est que Biden s’oppose au Parti communiste chinois, ce qui est une grande surprise pour eux. ils sont très surpris des dernières mesures prises par Washington. Les dirigeants du PCC ont envoyé des milliers de soldats attaquer les forces américaines pendant la guerre de Corée en 1950, et ces troupes sont mortes de froid. Ce qu’ils ont montré à l’Occident, c’est qu’ils étaient prêts à sacrifier des vies pour dissuader les Américains de poursuivre leurs opérations militaires dans cette direction. Si vous pensez à la guerre Hamas-Israël, vous devez vous demander quelle était la motivation pour déclencher cette guerre ? C'est ce qu'on appelle le terrorisme. Lénine a dit que le terrorisme était nécessaire pour arriver à quelque chose. Le terrorisme est l'un des concepts clés du PCC.

Le calendrier de l'opération des dirigeants chinois pour prendre Taiwan dépend de la guerre en Ukraine, de la situation avec la Pologne et de la Corée du Nord. En Corée du Nord, ils pourraient tenter une expérience nucléaire comme levier diplomatique.

La Russie va y exercer davantage de pression pour forcer l’OTAN à intervenir. Ils veulent également aggraver la situation au Moyen-Orient avec l’Iran, de sorte que nous devrons y consacrer des ressources.

Ensuite, il y a les progrès de la subversion de Taiwan. Ils pourraient provoquer le chaos à Taiwan. Ils pourraient également provoquer le chaos aux États-Unis à l’approche des élections de novembre.

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The importance of removing Great Firewall

 COVID-19 resulting from military-civil fusion for bio-warfare program of Chinese Communist Party(CCP), as well as China's blocking American websites, is not given enough attention. CCP is still not proscribed as a terrorist group.

CCP's several sentences, shared by Twitter user @liangxinfan_DB on Twitter,  against many Chinese who are prosecuted just for circumventing the Great Firewall (GFW) to access Twitter, X, YouTube, Facebook,etc., or sharing method of circumventing it, have been translated by @CPAJim2021. Many Chinese left China for other countries just because they could access Twitter or Google directly abroad to express opinions freely without circumventing GFW, without worries of being arrested or disappeared, without worries of organs being harvested forcedly.

Because of GFW issue and CCP's surveillance, real information and opinions from China cannot come out or have great difficulty in being posted, while propaganda of CCP could be shared easily on platforms of Twitter, TikTok, WeChat, YouTube, etc. Previously attempting to shut down WeChat failed as many people in America have been using it. So a more perfect solution is to remove Great Firewall and declare Chinese Communist Party to be a terrorist group and let glory of freedom enter China.
Many Chinese listen to radio of British Broadcasting Corporation online to improve English listening, hear original voices of foreign politicians including Trump, and to get information in English. BBC has been blocked since August 2018. No one acts to alter the situation.
Internet censorship has also been used by CCP to suppress freedom of belief and block Chinese belief in LORD God after population of Christians in China reportedly surpassed 100 million, which is larger than population of members of CCP.



The access of Bibles written in foreign languages and printed Bibles is also restricted strictly in China. Only the Bibles of Chinese version approved by CCP could be read in China without consequences of punishment.



Removing China's GFW, likely comparable to removing Berlin Wall of Germany, is more likely to be a game changer than just banning TikTok or WeChat in winning cyber warfare or cognitive warfare.





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Who is HING WONG


                                                       HING WONG(黄庆)

 HING WONG, born in 1962, American nationality.

From 1983 to 1989, he received a bachelor's degree in physics, a master's degree in engineering science, and a doctorate in engineering science from the University of California, Berkeley.
From January 1990 to June 1997, he served as a technical development engineer at International Business Machines Corporation;
From July 1997 to December 1997, he worked at Chromatic Research Inc. as a senior engineer;
From December 1997 to May 2003, he worked at Silicon Access Networks as deputy general manager of commercial affairs in the Asia-Pacific region;
From January 2004 to December 2004, he worked at Silicon Federation as a senior consultant;
From May 2005 to present, he works at Walden Investment Consulting (Beijing) Co., Ltd(华登投资咨询（北京）有限公司) as the Managing Director;
From September 2012 to present, he serves as a director of 3PEAK INCORPORATED.
According to 2022 annual report of 3PEAK INCORPORATED, he had been serving in multiple other semiconductor companies as a director or an executive in China, as well as in USA and in Taiwan, which may constitute conflict of interest. Specifically as follows: Director & CEO at Hua Xin (Shanghai) Venture Capital Management Corporation (华芯（上海）创业投资管理有限公司) from March 2011; Director & CEO at Huaxin Yuanchuang (Qingdao) Capital Management Co., Ltd.(华芯原创（青岛）投资管理有限公司) from September 2016; Executive Director & CEO at Hefei Huaxin Tahao Integrated Circuit Technology Co., Ltd.(合肥华芯太浩集成电路科技有限公司) in China from June 2017; Executive Director at Hefei Huadeng Technology Investment Management Co., Ltd.(合肥华登科技投资管理有限公司) from March 2017; Director at GalaxyCore Inc(格科微有限公司) in China from September 2006; Director at Calterah Semiconductor Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.(加特兰微电子科技（上海）有限公司) in China since March 2016; EMINENT ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY CORP. LTD. (台湾义明科技股份有限公司) in Taiwan as Director since March 2016; Director at PerceptIn in China since May 2016; Director at Yuexin Technology Co., Ltd.(合肥悦芯半导体科技有限公司) in China since May 2018; Director at Innophase Inc. since December; as Director at BOLB Inc. since January 2017; as Director at FORMOSA MEASUREMENT TECHNOLOGY INC. LTD.  (沛喆科技股份有限公司) in Taiwan since March 2016; as Director at Kangzhi Integrated Circuit (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.(慷智集成电路（上海）有限公司) in China since October 2017;  as Director at Nanjing Modi Multidimensional Digital Science And Technology Co ltd (南京魔迪多维数码科技有限公司) in China since June 2017;  as Director at Guangdong Dapu Telecom Technology Co., Ltd.(广东大普通信技术股份有限公司) in China since December 2018; as Director at AIC Semiconductor (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.(爱科微半导体（上海）有限公司) in China since April 2019; as Director at Posifa Technologies Shenzhen Limited.(博思发科技（深圳）有限公司) in China since January 2019; as Director at Nanjing SemiDrive Technology Ltd. (南京芯驰半导体科技有限公司) in China since September 2018; as Director at Circuit Fabology Microelectronics Equipment Co., Ltd.(合肥芯碁微电子装备股份有限公司) in China since October 2019;as Supervisor at BWI (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.(京西重工（上海）有限公司) in China since November 2019;  as Executive Director & Manager at Qingdao Anchor Technology Investment Development Co., Ltd.(青岛锚点科技投资发展有限公司) in China since May 2020;as Director at QST Corporation Ltd.(上海矽睿科技股份有限公司) in China since September 2020; as Director at Guangzhou Anyka Microelectronics Co., Ltd.(广州安凯微电子股份有限公司) in China since September 2020; Chair at Qingdao Huaxin Zhicun Semiconductor Technology Co., Ltd.(青岛华芯智存半导体科技有限公司) in China since January 2021; Director at Shenzhen FTR Technologies CO., LTD.(深圳飞特尔科技有限公司) in China since February 2021; Director at Shanghai Xinyi Semiconductor Technology Co., Ltd.(上海芯漪半导体科技有限公司) in China since January 2021; Chair & Manager at Huashi Zhijia (Hangzhou) Automotive Electronics Co., Ltd.(华世智驾（杭州）汽车电子有限公司) in China since October 2021; Chair at Huashi XinPan Intelligent Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.(华世新磐智能科技（上海）有限公司) in China since October 2021; Director at Mems Drive,Inc since September 2016; Director at Shenyang Heyan Technology Co., Ltd (沈阳和研科技股份有限公司) in China since April 2022; Director at Yinglefei Semiconductor (Nanjing) Co., Ltd.(英乐飞半导体（南京）有限公司) in China since July 2022.

According to the prospectus of GalaxyCore Inc. signed by HING WONG, the primary place of business operation of GalaxyCore Inc. is in China, though it was incorporated in One Nexus Way, Camana Bay, Grand Cayman, KY1-9005, Cayman Islands. From 2018 to 2020, more than 74% of revenue of GalaxyCore Inc. arose from China and Hong Kong. GalaxyCore Inc. had ownership right of property for industry in No. 118, Taisheng Avenue, Huimin Street, Jiashan County, Zhejiang, China, and right of use over properties in Shanghai, Beijing, Zhejiang, Xi'an, Hong Kong and Shenzhen of China. The main business is the research and development, design and sales of CMOS image sensors and display driver chips. It mainly provides CMOS image sensors from QVGA (80,000 pixels) to 32 million pixels, LCDs with resolutions from QQVGA to FHD, and TDDI display driver chips for HD and FHD. On 31st August 2022, the BSI production line of the "12-inch CIS integrated circuit characteristic process research and development and industrialization project" was successfully put into production, and the first wafer engineering batch achieved a yield of more than 95%.

Shenyang Heyan Technology Co., Ltd. mainly produces HG series wafer grinding machines, 6-12-inch DS series precision dicing machines, JS series fully automatic cutting and sorting all-in-one machines, etc. which are mainly used in integrated circuits, optoelectronic devices, discrete devices, sensors, LED, optics, refrigeration, optical communications, medical and other industries. Partners include BYD, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Alibaba, Huawei, Tencent, Shandong Jingdao Microelectronics Co., Ltd. and many other well-known companies. Shenyang Heyan Technology Co., Ltd. planed to build a semiconductor precision equipment production base project covering an area of 95 acres on 30th December 2022. After the project reached production, it was expected to achieve an output value of CNY500 million in the first year and CNY1 billion in three years.

Shenzhen FTR Technologies CO., LTD. was founded in 2015 by a number of returned Ph.D.s from overseas. It is mainly engaged in the R&D, production and sales of low-temperature ceramic co-fired (LTCC) filters. The team members include a number of Taiwanese senior LTCC craftsmen. The company's research and development focuses on 4G+/5G LTCC filters, Netcom filters and LTCC antennas, mainly for mobile terminals and base stations.


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